

# **Varieties of Political Regimes (Va-PoReg)**



## **Country Reports D-I**

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## Overview

The following country reports are part of the Va-PoReg supplementary materials. They provide detailed documentation of political regimes and regime change events from 1900 to the present. For the conceptual foundations and coding rules, please consult the codebook. The countries and territories covered by the dataset are listed in alphabetical order. In each case, the political regime in the respective territory from 1900 to the most recent cut-off date (currently 07/01/2024, with all dates following the format MM/DD/YYYY) is documented.

Each report begins with an entry for 01/01/1900, specifying the regime type in place and the date at which this regime began [in square brackets]. Subsequent entries record regime change events by indicating the end of one regime and the beginning of another. Reports conclude with a note on which regime continued at the last cut-off date, specifically 07/01/2024. Please note that regime periods beginning after 07/01 of a given year and ending before 07/01 of the following year are included in the country reports but not in the country-year dataset. If a regime type is mentioned in brackets after a protectorate, this refers to the dominant power. If a regime type is mentioned in brackets after a colony, this refers to the colonial power. If a regime type is mentioned in brackets after an occupation regime, this refers to the occupying power. All three terms are subsumed under the overarching category of dominant political authority.

## Note on Syntax for Colonial Regimes

For colonial regimes we use the format [*of France*], [*of United Kingdom*], [*of Germany*]. The choice of *of* is deliberate. Colonialism was typically justified and institutionalized by the claim of formal belonging to the colonizing power. In many cases, colonies were declared to be inseparable parts of the empire (e.g., *Algérie française*, *British India*). By using *of*, we reflect this legal-political fiction of incorporation that distinguished colonial rule from other forms of domination.

This differs from the category *part of other country*. While both formulations may suggest belonging, their conceptual bases diverge:

- *Part of other country* denotes actual political-administrative incorporation into another sovereign state. It is a factual status of integration.
- *Colonial regime [of ...]* refers to domination justified by the **claim of belonging**, even if the colonized territory was not in practice treated as fully integrated. Colonial rule often rested on this paradox: the colony was proclaimed a part of the empire, yet denied equality, representation, and rights.

By retaining *of* for colonial regimes, Va-PoReg emphasizes the colonial powers' own logic of legitimation, which was fundamentally different from the de facto integration of territories coded under *part of other country*.

### Acronyms for datasets used in the following regime narratives:

AF	Anckar and Fredriksson (2020, Political Regimes of the World Dataset, v.2.0) Regimes of the World Dataset, v.2.0
BMR	Boix, Miller, and Rosato
BR	Bjørnskov and Rode (2019)
CEI	Clean Elections Index (V-Dem)
CGV	Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland
EF&FI	Elections Free and Fair Index (V-Dem)
FH	Freedom House
GWF	Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2018)
LIED	Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy, dataset v6.4 (2022)
MCM	Magaloni, Chu, and Min (2013, Autocracies of the world)
PCLI	Political and Civil Liberties Index (V-Dem)
REIGN	Rulers, Elections and Irregular Governance Dataset
RoW	Regimes of the World
V-Dem	Varieties of Democracy

### Other abbreviations

EU	European Union
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
USA	United States of America

### Denmark

01/01/1900 Constitutional Monarchy [Start: 06/05/1849]: The King granted limited voting rights in 1834 but only to property owners and with limited power. When King Frederick VII

succeeded to the throne in January 1848, he was met by demands for a constitution and end to absolutism. Following these demands, first proper voting rights came in 06/05/1849, as the June Constitution of 1848 was signed by Frederick VII, to "men over 30 of good reputation".<sup>1</sup> But in the subsequent years the rules were changed a number of times, and it was not until the change of the constitution in 1915 that all men and women living within the kingdom had influence on all chambers.<sup>2</sup> Based on our observations, only multiparty legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints during this time. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive.

07/24/1901 End Constitutional Monarchy/Start (Monarchical) (Male) Defective Democracy: Denmark effectively started operating as a parliamentary democracy with the cabinet Deutzer. In Danish, the establishment of the new cabinet is denoted as a shift of government (systemsiftet).<sup>3</sup> Except for the Easter Crisis of 1920, no Danish government since this event has been established against the vote of a majority of the members of parliament.<sup>4</sup> Women gained the right to vote in 1915. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. During this time the country held competitive, clean and free and fair elections (LIED, V-Dem CEI and V-Dem EF&FI). Besides, political liberties were present until 1913 (LIED). V-Dem's PCLI scores full political liberties since 1901. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also comprehensive.

05/07/1915 End (Monarchical) (Male) Defective Democracy/Start (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy: On this date women could vote for the first time in parliamentary elections.<sup>5</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED, V-Dem's CEI and V-Dem's EF&FI maintained their scores. The constitution of 1849, which remained in effect with some amendments during that era, enshrined a range of civil and political liberties (Faerkel 1982).

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<sup>1</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal\\_suffrage#cite\\_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37)

<sup>2</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal\\_suffrage#cite\\_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37)

<sup>3</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deutzer\\_Cabinet](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deutzer_Cabinet); [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monarchy\\_of\\_Denmark](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monarchy_of_Denmark)

<sup>4</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deutzer\\_Cabinet](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deutzer_Cabinet)

<sup>5</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women\\_in\\_Denmark](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women_in_Denmark);

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1915\\_Danish\\_Folketing\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1915_Danish_Folketing_election)

According to LIED political liberties were achieved from 1919 to 1932 and V-Dem's PCLI also indicates full political liberties. In this regime period several parties alternated in forming one-party governments, but they had a strong tendency to be terminated prematurely due to economic and fiscal problems. In 1929 the government stabilized as Thorvald Stauning led coalitions with differing partners. Stauning served as prime minister for six consecutive legislatures until 1942.<sup>6</sup> Denmark implemented significant social and labor-market reforms, laying the foundation for the contemporary welfare state.<sup>7</sup> According to Polity5, during this period, the executive was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive. In this period Denmark maintained effective constraints on the executive, comprehensive protection of civil and political rights, and a cooperative multiparty environment. Political competition remained within the bounds of constitutional legality, and social conflict was mediated through institutional channels such as collective bargaining and party negotiation rather than violence. The extension of suffrage in 1915 thus marked not only formal inclusiveness but also the consolidation of a liberal democratic regime capable of integrating social reform without authoritarian reaction.

04/09/1940 End (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy/Start Indirect Rule Occupation Regime [by Germany, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]: On this date Operation Weserübung was conducted, which led to the occupation of Denmark by Germany. Following this, the Danish government and king continued to operate in a de facto protectorate until 08/29/1943, when Germany took direct military control over Denmark. Based on our observations, only multiparty legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Besides, during the occupation, LIED considers political liberties as absent and V-Dem's PCLI as somewhat present. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also comprehensive.

08/29/1943 End Indirect Rule Occupation Regime [by Germany, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Germany, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]: No legislative elections took place during this period (LIED). There was direct military control by Germany.<sup>8</sup> Based on our observations, no multiparty executive or legislative

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<sup>6</sup> <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html>, see narratives for version 5.0, Denmark\_R: 2-3.

<sup>7</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denmark#Constitutional\\_monarchy\\_\(1849%E2%80%93present\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denmark#Constitutional_monarchy_(1849%E2%80%93present))

<sup>8</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denmark\\_in\\_World\\_War\\_II](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denmark_in_World_War_II)

elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Furthermore, political liberties remained absent until 1945 (LIED). V-Dem's PCLI scores them as somewhat present in 1943 and 1945 and as ambiguous in 1944. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are comprehensive. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

05/05/1945 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Germany, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]/Start (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy: Denmark returned operating as a parliamentary representative democracy with a ceremonial monarch. The nation state is decentralized and unitary, with Queen Margrethe II serving as the head of state.<sup>9</sup> In 1953 the constitution was substantially revised. The new constitution reduced the national legislature to one chamber, the Folketing. All members were to be selected based on proportional representation.<sup>10</sup> The governmental power regularly alternates between different parties across the political spectrum, which govern in coalitions of usually two parties. This underscores the competitiveness and political competition in national elections.<sup>11</sup> Danish elections are widely recognized for being free and fair. They are conducted in an open and transparent manner, ensuring that all political parties have a fair chance to compete. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes all elections in this regime period as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI and CEI scores them as free and fair as well as clean and fair. Denmark consistently has one of the highest voter turnouts in the world. This reflects a strong democratic culture where citizens are actively engaged in the political process. Danish politics is characterized by a multi-party system with no single party holding an absolute majority in the Folketing since the early 20th century. This necessitates negotiations and compromise among various parties (Nannestad 2009). Civil liberties are a high priority in Denmark. For example, freedom of religion and freedom of assembly are upheld.<sup>12</sup> According to FH, for the assessed regime period, the country is categorized as free with a score between 2 and 4, which corresponds to our interpretation of free. Regarding the political liberties both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI affirm that they were constantly present since 1946. Denmark is known for high levels of transparency and accountability in its political institutions. This is reflected in the

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<sup>9</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics\\_of\\_Denmark](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Denmark)

<sup>10</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Denmark/Postwar-Denmark-1945-c-1990>;  
[https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Denmark\\_1953?lang=en](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Denmark_1953?lang=en)

<sup>11</sup> <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html> , see narratives for version 5.0, Denmark\_V.

<sup>12</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/denmark/freedom-world/2022>

public's satisfaction with these institutions and the country's regular ranking as one of the least corrupt in the world. These attributes indicate a high quality of democracy in Denmark, characterized by stable governance, strong institutions, and a culture of consensus and cooperation. The Danish judiciary operates independently.<sup>13</sup> However, the system's complexity, with multiple parties and the need for coalition-building, can sometimes slow down decision-making processes. Despite these challenges, Denmark's democratic system is widely regarded as robust and effective. LIED and Row classify the regime in their highest categories polyarchy respectively liberal democracy. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive. On 11/01/2022 in the Kingdom of Denmark general elections were held. In line with the Danish democratic tradition, these elections were deemed free and fair (OSCE 2023a).  
(Monarchical) Liberal Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

## **Djibouti**

[formerly known as French Somaliland]

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Defective Democracy] [Start: 03/25/1885]: In the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, France declared a protectorate and colony over the region at the Horn of Africa, which comprised Djibouti and its immediate hinterland, naming it French Somaliland (Lea/Rowe 2001, Roberts 1986). From 1862 until 1894, the land to the north of the Gulf of Tadjoura was called Obock and ruled by Somali and Afar Sultans.<sup>14</sup> French Somaliland was formally established after the Issa and Afar rulers each signed a treaty with the French.<sup>15</sup> On 03/11/1862, a treaty was signed in Paris by Afar Sultan Raieta Dini Ahmet, relinquishing the territory of Obock and later, that treaty was used by the French to colonize the south of the Bay of Tadjoura: On 03/25/1885 the French signed a treaty with the Gadabuursi, a northern Somali clan, effectively making them a protectorate of France.<sup>16</sup> On 03/26/1885 the French signed another treaty with the Issa making the latter a protectorate under the French.<sup>17</sup> Lagarde was appointed French colonial governor of Obock Territory in Africa, a position he

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<sup>13</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/denmark/freedom-world/2022>

<sup>14</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French\\_Territory\\_of\\_the\\_Afars\\_and\\_the\\_Issas](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_Territory_of_the_Afars_and_the_Issas)

<sup>15</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French\\_Somaliland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_Somaliland)

<sup>16</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French\\_Somaliland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_Somaliland)

<sup>17</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French\\_Somaliland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_Somaliland)

held from 1884 to 1899.<sup>18</sup> In 1894, he established a permanent French administration in the city of Djibouti.<sup>19</sup> Based on our observations, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Later, the administrative capital of the colony was moved from Obock to Djibouti to enhance trading from East Africa and Somalia (Lea/Rowe 2001). Both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI classify political liberties as absent. This period is coded as colonial rule because first, the Afar ruler ceded the territory of Obock to France and then the French claimed the southern regions that were under control of the Issa, despite the existence of a protectorate agreement. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

10/27/1946 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Liberal Democracy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Liberal Democracy]: On this day, the international status of French Somaliland was changed to an overseas territory within the French Union. It received its own legislature and representation in the French parliament.<sup>20</sup> Women attained the right to vote, and the Representative Council of French Somaliland was elected as the colony's parliament.<sup>21</sup> The council consisted of two sections with ten members each, one of which had to be French. The exact makeup of the section was subject to further restrictions along ethnic lines. For example, ethnic Afars and Arabs could only elect one member of the first section and two members of the second section each while French citizens elected six seats of the first section. Four seats of the second section were not elected but appointed by the Governor.<sup>22</sup> The Representative Council had the power to decide on budgetary and administrative issues.<sup>23</sup> Political liberties were absent according to LIED and V-Dem's PCLI. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. Based on our observations, only multiparty legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes elections during this regime period as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores them as not really free or fair. Their CEI scores elections during this time as not clean. These deficits to actual

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<sup>18</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/L%C3%A9once\\_Lagarde](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/L%C3%A9once_Lagarde)

<sup>19</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Djibouti](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Djibouti)

<sup>20</sup> <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13232162>

<sup>21</sup> <https://data.ipu.org/parliament/DJ/DJ-LC01/elections/historical-data-on-women/>

<sup>22</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1946\\_French\\_Somaliland\\_Representative\\_Council\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1946_French_Somaliland_Representative_Council_election)

<sup>23</sup> <https://saxafimedia.com/politics-french-somaliland-ch10-somali-nationalism/>



self-governance of French Somaliland mark an edge case between being a direct and indirect colony.

06/23/1956 End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Liberal Democracy]/Start Electoral Autocracy [as Protectorate of France, Liberal Democracy]: A decree implementing the Loi Cadre (enabling law) on this day marked the inception of the first territorial assembly and self-governance for French Somaliland. The executive council of ministers, consisting of eight elected assembly members, was entrusted with responsibilities for domestic affairs (Lea/Rowe 2001). The loi cadre granted equal voting rights to all residents and scrapped the dual college system and enabled the creation of political parties.<sup>24</sup> The territory's first elections under a system of proportional representation were held on the same day a year later. On 06/23/1957 the territorial assembly was elected while the Republican Union won all 30 seats (Lea/Rowe 2001).<sup>25</sup> In 1958, a referendum was held in the territory to decide whether to join the Somali Republic or to remain with France. The referendum turned out in favor of a continued association with France. However, there were allegations of vote rigging.<sup>26</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. According to LIED these elections were not competitive. V-Dem's CEI scored no electoral cleanliness, and the elections were not really free and fair (V-Dem EF&FI). In 1946 universal suffrage was introduced.<sup>27</sup> In 1966 France denied French Somaliland independence as recommended by the UN. Another plebiscite on the relationship with France was held, which was also defined by substantial vote rigging by French authorities.<sup>28</sup> On 05/07/1967, French Somaliland was renamed French Territory of the Afars and Issas. The position the Senior French representative changed to that of High Commissioner and "the Executive Council was renamed the Council of Government and the number of members was reduced to nine" (Lea/Rowe 2001). In addition to that both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI indicate that political liberties were absent. From 1958 to 1976, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. For the year 1977, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

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<sup>24</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1957\\_French\\_Somaliland\\_Territorial\\_Assembly\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1957_French_Somaliland_Territorial_Assembly_election)

<sup>25</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1957\\_French\\_Somaliland\\_Territorial\\_Assembly\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1957_French_Somaliland_Territorial_Assembly_election)

<sup>26</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French\\_Territory\\_of\\_the\\_Afars\\_and\\_the\\_Issas](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_Territory_of_the_Afars_and_the_Issas)

<sup>27</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s\\_suffrage](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage)

<sup>28</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French\\_Territory\\_of\\_the\\_Afars\\_and\\_the\\_Issas](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_Territory_of_the_Afars_and_the_Issas)

05/08/1977 Continuation Electoral Autocracy [as de-facto independent country]: On this day, a third plebiscite on the territory's future took place. A landslide of the electorate supported disengagement from France making Djibouti's independence.<sup>29</sup> With independence the French Territory of the Afars and Issas was renamed Republic of Djibouti.

06/12/1981 End Electoral Autocracy Start One-Party Autocracy [as de-facto independent country]: On this date, the country became a de-jure one-party-state. Hassan Gouled declared his party, the People's Rally for Progress (Rassemblement populaire pour le progrès, RPP) the sole authorized one. Leaders of the opposition party PDD were arrested and later released. In national assembly polls, 65 RPP candidates were elected unopposed. As RPP candidate, Gouled was elected without opposition for a six-year term as president on 06/12/1981, receiving 84.58% of the vote. A new government was formed, but in composition similar to the previous one (Lea/Rowe 2001: 133). Why we consider this to be the regime change event, due to the de-jure change into a one-party-regime, the process of regime transformation began earlier: The elections for the national assembly (held on 05/08/1977) were boycotted by the Djibouti Liberation Movement, the National Union for Independence and the Popular Liberation Movement, resulting in the People's Rally for independence winning all 65 seats.<sup>30</sup> Hassan Gouled became the first president appointed by the parliament (Lea/Rowe 2001: 133).<sup>31</sup> Gouled was re-elected as President in 1987 being the sole candidate, which was his third term in office, despite constitutional limits of presidential tenure to two terms. The decision was made on the ground that he had initially been appointed by the Chamber of Deputies rather than having been popularly elected (Lansford 2021: 457). The rebel organisation Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD) was formed by the merger of three Afar groups in April 1991 (Lea/Rowe 2001: 134). They demanded greater political participation of Afar and launched a guerrilla struggle against the government in late October.<sup>32</sup> According to LIED, executive and legislative elections, which weren't multiparty, were held during this period. Per FH, for the regime between 1977 and 1981, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. For the rest of the regime period the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Moreover, political liberties were absent according to LIED and V-Dem's PCLI. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive's constraints fell into Intermediate Category 1, between unlimited authority and slight limitations. From 1978 to 1991, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as

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<sup>29</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French\\_Territory\\_of\\_the\\_Afars\\_and\\_the\\_Issas](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_Territory_of_the_Afars_and_the_Issas)

<sup>30</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1970\\_Cambodian\\_coup\\_d%27%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1970_Cambodian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat)

<sup>31</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hassan\\_Gouled\\_Aptidon](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hassan_Gouled_Aptidon)

<sup>32</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hassan\\_Gouled\\_Aptidon](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hassan_Gouled_Aptidon)

indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For 1992, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

12/18/1992 End One-Party Autocracy/Start Electoral (Personalist) Autocracy: A national referendum was held on 09/04/1992, that saw the introduction of multiparty politics, although another separate vote supported that the number of legal parties should be limited to four. Opposition members boycotted the legislative balloting of 12/18/1992, resulting in the contestation of only two political parties and the RPP won again all 65 seats. Gouled defeated for other candidates and thus was re-elected for a fourth term in May 1993 (Lansford 2021: 457-458).<sup>33</sup> In February 1999, Gouled announced that he would refrain from contesting for another term and the RPP chose his nephew Guelleh as its presidential candidate. With only one opponent who was Ahmed-Idriss Moussa, Guelleh won 74% of the presidential vote on 04/09/1999. A few months later, Idriss was arrested for publishing a critical article about the government (Lansford 2021: 458). In September 2002 President Guelleh announced the establishment of a full multiparty system. The elections were contested between two coalitions, compromised of several parties (Lansford 2021: 458).<sup>34</sup> The ruling Union for a Presidential Majority won all 65 seats in balloting for the Chamber of Deputies on 01/10/2003, under allegations of significant vote rigging.<sup>35</sup> Guelleh was re-elected unopposed in 2005. The UMP again won all 65 seats in assembly elections on 02/08/2008, with opposition parties boycotting the polls on grounds that it was undemocratic (Lansford 2021: 458). Guelleh was re-elected in 2011, 2016 and secured his 5th presidential term in 2021 in elections marked by substantial irregularities.<sup>36</sup> The UMP won 57 seats in legislative balloting on 02/23/2018 and 58/65 in 2023. A coalition of the UDJ and PDD won seven seats, while the CDU secured one (Lansford 2021: 458). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Since 1992 elections were not competitive according to LIED. According to V-Dem's CEI the elections were not really clean from 1992 to 2005, 2011 to 2012 and 2016 and 2017. The remaining years no cleanliness was achieved. V-Dem's EF&FI scores not really electoral freedom and fairness during the entire

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<sup>33</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2003\\_Djiboutian\\_parliamentary\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2003_Djiboutian_parliamentary_election);

[https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Djibouti\\_2010?lang=en](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Djibouti_2010?lang=en)

<sup>34</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2003\\_Djiboutian\\_parliamentary\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2003_Djiboutian_parliamentary_election)

<sup>35</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2005\\_Djiboutian\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2005_Djiboutian_presidential_election)

<sup>36</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021\\_Djiboutian\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021_Djiboutian_presidential_election)

time. Although Djibouti technically operates under a multiparty political system, the ruling Union for a Presidential Majority (UMP) employs authoritarian tactics to uphold its dominant position. The opposition faces significant constraints on its operations, with journalists and activists routinely subjected to harassment or arrest for voicing criticism against Guelleh or the UMP.<sup>37</sup> Djibouti in this period is a borderline case between an electoral autocracy and a one-party autocracy. The name of the ruling party, Union for a Presidential Majority, shows the highly personalized character of the political regime. As classified by FH for the regime period until 1998, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Between 1999 and 2009 a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. From 2010 onward, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Furthermore, political liberties continued to be coded as absent according to LIED. V-Dem's PCLI considers them as not really present from 1992 to 2001, in 2003 and from 2005 to 2017. In 2002, 2004 and since 2018 the outcomes switched to ambiguous. From 1993 to 1998, as per Polity5's categorization, the executive experienced minimal limitations on decision-making, placing it in the first intermediate category. From 1999 to 2012, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. Since 2013, as per Polity5's classification, the executive experienced moderate limitations on authority, placing it in the second intermediate category. From 1993 to 1997, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. Since 1998, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

Electoral (Personalist) Autocracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Thibaut 1999)

## **Dominica**

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: 02/10/1763]: Following the ending of the Seven Years' war, sealed by the Treaty of Paris on

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<sup>37</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/djibouti>

02/10/1763, the island became British possession.<sup>38</sup> From 1833 until 1940 Dominica was part of the Leeward Islands, from 01/01/1940 until 01/01/1960 part of the Windward Islands. There was a legislative assembly from 1924 on, but candidates were more and more outmaneuvered by planters which were allied with the colonial administration.<sup>39</sup> LIED confirms the absence of universal male suffrage during this period. LIED codes political liberties as absent. LIED starts to register Dominica in its data only since 1924. According to LIED only multiparty legislative elections were held during this period. There were no executive elections. V-Dem's PCLI doesn't list Dominica. The regime is a borderline case between a direct rule and an indirect rule colonial regime.

10/31/1951 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Liberal Democracy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: On this day universal suffrage was introduced. The 1951 elections served to elect the first parliament (House of Assembly). Until 1957, there were no political parties in Dominica, so all candidates stood for election as independents.<sup>40</sup> From 01/02/1958 until 05/31/1962 Dominica was also part of the Federation of the West Indies. On 01/07/1966 preceding internal self-autonomy general elections were held. The result was a victory for the Dominica Labour Party, which won 10 of the 11 seats. Based on our observations, only multiparty legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Political liberties were absent according to LIED.

03/01/1967 End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Liberal Democracy [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: On this date, Dominica reached internal self-autonomy (Young 1976).<sup>41</sup> General elections were held in Dominica on 01/07/1966, providing democratic legitimacy to both the parliament and the government. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. 11/03/1978 Continuation Liberal Democracy [as independent country]: On 11/03/1978, this date, independence from the United Kingdom was gained. Dominica is a parliamentary democracy with a unicameral system, the House of Assembly. The Dominica Labor Party (DLP) has governed the country since 2000. While the nation is dedicated to democratic governance, and civil liberties are generally respected, certain concerns endure. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which

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<sup>38</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty\\_of\\_Paris\\_\(1763\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Paris_(1763))

<sup>39</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dominica>; [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Dominica](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Dominica)

<sup>40</sup> <https://pdpa.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/Dominica/parl51-75.html>

<sup>41</sup> <https://www.rulers.org/ruld.html#dominica>

aligns with the observations of LIED. According to FH, for the assessed regime period, the country is categorized as free with a score between 2 and 4, which corresponds to our interpretation of free. Moreover, LIED codes political liberties as constantly present ever since 1967. V-Dem does not list the country, FH lists it as free since 1972. These include the effective administration of elections, the efficiency of the judiciary, and government corruption, particularly in connection to the country's Citizenship by Investment (CBI) program.<sup>42</sup> On 12/06/2022 snap general elections took place.<sup>43</sup> With a voter turnout of just 31.6 percent, the turnout reached a historic low. The boycott by the two leading opposition parties, the United Worker's Party, and the Dominica Freedom Party, along with the Alternative Peoples' Party could have been one reason for the low voter turnout. They boycotted the election in December due to electoral reforms that had not been implemented. The DPL won 19 out of the 21 directly elected seats in the House of Assembly. Apart from the boycott, election observers deemed the election peaceful and orderly.<sup>44</sup> Additionally LIED confirms the presence of competitive election since Dominica's independence.

Liberal Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Catón 2005)

## **Dominican Republic**

01/01/1900 Non-Electoral Transitional Regime [Start: 02/27/1844]: The Dominican Republic was briefly unified with Haiti under Haitian rule from 1822 to 1844. On 02/27/1844 the Dominican Republic gained independence from Haiti. In 1880 male suffrage was introduced.<sup>45</sup> The call for free presidential elections arose soon after independence. Due to the ongoing threat by Haiti the enthusiasm for an electoral process was not shared by all high-ranking officials. The first constitution was passed in 1844 and was remarkably liberal (Hartlyn 2001: 23-24). It advocates for presidentialism, the separation of powers, and comprehensive "checks and balances." (Hartlyn 2001: 24). A second constitution in 1854 was even more liberal, although often disregarded (Hartlyn 2001: 24). In the Battle of Monte Cristi against Spanish occupation, the Dominican sovereignty was restored on 06/15/1865.<sup>46</sup> After Spanish troops departed,

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<sup>42</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/dominica/freedom-world/2022>;

[https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Dominica\\_2014?lang=en](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Dominica_2014?lang=en)

<sup>43</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022\\_Dominican\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Dominican_general_election)

<sup>44</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/dominica/freedom-world/2023>

<sup>45</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal\\_suffrage#Dates\\_by\\_country](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#Dates_by_country)

<sup>46</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_the\\_Dominican\\_Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Dominican_Republic)

authority in the country was divided between militias and local caudillos.<sup>47</sup> During this period, a continuous clash persisted between the primary factions within the oligarchies, namely the Rojos (Conservatives) and the Azules (Liberals), both characterized by a prominent emphasis on personalist leadership (Franco 2005: 239). Stability was brought back through the presidency of Ulises Heureaux that lasted between 09/01/1882 to 09/01/1884 and 01/06/1887 to 02/27/1889, as well as 04/30/1889 to 07/26/1899 even though Heureaux ruled the island through an “iron-fisted rule”.<sup>48</sup> The assassination of Heureaux in 1899 led to six years of instability, in this time there were four revolutions and six different presidents.<sup>49</sup> Vice-President Felipe Horacio Vásquez led a rebellion against the government of President Juan Isidro Jimenez beginning on 04/26/1902. On 05/02/1902 Vice-President Felipe Horacio Vásquez’s forces entered Santo Domingo, and President Jimenez was overthrown.<sup>50</sup> On 2/5/1902, Vice President Felipe Horacio Vásquez was appointed as President of a Provisional government.<sup>51</sup> According to LIED multiparty executive and legislative elections were held in 1900 and 1901, in 1903 only multiparty legislative elections were held. Political liberties were coded as absent by LIED, whereas V-Dem’s PCLI indicates them with an ambiguous level for this period. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

03/23/1903 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, General Alejandro Wos y Gil initiated a coup d’état, leading to the resignation of President Felipe Horacio Vásquez on 04/23/1903. Following these events, General Wos y Gil secured his position as the sole candidate, being elected on 06/20/1903. His inauguration as president took place on 08/01/1903.<sup>52</sup> Although General Wos y Gil was elected, we code the regime as a military autocracy because there was no other candidate or opposition, and his presidency started with a military intervention. As per Polity5’s classification, the executive’s authority was subject to minor institutional constraints during this time.

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<sup>47</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_the\\_Dominican\\_Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Dominican_Republic)

<sup>48</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ulises\\_Heureaux](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ulises_Heureaux);

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_the\\_Dominican\\_Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Dominican_Republic)

<sup>49</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_the\\_Dominican\\_Republic#cite\\_note-42](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Dominican_Republic#cite_note-42)

<sup>50</sup> <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/western-hemisphere-region/dominican-republic-1902-present/>

<sup>51</sup> <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/home/research-projects/dadm-project/western-hemisphere-region/dominican-republic-1902-present/>

<sup>52</sup> <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/home/research-projects/dadm-project/western-hemisphere-region/dominican-republic-1902-present/>

11/25/1903 End Military Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, a rebellion led by General Carlos Morales on 11/24-25/1903 ended the presidency of Wos y Gil. On 12/06/1903 General Morales established a provisional government. U.S troops were deployed in support of the government. A Jimenista rebellion was suppressed by government troops in March 1904. A peace agreement was reached and signed by the political factions in June 1904.<sup>53</sup> According to LIED only legislative elections, which weren't multiparty, were held. Based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. Political liberties continued to be coded as absent per LIED and can be interpreted as ambiguous following V-Dem's PCLI.

06/19/1904 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: After the peace agreement General Morales was elected president in May 1904, and he was inaugurated as president on 06/19/1904.<sup>54</sup> In 1905 administration of customs was transferred to the USA. As per the conditions of this arrangement, a Receiver-General, designated by the U.S. president, retained 55% of the overall revenues to settle claims from foreign entities, while allocating the remaining 45% to the Dominican government. In 1906, Morales stepped down from office, leading to the presidency of Ramón Cáceres, who was part of the Horacista faction. Cáceres managed to quell a rebellion led by General Desiderio Arias, which resulted in political stability and a resurgence of economic prosperity. In November 1907 a constituent assembly convened and approved a new constitution in February 1908. Ramón Arturo Cáceres Vásquez won the presidency through an electoral college vote on 05/30/1908 and was officially inaugurated as president on 07/01/1908.<sup>55</sup> This was supported by new US-investments in the sugar sector. Cáceres was assassinated in 1911, an event in which Morales and Arias bore some level of indirect responsibility. This event threw the republic back into a state of turmoil.<sup>56</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. The elections in this regime period were not competitive according to LIED. No cleanliness was achieved during the entire time (V-Dem CEI) because

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<sup>53</sup> <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/home/research-projects/dadm-project/western-hemisphere-region/dominican-republic-1902-present/>

<sup>54</sup> <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/home/research-projects/dadm-project/western-hemisphere-region/dominican-republic-1902-present/>

<sup>55</sup> <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/home/research-projects/dadm-project/western-hemisphere-region/dominican-republic-1902-present/>

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[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_the\\_Dominican\\_Republic#Restoration:\\_Second\\_Republic\\_1865%E2%80%931916](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Dominican_Republic#Restoration:_Second_Republic_1865%E2%80%931916)



no elections were held between 1904 and 1911, except in 1908. Those elections were not really free and fair (V-Dem EF&FI). Additionally, political liberties are classified as absent (LIED) and as ambiguous by V-Dem's PCLI. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

12/01/1911 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: In the ensuing power vacuum, General Alfredo Victoria seized control, prompting Congress to elect his uncle, Eladio Victoria, as interim president on 12/05/1911. Allegations of bribery tainted the general's influence, casting doubt on his uncle's legitimacy upon assuming office on 02/27/1912. Former president Horacio Vásquez returned from exile to lead his supporters in a popular uprising against the new government, joining forces with General Desiderio Arias, sparking civil conflict by December.<sup>57</sup> A bloody civil war lasted from 12/01/1911 to 11/01/1912. The USA escalated the situation by warning that they might shift their official recognition to the insurgents and relinquish the entire 45% of customs revenue to them unless President Victoria resigned. Consequently, on 11/26, Victoria stepped down from his position. American representatives engaged with the rebel leader Vásquez, leading to the appointment of Archbishop of Santo Domingo Adolfo Alejandro Nouel as interim president on 11/30.<sup>58</sup> According to LIED multiparty executive and legislative elections, which weren't multiparty, were held during this period. Political liberties are coded as absent by LIED and V-Dem's PCLI indicates an ambiguous state of political liberties. Based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

11/30/1912 End Military Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: Nouel was assigned the responsibility of organizing open elections, yet Arias promptly challenged the authority of the government. Within a span of four months, Nouel stepped down from his position, and Congress subsequently chose Senator José Bordas as provisional president.<sup>59</sup> On 04/14/1913 Bordas was elected and assumed the provisional presidency. He was a politician

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<sup>57</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dominican\\_Civil\\_War\\_\(1911%E2%80%931912\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dominican_Civil_War_(1911%E2%80%931912))

<sup>58</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dominican\\_Civil\\_War\\_\(1911%E2%80%931912\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dominican_Civil_War_(1911%E2%80%931912))

<sup>59</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dominican\\_Civil\\_War\\_\(1911%E2%80%931912\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dominican_Civil_War_(1911%E2%80%931912))

independent of the parties. His singular focus was on maintaining his presidency<sup>60</sup>, a task in which he did not succeed, despite a suppressed rebellion and the win of a hastily organized election.<sup>61</sup> He had to resign on 08/27/1914 and make way for another provisional government, which achieved the organization of elections on 10/25/1914. According to LIED multiparty executive and legislative elections, which weren't multiparty, were held during this period. Additionally, political liberties remained absent according to LIED and can be interpreted as absent by V-Dem's PCLI. Based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

10/25/1914 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start (Male) Electoral Autocracy: On this date, general elections, resulting in the election of Juan Isidro Jimenes Pereyra as president were conducted. He secured victory over his rivals Horacio Vásquez and Luis Felipe Vidal. The presidential selection followed a two-phase system, where voters initially chose an electoral college that subsequently carried out the president's election.<sup>62</sup> The elections were considered to be "comparatively fair" (Hartlyn 2001: 37). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED considers the election as not competitive. Moreover, V-Dem's CEI scored no cleanliness. The overall election conditions were ambiguous (V-Dem EF&FI). Universal male suffrage had been established in 1865, but women were only granted the right to vote in 1942 (Franco 2005: 243). Besides the restricted suffrage, a non-elected actor, namely the United States, continued to interfere in internal affairs of the state and therefore, restricting the exercise of power by elected state actors (Hartlyn 2001: 37). Furthermore, according to LIED political liberties were absent. V-Dem's PCLI declares them as ambiguous. For the year 1915, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For 1916, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

11/29/1916 End (Male) Electoral Autocracy/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by USA, Defective Democracy]: When the elections set for 12/03 appeared to be incapable of producing

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<sup>60</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dominican\\_Civil\\_War\\_\(1911%E2%80%931912\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dominican_Civil_War_(1911%E2%80%931912));

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jos%C3%A9\\_Bordas\\_Valdez](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jos%C3%A9_Bordas_Valdez)

<sup>61</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jos%C3%A9\\_Bordas\\_Valdez#Presidency\\_\(1913-1914\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jos%C3%A9_Bordas_Valdez#Presidency_(1913-1914))

<sup>62</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1914\\_Dominican\\_Republic\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1914_Dominican_Republic_general_election)

a candidate approved by the U.S. Government, Washington took steps to substitute the existing Dominican government with direct rule by the U.S. military. This decision was announced by U.S. Naval Captain Harry Knapp on 11/29. Knapp justified the U.S. actions by referring to breaches of the 1907 treaty.<sup>63</sup> Based on our observations, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. For this colonial time, LIED's continued to code political liberties as absent. Since 1916 V-Dem's PCLI outcomes decreased into a range which we interpret as not really present. From 1917 to 1919, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. From 1920 to 1923, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 1924, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

03/15/1924 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by USA, Defective Democracy]/Start (Male) Electoral Autocracy: General elections were held in the Dominican Republic on this date. We code this regime change event to be a Negotiated Transition, as it was the result of political pressure on the United States occupation, both coming from the Dominican Republic as well as forces inside the USA.<sup>64</sup> The negotiations led to the so-called "Hughes-Peynado Plan", in which the United States and members of the elite of the Dominican Republic agreed on a provisional president, a schedule for the withdrawal of troops and the organization of national elections, which concluded the process.<sup>65</sup> Horacio Vásquez of the Progressive National Alliance won the presidential election, whilst his party won the parliamentary elections and the Constitutional Assembly election.<sup>66</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. The elections were competitive according to LIED, whereas V-Dem's CEI indicates no real clean election. According to V-Dem's EF&FI somewhat free and fair conditions are given. Moreover, political liberties were absent (LIED). V-Dem's PCLI considers them as ambiguous for the whole period. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to

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<sup>63</sup> <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/wwi/108649.htm>; [https://rulers.org/ruld.html#dominican\\_republic](https://rulers.org/ruld.html#dominican_republic)

<sup>64</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_the\\_Dominican\\_Republic#Withdrawal](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Dominican_Republic#Withdrawal)

<sup>65</sup> [https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plan\\_Hughes-Peynado](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plan_Hughes-Peynado) ;

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_the\\_Dominican\\_Republic#Withdrawal](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Dominican_Republic#Withdrawal)

<sup>66</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1924\\_Dominican\\_Republic\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1924_Dominican_Republic_general_election)

minor institutional constraints during this time. The last US troops left the Dominican Republic in September 1924.<sup>67</sup> When in office, Vasquez pushed through changes which made it more difficult for the opposition to mobilize and modified the constitution four times, extending his term in office (Hartlyn 1998: 90-91, Casey et al. 2020: 5). For most of the regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For 1930, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

02/23/1930 End (Male) Electoral Autocracy/Start Personalist Autocracy: On this date, through a military coup supported by Brigadier General Rafael Trujillo president Horacio Vásquez was deposed. Trujillo installed himself as regime leader (Pons 1990: 509, Hartlyn 1998: 85, Casey et al. 2020: 5, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 56). On 08/02/1931 the Dominican Party was founded as an outgrowth of the Patriotic Coalition of Citizens that supported Trujillo's run for president. Soon afterward, it was proclaimed to be the only legal party. All adult citizens of the Dominican Republic were required to be members of the party. The party had no real ideology other than support for Trujillo. While there were several presidents in this regime period Rafael Trujillo remained the power center as the leader of his personalist party.<sup>68</sup> From 08/16/1930 until 08/16/1938 and from 05/18/1942 until 08/16/1952 Rafael Trujillo was president of the Dominican Republic.<sup>69</sup> Dominican women won the right to vote through a constitutional reform of 1942.<sup>70</sup> During the interim periods Trujillo began to install figurehead-presidents for instance Jacinto Bienvenido Peynado to pacify foreign dissatisfaction with his authoritarian regime, without relinquishing his actual power.<sup>71</sup> In the presidential elections 1952 Héctor Trujillo, brother of Rafael Trujillo, was the only candidate. The Dominican Party won every seat in the Congressional elections.<sup>72</sup> Trujillo controlled both the military and the secret service, enriched himself and his family through state monopolies over the largest companies, eliminated political opponents, and awarded offices to family and loyalists.<sup>73</sup> Moreover, the personality cult of the Trujillo era was very significant. This cult also extended to the family members.<sup>74</sup> Taken

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<sup>67</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dominican\\_Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dominican_Republic)

<sup>68</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dominican\\_Party](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dominican_Party)

<sup>69</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rafael\\_Trujillo](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rafael_Trujillo)

<sup>70</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women\\_in\\_the\\_Dominican\\_Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women_in_the_Dominican_Republic)

<sup>71</sup> [https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rafael\\_Le%C3%B3nidas\\_Trujillo\\_Molina](https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rafael_Le%C3%B3nidas_Trujillo_Molina)

<sup>72</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1952\\_Dominican\\_Republic\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1952_Dominican_Republic_general_election)

<sup>73</sup> <https://countrystudies.us/dominican-republic/11.htm>; <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Rafael-Trujillo>

<sup>74</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rafael\\_Trujillo](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rafael_Trujillo)

together, the regime must therefore be classified as a personalist autocracy, even though Trujillo was not president for the entire period. Trujillo formed the center of power through the party presidency and as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Trujillo was assassinated on 05/30/1961, nonetheless his regime remained until 11/19/1961 when the military uprising carried out by members of the Dominican Military Aviation ‘Rebellion of the Pilots’ expelled the Trujillo Clan from the island.<sup>75</sup> According to LIED multiparty executive and legislative elections were held until 1933, from 1934 to 1946 executive and legislative elections, which weren’t multiparty, were held, from 1947 to 1951 multiparty executive and legislative elections were held and from 1952 onward executive and legislative elections, which weren’t multiparty, were held. Furthermore, both LIED and V-Dem’s PCLI indicate that political liberties were absent for the whole period. From 1932 to 1960, based on Polity5’s assessment, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem’s LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

11/19/1961 End Personalist Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: Joaquin Balaguer, serving as a nominal president, took on substantial governing authority.<sup>76</sup> From 01/01/1962 on he was required, by OAS determination, to share his power with a seven-member Council of state including members of the opposition. On 01/04/1962 the sanctions by OAS were lifted.<sup>77</sup> LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem’s PCLI is likewise classified by us as showing that political liberties are absent. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

01/16/1962 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Military Autocracy: A military coup ousted in response to political riots Balaguer, Trujillo’s designated successor. A six member military junta was established in the aftermath to oversee competitive elections (Wiarda 1975: 263).

12/20/1962 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date, elections took place, which were won by the opposition (Hartlyn 1998:103).<sup>78</sup> According to LIED legislative elections, which weren’t multiparty, were held. The elections were not competitive according

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<sup>75</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rebellion\\_of\\_the\\_Pilots](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rebellion_of_the_Pilots)

<sup>76</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_the\\_Dominican\\_Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Dominican_Republic)

<sup>77</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_the\\_Dominican\\_Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Dominican_Republic)

<sup>78</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1962\\_Dominican\\_Republic\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1962_Dominican_Republic_general_election)

to LIED and not really clean (V-Dem CEI). Whereas the overall conditions achieved somewhat freedom and fairness (V-Dem EF&FI). Besides, political liberties were absent per LIED. However, V-Dem's PCLI categorizes them as somewhat present for this time. The regime in this period is a hybrid case that mixes democratic and autocratic elements. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

09/25/1963 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Military Autocracy: Colonel Elías Wessin overthrew the elected President Bosch out of fears that his economic, cultural and military policies were too extreme and installed a three-member military junta led by De Santos (Atkins/Wilson 1998:130, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 57, Marshall 2018b). Based on our observations, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Additionally, political liberties were still coded as absent (LIED) and V-Dem's PCLI indicates a not really present level. For 1964, V-Dem's JCE is classified as limited, indicating weak judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For the following year, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

04/24/1965 End Military Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: A coalition consisting of a military faction and civilian supporters of Bosch, the deposed civilian president, successfully toppled the government of Wessin. Armed forces were present on both sides of the confrontation. The insurgents managed to overcome the military faction aligned with the triumvirate and established a temporary governing body (Wiarda/Kryzanek 1992: 42-43, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 57).<sup>79</sup>

04/28/1965 End Military Autocracy/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by USA, Defective Democracy]: During this period U.S. military and government exerted significant influence and control over the country's internal affairs, effectively establishing provisional governments that were either directed or heavily influenced by the United States. Molina was pushed out of office by forces loyal to Cabral and the junta which overthrew Bosch. This was accomplished in part because of the US-led invasion of the country. Pedro Bartolomé was made the provisional president from 05/01 to 07 of the loyalist occupation government (Campillo/Jolio 1986: 251-

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<sup>79</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dominican\\_Civil\\_War](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dominican_Civil_War)

255, Yates 2014). He was also a member of the Revolutionary Committee, which ruled the country for about few hours on 04/25/1965.<sup>80</sup> On 09/03/1965 Héctor García-Godoy assumed the role of provisional president during this uncertain and tumultuous period, with ongoing shifts in power and political dynamics.<sup>81</sup> Based on our observations, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED continues to code political liberties as absent. The state of political liberties is classified as not really present per V-Dem's PCLI. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

06/28/1966 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by USA, Liberal Democracy]/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this day, the United States began the withdrawal of their troops, indicating a voluntary power transfer to Joaquín Balaguer who was elected under their occupation period (06/01/1966) (Campillo/Jolio 1986: 251-255, Yates 2014), and sworn in in August 1966.<sup>82</sup> Although multiparty elections were held regularly between June 1966 and May 1978, this period is considered authoritarian because elections were clearly unfair and civil liberties unprotected (Hartlyn 1998: 108-109, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 57).<sup>83</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Elections during this time are classified as not competitive by LIED. V-Dem's EF&FI scores them as not really free or fair. Their CEI scores them as not clean. As per FH's classification for 1972 and 1973, the country receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. For the rest of the regime period, the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. Moreover, political liberties are classified as absent (LIED) and not really present (V-Dem PCLI) for the entire period. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints during this time. During almost the entire regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. For 1978, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that

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<sup>80</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pedro\\_Bartolom%C3%A9\\_Benoit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pedro_Bartolom%C3%A9_Benoit)

<sup>81</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/H%C3%A9ctor\\_Garc%C3%ADa-Godoy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/H%C3%A9ctor_Garc%C3%ADa-Godoy)

<sup>82</sup> <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/home/research-projects/dadm-project/western-hemisphere-region/dominican-republic-1902-present/>

<sup>83</sup> <https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/display/document/obo-9780199766581/obo-9780199766581-0071.xml>

judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

05/16/1978 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date, general presidential and parliamentary elections were held, considered free and fair, marking the first peaceful transfer of power to the opposition in the country's history (Campillo/Jolio 1986: 289-295, Hartlyn 1998). We consider the mechanism of the regime change to be a case of elite concessions under mass pressure. The military initially stopped the count of the elections after the partial count indicated Balaguer's loss but resumed the count after vigorous protests at home and strong pressure abroad.<sup>84</sup> However, this period also saw problematic elections characterized by irregularities and violence, with the Central Electoral Authority accumulating extensive powers while remaining subordinate to the executive (Franco 2005: 241). The military wielded significant influence, constantly threatening political interference, as civilian control was maintained mainly through personal relationships and internal splits within the officer corps. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Indices like LIED classify the elections during this time as non-competitive. V-Dem's Electoral Freedom and Fairness Index initially scores the freedom and fairness of elections as not genuinely present, gradually improving over time. The Clean Elections Index rates the elections as not clean. In 05/1982, presidential elections resulted in Jorge Blanco of the PRD emerging victoriously. Despite initial hopes, his administration was no less personalist and failed to institutionalize governance effectively. Protests erupted due to economic conditions, and the period was marked by limitations on political and civil rights, with human rights violations being commonplace. As per FH's classification for the regime period in 1978, the country is considered free with a score ranging from 2 to 4, which we also interpret as free in our framework. Between 1979 and 1981 the country receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. For the years from 1990 to 1992, it is classified as free with a score of 5, which falls into our interpretation of the rather free category. From 1993 onward the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. LIED classifies political liberties as present for this period. According to V-Dem's PCLI political liberties were ambiguous in 1978, present from 1979 to 1987, somewhat present from 1988 to 1990, and again present from 1991 onward, except for 1994, during which political liberties were classified as somewhat present. According to the Polity5 indicator, during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on

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<sup>84</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joaqu%C3%ADn\\_Balaguer#Defeat\\_and\\_return\\_to\\_power](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joaqu%C3%ADn_Balaguer#Defeat_and_return_to_power)



decision-making power. From 1979 to 1982, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For the period 1983-1985, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. From 1986 onwards, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. Thus, it is appropriate to classify the Dominican Republic's political regime from 05/16/1978 until 08/16/1996 as an electoral hybrid regime.

06/30/1996 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Defective Democracy: On this date, a significant shift occurred with the general elections. President Balaguer endorsed Leonel Fernández, who won over Peña Gómez and was installed as Balaguer's successor on 08/16/1996. For the first time in thirty years, Balaguer was not one of the candidates (Lansford 2021: 469, Llanos/Marsteintredet 2010: 184). From this date forward, the Dominican Republic can be classified as a defective democracy. Presidential and legislative elections have been held regularly every four years, and while election-related violence remains a problem, political and civil rights are generally respected, with only minor instances of violations. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Per FH, for 1996 and 1997, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. In 1998 and 1999 the country is classified as free with a score of 5, which falls into our interpretation of the rather free category. For the following years through 2002 the Dominican Republic is classified as free, scoring between 2 and 4, which we also place in the free category. In 2003 the country receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. For the period between 2004 and 2012 it is considered free with a score ranging from 2 to 4, which we also interpret as free in our framework. According to FH, in 2013 and 2014 the country is rated once again as free with a score of 5, which we interpret as rather free in our framework. From 2015 onward the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. LIED and V-Dem's PCLI note that constant political liberties have been present since 1995. Polity5 indicates that since 1996, the executive's power was limited to a degree between substantial constraints and parity with other institutions. Until 2006, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were

absent. For 2007-2010, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. From 2011 to 2019, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For the year 2020, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. Since 2021, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. Despite improvements, issues like corruption remain systemic at all levels of government, judiciary, and security forces. Court decisions are not entirely free from political influence, and safeguarding the right to physical integrity and other human rights remains problematic.<sup>85</sup> General elections in 2016 and 2020 were found to be credible by independent observers, though procedural deficits and unequal access to media coverage led to an uneven playing field. The Organization of American States (OAS) issued major electoral reform recommendations. Corruption, extrajudicial killings, election-based violence, and voting irregularities persisted, but court rulings in 2019 continually improved public liberties and media freedom. In 2022, former president Danilo Medina was under investigation for administrative corruption, highlighting the ongoing extent of the problem. On 05/19/2024, general elections were held in which incumbent Luis Abinader won a second term with 58% of the vote, with turnout estimated at around 70%. Given the historical context and assessments from various political indices and sources, it is justified to code the Dominican Republic during this period as a defective democracy, acknowledging the presence of democratic structures alongside significant deficits in the implementation and adherence to democratic principles. Defective Democracy as of 07/01/2024 continues.

Additional sources (Crassweller 1966, Derby 2009, Haggerty 1989, Moya Pons 1998, Turits 2004, Wiarda 1968)

## **East Timor**

[officially known as Timor-Leste]

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<sup>85</sup> <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/dominican-republic>

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Portugal, Constitutional Monarchy] [Start 08/18/1860]: The first Portuguese settlers arrived in Timor-Leste in the mid-1500s. The Spanish arrived soon after, in 1522. The Dutch took possession of the western portion of the island in 1613. The British governed the island in 1812–1815. The Dutch and the Portuguese fought for supremacy over Timor, and Portuguese sovereignty over the island’s eastern half was settled by the “Treaty of Demarcation and Exchange Some Portuguese Possessions and Dutch in the archipelago of Solor and Timor” that was ratified on 08/18/1860.<sup>86</sup> Timor became a Portuguese colony thereafter and remained under colonial rule until 1975 (Olsson 2009). Based on our observations, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Universal suffrage was absent (LIED). Both LIED and V-Dem’s PCLI indicate that political liberties were absent.

12/17/1941 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Portugal, Right-Wing Autocracy]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [of Australia, Defective Democracy]: During World War II Australia aimed to prevent Japanese expansion by deploying troops to the island and East Timor was occupied by Dutch and Australian forces in the Battle of Timor. UK negotiated a withdrawal of Australian and Dutch troops with the neutral government of Portugal, but the Japanese invasion occurred before the materialization of this agreement.<sup>87</sup>

05/09/1942 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Australia, Defective Democracy]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Japan, Constitutional Monarchy]: On this day, Portuguese Timor was invaded by Japanese forces (Olsson 2009). Based on our observations, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Moreover, political liberties remained absent by LIED and V-Dem’s PCLI. Universal suffrage was absent (LIED).

09/05/1945 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Japan, Constitutional Monarchy]/Start Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Portugal, Right-Wing Autocracy]: After World War II, Timor-Leste was returned to Portugal when on this date, the Japanese commanding officer entered into negotiations with Portuguese Governor Manuel Ferreira de Carvalho, leading to the restoration of power to the governor and placing the Japanese forces under Portuguese jurisdiction (Olsson 2009).<sup>88</sup> Timor was subsequently annexed as an overseas province of Portugal, forcing it back under colonial rule.<sup>89</sup> In 1953 universal suffrage was introduced (LIED). In 1960, Timor was recognized as a non-self-governing territory by the UN with the right to self-determination

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<sup>86</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty\\_of\\_Lisbon\\_\(1859\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Lisbon_(1859))

<sup>87</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Timor-Leste#Portuguese\\_rule](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Timor-Leste#Portuguese_rule)

<sup>88</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle\\_of\\_Timor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Timor)

<sup>89</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Portuguese\\_Timor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Portuguese_Timor)

(Strating 2014: 476). Based on our observations, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Additionally, both LIED and V-Dem's PLCI indicate political liberties as absent for this colonial period.

05/02/1972 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Portugal, Right-Wing Autocracy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of Portugal, Right Wing Autocracy]: On this day the Portuguese parliament voted the Organic Law for Oversea Territories to grant more autonomy. In March the first elections for a Legislative Assembly took place. The candidates came from the People's National Action movements or other civic associations. On 04/25/1974 the Estado Novo regime in Portugal was overthrown (see Portugal) and the new government had the goal of decolonization (Olsson 2009).<sup>90</sup> Timorese political parties were legalized in April 1974 resulting in a dispute between major players, the Timor Democratic Union and Fretilin. A brief civil war emerged, in which members of the colonial police and Timorese soldiers of the Portuguese Army participated as well.<sup>91</sup> Despite the brief civil war, the Portuguese colonial authority still existed, and thus this period is coded as colonial rule. Based on our observations, only multiparty legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Besides, political liberties were absent according to LIED and V-Dem's PCLI.

12/07/1975 End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of Portugal, Liberal Democracy]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Indonesia, Military Autocracy]: Following the civil war, Fretilin declared East Timor's independence on 11/28/1975. However, a few weeks after the proclamation, Indonesia invaded East Timor on 06/12/1975 (Strating, 2014: 477). Based on our observations, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Political liberties remained absent (LIED), while V-Dem's PCLI changed to not really present.

07/17/1976 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Indonesia, Military Autocracy]/Start Part of Other Country [Indonesia, Military Autocracy]: On this date Timor was annexed by Indonesia as the Timor Timur province which was not recognized by the UN nor any other country, except for Australia (Olsson 2009). An estimated number of 180,000 deaths was reported for the 24-year period that Indonesia ruled East Timor.<sup>92</sup> During this time both LIED

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<sup>90</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Portuguese\\_Timor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Portuguese_Timor);

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1973\\_Portuguese\\_Timorese\\_Legislative\\_Assembly\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1973_Portuguese_Timorese_Legislative_Assembly_election)

<sup>91</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Portuguese\\_Timor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Portuguese_Timor)

<sup>92</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/East\\_Timor\\_independence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/East_Timor_independence)

and V-Dem's PCLI indicate the absence of political liberties. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held.

10/25/1999 End Part of Other Country [Indonesia, Military Autocracy]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [as International Mandate]: On this date, Timor came under UN administration (Olsson 2009). The Australian-led military intervention, called 'International Forces in East Timor' (INTERFET), was deployed on 09/20, after consultations of conflict parties including Indonesia. Indonesian civilian administration and military troops were withdrawn from the island with the last troops leaving on 10/31 (Olsson 2009). The UNTAET mission's scale surpassed previous UN peacekeeping endeavors. UNTAET wielded considerable authority during this time. Tensions arose between the objectives of establishing effective governance and rapidly preparing the territory for democratic self-rule. Governance was highly centralized, with limited focus on enhancing local capacity.<sup>93</sup> Based on our observations, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Per FH's evaluation for this regime period, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. Additionally, political liberties are coded as absent (LIED) and as somewhat present in 2000 and 2001 according to V-Dem's PCLI.

08/30[-31]/2001 End [de-facto] Direct Rule Occupation Regime [under International Mandate]/Start Defective Democracy [under International Mandate]: On this date pre-independence elections to the constituent assembly were held in East Timor on 08/30-31/2001 under UN administration. The result was a victory for Fretilin, which won 55 of the 88 seats. Following the election, the Constituent Assembly nominated a transitional Council of Minister.<sup>94</sup> A new constitution was promulgated in March 2002 and Presidential elections were held in April 2002, again under UN administration, which were won by Gusmão who became the first President of East Timor.<sup>95</sup> With the 2002 constitution, universal suffrage was established.<sup>96</sup> On 05/20/2002, the Democratic Republic of East Timor became formally independent. On 06/30/2007 the first post-independence parliamentary elections were held. Fourteen parties contested in the election which were conducted based on proportional representation with party lists.<sup>97</sup> The 2022 elections were, according to the BTI and FH, fair

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[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_East\\_Timor#:~:text=East%20Timor%20became%20formally%20independent,UN%20on%2027%20September%202002](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_East_Timor#:~:text=East%20Timor%20became%20formally%20independent,UN%20on%2027%20September%202002).

<sup>94</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2001\\_East\\_Timorese\\_parliamentary\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2001_East_Timorese_parliamentary_election)

<sup>95</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2001\\_East\\_Timorese\\_parliamentary\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2001_East_Timorese_parliamentary_election)

<sup>96</sup> [https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/East\\_Timor\\_2002](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/East_Timor_2002)

<sup>97</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007\\_East\\_Timorese\\_parliamentary\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007_East_Timorese_parliamentary_election)

and free with a strong intuitional basis,<sup>98</sup> however legal and procedural transparency is still undermined by ambiguities and would benefit from reforms.<sup>99</sup> Over the past years since independence, Timor-Leste has held free and fair elections and undergone several peaceful transfers of power. Therefore, this period is coded as democracy. According to FH, however, several weaknesses remain concerning the stability of democratic institutions and disputes among the major personalities from the independence struggle still exist in the political domain.<sup>100</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Since 2001, LIED categorizes elections in the country as competitive. From 2001 to 2016, V-Dem's EF&FI scored elections as somewhat free and fair, after 2016 as free and fair. V-Dem's CEI scored their electoral cleanliness as ambiguous between 2002 and 2006, as somewhat afterwards. V-Dem's CEI scored the elections as clean. As per FH, for 2001, the country receives a score of 8, which we interpret as falling into the rather not free category. Between 2002 and 2016 a score of 6 to 7 designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. From 2017 onward it receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. In addition to that, political liberties were absent for the entire time according to LIED, while V-Dem's PCLI scores them as somewhat present in 2001 and from 2015 to 2017 and in the remaining years even full political liberties are indicated. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority.

Defective Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

## **Ecuador**

01/01/1900 Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy [Start: 03/13/1830]: On 05/24/1822 Gran Colombia (and Ecuador as part of it) declared its independence from Spain. On 03/13/1830 the Republic of Ecuador became independent after the dissolution of Gran Colombia. Instability characterized much of the rule of the first president, Juan José Flores, fueled by conflict between liberals from Guayaquil and Quito-based conservatives - a schism that endured for more than a century (Macmillan 2022). In the constitution of 1861 property requirements for voting were abolished but were replaced by literacy requirements, which lasted until 1978 (Kellam 2013:

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<sup>98</sup> <https://bti-project.org/de/reports/country-dashboard/TLS>

<sup>99</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/timor-leste/freedom-world/2023>

<sup>100</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/timor-leste/freedom-world/2022>

29, Engerman/Sokoloff 2005: 912). In the 1892 presidential election Luis Cordero Crespo was elected. Because of an international political scandal, he had to resign in 1895. His vice-president Vicente Lucio Salazar became acting president between 04/16/1895 and 09/04/1895.<sup>101</sup> In 1895 the Liberal Revolution took place in Ecuador. It was a period of radical social and political upheaval.<sup>102</sup> On 06/05/1895 Eloy Alfaro deposed President Vicente Lucio Salazar and declared himself dictator. His presidency was legitimized only in the aftermath on 01/17/1897 by a constituent convent which named him constitutional president. He stayed in office until 09/01/1901 (Maier 1971: 481-482).<sup>103</sup> In 1901 presidential elections were held and Leónidas Plaza emerged as winner and assumed office 09/01/1901.<sup>104</sup> The elections in 1905 saw Lizardo García emerge as winner.<sup>105</sup> His presidency lasted only until 01/15/1906.<sup>106</sup> For a second time Alfaro overthrew the elected government and assumed office.<sup>107</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes elections during this time as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI and CEI score them as not really free, fair or clean. On 01/16/1906 after the overthrow of the elected government of Lizardo García, Alfaro convened a constituent assembly, to draft a new constitution and elect him. For the second time he used this method, to gain legitimation. Since the constitution stipulated a direct popular election of the president, This raises the question of whether presidents elected in such a manner can truly be considered constitutional, given that their rise to power did not initially align with constitutional provisions (Maier 1971: 481-482).<sup>108</sup> On 08/12/1912 following Alfaro's refusal to relinquish power to his successor, an armed uprising ensued, resulting in Alfaro's overthrow (Stornaiolo 1999: 179-84, Casey et al. 2020: 5). Overall Alfaro's presidency is often praised for the implementation of liberal principles like freedom of speech and religion and secularization. However, he and the Liberal Revolution did not succeed in eradicating the influence of oligarchic elites (Farrington 2012: 19-20).<sup>109</sup> Presidential elections were held regularly afterwards. The literacy requirements for voting remained applicable until 1978 (Kellam 2013: 29). Regarding the political liberties for this period, they were absent according to LIED. V-Dem's PCLI classified them as somewhat present until 1917 and as ambiguous

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<sup>101</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luis\\_Cordero\\_Crespo](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luis_Cordero_Crespo); [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vicente\\_Lucio\\_Salazar](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vicente_Lucio_Salazar)

<sup>102</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberal\\_Revolution\\_of\\_1895](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberal_Revolution_of_1895)

<sup>103</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eloy\\_Alfaro](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eloy_Alfaro)

<sup>104</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1901\\_Ecuadorian\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1901_Ecuadorian_presidential_election)

<sup>105</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1905\\_Ecuadorian\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1905_Ecuadorian_presidential_election)

<sup>106</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lizardo\\_Garc%C3%ADa](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lizardo_Garc%C3%ADa)

<sup>107</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eloy\\_Alfaro#](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eloy_Alfaro#)

<sup>108</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eloy\\_Alfaro#](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eloy_Alfaro#)

<sup>109</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eloy\\_Alfaro#](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eloy_Alfaro#)

from 1918 onwards. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For the year 1900, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. From 1901 to 1905, and 1912 to 1915, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. In between those two timeframes, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For the years 1916-1919, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. From 1920 onwards, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

07/09/1925 End Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: In July 1925, a group of junior officers, which called itself the Military League, carried out a military coup that overthrew President Gonzalo Córdova and assumed control of the government. The so called July Revolution was aligned against the plutocracy governing the nation.<sup>110</sup> After an initial military junta, it was extended for six years – until 1931 -, with two provisional government juntas.<sup>111</sup> In 1926, the junta officially transferred power to Isidro Ayora (Mora 1991: 690, Deas 1986: 663-68, Casey et al. 2020: 5). In 1930 women's suffrage was granted. In article 13 of the constitution, it was established that every Ecuadorian citizen could vote who was an individual, whether male or female, aged 21 years or older, and proficient in reading and writing.<sup>112</sup> In August 1931, Ayora handed over power to Colonel Luis Larrea Alba. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held until 1928, from 1929 onward only legislative elections, which weren't multiparty, were held. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

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<sup>110</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/July\\_Revolution\\_\(Ecuador\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/July_Revolution_(Ecuador))

<sup>111</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/July\\_Revolution\\_\(Ecuador\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/July_Revolution_(Ecuador))

<sup>112</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s\\_suffrage\\_in\\_Ecuador](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage_in_Ecuador)



Moreover, political liberties are classified as absent by LIED, whereas V-Dem's PCLI considers their presence as ambiguous. While there were considerable civic elements in this regime period this non-electoral regime is classified as a military autocracy.

10/15/1931 End Military Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: On this day, Alba was replaced by Alfredo Baquerizo Moreno, who then initiated a call for general elections (Mora 1991: 693-94).<sup>113</sup> The presidential election of 10/20–10/21/1931 in Ecuador was formally a multicandidate contest, but it did in the end not mark a transition to an electoral regime. First, the electoral outcome was not implemented. Neptalí Bonifaz Ascázubi, the winner, was disqualified by Congress in early 1932 due to Peruvian citizenship, which delegitimized the election *ex post*. Power remained with transitional elites, not an elected executive. Second, the election took place without institutionalized party competition. Candidates represented loose elite factions rather than legal parties. In the whole period Moreno, the transitional executive remained, the effective head of the executive. He was not elected, and there were no effective judicial or legislative constraints. V-Dem shows absent judicial and weak legislative checks, indicating a personalized autocratic structure. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For this short regime period, political liberties remained absent according to LIED and can be interpreted as ambiguous according to V-Dem's PCLI.

10/30[-/31]/1932 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date, the first multiparty elections took place, which were won by Juan de Dios Martínez, thus completing the transition to an electoral regime. Electoral fraud contributed to Martínez' victory<sup>114</sup> and the entire period from the retreat of Isidro Ayora in 1931 to 1934 was marked by economic and political instability. In October 1933, Jose Maria Velasco of the Conservative Party won presidential elections. He assumed the presidency in September 1934 (Mora 1991: 694, Casey et al. 2020: 6).<sup>115</sup> He had won with an overwhelming majority. This presidency was the first of his five periods overall, it lasted only eleven months. He was ousted by the military when he attempted to seize dictatorial powers by dissolving Congress and imprisoning his legislative adversaries (Rudolph 1991: 30). Because this approach failed, we do not consider

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<sup>113</sup> [https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alfredo\\_Baquerizo\\_Moreno](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alfredo_Baquerizo_Moreno)

<sup>114</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1932\\_Ecuadorian\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1932_Ecuadorian_presidential_election)

<sup>115</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1933\\_Ecuadorian\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1933_Ecuadorian_presidential_election)

the regime to be an autocracy, as neither Martínez or Velasco acquired a sufficient base of authority. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes the election as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores the electoral freedom and fairness as ambiguous. Their CEI scores the election as not clean. Moreover, political liberties remained absent according to LIED and V-Dem's PCLI indicates an ambiguous state regarding political liberties. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For most of the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For the year 1935, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

08/21/1935 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: In August 1935, Velasco was ousted from power in a military coup (Mora 1991: 695, Casey et al. 2020: 6).<sup>116</sup> On 09/26/1936, Antonio Pons was appointed as the interim president. However, instead of organizing elections, he relinquished power back to the armed forces. Subsequently, the junta installed Federico Paez as the dictator, and his regime was marked by extensive repression (Mora 1991: 695-96, Casey et al. 2020: 6). Furthermore, LIED still considers political liberties as absent and V-Dem's PCLI as ambiguous. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints during this time. In this timeframe, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

10/23/1937 End Military Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: General Alberto Enríquez Gallo led a military coup that overthrew Federico Paez. Following the coup, Enríquez assumed power (Mora 1991: 696-97, Casey et al. 2020: 6). According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints during this time. LIED identifies political liberties as absent and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the

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<sup>116</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jos%C3%A9\\_Mar%C3%ADn\\_Velasco\\_Ibarra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jos%C3%A9_Mar%C3%ADn_Velasco_Ibarra)

executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

08/10/1938 End Military Autocracy/Start Personalist Autocracy: On this date Enríquez established a Constituent Assembly and handed power over. The Constituent Assembly selected Aurelio Mosquera as president, but he dissolved the assembly and declared himself dictator, implementing a harsh campaign of repression (Mora 1991: 696-97, Casey et al. 2020: 6). Mosquera was elected head of the Ecuadorian Radical Liberal Party. He was also vice president of the Chamber of Deputies and of the Senate.<sup>117</sup> After dissolving the National Assembly, Mosquera did convene an extraordinary Congress with two chambers in February 1939. However, this new Congress was formed under conditions that favored his regime, and he strategically placed conservatives in key positions. This Congress functioned within the framework of the older 1906 constitution, which had been reestablished by Mosquera, sidelining the more progressive constitution that was supposed to be in effect at the time. So, while a parliamentary body did exist, it operated under the influence and control of Mosquera's government, suggesting a lack of genuine legislative independence. Specific details on the mechanics of how the members were selected or appointed are not clear from the historical sources. However, it was clearly not a democratic election. His economic policies favored the liberal bourgeoisie and involved personal interests, such as the exemption of import duties for foreign companies in which he had personal stakes. This suggests a governance style that favored a particular class and his own interests, which is a characteristic often seen in personalist autocracies.<sup>118</sup> He arrested some socialist and anarcho-syndicalist members of parliament, subdued an attempted coup, and removed five generals from their positions. Moreover, he placed conservatives in strategic positions, controlled municipal autonomy, and reorganized secular schools and universities, arguing that the student movement was politicized.<sup>119</sup> According to LIED only executive elections were held. For this period, political liberties are coded as absent by LIED and can be interpreted as ambiguous based on V-Dem's PCLI. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints during this time. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

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<sup>117</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aurelio\\_Mosquera](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aurelio_Mosquera)

<sup>118</sup> [https://www.biografiasyvidas.com/biografia/m/mosquera\\_narvaez.htm](https://www.biografiasyvidas.com/biografia/m/mosquera_narvaez.htm)

<sup>119</sup> [https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aurelio\\_Mosquera\\_Narva%C3%A1ez](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aurelio_Mosquera_Narva%C3%A1ez)

11/17/1939 End Personalist Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: After Mosquera's sudden death in November 1939, Carlos Arroyo del Rio, the president of the Senate, took over power (Mora 1991: 696-97, Casey et al. 2020: 6). As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints during this time. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

01/10[-01/11]/1940 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Electoral Autocracy: On these dates presidential elections took place. Arroyo employed widespread fraud to win the presidential election (Mora 1991: 696-97, Casey et al. 2020: 6). It was believed that Velasco had actually won the elections. During his presidency, Arroyo ruled through repression. The 1941 war with Peru became Arroyo's undoing. Ecuador was not prepared for the Peruvian invasion. Military mistakes were made upon the decisions of Arroyo, leaving the Ecuador's southern and eastern provinces nearly unprotected. The Protocol of Peace was signed in January 1942 between the two nations. This ended Peru's occupation. The Rio Protocol was ratified shortly afterwards (Rudolph 1991: 30-31). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes elections during this time as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI and CEI score them as not really free, fair and not clean. Additionally, according to LIED political liberties were still absent. V-Dem's PCLI outcomes remained unchanged at ambiguous. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

05/31/1944 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: A popular uprising supported by the Ecuadorian Democratic Alliance and by junior officers occurred on 05/28/1944. The so-called Glorious May Revolution led to the resignation of Carlos Arroyo on 05/31/1944. The Ecuadorian Democratic Alliance consisted of a wide array of Ecuadorian politicians of different political backgrounds (Fitch 1977:19, Becker 2000: 1-3, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 57, Mora 1991: 699, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014a, Casey et al. 2020: 6).<sup>120</sup> Although the military was involved it was not "a traditional military or palace coup

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<sup>120</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Ecuador\\_\(1925%E2%80%931944\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Ecuador_(1925%E2%80%931944))

which has seemingly plagued much of Latin American history” (Becker 2003: 1). The aim was rather to ensure a civilian rule under Velasco (Becker 2003: 1-2). Velasco returned to Ecuador at the head of a multiparty coalition – the Ecuadorian Democratic Alliance. The military transferred power to the Democratic Alliance, which subsequently appointed Velasco as the president of the republic, garnering popular acclaim.<sup>121</sup> In August 1944 a constituent assembly convened and began to work on a new constitution. It took seven months to complete it (Becker 2000: 6). Velasco vocally expressed his opposition to the new constitution and began to repress and persecute former supporters (Becker 2000: 9-10). According to LIED multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. The regime is to be classified as non-electoral transitional regime because no elections took place, Velasco was given the presidency by popular acclamation and the military, although involved in the popular uprisings, did not established a military junta but instead handed power directly to a civilian alliance. Besides, LIED still indicates the absence of political liberties. V-Dem’s PCLI still considers their presence as ambiguous. As per Polity5’s classification, the executive’s authority was subject to minor institutional constraints during this time. During this regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, whereas V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

03/30/1946 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Personalist Autocracy: On this date Velasco declared himself dictator and suspended the 1945 constitution. More and more of his former left-wing supporters became alienated from him. The Socialists and Communists left the government. Velasco forced the Communist Party underground. His group of supporters now only included conservatives; there was nothing left of the public acclaim that had brought Velasco into office. He convened a new Constituent Assembly to draft a much more conservative constitution. Leftists refused to take part in this process (Becker 2000: 10). Although very short-lived, this period has to be classified as personalist autocracy: Because Velasco seemed unwilling to accept institutional restrictions, forced the opposition underground through persecution and formed a constitution in his favor. While according to LIED multiparty executive and legislative elections took place, according to our judgement executive multiparty elections can be classified as present since Velasco was a popularly elected president but there was no popularly elected parliament in this period, considering the Constituent Assembly was not meant to function as a full legislative body. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem’s PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the

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<sup>121</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Ecuador\\_\(1925%E2%80%931944\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Ecuador_(1925%E2%80%931944))

state of political liberties. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

08/23/1947 End Personalist Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: Velasco was ousted in a coup orchestrated by the Minister of Defense, Carlos Mancheno Cajas. Because Mancheno failed to gather wider support within the military, they reinstated the President's constitutional successor as an interim leader, who successfully restored the country to constitutional order, and subsequently, a civilian was elected by Congress to complete the President's term in office (Fitch 1977:39, Becker 2000:5, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 57).<sup>122</sup> On 09/16/1947 Carlos Julio Arosemena Tola was elected as president by parliament until 08/31/1948. Under his rule presidential elections were prepared.<sup>123</sup> According to LIED multiparty executive and legislative were held. From 1946 to 1948 political liberties remained absent per LIED and can be interpreted as ambiguous by V-Dem's PCLI. Based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

06/06/1948 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date presidential elections, for the first time, supervised by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, were held. The elections were won by Galo Plaza of the National Democratic Civic Movement.<sup>124</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes elections during this period as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores them as somewhat free and fair. Their CEI scores electoral cleanliness as ambiguous. LIED categorizes political liberties as absent. V-Dem's PCLI considers them as somewhat present until 1959. Since 1960 the outcomes changed to ambiguous. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. During most of the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

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<sup>122</sup> <https://www.onwar.com/data/ecuador1947.html>

<sup>123</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carlos\\_Julio\\_Arosemena\\_Tola](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carlos_Julio_Arosemena_Tola)

<sup>124</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1948\\_Ecuadorian\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1948_Ecuadorian_presidential_election)

07/11/1963 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Military Autocracy: Concerns over Ecuador's relationship with the United States and Monroy's vocal support of the Cuban Castro regime led to the armed force move against him. Between 1963 and 1966 Ecuador was governed by a military junta consisting of Admiral Ramón Castro Jijón, General Marcos Gándara Enríquez, General Luis Cabrera Sevilla and General Guillermo Freire Posso (Fitch 1977:61-63, Schodt 1987:82, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 57). According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. While LIED still considers political liberties as absent, V-Dem's PCLI scores dropped back to not really present. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. In this timeframe, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

03/30/1966 End Military Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: On 03/29/1966 facing an economic crisis, protests from students, union groups gained popular support and forced the junta to hand power over to a civilian administration headed by Yerovi (Maier 1971: 506, Fitch 1977: 171f). Despite that Ecuador granted women suffrage in 1929, which was earlier than most independent countries in Latin America (except for Uruguay, which granted women suffrage in 1917), differences between men's and women's suffrage in Ecuador were only removed in 1967 with the establishment of a new constitution (before 1967 women's vote was optional, while that of men was compulsory; since 1967 it is compulsory for both sexes).<sup>125</sup> For these two years, political liberties were absent according to LIED. V-Dem's PCLI indicates a not real presence in 1966. In 1967 and 1968 the outcomes switched to a score that we interpret as ambiguous. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

06/02/1968 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date general elections were held in Ecuador (Fitch 1977:175, Freeman 1981, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 57). The presidential election was won by José María Velasco of the National Velasquista Federation, who received 32.8% of the vote.<sup>126</sup> The prospects for Velasco's fifth presidency were poor: a lack of a majority in Congress, the failure to forge a coalition, a stalemate in the legislature, a high turnover of cabinet ministers and the looming

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<sup>125</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s\\_suffrage](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage); <https://constitutionnet.org/country/constitutional-history-ecuador>

<sup>126</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1968\\_Ecuadorian\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1968_Ecuadorian_general_election)

fiscal crisis (Rudolph 1991: 40). To oversee the elections, the Organization of American States (OAS) sent three observers who monitored the process from 05/27/1968 to 06/12/1968. They concluded that the authorities were completely impartial, and the Armed Forces and Police conducted themselves impeccably. They also observed that the Electoral Supreme Court and Provincial Courts fully complied with the relevant laws and regulations. Furthermore, they highlighted the strong civic engagement displayed by the entire population during the events on 06/02 (Plaza 1968: 7-8). Quantitative indicators regarding the freeness and fairness of the elections are mixed. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED classifies the elections as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores electoral freedom and fairness as ambiguous and their CEI classifies them as not really clean. AF classifies this period as personalist autocracy, BR as a civilian dictatorship, MCM as a multiparty autocracy, GWF and REIGN as a democracy and LIED as an exclusive democracy. In addition, LIED sees political liberties as absent. V-Dem's PCLI scores them as ambiguous for the whole period. On the other hand, Polity 5 sees substantial limitations on executive authority in place and classifies the country as an anocracy. For the year 1969, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. Given all our indicators we classify the country as an electoral hybrid regime.

06/22/1970 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Personalist Autocracy: President Velasco suspended in an autogolpe the constitution, dissolved the parliament and declared himself a civilian dictator. After the self-coup he ruled by decree supported by the military and arrested the opposition (Fitch 1977:175-176, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 57). Velasco's crucial ally was his nephew and Minister of Defense, General Jorge Acosta Velasco, who consistently reorganized the high command to ensure the presence of Velasquistas in key positions.<sup>127</sup> Since the National Velasquista Federation was started in 1952 as an electoral vehicle and barely existed apart from election periods it cannot be regarded as a check on his personalist power. Regarding this regime our coding is in line with GWF and REIGN. However, like GWF and REIGN and different from AF we would not consider the whole period from the election on 06/02/1968 as a personalist autocracy. According to LIED only executive elections were present in this period. We agree to this classification since the president remained in power, but the parliament was dissolved in this period. According to Polity5, during this period, the

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<sup>127</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Ecuador\\_\(1960%E2%80%931990\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Ecuador_(1960%E2%80%931990))



executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. Regarding the political liberties, they remained absent according to LIED and ambiguous per V-Dem's PCLI. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

02/15/1972 End Personalist Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, General Guillermo Rodríguez Lara, the commander of the army, led a coup which overthrew Velasco and suspended the elections. Lara ruled apart from a junta as president in the aftermath. The reason for the coup was that military leaders feared that the upcoming presidential election could seat an unstable, populist candidate at the head of government. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. In this timeframe, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. While LIED's outcomes regarding political liberties were still absent, V-Dem's PCLI scores switched to decreased to not really present since 1973.

01/11/1976 End Military Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: On this date, a new military junta led by Burbano as chairman took power from Lara and worked to transition the country to civilian rule (Fitch 1977:179, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 58). According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For the years 1977 and 1978, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For the following year, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are limited. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. Per FH's evaluation for this regime period, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. For this period, political liberties were absent (LIED) and can be

interpreted as not really present until 1977 and as ambiguous form 1978 onwards per V-Dem's PCLI.

04/29/1979 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Defective Democracy: On this date, the second round of presidential elections and parliamentary elections were held. Both were considered free and fair (Schodt 1987:131, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 58). The capability for citizens to alter their government through elections was evident, with the 1998 campaign suggesting a shift away from the perceived national reluctance towards electoral mechanisms for resolving political disputes. Constitutional assurances regarding freedom of expression, religion, and the formation of political parties were generally upheld. However, the judiciary, often weakened by pervasive corruption within the political framework, was overseen by a supreme court that, until 1997, had been appointed by the legislature, thus susceptible to political manipulation (Karatnycky 2000). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. During this period, LIED categorizes elections as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores them mostly as free and fair with brief periods of being somewhat free and fair in between. Their CEI similarly scores them mostly as clean and sometimes as somewhat clean. As per FH's classification for the regime period between 1979 and 1984, the country is considered free with a score ranging from 2 to 4, which we also interpret as free in our framework. Between 1985 and 1987 the country receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. For the period from 1988 and 1990 Ecuador is considered free with a score ranging from 2 to 4, which we also interpret as free in our framework. Per FH's scoring for 1991 to 1995, the country is classified as free with a score of 5, which falls into our interpretation of the rather free category. In 1996 and 1997, it scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. For the remaining period of the regime, the country is classified as free with a score of 5, which falls into our interpretation of the rather free category. In addition to that, political liberties are still categorized as absent by LIED. V-Dem's PCLI outcomes varied between full and somewhat present in this period. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. Our classification of V-Dem's JCE however alternates between the indication of moderate (1980-1984, 1989-1992, and 1997-1998) and limited (1985-1988, 1993-1996, and 1999-2000) judicial constraints on the executive. While most quantitative indicators indicate that Ecuador was a liberal democracy in this period according to our observations it falls into the category of a defective democracy.

Despite the promising developments, several factors undermined the robustness of Ecuador's democracy. The judiciary, while constitutionally independent, was often compromised by pervasive corruption, particularly within the Supreme Court, which was appointed by the legislature until 1997. This susceptibility to political manipulation weakened the checks and balances essential for a healthy democratic system. Additionally, the military maintained substantial influence over politics, exerting control through personal relationships and internal divisions within the officer corps. The presence of corruption, clientelism, and limited judicial independence indicated significant democratic deficits.

01/21/2000 End Defective Democracy/Start Military (Rebel) Autocracy: President Jamil Mahuad was ousted by a coalition of Indigenous activists, led by CONAIE, the primary organization representing Indigenous peoples in Ecuador, and dissatisfied military officials, amid widespread protests against his harsh economic policies. Mahuad was compelled to flee the country. A temporary "junta of national salvation" was established by CONAIE and their military allies. However, this governance structure lasted less than 24 hours (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 76).<sup>128</sup> While we agree with MCM that there was a military takeover at this date according to our observation it only lasted one day.<sup>129</sup>

01/22/2000 End Military (Rebel) Autocracy/Start Defective Democracy: The leadership of the military caused the dissolution of the junta. On 01/22/2000 the National Congress elected Gustavo Noboa as president.<sup>130</sup> Noboa took the oath of office as President in the Ministry of Defense, and Mahuad reluctantly went into exile. Although the failure of the junior officers' coup in support of constitutional succession garnered national and international attention, there is no doubt that the armed forces' involuntary and unconstitutional removal of Mahuad constituted a military coup d'état (Fitch 2005: 45). Therefore, while the procedure was in principle in accordance with the constitution, the regime is classified in our dataset as a defective democracy. The reason is that the elected president Mahuad was forced out of office by a non-elected actor, namely the military. Therefore, it is an actor who exercises power outside the constitutional order and limits the exercise of power of constitutional and elected bodies. MCM classifies the period as a military autocracy and CGV as a civilian autocracy, AF classifies the regime as personalist. BMR notes a non-democratic period from 2000 to 2002. Other datasets like GWF, HTW, LIED and RoW overlook the deficits of the period and classify the period as democratic. LIED categorizes the elections as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI

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<sup>128</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2000\\_Ecuadorian\\_coup\\_d%27%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2000_Ecuadorian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat)

<sup>129</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2000\\_Ecuadorian\\_coup\\_d%27%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2000_Ecuadorian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat)

<sup>130</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gustavo\\_Noboa](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gustavo_Noboa)

indicates that elections were free and fair while their CEI indicates that they were somewhat clean. However, in line with our qualitative observations. Throughout the early 2000s, Ecuador continued to hold regular presidential and parliamentary elections. While international observers generally deemed these elections as competitive, there were underlying issues that impeded genuine democratic practices. The Central Electoral Authority, despite its long-established role since 1923, remained heavily influenced by the executive branch, limiting its ability to ensure impartial and transparent electoral processes. Additionally, the military maintained a significant presence in politics, exerting pressure through personal relationships and internal divisions within the officer corps, which threatened the stability and fairness of the political landscape. On 11/24/2002, Lucio Gutiérrez Borbúa, a retired colonel who had taken part in the removal of Mahuad (an event commemorated in the full title of his small group, the Patriotic Society Party of January 21 – PSP), won in the second round of the presidential election by defeating Álvaro Noboa Pontón, who ran as the leader of the Institutional Renewal Party of National Action – PRIAN. The first round of the presidential election took place on 10/15/2006, with 13 initial candidates. It resulted in a runoff between Álvaro Noboa Pontón of the PRIAN, a right-of-center populist millionaire, and Rafael Correa Delgado, an economist, former finance minister, and leader of the left-wing bloc called the Country Alliance – AP (Lansford 2021). Under President Rafael Correa, who came to power in 2007, there was a noticeable centralization of authority. The 2008 Constitution expanded presidential powers, allowing Correa to call national referenda, partially veto or modify legislation, and run for consecutive terms. These constitutional changes facilitated Correa's prolonged tenure and enabled him to influence key aspects of governance, including the judiciary and media (Lansford 2021). An essential tool at the president's disposal is the ability to partially veto or modify laws passed by the unicameral parliament. In such cases, the original legislation can only be restored with the approval of a two-thirds majority vote. Correa exploited this provision to alter laws as he pleased, even those proposed by his own legislative majority. The 2008 constitution introduced additional presidential powers, most notably lifting the ban on consecutive re-election of the president, previously in place in the 1998 Constitution. This change allowed Correa to serve multiple terms as president, running again in 2009 and subsequently in 2013. The 2008 document also grants Correa the power to dissolve the National Assembly and call for new elections, although he has not exercised this authority yet.<sup>131</sup> However, he has occasionally used the threat of doing so to prevent resistance from lawmakers.

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<sup>131</sup> [https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Ecuador\\_2021?lang=en](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Ecuador_2021?lang=en)

Members of the legislative majority belonging to Correa's party, the Alianza País (AP), understand that their electoral prospects heavily rely on their 'charismatic leader. As a result, they rarely deviate from official party lines or defy orders from above (Conaghan 2016). Elections are largely considered free and fair by international observers.<sup>132</sup> Ecuador possesses a strong and independent judiciary at higher levels, contributing to a functioning system of checks and balances. However, the lower-level judiciary struggles with prosecuting drug trafficking organizations.<sup>133</sup> LIED categorizes the elections for this entire period as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores them as free and fair until 2012, after which it only scores them as somewhat free and fair. Their CEI scores them as somewhat clean for almost the entire period and even as clean between 2003 and 2005. Per FH, for the regime period until 2020, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. 2021 and 2022 the country is classified as free with a score of 5, which falls into our interpretation of the rather free category. From 2023 onwards, it has again been rated as partly free with a score of 6, which we interpret as rather free in our framework. Furthermore, political liberties are still not achieved according to LIED, while V-Dem's PCLI declares full political liberties except between 2009 and 2017 when they view them as somewhat present. While the quantitative indicators still point into the direction of a liberal democracy according to our observations based on the literature we have to classify the regime as a defective democracy. The period saw significant political unrest and violence, particularly surrounding elections. High levels of corruption, clientelism, and the influence of criminal groups severely impacted the integrity of the electoral process. Hence, according to our observations V-Dem's EF&FI seems too high. Incidents such as the assassination of political candidates and threats against journalists created an environment of fear and intimidation, further restricting political competition and media freedom. Despite high voter turnout rates, these conditions prevented the elections from being fully free and fair, as they hindered the ability of candidates to campaign effectively and voters to make informed choices without coercion or fear. We rate the quality of the elections as ambiguous. On 23/07/2023 after President Guillermo Lasso Mendoza was impeached in May 2023, he invoked a constitutional clause that allowed him to trigger early elections by dissolving the legislature. The election period was marred by heavy violence, spreading fear among voters and forcing candidates to limit campaigning. V-Dem's CEI still scores the election as somewhat clean. Moreover, the elections were free and fair according to V-Dem's EF&FI. Still according to our observations this is a misjudgement since the quality of the elections is only ambiguous.

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<sup>132</sup> <https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/ECU>

<sup>133</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/ecuador/freedom-world/2024>

Mayor Augustin Inriago Quijano was killed in July and shortly after, on 08/09, presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio Valencia was assassinated. Danie Noboa Azín won in runoff elections in October. The electoral period saw such a spike in violence that Freedom House downgraded Ecuador's status to partly free. The violence extended to media representatives, further restricting journalists. FH reports indicate that self-censorship has increased due to pressure from criminal groups and fear of violence, leading some journalists to leave the country.<sup>134</sup> While turnout remained high at 82% this period cannot be classified as a full democracy due to the effects of high violence including obstacles to the electoral process, fear in voters and restrictive effects on media freedom.<sup>135</sup> From 2000 to 2006, as per Polity5's categorization, the executive's authority was significantly constrained, nearing parity with other branches, placing it in the third intermediate category. Since 2007, as per Polity5's classification, the executive experienced moderate limitations on authority, placing it in the second intermediate category. From 2001 to 2006, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For the year 2007, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. From 2008 to 2012, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. For the period 2013-2016, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. For the year 2017, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. Since 2018, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

Defective Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Conaghan 1994, Hudson 1991, Isaacs 1993, Levitt 2007, Sonntag 2001)

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<sup>134</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/ecuador/freedom-world/2024>

<sup>135</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023\\_Ecuadorian\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023_Ecuadorian_general_election)

## Egypt

01/01/1900 Autocratic Monarchy [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: 09/13/1882]: Egypt was until the end of the First World War officially a province of the Ottoman Empire. In 1882 British troops occupied the Ottoman Egypt in the aftermath of the ‘Urabi revolt’ that escalated on 06/11/1882 with the bombing of Alexandria<sup>136</sup> and ended with the battle of Tel el-Kebir on 09/13/1882 that ultimately restored British power over the territory.<sup>137</sup> However, from this date onwards it was semi-officially a virtually independent state with its own monarchy, armed forces, and territorial possessions in Sudan. For practical purposes it was a puppet state of the United Kingdom. The literature also speaks of a “veiled protectorate” established by Britain during that time.<sup>138</sup> After 1879, Egypt was subject to the control of the British advisers in its commercial matters (Willoughby/Fenwick 1974). Britain had posted a British agent and consul general in Egypt (Crawford 2006:287, McIlwraith 1917). From 12/18/1914 on Britain established a formal protectorate by treaty over Egypt (Crawford 2006:287). A British high commissioner replaced the British agent and consul general (Crawford 2006:287). Khedive Abbas II of Egypt was removed from power by the British because of his pro-Ottoman positions. He was replaced by his uncle Hussein Kamel, who declared Egypt’s independence from the Ottoman Empire and proclaimed himself as Sultan (Crawford 2006:287, McIlwraith 1917). According to LIED only multiparty legislative elections were held. Since the United Kingdom heavily interfered in domestic affairs this is a borderline case between a protectorate and a (de-facto) colony.<sup>139</sup> From 1900 to 1919, V-Dem’s JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. The remaining years of this regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is classified as robust, indicating strong and regular judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem’s LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. However, political liberties were absent according to LIED and not really present according to V-Dem’s PCLI. Therefore, we classify this period as an autocratic monarchy.

02/28/1922 Continuation Autocratic Monarchy [as independent country]: Egypt became independent from Britain as the Kingdom of Egypt officially as of 03/15/1922. However, four matters were still reserved to the British government’s discretion: defense, the security of imperial communications, the protection of foreign interests and of minorities, and the

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<sup>136</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Urabi\\_revolt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Urabi_revolt)

<sup>137</sup> <https://the-past.com/feature/all-sir-garnet/>

<sup>138</sup> <https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/first-world-war/a-global-view/the-middle-east/egypt/>

<sup>139</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sultanate\\_of\\_Egypt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sultanate_of_Egypt)

administration of the Sudan (Ibrahim 1973). Beyond these British prerogatives and the constant intervention of the British High Commissioner in “Egyptian affairs” after independence (Roberts 1986), Egypt nevertheless retained complete jurisdiction and had her own Ministry of Foreign Affairs and diplomatic envoys in the majority of countries globally (1936). This rules out that Britain maintained a protectorate over Egypt in the post-independence period. Egypt became formally a constitutional monarchy. In 1923 male suffrage was introduced (LIED). The 1923 constitution provided for an independent judiciary, a bicameral parliament and laid the executive powers with the king.<sup>140</sup> Sultan Ahmad Fu’ad (a son of Isma’il), who had succeeded in 1917, took the title of King of Egypt (Roberts 1986). However, he “violated the constitution the same year it was adopted and suspended it in 1930” (Vatikiotis 1961:23, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 58). In 1930 a new constitution granted more extensive powers to the executive in form of the king and his ministers. It was repealed in 1935 following extensive protests and replaced by the 1923 constitution.<sup>141</sup> On 04/28/1936, King Fu’ad died and was succeeded by his son Faruk.<sup>142</sup> In 1936, Egypt received a greater autonomy concerning its own diplomatic affairs and assumed control over its own military. Egypt also became a Member of the League of Nations (Roberts 1986). According to LIED only multiparty legislative elections were held in 1924, from 1926 to 1927, from 1931 to 1933 and from 1936 onward. Thus, according to LIED no multiparty executive elections were held from 1922 to 1923, in 1925, from 1928 to 1930 and from 1935 to 1935. From 1922 to 1927, as per Polity5’s classification, the executive’s authority was on par with or below that of other branches, reflecting executive parity or subordination. Between 1930 and 1933, as per Polity5’s classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem’s JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. Since 1935, the executive’s authority was on par with or below that of other branches, reflecting executive parity or subordination. For this time political liberties were coded as absent by LIED and can be interpreted as not really present per V-Dem’s PCLI.

07/23/1952 End Autocratic Monarchy/Start Military Autocracy: A military coup by the Free Officers, an organization of junior and mid-level officers, led by Major General Mohamed Naguib and Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, assumed power on this date (Haddad 1973: 11-12, 21-22, Perlmutter 1974:49).<sup>143</sup> They established the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC)

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<sup>140</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Egypt/Government-and-society>

<sup>141</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Egypt/Government-and-society>

<sup>142</sup> <https://countrystudies.us/egypt/29.htm>

<sup>143</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohamed\\_Naguib](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohamed_Naguib)



made up of members of the Free Officers' executive committee to rule (Haddad 1973: 11-12, 21-22, Brooker 1995: 148, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 58). The most notable economic manifestations of Arab Socialism were the land reforms in 1952 and the nationalization of major industries and the banking systems in the country.<sup>144</sup> Naguib called for a return to civil rule early on but was thwarted by other forces in the RCC. Naguib's tenure as president came to end in November 1954 due to disagreements with other members of the Free Officers, particularly with Nasser, who forced him to resign and succeeded him as president.<sup>145</sup> The Liberation Rally was a short-lived political organization created after the Egyptian revolution of 1952 to organize popular support for the government. Formed around a month after all other parties were outlawed, it supported pan-Arabism, Arab socialism, and British withdrawal from the Suez Canal. The Rally was dissolved in 1957 and replaced by the National Union.<sup>146</sup> Because the regime was ruled by a junta the period is classified as a military autocracy. The one-party autocracy can be seen as a continuation of the ruling military group which gained power through the coup in 1952. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. Besides, political liberties are coded as absent by LIED and V-Dem's PCLI. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For the year 1953, V-Dem's JCE is classified as robust, indicating strong and regular judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. From 1954 to 1956, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are moderate. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

07/24/1956 End Military Autocracy/Start One-Party (Personalist) Autocracy: On this date the RCC dissolved itself.<sup>147</sup> Its dissolution marked the end of the initial phase of military rule and the beginning of Nasser's personal rule, which continued to be characterized by a strong military influence in the government. The coup also led to the independence of Sudan. In 1956 female suffrage was additionally introduced.<sup>148</sup> Under Gamal Abdel Nasser there was a single-party rule.<sup>149</sup> The National Union and later the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) were based on the

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<sup>144</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Egyptian\\_Revolutionary\\_Command\\_Council](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Egyptian_Revolutionary_Command_Council)

<sup>145</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohamed\\_Naguib](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohamed_Naguib)

<sup>146</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberation\\_Rally](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberation_Rally)

<sup>147</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Egyptian\\_Revolutionary\\_Command\\_Council](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Egyptian_Revolutionary_Command_Council)

<sup>148</sup> <https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/12317569/>

<sup>149</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National\\_Democratic\\_Party\\_](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Democratic_Party_);

<https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/1/101085/BREAKING-Chad-president-assassinated-by-militants-from-North>

principles of Nasserism and Arab socialism.<sup>150</sup> While ASU remained the sole legal party in the parliamentary elections on 10/28/1976, as in previous elections, these elections were unique in having three distinct political factions of the party compete against each other (the right-wing Socialist Liberal Organisation, the centrist Arab Socialist Organisation and the left-wing National Progressive Unionist Party). Between 02/22/1958 and 09/28/1961 Egypt was united with Syria as United Arab Republic. Egypt continued until 1971 to name itself as the United Arab Republic. The UAR soon turned into a state dominated by Egypt. Hence, the UAR is coded under the cowcode of Egypt in this period. The period is classified as a one-party autocracy. However, the regime had strong military features because of the military character of Nasser's rise to power by coup d'état as well as his strict military allegiance. Following Gamal Abdel Nasser's death, Anwar Sadat took the presidential office on 10/15/1970 and launched the "Corrective Revolution" on 05/15/1971 to consolidate his power. He dismissed and imprisoned Vice President Ali Sabri and the Minister of the Interior, Sharawi Gomaa.<sup>151</sup> On 10/02/1978 Nasser's successor Anwar Sadat announced the founding of the National Democratic Party (NDP), on 07/09/1978. It was then officially approved on 10/02/1978. While Sadat had introduced several reforms to instate a multi-party, democratic electoral system, there was a de facto one-party rule. A new state organ known as the Political Parties Committee (PPC) was created which was able to suspend other parties' activities under law 40. PCC was chaired by NDP.<sup>152</sup> All parties emerged from the ruling party. Consequently, the regime is viewed as a de facto one-party autocracy.<sup>153</sup> This is underlined by the fact that in the presidential elections there was only one candidate from the NDP and no competition. Since its creation in 1978, the NDP held no less than three-quarters of the seats in the parliament. The party's ideology intentionally stayed ambiguous and open to interpretation.<sup>154</sup> Even though the first multi-party parliamentary elections in Egypt since 1952 took place on 06/07/1979<sup>155</sup>, the NDP wielded uncontested power in state politics and is usually considered a de facto single party

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<sup>150</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab\\_Socialist\\_Union\\_\(Egypt\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_Socialist_Union_(Egypt))

<sup>151</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anwar\\_Sadat#Presidency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anwar_Sadat#Presidency)

<sup>152</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National\\_Democratic\\_Party\\_](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Democratic_Party_);

<https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/1/101085/BREAKING-Chad-president-assassinated-by-militants-from-North>

<sup>153</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1979\\_Egyptian\\_parliamentary\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1979_Egyptian_parliamentary_election)

<sup>154</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National\\_Democratic\\_Party\\_](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Democratic_Party_);

<https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/1/101085/BREAKING-Chad-president-assassinated-by-militants-from-North>

<sup>155</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1979\\_Egyptian\\_parliamentary\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1979_Egyptian_parliamentary_election)

regime.<sup>156</sup> The parliament was restricted to the role of rubber-stamping presidential authority because it is confined by presidential powers beyond its control.<sup>157</sup> This period represents a borderline case between a military autocracy and a one-party autocracy because Sadat (the founder of the NDP)<sup>158</sup> as well as his successor Hosni Mubarak were military officers.<sup>159</sup> Anwar Sadat was a senior member of the “Free Officers” who overthrew the King in the 1952 coup d’état during the Egyptian Revolution which led to Nasser’s accession to power.<sup>160</sup> Sadat was assassinated on 10/06/1981. Sufi Abu Taleb served as interim president from 10/06/1981 to 10/14/1981, after which Hosni Mubarak took the presidential office.<sup>161</sup> Until Mubarak’s deposition in 2011 Egypt had operated under a “state of emergency” for all but five months since 1967, allowing the president to outlaw demonstrations, hold detainees indefinitely without trial, and issue law by decree.<sup>162</sup> State repression and surveillance was constant and widespread, limiting Islamist and liberal opposition groups, as they were targeted by state violence, arrests, and legal harassment.<sup>163</sup> The Muslim Brotherhood, the largest opposition group, though officially banned, had some success by running as “independent” candidates in elections.<sup>164</sup> According to LIED only executive elections were held in 1956, in 1957 executive and legislative elections, which weren’t multiparty, were held, from 1958 to 1962 only executive elections were held, from 1963 onward executive and legislative elections, which weren’t multiparty, were held. As classified by FH for 1972 and 1973, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Between 1974 and 1983 the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. In 1984 and 1985 the country receives a score of 8, which we interpret as falling into the rather not free category. For the regime period from 1986 to 1991 a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. For the remaining period Egypt scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. Furthermore, LIED classifies political liberties as absent for this period. V-Dem’s PCLI categorizes political

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<sup>156</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National\\_Democratic\\_Party\\_](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Democratic_Party_);  
<https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/1/101085/BREAKING-Chad-president-assassinated-by-militants-from-North>

<sup>157</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National\\_Democratic\\_Party\\_](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Democratic_Party_)

<sup>158</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anwar\\_Sadat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anwar_Sadat)

<sup>159</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosni\\_Mubarak](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosni_Mubarak)

<sup>160</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anwar\\_Sadat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anwar_Sadat)

<sup>161</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosni\\_Mubarak#President\\_of\\_Egypt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosni_Mubarak#President_of_Egypt)

<sup>162</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National\\_Democratic\\_Party\\_](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Democratic_Party_);  
<https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/1/101085/BREAKING-Chad-president-assassinated-by-militants-from-North>

<sup>163</sup> <https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2009/12/egypts-opposition-misled-by-fixation-with-mubaraks-son?lang=en>

<sup>164</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muslim\\_Brotherhood#Mubarak\\_era](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muslim_Brotherhood#Mubarak_era)

liberties as absent until 1972 and as not really present from 1973 onwards. Since 1956, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints during this time. For 1957, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. For the year 1958, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For the year 1959, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also moderate. For 1960, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For the year 1961, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. In the two following years, For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are moderate. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. From 1964 to 1970, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. From 1971 to 1989, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For the rest of the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

09/07/2005 End One-Party Autocracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: The first multi-candidate presidential elections in the history of Egypt were held on 09/07/2005.<sup>165</sup> All Egyptians over the age of 18 were required to vote but only around 40% of the population were registered as voters. Parties were allowed to propose presidential candidates which were subsequently reviewed by the Presidential Election Commission. In 2005, only around one third of the initially presented candidates were allowed to run in the elections. Monitoring was carried out by Egyptian Judges, international oversight, however, was not allowed.<sup>166</sup> Based on our

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<sup>165</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2005\\_Egyptian\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2005_Egyptian_presidential_election)

<sup>166</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2005\\_Egyptian\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2005_Egyptian_presidential_election)

observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes elections during this period as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores them as not really free or fair while their CEI scores them as not clean. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. Besides, political liberties are categorized as absent by LIED and can be interpreted as not really present by V-Dem's PCLI. Based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

02/11/2011 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: After two weeks of mass protests (Egyptian revolution) President Mubarak's resigned, entrusting the Supreme Council of Egyptian Armed Forces with the leadership of the country. The military junta was headed by Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi who served as the Minister of Defense under Mubarak.<sup>167</sup> This regime is classified as military autocracy rather than non-electoral transitional autocracy based on its legitimization pattern. While SCAF initially employed caretaker rhetoric, describing itself as managing a transition and organizing elections, it simultaneously invoked guardianship legitimization. SCAF claimed authority to protect Egypt's national interests, presented the military as the guardian of the revolution and national stability, and asserted the armed forces' unique capacity to navigate the crisis. In public statements, SCAF emphasized the military's role as the protector of the nation and the revolution, not merely as a facilitator of transition. This combination of guardianship and transitional rhetoric is decisive: the presence of guardianship claims reveals a substantive legitimization of military rule rather than purely procedural facilitation. Had SCAF employed exclusively caretaker legitimization without invoking the military's special guardianship role, classification as non-electoral transitional autocracy would be warranted. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. Based on Polity5's evaluation, during this period, the executive faced weak constraints, classified as Intermediate Category 1 between unlimited authority and slight limitations. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our

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<sup>167</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supreme\\_Council\\_of\\_the\\_Armed\\_Forces](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supreme_Council_of_the_Armed_Forces)

interpretation of not free. Political liberties are still coded as absent per LIED, whereas V-Dem's PCLI outcomes can be interpreted as ambiguous in 2011.

05/23[&24]/2012 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: First mostly free and fair democratic presidential election of Egypt's history, which were won by Mohamed Morsi of the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood.<sup>168</sup> However, from the start of Morsi's presidency there were severe restrictions to democracy. Shortly after taking office, in 11/2012, a temporary constitutional declaration was released, providing him with unlimited powers and the authority to legislate without judicial oversight (Kirkpatrick/Sheikh 2012). The aim of this was to avoid judicial control by the judges of the Mubarak era. Independent press agencies called this process an Islamist coup. Morsi revoked this decree during the protests in 2012. A new constitution was passed by referendum.<sup>169</sup> Restrictions on political and civil rights in regard to the freedom of association, speech, and press remained.<sup>170</sup> Per FH's evaluation for this regime period, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. According to LIED political liberties were coded as absent and V-Dem's PCLI scores them as ambiguous. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. The 2012 elections are categorized as not competitive by LIED. V-Dem's EF&FI scores it as somewhat free and fair while their CEI scores it as ambiguously clean. Based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

07/03/2013 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Military Autocracy: A military coup led by General Abdul Fatah al-Sisi ousted President Mohamed Morsi. The constitution of 2012 was suspended, and Adly Mansour was declared interim President. The independence of the judiciary was weakened, and the military's role strengthened (Lenze Jr. 2016).<sup>171</sup> The interim phase is defined by substantial unrest and instability leading to sectarian attacks against minority groups and wide-spread repression and arrests of the opposition and extremist groups by the military. On 05/28/2014 former Military General Al-Sisi was elected President receiving 97% of votes. Transparency and fairness of the presidential election was criticized. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held in 2013, in 2014 only

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<sup>168</sup> <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-18571580>

<sup>169</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohamed\\_Morsi](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohamed_Morsi)

<sup>170</sup> <https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2012/nea/204357.htm>

<sup>171</sup> <https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/75353>

executive elections were held. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is also classified by us as indicating that political liberties are not really present in 2013 and are absent afterwards. For 2014, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For the year 2015, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are robust. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

10/17[-12/02]/2015 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral (Military) Autocracy: The 2019 constitutional amendments extended the military's scope of action into civilian-defined area. Thereby, the EAF can de jure intervene against the executive leader at any given time, as their veto power over the presidential authority is anchored in the new constitution.<sup>172</sup> Decision-making today is in the hands of former army leaders who left the military establishment and entered the civilian sphere. Significant political opposition is nearly non-existent, as expressing dissent can result in criminal prosecution and imprisonment. Civil liberties, such as press freedom and freedom of assembly, are closely restricted.<sup>173</sup> Although there is no formal junta, the military wields significant power over civilian governance and public life. The political environment under Sisi has been marked by severe restrictions on political opposition, media freedom, and civil liberties. From 2015 onward LIED reflects that multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. According to LIED and V-Dem's PCLI political liberties were not present ever since 2015. From 2014 to 2018, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints. For the year 2016, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For 2017, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For 2018, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. Since 2019, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that

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<sup>172</sup> <https://timep.org/reports-briefings/timep-brief-2019-constitutional-amendments/>

<sup>173</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/egypt>; [https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Egypt\\_2019?lang=en](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Egypt_2019?lang=en)

judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. Elections in December 2023 were uncompetitive with no opposition and marked by intimidation and arrests. Incumbent president Al-Sisi won his 6th consecutive term with a reported 89.6% of the vote. The regime continues to highly restrict political rights, civil liberties and media freedom<sup>174</sup> and its crackdown on political opponents and dissidents.<sup>175</sup> New legislation in early 2024 has further entrenched the military's authority, allowing for the deployment of military personnel in civilian facilities and expanding their role in controlling markets and public order.

Electoral (Military) Autocracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Albrecht 2005, Blaydes 2011, Breivik Andersen 2011, Brown 1997, Brownlee 2007, Hinnebusch 1988, Oppenheim/Roxburgh 1920, Ottaway 2015, Richter 2007, Rutherford 2008, Tripp/Owen 1989)

## **El Salvador**

[formerly known as Salvador]

01/01/1900 Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy [Start: 09/15/1821]: On 09/15/1821, El Salvador became independent as a part of Central America. Criollos in Guatemala City composed the Act of Independence of Central America. On 01/05/1822, the government of Central America voted for the annexation of Central America and Central America became a province of the First Mexican Empire.<sup>176</sup> On 07/01/1823 the Congress of Central America declared independence from Mexico. On 02/02/1841 the Federal Republic of Central America dissolved, and El Salvador became an independent nation. In 1883 universal male suffrage was introduced. However, even with universal male suffrage, the elections held minimal political importance, with electoral competition confined to a small oligarchy (Krennerich 2005: 270). This oligarchy consisted of wealthy landowners, especially owners of coffee plantations. They are often referred to as Fourteen Families. The Coffee Growers Association has often been described as 'invisible government'.<sup>177</sup> Therefore, the oligarchy's dominant position remained unchallenged by government actions. The direct and indirect ties of the presidents during that

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<sup>174</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/egypt/freedom-world/2024>

<sup>175</sup> <https://bti-project.org/de/reports/country-dashboard/EGY>

<sup>176</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal\\_Republic\\_of\\_Central\\_America#Independence\\_1821%E2%80%931822](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Republic_of_Central_America#Independence_1821%E2%80%931822); [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Central\\_America](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Central_America)

<sup>177</sup> <https://countrystudies.us/el-salvador/6.htm>



time with influential families in the country also played a crucial role. In broad terms, the system persisted without modification, as it proved effective for the limited portion of Salvadorans who profited from it – specifically, the economic elite, high-ranking government officials, and the military High Command.<sup>178</sup> The percentage of voters of the total population is according to Vanhanen between 3,0 and 5,0% (Vanhanen 2019). The combination of the quantitative and qualitative indicators justifies the classification of the regime as an electoral oligarchy, despite the universal male suffrage. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes elections during this time as not competitive. V-Dem’s EF&FI scores them as not really free or fair and their CEI scores them as not clean. In addition to that political liberties were absent according to LIED and considered as not really present by V-Dem’s PCLI. Based on Polity5’s assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

12/02/1931 End Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: A military coup by junior officers ousted the elected president Arturo Araujo. The military junta “Civic Directory” ruled from 12/02/1931 to 12/04/1931 before General Hernández Martínez, who had been vice president, defense Minister, and commander of the armed forces, assumed the presidency (White 1973:99, Haggerty 1990, Stanley 1996:48-50, 63-64, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 58).<sup>179</sup> Presidential elections were held on 01/13-15/1935, with General Hernández Martínez as the only candidate. The legislative elections in 1932 were cancelled by the President, and the results of the elections in 1936 were never published.<sup>180</sup> From 1933 to 1945, the National Party of the Fatherland (PNPP) was the sole legal party in El Salvador. While de forma El Salvador was a one-party autocracy, it was de facto a subtype of a military autocracy. The whole purpose of the party was to support the regime of General Hernández Martínez, who founded the party and was its leader.<sup>181</sup> Women obtained suffrage in 1939 with restrictions requiring literacy and a higher age. According to LIED executive and legislative elections, which weren’t multiparty, were held until 1938, and from 1939 onward only legislative elections, which weren’t multiparty, were held. Moreover, for this regime period, both LIED and V-Dem’s PCLI coded political liberties as absent. Based on Polity5’s assessment, during this period, the executive

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<sup>178</sup> <https://countrystudies.us/el-salvador/6.htm>

<sup>179</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1931\\_Salvadoran\\_coup\\_d%27%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1931_Salvadoran_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat)

<sup>180</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections\\_in\\_El\\_Salvador#1931\\_2](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_El_Salvador#1931_2)

<sup>181</sup> <https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/el-salvadorans-bring-down-dictator-1944>

operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

05/09/1944 End Military Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: Following intense street protests, President General Hernandez Martinez resigned.<sup>182</sup> On the same day, General Andrés Ignacio Menéndez assumed the role of the provisional president. He declared amnesty for everyone who was part of the unrest, and thus began a national transition to democracy. Since the regime did not start with a military coup it is classified as a non-electoral transitional regime and not as a military autocracy. As per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time.

10/21/1944 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Military Autocracy: Provisional President Andrés Ignacio Menéndez was overthrown by General Osmín Aguirre.<sup>183</sup> In early 1945, Aguirre transferred power to Salvador Castaneda Castro, a military officer, from the Social Democratic Unification Party. In presidential elections on 01/14-16/1945 military officer Castaneda Castro was elected. However, the elections were not free and fair and no oppositional candidates took part in the election. They were namely boycotted by five candidates who withdrew after accusing Osmín Aguirre y Salinas of unfair practices to ensure victory for his favored candidate.<sup>184</sup> Even so there were presidential elections in 1945 the period after is classified as a continuation of the military autocracy starting on 10/21/1944. According to LIED only legislative elections, which weren't multiparty, were held in 1944, from 1945 onward executive and legislative elections, which weren't multiparty were held. Following LIED political liberties were still coded as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI indicates that political liberties were not really present. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

12/14/1948 End Military Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: A coup orchestrated by junior officers compelled the retirement of all officers ranked above Lieutenant Colonel, effectively dismantling the Hernandez Martinez faction. This event led to the establishment of a

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<sup>182</sup> <https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/el-salvadorans-bring-down-dictator-1944>

<sup>183</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Osm%C3%ADn\\_Aguirre\\_y\\_Salinas#Presidency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Osm%C3%ADn_Aguirre_y_Salinas#Presidency)

<sup>184</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1945\\_Salvadoran\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1945_Salvadoran_presidential_election)

Revolutionary Governing Council, selected by the remaining officer corps in its entirety (White 1973:105, Baloyra 1982:17, Stanley 1996:67). The regime following 1948 is distinguished from its predecessor by the shift in leadership ranks within the regime (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 58). A junta headed by Major Oscar Osorio was installed. In 1950 all restrictions were lifted allowing women to vote, but women obtained the right to stand for elections only in 1961.<sup>185</sup> According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. For these two years, political liberties were absent according to LIED and can be interpreted as not really present following to V-Dem's PCLI. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

09/16/1950 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: Under the terms of the constitution of 1950, which had emerged from the revolution of 1948, Osorio was elected president. He stood as candidate of the Revolutionary Party of Democratic Unification. The only opposition candidate was Colonel José Menéndez Ascencio.<sup>186</sup> Under Osoria some democratic improvements were made, but at the same time, he instituted regulations that placed the country under a suspension of both individual and collective rights, referred to as the Law on Defense of the Constitutional Order.<sup>187</sup> Based on it, he began to suppress labor leaders and students in 1952 until the end of his term.<sup>188</sup> In 1952, 1954 and 1958 parliamentary elections were held. The Revolutionary Party of Democratic Unification was the only party to contest because the opposition claimed the elections were fraudulent. Presidential elections were held on 03/04/1956. Beforehand several opposition candidates had been barred from contesting, allowing their candidate José María Lemus to win with 95%.<sup>189</sup> He held the presidency until 10/26/1960.<sup>190</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes elections during this time as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores them as not really free or fair and their CEI scores them as not clean. Due to the unfair conditions in electoral competition and process, the period is classified as an electoral autocracy. Additionally, LIED and V-Dem's

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<sup>185</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s\\_suffrage](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage)

<sup>186</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%93scar\\_Osorio](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%93scar_Osorio)

<sup>187</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%93scar\\_Osorio](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%93scar_Osorio)

<sup>188</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%93scar\\_Osorio](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%93scar_Osorio)

<sup>189</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revolutionary\\_Party\\_of\\_Democratic\\_Unification;](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revolutionary_Party_of_Democratic_Unification;)

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1952\\_Salvadoran\\_legislative\\_election;](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1952_Salvadoran_legislative_election;)

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1954\\_Salvadoran\\_legislative\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1954_Salvadoran_legislative_election)

<sup>190</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jos%C3%A9\\_Mar%C3%AD\\_Lemus](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jos%C3%A9_Mar%C3%AD_Lemus)

PCLI scores concerning the political liberties remained absent and not really present. Based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

10/26/1960 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: Lemus, facing student uprisings and political failures was overthrown by the military who feared a loss of stability and revolution. The ranking military representative was Lieutenant Colonel Julio Adalberto Rivera. Also, the civilian professor Castillo gained great influence.<sup>191</sup> According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints during this time. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are not really present. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

01/25/1961 End Military Autocracy/Start Military (One-Party) Autocracy: The Junta of Government led by Castillo was overthrown by junior officers and sectors of the military who felt the regime was too far to the left. The Civic-Military Directory was established with Portillo as its head.<sup>192</sup> Between 1962 and 1979, the National Conciliation Party (PCN), closely aligned with the Salvadoran military, governed the nation, effectively establishing a one-party state. While opposition parties did exist during this period, they had little practical influence or power.<sup>193</sup> On 07/01/1962, Julio Adalberto Rivera Carballo, a military officer and member of the Civic-Military Directory, was elected president.<sup>194</sup> According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. According to LIED only legislative elections, which weren't multiparty were held in 1961 and from 1962 to 1966 executive and legislative elections, which weren't multiparty, were held. For this regime period, LIED still classifies political liberties as absent. V-Dem's PCLI can be interpreted in the way that political liberties were not really present during this period.

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<sup>191</sup> <https://www.onwar.com/data/elsalvador1960.html>

<sup>192</sup> [https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/An%C3%ADbal\\_Portillo](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/An%C3%ADbal_Portillo)

<sup>193</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military\\_dictatorship\\_in\\_El\\_Salvador](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_dictatorship_in_El_Salvador)

<sup>194</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Julio\\_Adalberto\\_Rivera\\_Carballo](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Julio_Adalberto_Rivera_Carballo)

03/05/1967 End Military (One-Party) Autocracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date, presidential elections in El Salvador were held. Fidel Sánchez Hernández of the Party of National Conciliation won the election, securing 54.4% of the vote.<sup>195</sup> Legislative elections took place in El Salvador on 03/10/1968. The National Conciliation Party achieved victory, securing 27 out of 52 seats. Voter turnout was only 36.6%.<sup>196</sup> According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. LIED confirms that multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. As per FH's classification for the regime period from 1972 to 1975, the country receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. In 1976 a score of 6 to 7 for the assessed regime period designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. In 1977 it is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. For the remaining regime period the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. Political liberties were absent during this period (LIED). V-Dem's PCLI classifies political liberties as not really present until 1971 and absent from 1972 onwards.

10/25/1979 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: Violence between right-wing death squads and left-wing revolutionaries reached a destabilizing level and a new military and civilian junta took over to defeat the insurgencies. The military established the Revolutionary Government Junta of El Salvador as the government.<sup>197</sup> According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. Per FH's evaluation for this regime period, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. LIED and V-Dem's PCLI indicate the absence of political liberties. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

03/28/1982 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Hybrid (Military) Regime: In 1982, military and economic elites agreed to the election of a constituent assembly, where the right-wing ARENA party was prominent. The major parties' negotiations led to the Apaneca Pact, forming a Political Commission to draft a new constitution in 1983. This constitution facilitated

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<sup>195</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1967\\_Salvadoran\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1967_Salvadoran_presidential_election)

<sup>196</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1968\\_Salvadoran\\_legislative\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1968_Salvadoran_legislative_election)

<sup>197</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1979\\_Salvadoran\\_coup\\_d%27%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1979_Salvadoran_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat)

relatively free elections in 1984, won by moderate Christian Democrat Jose Napoleon Duarte (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 26).<sup>198</sup> However, the left was excluded from the elections and a civilian president deemed satisfactory to both the military and Washington got to power. Even though the allowed opposition secured victory in the presidential election in 05/1984, Geddes, Wright, and Frantz categorize the 1982-94 regime as "indirect military rule" (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 58-59). However, as regional experts Scott Mainwaring and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán in their dataset for Latin American regimes code the regime period as a semidemocracy (Mainwaring/Pérez-Liñán 2013). However, the case is in our classification a borderline case between an electoral autocracy and electoral hybrid regime. According to LIED multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. Elections during this time are categorized as competitive by LIED, which seems in a comparative perspective a misjudgment. V-Dem's EF&FI scores electoral freedom and fairness as ambiguous. Their CEI scores the elections as not clean. Furthermore, political liberties were absent for the entire time per LIED. V-Dem's PCLI indicates several changes. According to FH, for 1982 and 1983, a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. In 1984 the country receives a score of 8, which we interpret as falling into the rather not free category. From 1985 onward a score of 6 to 7 for the assessed regime period designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. Until 1989 no political liberties were present. The following two years they are classified as not really present. In 1992 the outcomes switched to an ambiguous level and to a somewhat present level in 1993. From 1984 to 1994, according to the Polity5 indicator, during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. From 1983 to 1989, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For 1990-1991, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. For the rest of the regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

03/20/1994 End Electoral Hybrid (Military) Regime/Start Defective Democracy: The 1994 election marked the culmination of the democratic transition initiated by the 1992 Chapultepec

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<sup>198</sup> [https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/El\\_Salvador\\_2014?lang=en](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/El_Salvador_2014?lang=en)

Peace Accords, a negotiated settlement between the Salvadoran government and the leftist insurgent group FMLN.<sup>199</sup> On this date, the ruling faction permitted a genuinely competitive presidential election under universal suffrage, wherein leftist parties participated for the first time.<sup>200</sup> This marked a transition to democracy (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 59). In the 01/18/2009 legislative elections, ARENA suffered a setback, losing two seats and its overall advantage to the FMLN. However, a late arrangement with the PCN allowed ARENA to maintain control of the assembly's presidency. Meanwhile, the appointment of Rodrigo Ávila, a congressman and former national police chief, as the party's candidate in the March presidential election caused internal tensions, with certain members alleging campaign fraud (Lansford 2021: 507). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes all elections during this time as competitive. From 1994 to 2013, V-Dem's EF&FI scores elections as somewhat free and fair and their CEI scores their electoral cleanliness as ambiguous. After 2013 they increase their rankings to scoring the elections as free, fair and somewhat clean. Per FH, for 1995 and 1996, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. For the period between 1997 and 2018 the country is rated as free with a score of 5, which we interpret as rather free in our framework. For the remaining period from 2019 onward the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. Moreover, political liberties are classified as absent by LIED. Whereas V-Dem's PCLI confirms they are present until 2019 and somewhat present from 2020 onwards. Until 2008, according to the Polity5 indicator, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. Since then, based on Polity5's evaluation, during this period, the executive's power was limited to a degree between substantial constraints and parity with other institutions, fitting Intermediate Category 3. From 1995 to 2007, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. For the years 2008 and 2009, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. From 2010 to 2018, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also robust. For 2019 and 2020, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as

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<sup>199</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_El\\_Salvador](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_El_Salvador)

<sup>200</sup> <https://www.ifes.org/publications/election-observation-el-salvador-march-20-april-24-1994>

indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For the year 2021, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

01/05/2021 End Defective Democracy/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: The Bukele administration consistently disrupted the legislature's policymaking process until securing a supermajority in the legislative session that began on 05/2021. Since then, both the government and legislators from the ruling party regularly block opposition lawmakers from accessing crucial information, such as draft legislation, hindering substantial discussions on proposed laws.<sup>201</sup> Bukele dismissed several judges of the highest court as well as the attorney general who was leading corruption charges. Checks and balances through media are hardly present internally and reports on the state of affairs rely mostly on investigative international media sources according to the BTI.<sup>202</sup> On 03/27/2022, President Bukele's government declared an unconstitutional state of exception which led to the arbitrary arrest of civilians and limited the freedom of assembly rights.<sup>203</sup> Since 2021, Bukele has taken steps to limit the opposition's chances, including structural changes in municipalities that favor the ruling party and significantly reducing the number of elected offices.<sup>204</sup> In the February 2024 elections, President Bukele won another term despite exceeding the constitutional term limit. Before the election, he replaced all judges in the constitutional chamber of the Supreme Court and the attorney general with loyalists. Four months later, these newly appointed officials ruled that Bukele could seek re-election despite the term limit.<sup>205</sup> He won a sweeping 85% of the vote and his party secured a supermajority in congress with 54 out of 60 seats. Multiple irregularities and shortcomings were reported including ballot duplication and other issues in the hand-counted procedure. According to Reuters, observation organization noticed that Bukele's party took intimidating attitudes towards opposition while trying to hinder the press and observation missions.<sup>206</sup> Events leading up to and after the election suggest an increasingly authoritarian trend. El Salvador became an electoral hybrid regime. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes elections during this time as competitive. V-Dem's

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<sup>201</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/el-salvador/freedom-world/2022>

<sup>202</sup> <https://bti-project.org/de/reports/country-dashboard/SLV>

<sup>203</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/el-salvador/freedom-world/2023>

<sup>204</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/el-salvador/freedom-world/2024>

<sup>205</sup> <https://bti-project.org/de/reports/country-report/SLV>

<sup>206</sup> <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/el-salvador-opposition-requests-repeat-election-congress-after-irregularities-2024-02-19/>



EF&FI scores elections as somewhat free and fair and their CEI scores their electoral cleanliness as ambiguous. According to FH, a score of 6 to 7 designates the country in the years from 2021 and 2022 as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. From 2023 onwards it is classified as partly free with scores from 8 to 9, which we place in the rather not free category in our framework. Regarding the political liberties they were still absent in 2021 (LIED). V-Dem's PCLI classifies them as ambiguous since 2021. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

Electoral Hybrid Regime as of 07/01/2025 continued.

## **Equatorial Guinea**

[formerly (during colonial rule) known as Spanish Guinea]

06/27/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Spain, Constitutional Monarchy] [Start: 03/11/1778]: The Spanish colony in the Guinea region was established in 1778, by the "Treaty of El Pardo", signed on 03/11/1778,<sup>207</sup> between the Spanish and the Portuguese Empire.<sup>208</sup> In 1926 Río Muni, Fernando Póo, and Annobón were united as Spanish Guinea. On 06/30/1959 Spanish Guinea became an overseas province of Spain.<sup>209</sup> In 1963 universal suffrage was introduced. Equatorial Guinea effectively was a one-party state under the Democratic Party of Equatorial Guinea since 1987. Elections were not considered to be free or fair.<sup>210</sup> On 12/20/1966, the UN General Assembly urged Spain to conduct elections in Equatorial Guinea. Subsequently, a constitutional conference convened on 10/30/1967 at the Palace of Santa Cruz in Madrid to deliberate on Equatorial Guinea's independence. Leading the Equatorial Guinea delegation was Federico Ngomo Nandong, the President of the General Assembly. Other delegation members included Enrique Gori (Vice-President of the General Assembly), Antonio Ndongo, Bonifacio Ondó Edu (Chairman of the Governing Council), and Francisco Macías Nguema (Vice-President of the Governing Council). The Constitutional Conference concluded on 06/22/1968, proposing a constitution that established a federal republic with two autonomous provinces.<sup>211</sup> According to LIED no multiparty legislative elections were held and

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<sup>207</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty\\_of\\_El\\_Pardo\\_\(1778\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_El_Pardo_(1778))

<sup>208</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spanish\\_Guinea](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spanish_Guinea)

<sup>209</sup> <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/spanish-guinea-1950-1968/>

<sup>210</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s\\_suffrage](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage)

<sup>211</sup> <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/spanish-guinea-1950-1968/>

universal suffrage was introduced in 1968. LIED classifies political liberties as absent for this period. Political liberties were absent until 1963 and not really present from 1964 onward according to V-Dem's PCLI. In 1968, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. From 1900 to 1959, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For the rest of the regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

10/12/1968 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Spain, Right-Wing (Corporatist) Autocracy]/Start Electoral (Personalist) Autocracy: On this date the Republic of Equatorial Guinea achieved full independence (Lansford 2021:509, Marshall 2018c). Shortly before Francisco Macías Nguema was elected in the last free and fair elections until 1993.<sup>212</sup> President Macías promptly abolished the 1968 Constitution under his regime, swiftly suppressing opposition and consolidating absolute power through a period of terror. The ruthless internal repression carried out by the Macías administration resulted in the disappearance of two-thirds of the members of the 1968 National Assembly by the end of his tenure. This oppressive atmosphere led to the mass exodus of one-third of the population, including almost all individuals from skilled and educated strata (Fleischhacker 1999a). Since after independence Nguema ruled the country undemocratically from the start the regime is classified as an electoral autocracy. While the regime had a strong personalist character from the start it has to be taken into account that Nguema's rule was legitimized by relatively free presidential elections.<sup>213</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED affirms that competitiveness was absent. V-Dem's CEI underlines no clean elections, whereas V-Dem's EF&FI considers the overall conditions as somewhat free and fair. Besides, both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI confirm that political liberties were not achieved. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

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<sup>212</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1968\\_Spanish\\_Guinean\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1968_Spanish_Guinean_general_election)

<sup>213</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1968\\_Spanish\\_Guinean\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1968_Spanish_Guinean_general_election)

01/01/1970 End Electoral (Personalist) Autocracy/Start Personalist Autocracy: In 1970 Nguema formed the United National Workers' Party as a vehicle for his power and issued a decree suppressing all existing political parties in the country. We count this as a self-coup. On 07/14/1972 Nguema "consolidated power by establishing an extreme cult of personality, a one-party state ruled by his United National Workers' Party and declaring himself president for life on this date, which was then ratified by a referendum the following year".<sup>214</sup> In a reign of terror approximately 80.000 out of 300.000 citizens were reportedly killed.<sup>215</sup> On 06/29/1973 a constitutional referendum installed a one-party system under the 'United National Workers' Party' and was accepted by 99% of the voters.<sup>216</sup> Macías Nguema proceeded to institute a totalitarian regime supported by three key pillars: the United National Workers' Party, the Juventud en Marcha con Macías (JMM; English: Youth on the March with Macías) militia/youth group, and the Esangui clan of Río Muni. The tools of repression in the country, including the military and the presidential bodyguard, were under the complete control of Macías Nguema's relatives and members of his clan.<sup>217</sup> The regime is a borderline case between a one-party autocracy and a personalist autocracy. However, because Nguema was declared president for life no other party member had a chance to obtain the leadership. According to LIED executive and legislative elections, which weren't multiparty, were held in 1970, in 1971 only executive elections were held, from 1972 onward no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. In addition to that, political liberties remained absent according to LIED and V-Dem's PCLI. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

08/03/1979 End Personalist Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: After Nguema began to execute members of his own family and ruling circle, his nephew and military commander Teodoro Obiang overthrew him on this date. He established himself as the chairman of a military junta.<sup>218</sup> After the coup the only political party United National Worker's Party had

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<sup>214</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Francisco\\_Mac%C3%ADas\\_Nguema#Early\\_career](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Francisco_Mac%C3%ADas_Nguema#Early_career;);  
<https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/people-global-african-history/francisco-macias-nguema-1924-1979/>

<sup>215</sup> <https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/GNQ>

<sup>216</sup> <https://africanelections.tripod.com/gq.html>

<sup>217</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Francisco\\_Mac%C3%ADas\\_Nguema](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Francisco_Mac%C3%ADas_Nguema)

<sup>218</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Francisco\\_Mac%C3%ADas\\_Nguema](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Francisco_Mac%C3%ADas_Nguema)

been banned. Later that year, he appointed himself president. Nevertheless, the so called Supreme Military Council ruled Equatorial Guinea until the adoption of a new constitution, which was passed in a referendum in 1982.<sup>219</sup> Nguema was sentenced to death for the crime of genocide against the Bubi people and other crimes committed.<sup>220</sup> According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. For this period, political liberties are coded as absent by both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

08/15/1982 End Military Autocracy/Start Personalist Autocracy: On that day the new constitution, which had been drafted with the help of the United Nations, was passed through a popular referendum. 95,8% voted in favor of the new constitution. Through the referendum, Teodoro Obiang officially became president for a seven-year term.<sup>221</sup> Equatorial Guinea nominally returned to a civilian rule.<sup>222</sup> Although the constitution entailed provisions for human rights, democratic principles and a free-market economy, it also granted Obiang widespread powers. These encompassed unilateral powers, granting control over aspects like cabinet appointments and the authority to govern through decrees.<sup>223</sup> It was only in 1987 that Democratic Party of Equatorial Guinea (PDGE) was founded by President Teodoro Obiang. It stayed the only political organization until 1991. The main purpose of the party was to support Obiang.<sup>224</sup> In the parliamentary elections in 1988, therefore, only the PDGE presented candidates, specifically a "single list of 60 candidates for the 60 seats."<sup>225</sup> Obiang was reelected as president in 1989, and analogous to the parliamentary elections, he was the only candidate.<sup>226</sup> Like his uncle, Teodoro Obiang established a cult of personality.<sup>227</sup> In 1991, another constitutional referendum took place, leading to the first parliamentary multi-party elections in

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<sup>219</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supreme\\_Military\\_Council\\_\(Equatorial\\_Guinea\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supreme_Military_Council_(Equatorial_Guinea))

<sup>220</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1979\\_Equatorial\\_Guinea\\_coup\\_d%27%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1979_Equatorial_Guinea_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat)

<sup>221</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1982\\_Equatorial\\_Guinea\\_constitution](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1982_Equatorial_Guinea_constitution)

<sup>222</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Teodoro\\_Obiang\\_Nguema\\_Mbasogo](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Teodoro_Obiang_Nguema_Mbasogo)

<sup>223</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1982\\_Equatorial\\_Guinea\\_constitution](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1982_Equatorial_Guinea_constitution)

<sup>224</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic\\_Party\\_of\\_Equatorial\\_Guinea](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic_Party_of_Equatorial_Guinea)

<sup>225</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1988\\_Equatorial\\_Guinean\\_parliamentary\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1988_Equatorial_Guinean_parliamentary_election)

<sup>226</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Teodoro\\_Obiang\\_Nguema\\_Mbasogo](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Teodoro_Obiang_Nguema_Mbasogo)

<sup>227</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_cults\\_of\\_personality](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cults_of_personality)

1993.<sup>228</sup> The regime classification is disputed. HTW classifies it as one-party regime, REIGN as personal regime, and MCM as well as AF classify it as a military regime. We classify it as personalist autocracy because Teodoro Obiang Mbasogo was de facto the sole ruler of the regime. His powers were far-reaching and were not really limited by other institutions or challenged in any way by other candidates. The PDGE was a regime-party with no political aspirations or vision of its own. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held in 1982, from 1983 onward executive and legislative elections, which weren't multiparty, were held. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Moreover, political liberties were still not present (LIED, V-Dem PCLI). From 1982 to 1992, as per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time. In 1993, the executive faced weak constraints, classified as Intermediate Category 1 between unlimited authority and slight limitations. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

11/21/1993 End Personalist Autocracy/Start Electoral (Personalist) Autocracy: On this date the first parliamentary first multi-party elections were held in Equatorial Guinea since the pre-independence elections of 1968. Although seven parties were allowed to run in the election, the ruling PDGE maintained its grip on power, winning 68 of the 80 seats in the enlarged Chamber of People's Representatives. They were described as not free and fair.<sup>229</sup> The government imposed a ban on unauthorized demonstrations and included no opposition members in the new cabinet (Lansford 2012a: 510). Obiang was re-elected in 1996 and 2002 with 98 percent of the vote in elections condemned as fraudulent by international observers. In 2002, for instance, at least one voting district was recorded as giving Obiang 103 percent of the vote. He was re-elected for a fourth term in 2009 with 97% of the vote, again amid accusations of voter fraud and intimidation beating opposition leader Plácido Micó Abogo.<sup>230</sup> The cult of personality still exists. Obiang gave himself various titles. For example, "gentleman of the great island of Bioko, Annobón and Río Muni", he made comments about his God-like power and his special relationship and contact with God, and he also likes to call himself El Jefe.<sup>231</sup> In November

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<sup>228</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991\\_Equatorial\\_Guinean\\_constitutional\\_referendum](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991_Equatorial_Guinean_constitutional_referendum);

[https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Equatorial\\_Guinea\\_2012?lang=en](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Equatorial_Guinea_2012?lang=en)

<sup>229</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1993\\_Equatorial\\_Guinean\\_legislative\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1993_Equatorial_Guinean_legislative_election)

<sup>230</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Teodoro\\_Obiang\\_Nguema\\_Mbasogo](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Teodoro_Obiang_Nguema_Mbasogo)

<sup>231</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_cults\\_of\\_personality](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cults_of_personality)

2022, Obiang secured re-election in the 2022 Equatorial Guinean general election with 99.7% of the vote, amidst allegations of fraud raised by the opposition.<sup>232</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes all elections in the country as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI and CEI score them as neither free, fair nor clean. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Moreover, both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI still categorizes the political liberties as constantly absent for the whole time. In 1994 and 1995, as per Polity5's categorization, the executive experienced minimal limitations on decision-making, placing it in the first intermediate category. Since 1996, based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

Electoral (Personalist) Autocracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Wood 2004)

## Eritrea

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Italy, Constitutional Monarchy] [Start: 01/01/1890]: Eritrea started to be a colony on 01/01/1890. Ethiopia was integrated into the Ethiopian Empire, while Massawa, the port city was Ottoman territory since 1577 and transferred to Egypt in 1865. The Italians occupied Ethiopia in 1869, after the Suez Canal opened and settled in Eritrea. In 1885, they took control over Massawa leading to a dispute with Ethiopians, who also claimed authority over the port city (Jerven/Strangio/Weisdorf 2021). After three years, the Ethiopians retreated and officially relinquished their claims in Eritrea to Italy in the 1889 Treaty of Ucciali (Jerven/Strangio/Weisdorf 2021). Eritrea was declared an Italian colony on 01/01/1890 and called Italian Eritrea (Jerven/Strangio/Weisdorf 2021). After the war of 1935-36, Italy occupied Ethiopia and established a unified government for the whole of Italian East Africa that consisted of the Eritrea Governorate, the Ethiopian region of Tigre and Somalia and based in Addis Ababa (Crowder 1984). According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. Both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI classify political

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<sup>232</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equatorial\\_Guinea#History](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equatorial_Guinea#History)

liberties as absent. Therefore, the regime in this period is coded as a direct rule colonial regime. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

03/27/1941 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Italy, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: Italy's defeat in the Battle of Keren led to British occupation of Eritrea after Ethiopian independence. Britain placed Italian Eritrea (along with Italian Somalia, and British Somaliland) under British military administration (Crowder 1984). This period is coded as occupation (by United Kingdom) because Italy formally ceded its claim over the colonies (including Eritrea) by the Treaty of Peace with Italy, signed on 02/10/1947 between Italy and the powers of World War II, which came into effect on 09/15/1947. The military administrations were later gradually replaced by civilian ones, however, there was no agreement amongst the Allies concerning the future status of Eritrea (Crowder 1984, Kibreab 2005). In the meantime, the Eritreans demanded self-determination. A United Nations (UN) commission was dispatched to the former colony in 02/1950. The UN General Assembly on 12/02/1950 decided on a termination of the British military administration of Eritrea by 09/15/1952. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. In addition to that, political liberties were coded as absent according to LIED. V-Dem's PCLI vary for this period. In 1941 political liberties were not really present, from 1942 to 1950 somewhat present and ambiguous from 1951 onwards. From 1942 to 1951, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are limited. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 1952, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

03/25/1952 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Indirect Rule Occupation Regime [by United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: The British military administration held parliamentary elections on 03/25 and 26/1952, for a parliament with 68 members. On 09/11/1952, Emperor Haile Selassie ratified a constitution that was put forward by the UN commissioner. The Representative Assembly subsequently became the Eritrean Assembly.<sup>233</sup> This period is not coded as international

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<sup>233</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Eritrea#British\\_administration\\_and\\_federalisation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Eritrea#British_administration_and_federalisation)

mandate because the authority of the British military administration to lead a provisional government was not based on a UN resolution, but the UN had a rather supervising role. Furthermore, the BMA in Eritrea formally ended on 09/15/1952.

09/11/1952 End Indirect Rule Occupation Regime [by United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy [as Protectorate of Ethiopia, Autocratic Monarchy]: On this date, an UN General Assembly Resolution went into effect by which Eritrea was established as an autonomous entity within the sovereignty of the Ethiopian Crown (Crawford 2006:555). Under this agreement, the Ethiopian government received authority over matters of defense, currency and external affairs (Crowder 1984). Before the establishment of the autonomous unit, the first Eritrean elections were held in March 1952, overseen by the British administration. The Eritrean Representative Assembly opened on 04/28/1952. They got a draft of the Eritrean Constitution on 05/03, and by 05/14, they all agreed on the first part about joining Ethiopia. Over the next two months, they talked about each part of the Constitution. On 07/10, they all agreed on the Constitution with some changes (United Nations Department of Public Information 1996). The elections of 1952 had been limited to direct voting solely in Asmara and Massawa. In other regions, a complex system of indirect elections was employed, with constituencies arbitrarily defined. Determining the desires of the Eritrean populace was hindered, if not made impossible, by the absence of comprehensive records on political factions. Consequently, these factions could make exaggerated claims about their influence. Both the four-power commission and the UN Commission for Eritrea struggled to gauge the strength of these factions and, by extension, the will of the people. Moreover, the situation was complicated by a lack of political awareness among the populace and deep-seated ethnic and religious divisions (Tiruneh 1981). Ato Tedla Bairu was elected as Chief Executive by the assembly on 09/13/1952.<sup>234</sup> According to the constitution of 1952 (Article 20) the right to vote was limited to males of Eritrean descent over twenty-one, who had maintained residency in Eritrea for at least one year.<sup>235</sup> Eritreans of mixed ethnicity were denied the right to vote. Moreover, economic, and educational policies disadvantaged ethnic Eritrean people, and the freedom of the press was severely diminished.<sup>236</sup> In July 1955, Emperor Haile Selassie made Ato Tedla Bairu step down from his position as Chief Executive. Then, in August 1955, the Emperor chose Asfaha Woldemichael as the new Chief Executive and Idris Mohammed Adem as the President

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<sup>234</sup> <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/home/research-projects/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/ethiopiaeritrea-1950-1993/>

<sup>235</sup> <https://snitna.com/documents.html>

<sup>236</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federation\\_of\\_Ethiopia\\_and\\_Eritrea](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federation_of_Ethiopia_and_Eritrea)



of the Eritrean Assembly.<sup>237</sup> There is no record of further elections during the period under review. The 1952 elections mentioned here are strictly speaking outside the period but are worth mentioning to justify the classification. For these elections there is no record of the percentage of the population that participated. Therefore, we classify this period as electoral oligarchy. Other typologies lack an independent classification of Eritrea in this period; only LIED provides one and classifies a multiparty autocracy without elected executive. According to LIED only multiparty legislative elections were held. However, any election during this period are classified as not competitive per LIED. V-Dem's EF&FI and CEI score them as neither free, fair nor clean. In addition to that political liberties were absent (LIED). V-Dem's PCLI scores them as not really present until 1957 and as not present from 1958 onwards. From 1953 to 1959, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For the years 1960 and 1961, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. For 1962, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

11/14/1962 End Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy [as Protectorate of Ethiopia, Autocratic Monarchy]/Start Part of Other Country [Ethiopia, Autocratic Monarchy]: The UN had planned a popular plebiscite after ten years, where Eritrean people could choose between complete union with Ethiopia or complete independence (Tseggai 1976). However, in 1962, Ethiopia went a step further as Emperor Haile Selassie unilaterally annulled the federation agreement, without prompting any response from the UN (Crawford 2006: 625). The parliament was dissolved, and Eritrea became an Ethiopian province, ruled by a governor-general from Addis Ababa (Crowder 1984). From the early 1980s, the struggle for independence was dominated by the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF, informally known as Shabia). LIED does not treat Eritrea during this period. According to our interpretation of V-Dem's PCLI political liberties were absent. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

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<sup>237</sup> <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/home/research-projects/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/ethiopiaeritrea-1950-1993/>

05/29/1991 End Part of Other Country [Ethiopia, Non-Electoral Transitional Regime]/Start One-Party (Personalist) Autocracy [as (de facto) independent country]: Briefly after the communist regime broke down in Ethiopia and Mengistu Haile Mariam fled the country, the Eritrean province achieved de facto independence.<sup>238</sup> Eritrea was from that date on under the control of Isaias Afwerki and the EPLF, an armed Marxist-Leninist organization that dominated the struggle for independence of Eritrea (Lansford 2012b: 446){Geddes, 2014 #38583}. On 05/24/1993 Eritrea's de jure (legal) independence was formally declared, following an UN-monitored referendum in which the Eritrean people overwhelmingly voted for independence. In 1994, the EPLF transformed into the People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) and became the ruling, and sole legal political party of Eritrea. The former secretary-general of the EPLF, Afewerki, has ruled the country as president since independence without ever having been confirmed in his office by a popular vote".<sup>239</sup> While no elections have been held the regime is coded rather as a one-party autocracy than a pure (almost institutionless) personalist autocracy. While there have been elements of a Marxist-Leninist ideology the regime cannot be classified as a communist ideocracy.<sup>240</sup> According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. From 1993 to 2000, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. As classified by FH for 1993 and 1994, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. From 1995 to 1998 Eritrea scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. From 1999 onward a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. Furthermore, since 1993 both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI confirm the constant absence of political liberties. Since 2001, as per Polity5's categorization, the executive experienced minimal limitations on decision-making, placing it in the first intermediate category. Until 2020, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. Since 2021, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

One-Party (Personalist) Autocracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

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<sup>238</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eritrea\\_Province](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eritrea_Province)

<sup>239</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s\\_suffrage](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage); <https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/ERI>

<sup>240</sup> [https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Eritrea\\_1997?lang=en](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Eritrea_1997?lang=en); <https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/ERI>

## Estonia

01/01/1900 Part of Other Country [Russia, Autocratic Monarchy] [Start: 09/10/1721]: Estonia had become a part of the Russian Empire after Russia's defeat of Sweden in the Great Northern War in 1720. With the Peace Treaty of Nystad, concluded on 09/10/1721, King Frederick I of Sweden formally recognized the transfer of Estonia, Livonia, Ingria and Southeast Finland to Russia in exchange for two million silver thaler, while Russia returned the bulk of Finland to Swedish rule.<sup>241</sup> Under Russian rule, the German elites thrived. They controlled the Lutheran church, the legal system, education and local and town governments. During the 1905 Russian Revolution, the first Estonian voices demanding freedom of press and assembly, universal franchise and national autonomy were heard.<sup>242</sup> After the Russian February Revolution, the autonomous Estonian Governorate was formed in April 1917. This was a response to the Estonians' demand for autonomy. In the spring of 1917, the Estonian Land People's Association (Eesti Maarahva Liit, EML) was formed around Jaan Hünerson to represent the wealthier part of the Estonian small farmers. The EML positioned itself against radical land reform. On 03/15/1917 universal suffrage declared by the Russian Provisional Government (in control of the then governorate of Estonia). In the parliamentary elections in July 1917, the EML became the strongest party. After the mixture of coup and mass rebellion led by the Communists in St. Petersburg on 11/04/1917, the Estonians did not recognize the new Communist government. The Communists then forcibly dissolved the Estonian parliament and called new elections. LIED and V-Dem do not provide data for Estonia before 1917.

11/05/1917 Continuation Part of Other Country [Russia, Constitutional Monarchy]: On this date the Estonian Bolshevik leader Jaan Anvelt took over power by means of a coup d'état against the elected Maapäev (Russian official).<sup>243</sup> On 02/3-4/1918 elections to the Estonian Constituent Assembly, which were organized by the Bolsheviks, were held on 02/3-4/1918 with universal suffrage. Despite the Communists' threats, the Bolsheviks only achieved 37 per cent of the votes and parties advocating Estonian national independence achieved almost two-thirds of the vote. Therefore, the Communists promptly dissolved the assembly and proclaimed the elections null and void.<sup>244</sup> The Estonian Constituent Assembly was never convened, therefore,

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<sup>241</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty\\_of\\_Nystad](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Nystad)

<sup>242</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Estonia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Estonia)

<sup>243</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jaan\\_Anvelt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jaan_Anvelt)

<sup>244</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Estonian\\_Provincial\\_Assembly](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Estonian_Provincial_Assembly);  
[https://dbpedia.org/page/1918\\_Estonian\\_Constituent\\_Assembly\\_election](https://dbpedia.org/page/1918_Estonian_Constituent_Assembly_election)

the regime period can neither be classified as independent nor as electoral.<sup>245</sup> LIED identifies political liberties as absent.

11/07/1917 Continuation as Part of Other Country [Russia, Communist Ideocracy]: On this date the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) was proclaimed and Estonia was de facto part of the Bolshevik-controlled Russian state, not an autonomous Soviet republic. The Bolshevik takeover in Tallinn under Jaan Anvelt followed the October Revolution in Petrograd and was fully subordinated to the Soviet leadership there.<sup>246</sup> No autonomous governmental structure or separate Soviet republic was proclaimed. Local Bolsheviks acted on directives from Petrograd, and the dissolution of the elected Estonian Constituent Assembly directly mirrored Lenin's actions in Russia. Estonia remained legally and politically part of the RSFSR, with no recognized sovereignty or self-government during this period.

02/25/1918 End Part of Other Country [Russia, Communist Ideocracy]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [Germany, Constitutional Monarchy]: To put pressure on the new Bolshevik regime of Soviet Russia to sign the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Germans landed on the mainland of Estonia on 02/18/1918. On 02/25/1918 Tallinn was occupied.<sup>247</sup> Estonia became part of the German Ober Ost (military administration) until the end of World War I in November 1918.<sup>248</sup> On 02/19/1918, between Russian retreat and German occupation, the "Salvation Committee" declared Estonian independence. The members of the Salvation Committee were Konstantin Päts, Jüri Vilms and Konstantin Konik.<sup>249</sup>

11/11[-14]/1918 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Germany, Constitutional Monarchy]/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: Between these dates, after the German Revolution, the representatives of Germany formally handed over political power in Estonia to the national government. However, the departure of German troops left a void and the Russian Bolshevik troops moved in. The Estonian War of Independence followed. Estonian Bolshevik leader Jaan Anvelt took over power in Narva. The Commune of the Working People of Estonia was an unacknowledged government asserting control over the Bolshevik-occupied regions of the Republic of Estonia during the Estonian War of Independence and the Russian Civil War.<sup>250</sup> The regime instituted a reign of terror from November 1918 to January 1919. However, we code here the non-electoral transitional regime with three provisional governments all led by

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<sup>245</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1918\\_Estonian\\_Constituent\\_Assembly\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1918_Estonian_Constituent_Assembly_election)

<sup>246</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jaan\\_Anvelt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jaan_Anvelt)

<sup>247</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German\\_occupation\\_of\\_Estonia\\_during\\_World\\_War\\_I](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_occupation_of_Estonia_during_World_War_I)

<sup>248</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German\\_occupation\\_of\\_Estonia\\_during\\_World\\_War\\_I](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_occupation_of_Estonia_during_World_War_I)

<sup>249</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Estonian\\_Salvation\\_Committee](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Estonian_Salvation_Committee)

<sup>250</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commune\\_of\\_the\\_Working\\_People\\_of\\_Estonia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commune_of_the_Working_People_of_Estonia)

Konstantin Päts. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are somewhat present. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

04/05[-07]/1919 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Defective Democracy: New elections for the Constituent Assembly were held in this period.<sup>251</sup> On 02/02/1920 a peace treaty (Treaty of Tartu) was signed between the Republic of Estonia and the Russian SFSR. This marked the end of the Estonian War of Independence. On 06/15/1920, the first Estonian constitution was adopted. In the 1930s an anticommunist antiparliamentary movement named Vaps emerged.<sup>252</sup> The distribution of power in the constitution ratified on 06/15/1920 divided authority among the judiciary, executive, and legislature.<sup>253</sup> With the new constitution, the head of government was no longer the prime minister, but the "Elder of the State", who functions as a combination of president and prime minister. The governing parties and coalitions alternated frequently, indicating that governments were not very stable.<sup>254</sup> Estonia's enactment of the cultural autonomy law for ethnic minorities in 1925 was widely regarded as one of the most progressive in the world during that period.<sup>255</sup> According to LIED multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. For this period, LIED categorizes elections as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI and CEI score them as somewhat free, fair and clean. However, LIED scores that political liberties were coded as absent. V-Dem's PCLI declares them as present since 1920. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. Estonia is in this period a borderline case between a liberal and defective democracy. From 1920 to 1933, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 1934, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. 01/24/1934 End Defective Democracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: After an October 1933 constitutional referendum organized by Vaps, Konstantin Päts took over as acting president in

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<sup>251</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1918\\_Estonian\\_Constituent\\_Assembly\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1918_Estonian_Constituent_Assembly_election)

<sup>252</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Estonia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Estonia)

<sup>253</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution\\_of\\_Estonia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_Estonia)

<sup>254</sup> <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html>, see narratives for version 5.0, Estonia\_R: 1.

<sup>255</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Estonia#Independence>

January 1934, and with the help of General Lohan Laidoner, Pats declared a state of emergency to prevent opposition candidate General Andres Larka from winning the upcoming election and initiated a wave of repression against opposition figures (Taylor 2018: 38-39, 44, 48, 63-64, Casey et al. 2020: 7). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. During the whole regime period, LIED categorizes elections as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI and CEI score them as ambiguously free, fair and clean. According to LIED political liberties were absent. According to V-Dem's PCLI political liberties were ambiguous in 1934 and not really present since 1935. While quantitative indicators point into the direction of an electoral hybrid regime, Estonia is in this period a clear case of an electoral autocracy according to our reading of the research literature. From 1936 to 1940, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was only subject to minor institutional constraints. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

06/16/1940 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by USSR, Communist Ideocracy]: Facing the imminent threat of a Soviet invasion, Estonia yielded to Soviet demands, and shortly thereafter, the Red Army took control of Estonia (Taylor 2018: 60, 88-89, Casey et al. 2020: 7).

08/09/1940 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [USSR, Communist Ideocracy]/Start Part of Other Country [USSR, Communist Ideocracy]: The Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic formed under the occupation regime became a member of the USSR. Estonia within the Soviet Union represents a contested borderline case, as it functioned de facto as a constituent Soviet Socialist Republic within the USSR federal structure and was governed through Soviet institutions. However, many Western states never recognized Soviet annexation as legitimate, maintaining diplomatic recognition of Baltic governments-in-exile and treating the territories as occupied rather than legitimately integrated. Va-PoReg's de facto classification principle prioritizes actual governance structures, leading to Part of Other Country classification based on factual integration into Soviet administration, with the contested nature and subsequent independence restoration (1990-1991) warranting this borderline designation. Especially in the early days of the annexation, the regime was similar to the occupation regime before. On 07/23/1940 all land, banks, and major industrial enterprises in Estonia were nationalized by the Soviets, and the state launched an economic transformation under Soviet central planning. Sovietization included population transfers and purges of non-communist elites. The Estonian SSR was molded as a

model Soviet republic, but with the promotion of in-migration from Russia and other Soviet regions. Soviet planners prioritized all-union economic chains, disregarding local environmental and social needs. The Estonian language and national symbols were suppressed in public life, with Russification stronger here than in most other western Soviet republics. The local Communist Party was controlled directly from Moscow, with ethnic Russians and a minority of loyal Estonian communists in leadership positions. The First Secretary of the Communist Party of Estonia held de facto power but was usually subject to frequent rotation and central vetting.

08/28/1941 End Part of Other Country [USSR, Communist Ideocracy]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Germany, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]: On this date, German troops captured Tallinn, after having invaded Estonia on 07/05/1941. During the occupation, Estonia was exploited for the war effort and tens of thousands of people, including Estonians, Jews, Romani people and Russians, were murdered. For the duration of the occupation, Estonia was incorporated as Generalbezirk Estland, subordinated to the Reichskommissariat Ostland an administrative subdivision of the German Reich.<sup>256</sup>

09/22/1944 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Germany, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]/Start Part of Other Country [USSR, Communist Ideocracy]: On this day, Soviet troops captured Tallinn. German troops had begun to withdraw from Estonia on 09/17/1944.<sup>257</sup> Beginning in 10/1944, the anti-communist guerrilla group “Forest Brothers” hid in the Estonian forests and waged war against the Soviet troops. They continued resist against the Soviet forces until 1953.<sup>258</sup> Soviet mass deportations of Estonians in 03/1949, as well as the collectivization of farms lead to many partisans to give themselves up. Between 06/14/1987 and 09/06/1991 the “Singing Revolution” and mass civic mobilization marked Estonia’s peaceful struggle for independence.<sup>259</sup> On 03/03/1991 an independence referendum in the Estonian SSR (alongside a similar referendum in the Latvian SSR) was approved by 78.4% of voters with an 82.9% turnout. Between 1940 and 1990 LIED and V-Dem do not provide data for Estonia.

08/20/1991 End Part of Other Country [USSR, Communist Ideocracy]/Start Democratizing Regime: On this date independence was restored by the Estonian Supreme Council.<sup>260</sup> In August 1991, an agreement was brokered between the radical and moderate factions of the

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<sup>256</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German\\_occupation\\_of\\_Estonia\\_during\\_World\\_War\\_II](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_occupation_of_Estonia_during_World_War_II)

<sup>257</sup> <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/home/research-projects/dadm-project/europerussiacentral-asia-region/soviet-unionestonia-1940-1991/>

<sup>258</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Estonian\\_Soviet\\_Socialist\\_Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Estonian_Soviet_Socialist_Republic)

<sup>259</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Singing\\_Revolution](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Singing_Revolution)

<sup>260</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991\\_Estonian\\_independence\\_referendum](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991_Estonian_independence_referendum)

independence movement, resulting in the formation of a Constitutional Assembly and the attainment of complete independence for Estonia from the Soviet Union (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 26). During the transitory phase, elected representatives from the Supreme Soviet of Estonia were still in place, with the de facto head of state being Arnold Rüütel who was elected by the legislative body in 1990 and would go on to become president in the 1992 elections.<sup>261</sup> Therefore, while according to LIED multiparty executive and legislative elections were present, in this short regime period neither legislative nor executive elections were held. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was on par with or below that of other branches, reflecting executive parity or subordination. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive. As per FH's classification for this regime period, the country receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. LIED identifies political liberties as present, and V-Dem's PCLI is likewise classified by us as indicating that political liberties are present.

09/20/1992 End Democratizing Regime/Start Liberal Democracy: On this date the first parliamentary elections after regaining independence from the USSR took place. They are considered to be free and fair (Marshall 2018d).<sup>262</sup> Estonia is a parliamentary democracy with a unicameral parliament. Citizens who are 18 and older have the right to vote. On 03/05/2023 parliamentary elections were held (OSCE 2023b). The political landscape in Estonia is free and competitive. Estonia is well known for its advanced e-governance services as well as its high level of government transparency. Freedom of religion, freedom of assembly and freedom of association are guaranteed.<sup>263</sup> Democratic institutions in Estonia are independent and stable and political rights and liberties are respected. Per FH's scoring for 1993 and 1994, the country is classified as free with a score of 5, which falls into our interpretation of the rather free category. From 1995 onward the country is classified as free, scoring between 2 and 4, which we also place in the free category. Therefore, both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI underline that political liberties were present ever since 1992. Ongoing challenges are posed by the fact that around 5% of the population are considered "stateless" and are excluded from elections. In recent years, right-wing forces have started to become louder. Corruption and discrimination against Russians and LGBT+ people among other are persistent issues. New challenges arose from the wave of Ukrainian refugees (around 60.000) and Russian immigrants (around 300.000)

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<sup>261</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arnold\\_R%C3%BC%C3%BCtel](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arnold_R%C3%BC%C3%BCtel)

<sup>262</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1992\\_Estonian\\_parliamentary\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1992_Estonian_parliamentary_election);  
[https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Estonia\\_2015?lang=en](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Estonia_2015?lang=en)

<sup>263</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/estonia/freedom-world/2023>



caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In September 2022 Estonia closed its borders to most Russian citizens.<sup>264</sup> The Estonian political landscape is marked by several key parties with distinct ideological orientations. The Estonian Centre Party (EK) is a center party with moderate political values. It advocates for social justice, economic stability, and multicultural integration. The Estonian Reform Party (ER) is a liberal party that has been influential in shaping Estonia's economic policies, promoting neoliberal economic ideologies and the promotion of flexicurity in labor relations. The Conservative People's Party of Estonia (EKRE) represents right-wing nationalist interests, emphasizing traditional values and national sovereignty. The Social Democratic Party (SDE) aligns with center-left ideologies, focusing on social justice, equality, and welfare policies. These parties have contributed to a dynamic and pluralistic political environment, reflecting a broad spectrum of ideologies and policy preferences within Estonia's democratic framework. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Since its independence, LIED categorizes elections as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI and CEI score them as free, fair and clean. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also comprehensive.

Liberal Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Hiden/Salmon 1991, Iwaskiw 1995, Laur et al. 2000, McHale 1983, Parming 1975, Siaroff 1999, Sikk 2010)

## **Eswatini**

[formerly known as Swaziland (until 2018)]

01/01/1900 Autocratic Monarchy [as Protectorate of Transvaal Republic] [Start: 12/10/1894]: On 07/24/1890, Swaziland was placed under a triumvirate administration, representing the interests of the British, the Dutch republics, and the Swazi people. On 12/10/1894,<sup>265</sup> a convention was established, placing Swaziland under the protection of the South African

<sup>264</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/estonia/freedom-world/2023>

<sup>265</sup> <https://www.worldstatesmen.org/Swaziland.html>

Republic.<sup>266</sup> In 1899, the Second Boer War broke out, in which Swaziland was indirectly involved. During this time, the colonists evacuated Swaziland, leaving it in the power of the King, Ngwane V of Swaziland.<sup>267</sup> According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. Political liberties were absent per LIED and can be interpreted as not really present according to V-Dem's PCLI. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are moderate. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

05/31/1902 End Autocratic Monarchy [as Protectorate of Transvaal Republic]/Start (de facto) Direct Rule Colonial Regime [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy, as part of Transvaal Republic]: When the British won the Second Boer War, the Treaty of Vereeniging between the Empire and the Transvaal Republic and Orange Free State was signed on 05/31/1902. With this Treaty, Transvaal became part of the British Empire.<sup>268</sup> With that, "[t]he Governor of the Transvaal was granted all His Majesty's powers and jurisdiction within Swaziland" (Mashasha 1974). Swaziland became a British "High Commission Territory".<sup>269</sup> On 10/01/1904, Lord Milner issued the Swaziland Administration Proclamation, which stated that the laws of the Transvaal were declared in force in Swaziland, and it was administered as if it was a district of the Transvaal (Mashasha 1974). According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and not really present according to V-Dem's PCLI for this period. In this timeframe, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are moderate. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

12/01/1906 Continuation (de facto) Direct Rule Colonial Regime [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy]: On 12/01/1906, Swaziland was disannexed from Transvaal and became a separate British protectorate (Mashasha 1974). After becoming a British Protectorate, the Swazi state changed its character of a traditional monarchical authority. The Swazi Ngwenyama became a 'Paramount Chief' because the British would not allow another authority to usurp theirs (Woods 2017). Contrary to the direct rule of the monarch, the nation was predominantly overseen by a resident commissioner. This commissioner governed in accordance with decrees issued by the British High Commissioner to South Africa. The

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<sup>266</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eswatini#Swazi\\_settlers\\_\(18th\\_and\\_19th\\_centuries\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eswatini#Swazi_settlers_(18th_and_19th_centuries))

<sup>267</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Eswatini#Anglo-Boer\\_War\\_\(1899%E2%80%931902\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Eswatini#Anglo-Boer_War_(1899%E2%80%931902))

<sup>268</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South\\_African\\_Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_African_Republic)

<sup>269</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eswatini>

formulation of these decrees involved close consultation with the resident commissioners, who, in turn, sought informal and formal advice from White settler interests and the Swazi king.<sup>270</sup> In 1921 the European Advisory Council, consisting solely of elected white settlers, was established. Its task was to give advice to the Commissioner on affairs, that were not related to Swazis. After the Commissioner changed the authority of the Swazi King in 1944, objections arose, leading to the granting of more autonomy to the Paramount Chief in 1952.<sup>271</sup> According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and not really present according to V-Dem's PCLI in this period. For almost the entire relevant period, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are moderate. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 1964, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

06/17/1964 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: General elections for a Legislative Council were held<sup>272</sup>. In 1964, preparations for Swaziland's independence began. King Sobhuza II founded his own party, the Imbokodvo National Movement (INM). According to LIED only multiparty legislative elections were held. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and not really present according to V-Dem's PCLI for this period. For 1965 and 1966, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For 1967, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

04/25/1967 End (de facto) Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Autocratic Monarchy: On 04/25/1967, Swaziland was granted internal self-governance. In the same year, universal suffrage was introduced.<sup>273</sup> In the parliamentary elections of 04/19–20/1967, the royal party, the INM, won all seats with almost 80 per cent of the vote. Although Swaziland had a parliament and initially held multiparty

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<sup>270</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Eswatini#Swaziland\\_Protectorate\\_\(1906%E2%80%931968\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Eswatini#Swaziland_Protectorate_(1906%E2%80%931968))

<sup>271</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Eswatini#Swaziland\\_Protectorate\\_\(1906%E2%80%931968\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Eswatini#Swaziland_Protectorate_(1906%E2%80%931968))

<sup>272</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1964\\_Swazi\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1964_Swazi_general_election)

<sup>273</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s\\_suffrage](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage)

elections, the royal family's policy decisions and appointments were not constrained by the legislature from the outset (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 96). Hence, the country is coded as an autocratic monarchy. In 1972, the opposition secured victories in three constituencies. In reaction, the king declared a state of emergency, dissolved parliament, disbanded all political parties, and governed by decree from 1973 to 1978 (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 96). In 1978, the new constitution banned parties and introduced nomination and indirect election procedures to ensure royal control over future parliaments. On 08/22/1982 King Sobhuza II died and as he did not name an heir, the Queen Mother became the Executive Authority (Marshall 2018i). She was replaced by Ntombi as Queen contrary to the King's wishes on 08/10/1983. The new constitution of 07/26/2005 allowed direct, non-partisan election of most of the assembly, but the king could still appoint ten of 65 MPs, 20 of 30 Senators, and the government (Baloro 1994: 21-29, Daniel/Vilane 1986: 57, Levin/MacMillan 2003: 1094-95, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 96).<sup>274</sup> In line with FH we observe that the "king exercises ultimate authority over all branches of the national government and effectively controls local governance through his influence over traditional chiefs".<sup>275</sup> Hence, the country is still classified as an autocratic monarchy. According to LIED only multiparty legislative elections were held in 1967, from 1968 to 1972 multiparty executive and legislative elections were held, and from 1972 onward no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. Per FH, for 1972, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. Between 1973 and 1983 a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. From 1984 to 1997 Eswatini is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. In 1998, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. For the remaining period from 1999 onward the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. Besides, political liberties are classified as constantly absent by LIED since 1967. Following V-Dem's PCLI they were not really present until 1972 and constantly absent from 1973 onwards. From 1968 to 1972, based on Polity5's evaluation, the executive faced weak constraints, classified as Intermediate Category 1 between unlimited authority and slight limitations. Between 1973 and 1978, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations. In 1979, 1980, and 1981, the executive experienced minimal limitations on decision-making, placing it in the first intermediate category. From 1982 to 1985, according to Polity5, the executive

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<sup>274</sup> <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/national-practice/constitution-2005-2>;  
<https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2841.html>; <https://africanelections.tripod.com/sz.html>

<sup>275</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/eswatini>;  
[https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Swaziland\\_2005?lang=en](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Swaziland_2005?lang=en)

encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. Between 1986 and 1992, the executive faced weak constraints, classified as Intermediate Category 1 between unlimited authority and slight limitations. From 1993 to 2004, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints. Since 2005, the executive's constraints fell into Intermediate Category 1, between unlimited authority and slight limitations. From 1968 to 2004, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. From 2005 to 2017, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. For 2018-2020, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. Again since 2021, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

Autocratic Monarchy as 07/01/2024 continued.

Additional sources (Keltie 2014)

## **Ethiopia**

[the Ethiopian Empire was also known by the exonym Abyssinia]

01/01/1900 Autocratic Monarchy [as independent country] [Start: 11/03/1889]: During the Convention of Addis Abeba on 10/26/1896, Italy recognized the independence of the Ethiopian Empire; known as Abyssinia (Willoughby/Fenwick 1974). On 11/03/1889, Menelik II was crowned following his capture of the Ethiopian throne in battle against Menelik of Shewa, a vassal state at the time, marking the beginning of a new dynasty. Menelik brought together the territories that now comprise Ethiopia (Haile-Selassie 1997: 27-29, 34, Turner 1991, Mockler 2002: 89-90, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 59). In a Treaty between Great Britain, France and Italy on 12/13/1906, the then colonial powers agreed to refrain from any intervention in Abyssinian affairs and to respect the respective interests of the contracting powers in those territories bordering on Abyssinia (Willoughby/Fenwick 1974). From 12/12/1913 until

09/27/1916 Lij Iyasu was empress of Ethiopia. Then he was removed from power.<sup>276</sup> After Iyasu was removed, Zewditu became Empress of Ethiopia. Yet, Täfäri Mäkönnän was ruling because Zewditu was not allowed to exercise power herself.<sup>277</sup> On 04/02/1930 Mäkönnän was crowned himself as Emperor Haile Selassie I. Selassie endeavored to modernize the nation by implementing a range of political and social changes. For this period, political liberties are classified as absent by LIED and V-Dem's PCLI. These included the enactment of the 1931 constitution, the first written constitution for the country, and the elimination of slavery.<sup>278</sup> According to our observations as well as LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. Until 1929, according to Polity5, during this period, the executive was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. Since 1930, based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. Until 1930, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. From 1931 onwards, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

10/03/1935 End Autocratic Monarchy/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Italy, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]: During the Second Italo-Ethiopian War, Ethiopia was occupied by Italian forces and Emperor Haile Selassie and his family were forced to flee into exile. A few days later, the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa came under Italian control (Roberts 1986). On 06/01/1936 Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia are united into Italian East Africa and reorganized as a federation of six provinces. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is also classified by us as showing that political liberties are absent. V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

05/09/1936 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Italy, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]/Start Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Italy, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]: Ethiopia was annexed by Italy and together with Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia was united into Italian East Africa (AOI) under a unified government in Addis Ababa.<sup>279</sup> In this short colonial

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<sup>276</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lij\\_Iyasu](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lij_Iyasu)

<sup>277</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zewditu>

<sup>278</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haile\\_Selassie](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haile_Selassie)

<sup>279</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Italian\\_East\\_Africa](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Italian_East_Africa)

time no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held (LIED). Both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI classify political liberties as absent. From 1937 to 1940, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 1941, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

05/05/1941 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Italy, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]/Start Autocratic Monarchy [as independent country]: After Italy declared war on Britain and France on 06/19/1940, allied forces led by Britain invaded Italian East Africa (Eritrea, Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland). Addis Ababa was liberated by allies and on 05/05/1941 Haile Selassie re-entered Addis Ababa and returns to the throne (Roberts 1986). The last Italian forces surrendered in November 1941. With the withdrawal of the Italian Army and the return of the emperor Ethiopia was again an autocratic monarchy according to our classification. The previous regime count of the ruling monarchy is proceeded. In 1955 universal suffrage was introduced.<sup>280</sup> According to our observations, as well as LIED, no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. As classified by FH since 1972, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Political liberties were absent for the whole time according to data from LIED and V-Dem's PCLI. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

09/12/1974 End Autocratic Monarchy/Start Communist Ideocracy: Facing popular unrest since February 1974 in the course of inflation, famine and discontent, Emperor Selassie was overthrown by the Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces, Police and Territorial Army, commonly known as the Derg (aka Dergue) (Abate 1983: 32, Haile-Selassie 1997: 121, 127, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 59-60). The Derg became the ruling junta under Andom's rule.<sup>281</sup> Between February and September 1974, the Dergue eliminated power holders of the old regime; the removal of the emperor completed the transition from monarchy to a new form of autocracy. When the crown prince, who had been offered the throne, refused to return to

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<sup>280</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s\\_suffrage](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage)

<sup>281</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Derg>

Ethiopia, the Dergue proclaimed itself acting head of state and changed its name to the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) on 09/13/1974 (Haile-Selassie 1997: 128). The Dergue originally included three elected representatives from each unit of the armed forces; members ranged from ordinary soldiers to colonels (Erich 1983: 473-475, Clapham 1985: 260, Haile-Selassie 1997: 147-148). In March 1975 the Derg established Ethiopia as a Marxist-Leninist state with itself as the vanguard movement in a provisional government. While Ethiopia became not earlier than in 1987 the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE) under a new communist constitution, the regime is classified as communist from the start. In 1975, for instance, the regime asserted control over all land, assigning parcels of up to 25 acres (10 hectares) to individual peasants who worked the land themselves.<sup>282</sup> From September 1974 until June 1991 the Ethiopian Civil War was fought between the regime and Ethiopian-Eritrean anti-government rebels. It left at least 1.4 million people dead.<sup>283</sup> According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held until 1986, from 1987 onward only executive elections were held. As classified by FH since 1972, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Regarding the political liberties, LIED and V-Dem's PCLI code them as absent. From 1975 to 1983, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. Since 1984, as per Polity5's categorization, the executive experienced minimal limitations on decision-making during this period, placing it in the first intermediate category. From 1975 to 1986, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

05/18/1991 End Communist Ideocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: On this date, Mengistu Haile Mariam fled the country after the regime was defeated by insurgents from several different regions. Vice President Tesfaye Gebre Kidan took over the Junta (Haile-Selassie 1997: 284-328). The remaining officials declared a ceasefire and Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) forces began entering Addis Ababa on 05/27/1991 (Haile-Selassie 1997: 284-328, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 60). Kidan surrendered the Derg government to the EPRDF. Meles Zenawi assumed power as interim revolutionary president. The EPRDF immediately disbanded the Workers' Party of Ethiopia and shortly afterward

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<sup>282</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Ethiopia/Socialist-Ethiopia-1974-91>

<sup>283</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethiopian\\_Civil\\_War](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethiopian_Civil_War)



arrested almost all of the most prominent Derg (Haile-Selassie 1997: 284-328, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 60). According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. Per FH, for 1991, 1993 and 1994, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. In 1992, however, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. Besides, political liberties were not present (LIED) and can be interpreted as not really present by V-Dem's PCLI. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

06/05/1994 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date the first ever multi-party elections in the country for a Constituent Assembly were held.<sup>284</sup> Parliamentary elections were held in May 1995. The EPRDF and its affiliated parties won a majority of 471 out of the 547 seats. Although the initial efforts of the new administration showed some success in reshaping the economy, doubts lingered regarding its dedication to political pluralism (Meier 1999: 374).<sup>285</sup> Opposition leaders as well as journalists stayed in prison or were in exile abroad. The exclusion of important opposition groups occurred on the federal and the regional level (Meier 1999: 374). General elections were held in 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2015. The quality of the elections fluctuated. However, deficits always existed to varying degrees. In the general elections 2000, for example severe deficits and incidents in the Southern Nations, Nationalities and People's Region (SNNPR) occurred. These included ballot stuffing and voter intimidation.<sup>286</sup> In regard to the general election in 2010, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor stated in the Human Rights Report: While the limited number of international observers permitted to monitor the elections acknowledged the competent handling of technical aspects of the voting process, some also observed the absence of a conducive environment for free and fair elections prior to the election day. Various laws, regulations, and procedures introduced since the 2005 national elections were seen to favor the EPRDF throughout the electoral process. Additionally, reported human rights violations during the year encompassed unlawful killings, torture, beatings, and mistreatment of detainees and opposition supporters by security forces.<sup>287</sup> Harassment and detention of opposition figures occurred also during the general elections in 2015.<sup>288</sup> On 02/15/2018 Hailemariam announced

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<sup>284</sup> [https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Ethiopia\\_1994?lang=en](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Ethiopia_1994?lang=en)

<sup>285</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1995\\_Ethiopian\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1995_Ethiopian_general_election)

<sup>286</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2000\\_Ethiopian\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2000_Ethiopian_general_election)

<sup>287</sup> <https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/af/154346.htm>

<sup>288</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2015\\_Ethiopian\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2015_Ethiopian_general_election)

his decision to step down following days of demonstrations and protests. Hailemariam also resigned as the chair of the EPRDF. ABIY Ahmed (OPDO) was selected as EPRDF chair on 03/27 and sworn in as prime minister on April 2 (Lansford 2021: 541). The dissolution of the EPRDF occurred on 12/01/2019. Three member-parties of the EPRDF merged into the Prosperity Party. The 2021 Ethiopian general election to elect members of the House of Peoples' Representatives was held on 06/21/2021 and 09/30/2021. Regional elections were also held on those dates. It was the first multi-party election in Ethiopia since the 2005 election.<sup>289</sup> The Prosperity Party won with an overwhelming majority. Abiy Ahmed was confirmed as prime minister for a five-year term on 10/04/2021 by the House of People's Representatives. African Union characterized the election overall as positive and an improvement compared with previous elections, but also pointed to the need for further democratic improvements.<sup>290</sup> The Human Rights Report by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor stated Conducted amid a backdrop of instability marked by interethnic and intercommunal violence, the elections unfolded within an electoral process that was deemed neither free nor fair for all citizens. However, observers generally concluded that the results reflected the will of the majority of citizens.<sup>291</sup> Because of the continuation of severe deficits in the electoral process and competition with different degree, we classify this period as electoral autocracy. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes elections in the country as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI and CEI score them as not really free, fair or clean. Per FH's evaluation until 1997, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. In 1998 the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. Between 1999 and 2009 Ethiopia scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. From 2010 onward it scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. Additionally, according to LIED no political liberties have been achieved ever since 1994. V-Dem's PCLI scores them as not really present until 2017 and in 2023. In 2018 and from 2021 to 2022 the outcomes were ambiguous. Between 2019 and 2020 political liberties were somewhat present. Until 2017, according to Polity5, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. In 2018, according to the Polity5 indicator, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. Until 2017, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial

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<sup>289</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021\\_Ethiopian\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021_Ethiopian_general_election)

<sup>290</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021\\_Ethiopian\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021_Ethiopian_general_election)

<sup>291</sup> <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/ethiopia>

constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. For the year 2018, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. Since 2019, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

Electoral Autocracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Abink 2009, Halliday/Molyneux 1983, Henze 1985, Henze 2000, Henze 2007, Hess 1970, Keller 1988, Kinfe 1994, Perham 1947, Tiruneh 1993)

## **Falkland Islands**

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start 01/02/1833]: At various times, the islands have had French, British, Spanish, and Argentine settlements. Britain reasserted its rule on 01/02/1833,<sup>292</sup> but Argentina maintains its claim to the islands. In 1840, the Falklands became a Crown colony and Scottish settlers subsequently established an official pastoral community. In the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the Falklands served an important role in Britain's territorial claims to subantarctic islands and a section of Antarctica.<sup>293</sup>

03/04/1949 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: On this day the Islands got a new constitution creating a new Legislative Council. Election with universal suffrage took place the same year. The number of elected members increased over the time.<sup>294</sup>

04/02/1982 End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Argentina, Military Autocracy]: On this date, Argentina's military forces invaded the islands. This act started the Falkland Islands War, which ended two months later with the surrender of the Argentine forces at Stanley to British troops who had forcibly reoccupied the islands.<sup>295</sup>

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<sup>292</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reassertion\\_of\\_British\\_sovereignty\\_over\\_the\\_Falkland\\_Islands\\_\(1833\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reassertion_of_British_sovereignty_over_the_Falkland_Islands_(1833))

<sup>293</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falkland\\_Islands](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falkland_Islands)

<sup>294</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legislative\\_Council\\_of\\_the\\_Falkland\\_Islands](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legislative_Council_of_the_Falkland_Islands)

<sup>295</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Falkland-Islands/History>

06/14/1982 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Argentina, Military Autocracy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: British administration was restored at the end of the Falklands War. And as a result to the 1981 'British Dependent Territory Act', the status was changed from Crown Colony to Dependent Territory. The islanders had full British citizenship restored in 1983. Their quality of life improved through investments made by the UK after the war and by economic liberalization that had been stalled for fear of angering Argentina. LIED does not treat the Falkland Islands during its colonial time.

04/18/1985 End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: On this date, a new constitution was enacted, promoting self-government which has continued to devolve power to the islanders.<sup>296</sup> The politics of the Falkland Islands takes place in a framework of a constitutional monarchy and parliamentary representative democratic dependency as set out by the constitution. In 2002 the remaining British Dependent Territories were renamed as British Overseas Territories. In 01/2009 a new constitution came into effect that strengthened the Falklands' local democratic government and reserved for the islanders their right to determine the territory's political status. Executive power is exercised on behalf of the King by an appointed Governor. Legislative power is vested in both the government and the Legislative Assembly. The judiciary is independent of the executive and the legislature. The military defense and foreign policy of the islands is the responsibility of the United Kingdom. No political parties exist on the islands currently and so Members stand as independents, however the governmental and legal proceedings very closely resemble British standards.<sup>297</sup> In a 2013 sovereignty referendum, almost all Falklanders voted in favor of remaining a UK overseas territory.<sup>298</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. FH, LIED and V-Dem do not provide data for the Falkland Island.

Liberal Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

## Faroe Islands

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<sup>296</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falklands\\_War](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falklands_War)

<sup>297</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics\\_of\\_the\\_Falkland\\_Islands](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_the_Falkland_Islands)

<sup>298</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Falkland-Islands/History>

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [Denmark, Constitutional Monarchy] [Start: 01/14/1814]: Between 1814 and 1948, the Faroe Islands are classified by us as a colonial regime under direct rule by Denmark. On 01/14/1814, with the dissolution of the Denmark–Norway union, the Faroe Islands, along with Iceland and Greenland, were incorporated into Denmark as a result of the Peace of Kiel.<sup>299</sup> In 1816, the Faroese parliament, known as the Løgting, was officially dissolved, and a Danish judicial and administrative system was introduced to replace it. The use of Danish as the primary language was promoted in administration, education, and the church, while Faroese was actively discouraged. Executive authority was exercised by a Danish-appointed prefect, and all significant decisions were made in Copenhagen. This structure reflects the defining features of direct colonial rule, in which a non-sovereign territory is governed by officials of the metropole without meaningful delegation of authority to local actors. In 1849, Denmark adopted a new constitution, which was extended to the Faroe Islands in 1850, granting them two seats in the Danish parliament, the Rigsdag. However, this limited metropolitan representation did not entail local self-government. In 1852, the Faroese successfully reinstated the Løgting, but only as a county council with an advisory role, lacking any binding legislative power.<sup>300</sup> The body remained fully subordinate to the Danish administration. The Løgting did not become a directly elected institution until 1926, and even then, it remained an advisory body without legislative competence. While Faroese was standardized as a written language in 1890, it was not permitted for use in public schools until 1938 and in the church (Fólkakirkjan) until 1939.<sup>301</sup> The continued imposition of Danish and the marginalization of the Faroese language and culture were characteristic of colonial assimilation policies. There was no attempt to govern through traditional Faroese elites or to integrate local institutions into the decision-making process. Instead, Danish officials exercised political control throughout the period. This political structure, marked by the absence of internal sovereignty, legislative autonomy, and cultural self-determination, corresponds to standard definitions of direct colonial rule in comparative political science.

04/12/1940 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [Denmark, Indirect Rule Occupation Regime]/Start Indirect Rule Occupation Regime [by United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: In World War II, Nazi Germany invaded and occupied Denmark. In response to this, the British conducted a preemptive invasion and occupation of the Faroe Islands, which was called Operation Valentine, with the aim of preventing a potential German invasion. The

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<sup>299</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty\\_of\\_Kiel](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Kiel)

<sup>300</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty\\_of\\_Kiel](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Kiel)

<sup>301</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_the\\_Faroe\\_Islands#1600s\\_onwards](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Faroe_Islands#1600s_onwards)

Løgting acquired legislative authority during this time, while Danish prefect Carl Aage Hilbert continued to hold executive control. Although there were certain efforts to proclaim full independence at this juncture, the United Kingdom had made a commitment not to intervene in the internal matters of the Faroe Islands or take action without the consent of a liberated Denmark. The wartime self-government experience played a pivotal role in preparing the path for the formal autonomy achieved in 1948.<sup>302</sup>

05/13/1945 End Indirect Rule Occupation Regime [United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Part of Other Country [Denmark, Liberal Democracy]: After the liberation of Denmark and the conclusion of World War II, the British occupation came to an end.<sup>303</sup> The final British troops departed in September 1945. Until 1948, the Faroe Islands held the official designation of a Danish amt (county). In 1946, a referendum on complete independence took place, garnering majority support. However, the Danish government and king did not acknowledge this outcome because only two-thirds of the population participated in the referendum. Consequently, the Danish king dissolved the Faroese government.<sup>304</sup>

03/23/1948 End Part of Other Country [Denmark, Liberal Democracy]/Start Liberal Democracy [as Protectorate of Denmark, Liberal Democracy]: Responding to the increasing movements advocating for self-government and independence, Denmark ultimately conferred home-rule upon the Faroe Islands in 1948, providing a significant level of local autonomy.<sup>305</sup> Executive authority in local government matters is vested in the Faroese government. The leader of the government, known as the Løgmaður (Chief Justice), serves as both the Prime Minister and the head of the Faroese Government. Elections take place under universal suffrage at both municipal and national levels, also choosing two members for the Folketing. Up until 2007, there were seven electoral districts, but they were eliminated on 25 October of that year in favor of a single nationwide district.<sup>306307</sup> The judiciary in the Faroe Islands maintains independence from both the executive and legislative branches and falls under the jurisdiction of Denmark.<sup>308</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. The Faroe Islands are not registered in FH's, LIED's or V-Dem's datasets.

Liberal Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

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<sup>302</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_the\\_Faroe\\_Islands#World\\_War\\_II](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Faroe_Islands#World_War_II)

<sup>303</sup> <https://www.royalmarineshistory.com/post/operation-valentine-occupation-of-the-faroe-islands>

<sup>304</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_the\\_Faroe\\_Islands#Post-World\\_War\\_II:\\_Home\\_Rule](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Faroe_Islands#Post-World_War_II:_Home_Rule)

<sup>305</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Faroe\\_Islands#History](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Faroe_Islands#History)

<sup>306</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Faroe\\_Islands#Government\\_and\\_politics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Faroe_Islands#Government_and_politics)

<sup>307</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women\\_in\\_the\\_Faroe\\_Islands#Parliamentary\\_appointments\\_and\\_elections](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women_in_the_Faroe_Islands#Parliamentary_appointments_and_elections)

<sup>308</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics\\_of\\_the\\_Faroe\\_Islands](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_the_Faroe_Islands)

## Fiji

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: 10/10/1874]: The Kingdom of Fiji, with Ratu Seru Epenisa Cakobau as King, existed from 1871.<sup>309</sup> It became the largest British crown colony in the Pacific in 1874, after the Fijians ceded their country to Britain (McIntyre 1999). Because this phase is clearly marked by British annexation of the islands, this period is coded as colonial rule. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held until 1904, from 1905 onward, only multiparty legislative elections were held. Universal suffrage was absent until 1963.<sup>310</sup> Political liberties were absent according to LIED. V-Dem's PCLI classifies political liberties as ambiguous until 1959 and as somewhat present from 1960 onward. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

04/17/1963 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: General elections took place in Fiji from 04/17 – 05/04/1963.<sup>311</sup> A new constitution in 1963 provided for a majority-elected Legislative Council and Chinese, Rotumans and other Pacific Islanders were enfranchised for the first time (Lal 2008). For the first time, women and indigenous Fijians were granted the right to vote alongside male Europeans and Indo-Fijians. On 07/25/1965 the London conference at Marlborough House initiated steps towards greater autonomy in internal affairs, especially regarding the introduction of responsible government for Fiji. According to LIED only multiparty legislative elections were held. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and somewhat present according to V-Dem's PCLI. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

08/10/1966 End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start (Monarchical) Electoral Hybrid Regime [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: The first pre-independence general elections in Fiji were

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<sup>309</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom\\_of\\_Fiji](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Fiji)

<sup>310</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s\\_suffrage](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage)

<sup>311</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1963\\_Fijian\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1963_Fijian_general_election)

held on 09/26/1966 & 10/08/1966, in which two political parties (the Federation and the Alliance) contested. The elections resulted in a victory for the Alliance.<sup>312</sup> On 09/01/1967, a ministerial style of government was established with Kamsese Mara as Chief Minister (Lal 2008). There were also strong monarchic elements in the regime form of Fiji. Mara was the hereditary Paramount Chief of the Lau Island.<sup>313</sup> On 11/03/1969 all parties agreed that Fiji should become a fully sovereign independent state with the Queen as Head of State as a Dominion in the British Commonwealth (McIntyre 1999). Because the rather complicated electoral system applied in the elections of 1966 cannot be considered democratic because voters were mostly forced to vote along ethnic lines the regime is classified as an electoral hybrid regime. On 10/10/1970 Fiji attained independence as the Dominion of Fiji. The legislative council was replaced with a bicameral parliament, with a senate dominated by Fijian chiefs and a popularly elected house of representatives (Marshall 2018e).<sup>314</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. For this period, LIED categorizes elections as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores them as free and fair while their CEI scores them as somewhat clean. However, political liberties were coded as absent according to LIED. V-Dem's PCLI scores them as somewhat present. In 1970 and 1971, according to Polity5, during this period, the executive was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. While quantitative indicators from other datasets point more into the direction of a democracy, we classify it as an electoral hybrid regime. Until 1969, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. From 1970 to 1972, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

04/15[-29]/1972 End (Monarchical) Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start (Monarchical) Defective Democracy: Between these dates general elections were held in Fiji. Different from the electoral system of the elections in 1966 the new rules can be considered democratic. Post-independence politics was initially dominated by the Alliance Party of Kamsese Mara. The 1977 election, however, saw the Indian-led opposition win a majority but fail to form a government, leading to the Fiji Constitutional Crisis of 1977. A significant change occurred in April 1987 when a

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<sup>312</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1966\\_Fijian\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1966_Fijian_general_election)

<sup>313</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kamsese\\_Mara](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kamsese_Mara)

<sup>314</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colonies\\_of\\_Fiji](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colonies_of_Fiji)



coalition led by Timoci Bavadra, supported by the Indo-Fijian community, won the general election and formed the first majority Indian government, with Bavadra as Prime Minister.<sup>315</sup> As per FH's classification for this regime period, the country is considered free with a score ranging from 2 to 4, which we also interpret as free in our framework. Fiji's political framework facilitated the protection of minority rights, ensuring the preservation of civil and political liberties, and establishing an independent judiciary, further reinforced by the presence of an ombudsman (Gastil 1987). Nevertheless, LIED still considers that political liberties were not given. V-Dem's PCLI scores remained at a somewhat level for the entire time. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Besides, for this period, LIED categorizes elections as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores them as free and fair while their CEI scores them as somewhat clean. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. For almost the entire regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For the year 1987, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. Between 04/04/1987 and 04/11/1987, general elections in Fiji resulted in a victory for the coalition of the Labour Party and the National Federation Party, ending the Alliance Party's post-independence rule. Timoci Bavadra became Prime Minister.

05/14/1987 End (Monarchical) Defective Democracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, Lieutenant Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka led a military coup against the Bavadra government, citing ethnic unrest and concerns of racial discrimination against indigenous Fijians. This coup initiated a military autocracy led by Rabuka. The regime suspended the constitution and civil liberties. The government Rabuka led after the coups can be described as a military junta, as it was controlled by military leaders without democratic legitimacy.

05/19/1987 End Military Autocracy/Start (Monarchical) Democratizing Regime: In the aftermath, Governor-General Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau and Queen Elizabeth II attempted to restore order, granting Rabuka temporary amnesty and some authority and established a caretaker amid ongoing tensions.

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<sup>315</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modern\\_history\\_of\\_Fiji](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modern_history_of_Fiji)

09/25/1987 End (Monarchical) Democratizing Regime/Start Military Autocracy: Rabuka staged a second coup after the Supreme Court declared the first coup illegal and the Queen's new governor-general appointee attempted to assert executive power. He abolished the monarchy, declared Fiji a republic, and appointed himself president, establishing a military administration and severing ties with the British monarchy (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 77). This marked a further regime change to a military junta led by Rabuka. Despite this, pressures for democratic transition persisted, resulting in a new constitution in 1990 and subsequent elections in 1992 (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 27).<sup>316</sup> According to LIED only legislative elections, which were not multiparty, were held during this period. Per FH, for 1987, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. For the remaining regime period a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. Moreover, political liberties are categorized as absent by LIED and as ambiguous by V-Dem's PCLI. From 1987 to 1989, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints. In 1990 and 1991, based on Polity5's evaluation, the executive's power was limited to a degree between substantial constraints and parity with other institutions, fitting Intermediate Category 3. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

05/30/1992 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date, the Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT), a party founded by Rabuka to represent indigenous Fijian interests, won the majority of seats reserved for ethnic Fijians. Sitiveni Rabuka transitioned from military leader to elected Prime Minister. While this signified a move toward civilian rule, the electoral system was heavily biased. The 1990 Constitution allocated a disproportionate number of parliamentary seats to indigenous Fijians and established a voting system that marginalized Indo-Fijians and other minorities. Despite the return to an elected government, the political environment remained strained. Civil liberties were generally safeguarded, but somehow restricted due to the constitutional framework that institutionalized ethnic divisions. Following the 1992 elections, the development was marked by ongoing efforts to address ethnic tensions and constitutional inequalities. The discriminatory aspects of the 1990 Constitution led to domestic and international pressure for reform. In 1997, a new, more inclusive constitution was adopted, aiming to provide equitable representation for all ethnic groups. The constitutional

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<sup>316</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1987\\_Fijian\\_coups\\_d%27%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1987_Fijian_coups_d%27%C3%A9tat)

amendments in March 1999 lead to an end of the longstanding monopoly on power that had been guaranteed to indigenous Fijians for a decade (Karatnycky 2000). The 1999 general elections under the new constitution resulted in a significant political shift. Mahendra Chaudhry, an Indo-Fijian, became Fiji's first Prime Minister of Indian descent, leading the Fiji Labour Party to victory. This peaceful transition of power indicated progress toward a more inclusive democracy. According to FH, a score of 6 to 7 for the assessed regime period until 1998 designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. In 1999 the country receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. Political liberties were still absent in this period following LIED. However, V-Dem's PCLI still indicates that political liberties were somewhat present. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes elections as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores them as free and fair while their CEI scores them as somewhat clean. Based on Polity5's evaluation, during this period, the executive's power was limited to a degree between substantial constraints and parity with other institutions, fitting Intermediate Category 3. In 1999, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. From 1993 to 1999, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For the year 2000, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. The election on 05/08&15/1999 saw a peaceful transition of power. During that period civil liberties were safeguarded. While quantitative indicators indicate a defective democracy our qualitative observations clearly point to an electoral hybrid regime. The Constitution disproportionately allocated seats to indigenous Fijians, thereby systematically marginalizing Indo-Fijians and violating the core democratic principle of equal representation.

05/19/2000 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Military (Rebel) Autocracy: On this date, ethnic Fijian nationalist George Speight citing racial cleavages attacked the elected government with rebel soldiers from the Fiji's Counter Revolutionary Warfare Unit. The Indo-Fijian Prime Minister, Mahendra Chaudhry and a number of other members of parliament were taken hostage by Speight and his gunmen. Speight claimed to have seized power on behalf of ethnic

Fijians, and purported to have revoked the 1997 constitution and appointed himself interim president and opposition member Timoci Silatolu as interim Prime Minister.<sup>317</sup>

05/29/2000 End Military (Rebel) Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: On this date, Military Forces Commander Commodore Frank Bainimarama manifested the removal of the elected government by an interim regime headed by Josefa Iloilo against the background of the ongoing hostage situation. De facto power lay in this time by the military. On 07/09, following prolonged negotiations, Speigh and the military signed the Muanikau Accord. All key demands of Speigh had been met. However, on 07/26 Speight and others were arrested at a military checkpoint following threats to President Josefa Iloilo.<sup>318</sup> In 2001, Iloilo persuaded the military to allow a return to democracy.<sup>319</sup> The Constitution of Fiji was restored by a High Court decision on 11/15/2000, following the failure of the political upheaval in which the government had been deposed and the constitution suspended in May that year.<sup>320</sup> According to our observations and LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. Political liberties were absent according to LIED, whereas according to V-Dem's PCLI they can be interpreted as somewhat present. V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive.

08/25/2001 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Defective Democracy: On this date, an election to restore democracy, that can be considered as rather free and fair, was held.<sup>321</sup> In 2001, Qarase, representing the United Fiji Party, assumed the role of prime minister. Despite the constitution's requirement for cabinet representation for parties holding more than 10 percent of seats, Qarase declined to include Labour Party members in his cabinet, persisting in this decision despite a supreme court ruling and negotiations. The government exercises significant control over the media and restricts freedom of speech. The Television Act grants authorities influence over programming content, while the Press Correction Act allows for the arrest of individuals publishing "malicious" material and mandates corrections for allegedly false or distorted articles. Political, economic, and social discussions often revolve around ethnic divisions, with entrenched racial discrimination prevailing. A prominent divide exists between indigenous Fijians, who hold significant influence in government and the armed forces,

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<sup>317</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2000\\_Fijian\\_coup\\_d%27%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2000_Fijian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat);

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George\\_Speight](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Speight)

<sup>318</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George\\_Speight](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Speight)

<sup>319</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Josefa\\_Iloilo](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Josefa_Iloilo);

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2000\\_Fijian\\_coup\\_d%27%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2000_Fijian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat)

<sup>320</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2001\\_Fijian\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2001_Fijian_general_election)

<sup>321</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2001\\_Fijian\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2001_Fijian_general_election)

and Indo-Fijians, who wield considerable economic power. Indigenous Fijians receive preferential treatment in various areas, including education, housing, and land acquisition, while certain job opportunities remain exclusive to them. Throughout this period, Freedom House classifies Fiji as partly free (Piano/Puddington/Rosenberg 2006). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes elections mostly as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores them as free and fair, while their CEI scores them as somewhat clean. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. Additionally, according to LIED political liberties were still absent. Whereas V-Dem's PCLI categorizes them as somewhat present. Until 2005, as per Polity5's categorization, the executive's authority was significantly constrained, nearing parity with other branches, placing it in the third intermediate category. From 2002 to 2005, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For 2006, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive.

12/05/2006 End Defective Democracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date Bainimarama spearheaded Fiji's fourth coup, deposed the civilian government, and assumed the role of acting president. President Iloilo, despite reservations, yielded to the persuasion of military leaders, leading to the dissolution of parliament. He appointed Bainimarama as acting prime minister and validated the establishment of an interim government comprising military officers and cooperative civilians. In return, Bainimarama reinstated Iloilo as president on 01/05/2007 (Lansford 2021: 552). According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. For this period, LIED still considers political liberties as absent. V-Dem's PCLI scores dropped back to not really present. In 2006, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints during this time. From 2007 to 2013, based on Polity5's evaluation, during this period, the executive faced weak constraints, classified as Intermediate Category 1 between unlimited authority and slight limitations. For the years 2007 and 2008, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. For 2009, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. From 2010 to 2012, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as

indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. In 2013, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For 2014, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

09/17/2014 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date, elections under a new constitution, which were planned for 2009, took place.<sup>322</sup> Of the seven parties contesting the election, three won seats (Lansford 2021: 553). International observers deemed the election to be credible, but they did note some issues such as the restrictive media environment which limited the ability of Fijian journalists to scrutinize the claims of candidates and parties, the short timeframe for the election, and a complex voting system. Despite this, leaders of several opposition parties disputed the result, alleging ballot tampering.<sup>323</sup> The ruling party often intervenes in opposition activities, the judiciary is susceptible to political influence, and instances of military and police brutality pose a significant challenge.<sup>324</sup> General elections took place on 12/14/2022, to elect 55 members of Parliament. Controversial electoral amendments were passed prior to the elections, including one restricting voter registration to birth names and another granting extensive powers to the election's supervisor, sparking criticism from opposition parties and legal organizations. Following the elections, FijiFirst secured a plurality with 26 seats, while the People's Alliance (PA) won 21 seats and the National Federation Party (NFP) secured five. Negotiations to form a government ensued, with FijiFirst and the PA-NFP coalition vying for the support of the kingmaker party, SODELPA. Eventually, on 12/20, SODELPA's management board voted to form a coalition government with the PA-NFP coalition, ending FijiFirst's eight-year rule and Prime Minister Bainimarama's 16-year tenure. Despite this decision, the first parliamentary session, scheduled for 12/21, was delayed, leading SODELPA's management board to reaffirm their decision to form a government with the PA-NFP coalition on 12/23.<sup>325</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes elections as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores them as somewhat free and fair while their CEI scores them as of ambiguous electoral

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<sup>322</sup> [https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Fiji\\_2013?lang=en](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Fiji_2013?lang=en)

<sup>323</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014\\_Fijian\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_Fijian_general_election)

<sup>324</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/fiji>

<sup>325</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022\\_Fijian\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Fijian_general_election)

cleanliness. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. In addition, LIED's outcomes concerning the political liberties did not change. V-Dem's PCLI outcomes switched to ambiguous until 2022. In 2023 political liberties are considered as somewhat present. Until 2017, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive's power was noticeably limited but not substantial, fitting Intermediate Category 2. In 2018, according to the Polity5 indicator, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. From 2015 to 2022, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. For 2023, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

Electoral Hybrid Regime as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Hartmann 2001)

## Finland

01/01/1900 Part of Other Country [Russia, Constitutional Monarchy] [Start: 09/17/1809]: Finland became part of the Russian Empire after the Finnish War of 1808-1809. The Romanov Emperor of Russia became also the Grand Duke of Finland, represented by a governor-general in Finland.<sup>326</sup> As an autonomous Grand Principality in the Russian Empire, Finland achieved universal suffrage in 1906, becoming the second country in the world to adopt universal suffrage. The Finnish parliamentary election of 1907 was the first time when women were elected (19 of 200 MPs). Despite that the Grand Duke of Finland was the emperor of Russia Finland was a borderline case between being a part of the Russian Empire and a semi-autonomous protectorate. Free and fair pre-independence election for a parliament were already held on 10/1&2/1917.<sup>327</sup> According to LIED only multiparty legislative elections were held during this period. LIED considers political liberties as absent and V-Dem's PCLI as ambiguous for the whole time. From 1900 to 1904, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For 1905, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while

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<sup>326</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand\\_Duchy\\_of\\_Finland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand_Duchy_of_Finland)

<sup>327</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1917\\_Finnish\\_parliamentary\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1917_Finnish_parliamentary_election)

V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For the following year, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. From 1907 to 1911, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. From 1912 to 1917, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive.

11/07/1917 Continuation as Part of Other Country [Russia, Communist Ideocracy]: On this date the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) was proclaimed.

12/06/1917 End Part of Other Country [Russia, Communist Ideocracy]/Start No Central Authority: During the period between 12/06/1917 and 05/16/1918, Finland was in a state of intense turmoil due to the Finnish Civil War, which erupted shortly after the country declared independence from Russia on 12/06/1917. The nation was effectively divided between two opposing regimes, each controlling different parts of the country and imposing strict controls over their territories. On one side was the Finnish Socialist Workers' Republic, known as Red Finland, proclaimed on 01/28/1918 by the socialist faction composed mainly of the working class and supported by the Social Democratic Party. They sought to establish a socialist state inspired by the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. Red Finland controlled the southern industrial regions, including major cities like Helsinki and Tampere. The regime implemented radical reforms such as nationalization of industries and collectivization of agriculture. Political liberties were suppressed for those opposing socialist rule; freedom of speech and assembly were limited, especially for non-socialist parties. Dissent was not tolerated, and the government exercised strict censorship to control information and maintain power. On the other side was the Senate of Finland, referred to as White Finland, representing the non-socialist government that had declared independence. Led by Prime Minister Pehr Evind Svinhufvud and General Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim, who commanded the White Army, they aimed to establish a democratic republic with a market economy. The White regime held control over the northern and central regions of Finland. While advocating for democratic principles, they also curtailed political liberties during the civil war. Leftist parties and organizations were suppressed, and censorship was imposed to maintain order and morale. Freedom of speech and assembly were restricted, and those suspected of supporting the Reds faced persecution. The civil war had a profound impact on political liberties across Finland. Both regimes imposed censorship to control propaganda and suppress dissenting voices. Publications opposing the ruling faction in



each territory were banned or strictly regulated. Public gatherings were restricted due to martial law conditions, and political organizations affiliated with the opposing side were outlawed. Members of these organizations were often arrested or persecuted, and the conflict led to human rights violations on both sides, including arbitrary arrests, executions without trial, and other wartime atrocities. This period is classified by us as having no political liberties because the civil war created an environment where basic freedoms were severely restricted by both competing governments. The state of emergency and military actions took precedence over constitutional rights, leading to widespread suppression of political and civil liberties. The conflict disrupted normal political processes, and the focus on military objectives overshadowed any commitment to upholding individual rights. On 01/03/1918 independence was recognized by the highest Soviet executive body. All datasets like BMR, LIED and RoW consider Finland immediately from the date of its independence as democratic.<sup>328</sup> Historically this is wrong since this classification overlooks the period of civil war, while after the war Finland became a democracy and continued its universal suffrage, there were still severe problems concerning political liberties according to our observations.<sup>329</sup> LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the state of political liberties. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. . V-Dem's indicators LCE and JCE seem to be here largely misleading and to say it clearly wrong (see text above).

05/16/1918 End No Central Authority/Start Liberal Democracy: After the conflict concluded with the victory of the White forces, the Senate reestablished control over the entire country. In the aftermath, efforts were made to stabilize the nation and rebuild democratic institutions. However, the immediate period following the war saw harsh reprisals against those who had supported the Reds, which continued to affect political liberties. It took time for Finland to fully restore democratic norms and protect political freedoms for all its citizens. In November 1939 Finland was invaded by the Soviet Union and forced to cede parts of its territory. When Risto Heikki Ryti took over the presidency in December 1940, the government started negotiations with Nazi Germany and by June 1941 Finland entered World War II as a co-belligerent against the Soviet Union. Ryti resigned in August 1944 and was succeeded by Carl Gustav Mannerheim, who had been Commander-in-Chief during the war against the Soviet Union, but

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<sup>328</sup> [https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Finland\\_2011?lang=en](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Finland_2011?lang=en)

<sup>329</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal\\_suffrage#cite\\_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37)

his government is not considered military. His presidency emerged out of the state of crisis and was supported by a majority in parliament. He resigned in March 1946.<sup>330</sup> From this point on, presidencies rarely changed, indicating very stable conditions.<sup>331</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED consistently categorizes Finnish elections as competitive. V-Dem's CEI scores all elections since independence as clean. Their EF&FI scores elections as somewhat free and fair until 1945 and since then as free and fair. Finland is a parliamentary representative democracy with a unicameral system.<sup>332</sup> Legislative power is vested in the parliament (Eduskunta) and while the president, elected for six-year terms, is the chief executive, he shares his power with the Council of State.<sup>333</sup> The political regime is characterized by in our observations fair and free elections within the framework of a competitive multi-party system. This is in line with the observations of LIED. The constitution guarantees an independent judiciary. As per FH's classification for this regime period, the country is considered free with a score ranging from 2 to 4, which we also interpret as free in our framework. Moreover, political liberties were first acknowledged by LIED in 1950 and remained present ever since. V-Dem's PCLI underlines that political rights were somewhat present from 1919 to 1938, in 1945 and in 1947. Between 1939 and 1944 the scores decreased to an ambiguous level. In 1946 and since 1948 political liberties were constantly present. The universal suffrage applies to citizens aged 18 and older (OSCE 2023c). Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive.

Liberal Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Alapuro/Allardt 1978, Anckar/Anckar 2010, Arter 1985, Arter 1999, Auffermann 2009, Coakley 1986, Endemann 1999, Karvonen 2000, Nousiainen 2001, Siaroff 1999)

## France

<sup>330</sup> <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html> , see narratives for version 5.0, Finland\_R: 2-3.

<sup>331</sup> <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html> , see narratives for version 5.0, Finland\_R: 3, Finland\_V: 1-2.

<sup>332</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics\\_of\\_Finland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Finland)

<sup>333</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Finland/Labour-and-taxation#ref26132>

01/01/1900 (Male) Defective Democracy [Start: 02/08/1871]: Starting in 987, the Kingdom of France emerges on the map. From 09/21/1792 until 05/18/1804 France was for the first time a republic (French First Republic). From 04/06/1814 until 02/24/1848 France was a constitutional monarchy.<sup>334</sup> In 1848 universal male suffrage was introduced, with the exception of the military who obtained the right to vote in 1945. Louis-Napoléon orchestrated a coup d'état in 1851, overthrowing the republic and declaring himself Emperor Napoleon III, thus establishing the Second French Empire. This Bonapartist regime lasted from 01/14/1852, to 10/27/1870. Following the collapse of the Second French Empire during the Franco-Prussian War, France adopted the democratic regime known as the French Third Republic on 09/04/1870.<sup>335</sup> The regime is classified from 02/08/1871, the date of the first parliamentary elections in this period as a – severely – defective democracy, because women had no right vote.<sup>336</sup> The French Third Republic struggled with governmental instabilities, frequent changes in cabinets and procedural difficulties in the legislature. Governmental power was exercised by broad coalitions, known as party blocs, of which the most prominent are the Bloc National, the Cartel des Gauches, the Union Nationale, and Concentration.<sup>337</sup> During the 1920s, the governments were challenged by the financial crisis and devaluation of the franc, the French currency at the time. Anecdotally, in 1934 violent riots in Paris over a financial scandal enforced the retirement of Prime Minister Édouard Daladier after only ten days in office.<sup>338</sup> Fiscal policies are a major factor for governmental instability during this period. In the second half of the 1930s an external threat to government stability emerged, namely the rise of fascism in Spain, Italy and Germany. Pierre Laval and, again, Édouard Daladier had to resign from their positions as prime minister because of their lack in political engagement against the fascist threat.<sup>339</sup> Germany's Nazi-regime and the start of the Second World War finally heralded the end of the French Third Republic.<sup>340</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. V-Dem's CEI scores all elections as clean. Their EF&FI scores elections as free until 1918, somewhat free and fair from 1919 onward. Furthermore, political liberties were present except in the period of World War I (LIED). V-Dem's PCLI scores full political liberties but between World War I the outcomes decreased to somewhat present. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either

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<sup>334</sup> <https://rulers.org/rulf.html#france>

<sup>335</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French\\_Third\\_Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_Third_Republic)

<sup>336</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French\\_Second\\_Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_Second_Republic)

<sup>337</sup> <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html>, see narratives for version 5.0, France\_R: 1, France\_V: 1.

<sup>338</sup> <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html>, see narratives for version 5.0, France\_R: 4.

<sup>339</sup> <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html>, see narratives for version 5.0, France\_V: 4-5.

<sup>340</sup> <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html>, see narratives for version 5.0, France\_R: 5-6, France\_V: 5-6.

equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. From 1900 to 1913, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive. During World War I, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. From 1919 to 1939, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are again both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive. For 1940, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

06/22/1940 End (Male) Defective Democracy/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Germany, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]: On this date, the Second Armistice at Compiègne was signed by officials of Germany and France, establishing a German occupation zone in Northern and Western France, encompassing around 60% of France's European territory. The German troops had reached and occupied Paris on the 06/14/1940. The area that was under military occupation during World War II, referred to as the "occupied zone", encompassed the northern and western regions of France, including the two restricted areas. On the other hand, the southern region of France, excluding the western portion of Aquitaine along the Atlantic coast, was designated as the "free zone" (French: zone libre), where the Vichy regime continued to hold power as a separate state, albeit under significant German influence. Vichy France, also known as the "French State" (État français), took over after the French Third Republic disintegrated due to defeat.<sup>341</sup> According to our observations and LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, therefore we code this regime as a direct occupation regime. Political liberties were not present according to LIED and V-Dem's PCLI. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE is classified as limited, indicating weak judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

For the time between 06/14/1940 and 08/25/1944 see also **France, Vichy**.

08/25/1944 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Germany, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]/Start Democratizing Regime: The occupation ended effectively with the liberation of Paris on this date. In the months following the liberation, and until the first elections in 1945, the country was governed by the Provisional Government of the French Republic

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<sup>341</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German\\_military\\_administration\\_in\\_occupied\\_France\\_during\\_World\\_War\\_II](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_military_administration_in_occupied_France_during_World_War_II)

(Gouvernement provisoire de la République française, GPRF). This government was established in June 1944 and led by General Charles de Gaulle. The GPRF also replaced the Vichy regime and assumed control as the legitimate authority representing Free France. The GPRF was composed of the French Communist Party (PCF), the French Section of the Workers' International (SFIO) and the Christian democratic Popular Republican Movement (MRP).<sup>342</sup> On 04/21/1944 before the first post-war election full universal suffrage, including women as voters, was introduced.<sup>343</sup>

10/21/1945 End Democratizing Regime/Start Liberal Democracy: On this date, the first post-war legislative election took place. The French Communist Party, which had already doubled its performance in the 1936 elections, emerged as the leading party, securing approximately 26% of the vote and 159 seats.<sup>344</sup> Since 1946, the Fourth Republic has faced challenges including a lack of political consensus, a weak executive branch, and a recurring pattern of rapidly forming and collapsing governments. Due to the absence of a party or coalition capable of securing a parliamentary majority, prime ministers have been cautious about implementing unpopular reforms to avoid jeopardizing their political standing.<sup>345</sup> The year 1956 was a pivotal one in French history, marked by a series of events that brought the country to the brink of a democratic breakdown, setting the stage for the establishment of the Fifth Republic in 1958 (Marshall 2018f). These developments also mark the transition of France's parliamentary system to its contemporary presidential system.<sup>346</sup> The most significant factor was the Algerian War of Independence. Algeria, a French colony since 1830, began its fight for independence in 1954. By 1956, the conflict had intensified, demanding significant attention and resources from France. The political framework of the Fourth Republic, with its fragmented parliamentary system, proved ineffective in dealing with the crisis. The government struggled to maintain a stable majority, leading to frequent changes in leadership and an inability to form a cohesive policy on Algeria. As 1956 drew to a close, the public sentiment was increasingly in favor of a stronger government that could effectively handle the crisis. A new constitution was introduced with a stronger executive branch to stabilize the nation.<sup>347</sup> From 1947 to 1957, based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. In 1958, as

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<sup>342</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1945\\_French\\_legislative\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1945_French_legislative_election)

<sup>343</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal\\_suffrage#cite\\_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37)

<sup>344</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1945\\_French\\_legislative\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1945_French_legislative_election)

<sup>345</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French\\_Fifth\\_Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_Fifth_Republic)

<sup>346</sup> <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html>, see narratives for version 5.0, France\_V: 8.

<sup>347</sup> [https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/France\\_2008?lang=en](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/France_2008?lang=en)

per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints. From 1959 to 1964, based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive's power was noticeably limited but not substantial, fitting Intermediate Category 2. From 1965 to 1968, based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive encountered substantial institutional limitations on power. Until 1985, as per Polity5's categorization, the executive's authority was significantly constrained, nearing parity with other branches, placing it in the third intermediate category. Since 1986, according to Polity5, the executive was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. France is a democracy with a dual executive and a bicameral system, consisting of the National Assembly and the Senate. For the year 1945, V-Dem's JCE is classified as comprehensive, indicating comprehensive judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For the following year, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For the years 1947-1958, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive. From 1959 to 1968, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. Since 1969, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive. Nevertheless, events in recent years (terrorist attacks, the pandemic) have led to government cutbacks on civil liberties. As per FH's classification for this regime period, the country is considered free with a score ranging from 2 to 4, which we also interpret as free in our framework. Furthermore, according to LIED and V-Dem's PCLI political liberties have been constantly present since 1946. Elections in France are deemed free and fair. Political parties operate independently, and the government acts transparently.<sup>348</sup> The right to vote applies to citizens aged 18 and older.<sup>349</sup> On 06/12/2022 and 06/19/2022 legislative elections were held.<sup>350</sup> They were deemed to be free and fair. During the parliamentary elections in June 2022, Ensemble! secured 245 lower-house seats, but it fell short of achieving an absolute majority. The New Ecological and Social People's Union (NUPES), a left-wing coalition consisting of four parties, earned 131 seats. The far-right, Rassemblement

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<sup>348</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/france/freedom-world/2023>

<sup>349</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections\\_in\\_France](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_France)

<sup>350</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022\\_French\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_French_presidential_election)

National, experienced a significant advancement by winning 89 seats, a notable increase from the 8 seats it secured in 2017.<sup>351</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. During independence, LIED has categorized elections in France as competitive in the whole regime period. V-Dem's EF&FI indicates that elections were free and fair and clean in this period while the CEI indicates they were also somewhat clean.

Liberal Democracy as of 01/07/2024 continued.

Additional sources (Elgie 1999, Hanson 2006, Huber 1998, Kempf 2004, Kempf 2009, Knapp/Wright 2005, MacRae 1967, Nohlen 2010, Rioux/Rogers 1989, Skach 2005, Stepan/Suleiman 1995, Suleiman 1994)

### **France, Vichy**

[The Vichy-regime refers to the independent French State (État Française, zone libre), the southern part of France that was not occupied by Nazi-Germany during World War II.]

06/22/1940 Right-Wing (Corporatist) Autocracy [as protectorate of Germany, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]: On this date, the armistice agreement between Germany and France was signed, dividing the former territory of France into two zones, a German-occupied zone in the north (zone occupée) and a nominally independent zone in the south (zone libre). We code this regime change event as a foreign intervention to acknowledge the presence and political influence exercised by Nazi Germany. However, the Vichy-Regime is a collaborationist regime and not an occupational regime. Pétain agreed on the armistice with Nazi Germany and set up a government in Vichy, leaving Paris and the northern regions of France to German occupation. The French colonies outside of Europe remained under French, meaning Vichy's, authority.<sup>352</sup> Pétain followed an authoritarian, conservative-fundamentalist polity (Vagge 2024: 72). The anti-Semitic laws he adopted were by no means forced upon him and his regime orchestrated the deportation of roughly 76.000 Jewish people into German death camps voluntarily (Prinz 2008: 265). Though his ideology was not exactly fascist, it did resemble the fascist ideology in that it was anti-modern, authoritarian, Anglophobe and anti-communist (Prinz 2008: 265). Another narrative that Pétain shared with fascist ideologies was his denunciation of decadence

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<sup>351</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/france/freedom-world/2023>

<sup>352</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German\\_military\\_administration\\_in\\_occupied\\_France\\_during\\_World\\_War\\_II](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_military_administration_in_occupied_France_during_World_War_II)

and moral degeneration in the French Third Republic.<sup>353</sup> Vichy France as a collaboration regime was a borderline case between occupation and a protectorate status.

11/11/1942 End Right-Wing (Corporatist) Autocracy/Start Indirect Rule Occupation Regime [by Germany, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]: Three days earlier, on 11/08/1942, Allied navy troops had landed in North Africa and pushed back the German Africa Corps. This Allied advance posed a threat to Nazi-Germany, because Europe was now vulnerable along the Mediterranean coastline. On 11/11/1942, German troops started Case Anton, marching south and hence occupying all of France. Italian troops invaded the south-east of France, assisting the German occupation.<sup>354</sup>

08/25/1944 End France, Vichy [Indirect Rule Occupation Regime of Germany, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]: With the liberation of Paris, effectively, the Vichy-regime came to an end and was replaced by Charles de Gaulles' Provisional Government of the French Republic (Gouvernement provisoire de la République française, GPRF).

For the time after 08/25/1944, see **France**.

## **French Guiana**

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Defective Democracy] [Start: 07/31/1667]: The initial French presence in Guiana dates back to 1503, but it wasn't until 1643 that the French established a lasting settlement when colonists founded Cayenne. The Treaty of Breda awarded the territory to France on 07/31/1667.<sup>355</sup> Over time, Guiana evolved into a slave-based society, with a substantial influx of African slaves working on extensive sugar and other plantations, leading to population growth. During World War II, when France fell to German forces, French Guiana became part of Vichy France. However, it officially joined the Free France movement on 03/16/1943.<sup>356</sup>

03/19/1946 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Defective Democracy]/ Part of Other Country [France, Defective Democracy]: On this date, French Guiana became a department of France. In 1974 regional status was given to French Guiana.<sup>357</sup> French Guiana, being an integral part of France, holds a unique position as part of the European Union. It operates under the leadership of the President of the French Republic as its head of state and the Prime Minister

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<sup>353</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German\\_military\\_administration\\_in\\_occupied\\_France\\_during\\_World\\_War\\_II](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_military_administration_in_occupied_France_during_World_War_II)

<sup>354</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German\\_military\\_administration\\_in\\_occupied\\_France\\_during\\_World\\_War\\_II](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_military_administration_in_occupied_France_during_World_War_II)

<sup>355</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/French-Guiana/Government-and-society#ref2490>

<sup>356</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French\\_Guiana#History](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_Guiana#History)

<sup>357</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/French-Guiana/Government-and-society#ref2490>



of France as its head of government. The French government and its agencies have jurisdiction over various national matters, including defense and external relations. French Guiana is represented in the French National Assembly by two deputies. One deputy represents the municipalities of Cayenne and Macouria, while the other represents the remaining regions of French Guiana. Additionally, French Guiana sends two senators to the French Senate.<sup>358</sup> FH, LIED and V-Dem do not list French Guiana in their data. Due to the legal equality of the overseas territory with the regions of mainland France, as well as its representation in the French Parliament and in the European Union, French Guiana can be regarded as a part of France. A referendum held in 2010 on granting greater autonomy and changing the legal status to a collectivité d'outre-mer was rejected.<sup>359</sup> Consequently, participation in the French state as a department of France was further legitimized.

Part of Other Country [France, Liberal Democracy] as of 07/01/2025 continued.

## French Polynesia

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Defective Democracy] [Start 03/16/1888]: In 1842, France established a protectorate over Tahiti and later engaged in a war with Tahiti from 1844 to 1847. Subsequently, in 1847, the British and French signed the Jarnac Convention, which stipulated that the kingdoms of Raiatea, Huahine, and Bora Bora were to remain independent from both powers. It also prohibited any single chief from ruling over the entire archipelago. However, France later violated this agreement, and in 1888, after a series of native resistances and conflicts known as the Leewards War lasting until 1897, the islands were annexed and became a French colony. French Governor Théodore Lacascade officially annexed all of the Leeward Islands on 03/16/1888 via proclamation. The “Proclamation de Gouverneur aux habitants des Îles sous le Vent à l’occasion de l’annexion de ces îles à la France” (Proclamation by the Governor to the inhabitants of the Leeward Islands on the occasion of the annexation of these islands to France) was done without documents of cession from the former sovereign government of the islands.<sup>360</sup> During the 1880s, France asserted its control over the Tuamotu Archipelago, previously under the Pōmare Dynasty, although it was not formally annexed. Furthermore, after declaring a protectorate over Tahuata in 1842, the French considered the entire Marquesas Islands as part of their territory.<sup>361</sup> On

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<sup>358</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French\\_Guiana#Politics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_Guiana#Politics)

<sup>359</sup> <https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Franz%C3%B6sisch-Guayana>

<sup>360</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Annexation\\_of\\_the\\_Leeward\\_Islands\\_by\\_France](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Annexation_of_the_Leeward_Islands_by_France)

<sup>361</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French\\_Polynesia#History](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_Polynesia#History)

10/27/1946 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Liberal Democracy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [France, Liberal Democracy]: In 1946, French citizenship was extended to Polynesians, and the islands' designation was altered to become an overseas territory. Subsequently, in 1957, the name of the islands was officially modified to Polynésie Française, which translates to French Polynesia. In 1977, a degree of internal autonomy was conferred upon French Polynesia, and this autonomy was expanded in 1984.

02/27/2003 End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [France, Liberal Democracy]/Start Defective Democracy [as protectorate-type of France, Liberal Democracy]: , French Polynesia attained the status of a complete overseas collectivity within France.<sup>362</sup> FH, LIED and V-Dem do not provide data for French Polynesia. French Polynesia possesses both legislative and executive powers and is represented in the French Senate and Assembly. However, a representative of the French state oversees these institutions and has the authority to postpone legislative decisions, dissolve the parliament or the executive, and establish an interim government. Important policy areas, such as foreign affairs and security policy, are determined by France. Its economy depends heavily on French subsidies, reinforcing structural dependency. Since 2013, French Polynesia has once again been listed by the United Nations as a Non-Self-Governing Territory caused by an ongoing debate about the independence of the region.<sup>363</sup> The autonomy rights, representation in the French Parliament, limited sovereignty, and dependent economy make it difficult to categorize the regime. French Polynesia, as well as the other overseas collectivities, represents a special case. Due to its higher degree of autonomy compared to other French administrative zones, such as the départements et régions d'outre-mer, the region cannot be classified as an Indirect Rule Colonial Regime. Instead, it can be categorized as a Defective Democracy with the additional designation of a protectorate-type. It is considered defective because, due to France's position, these territories do not possess full sovereignty.

Defective Democracy [as protectorate-type of France, Liberal Democracy] as of 07/01/2025 continued.

## **Gabon**

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Defective Democracy] [Start: 08/01/1886]: Gabon became part of French Congo on 08/01/1886, which was a French colony

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<sup>362</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French\\_Polynesia#History](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_Polynesia#History)

<sup>363</sup> <https://www.un.org/dpa/decolonization/en/nsqt>

compromising the present-day area of the Republic of the Congo, parts of Gabon, and the Central African Republic. In 1910, Gabon was declared a territory of French Equatorial Africa (AEF).<sup>364</sup> Between 06/30/1934 and 12/31/1937 the region was part of French Equatorial Africa. In World War II, the Free French Forces, backed by British naval and air forces, launched an invasion of Gabon. Their objective was to topple the pro-Vichy France colonial administration and unite French territories in support of the Allied cause.<sup>365</sup> In the so-called Battle of Gabon, the administration was defeated and surrendered on 11/12/1940.<sup>366</sup> According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held until 1945, from 1946 onward only multiparty legislative elections were held. However universal male and female suffrage was absent until 1957 (LIED). According to LIED political liberties were absent. V-Dem's PCLI classifies political liberties as absent until 1949 and as not really present from 1950 onward. Both LIED's and V-Dem's data for Gabon only start in 1910. From 1910 to 1945, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 1946-1949, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. From 1950 to 1958, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

11/28/1958 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Liberal Democracy]/Start Electoral Autocracy [as Protectorate of France, Liberal Democracy]: On this date, Gabon became an autonomous republic within the French Community.<sup>367</sup> Already in March 1957 territorial elections had been held under universal suffrage. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. The elections were not competitive (LIED), not really clean (V-Dem CEI) but in stark contrast to that somewhat free and fair according to V-Dem's EF&FI. Although originally finishing second, the BDG had gained a parliamentary majority because of bribes, which had led deputies of the UDSG to switch parties. On 05/21/1957 Léon M'ba was appointed vice-president of the government council under the control of the French governor.<sup>368</sup>

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<sup>364</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gabon>

<sup>365</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gabon>

<sup>366</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle\\_of\\_Gabon](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Gabon)

<sup>367</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gabon>

<sup>368</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/L%C3%A9on\\_M%27ba#Rise\\_to\\_power](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/L%C3%A9on_M%27ba#Rise_to_power)

After constitutional referendum in September 1958, which had granted the autonomous status, the assembly voted to establish a legislature in December 1958 and then proclaimed the constitution on 02/19/1959. On 02/27/1959 M'ba became Prime Minister. M'ba had previously detained an opposition leader and coerced certain opposition deputies to change their party affiliations. The BDG (Gabonese Democratic Bloc) benefited from gerrymandering and a multimember district, plurality electoral system, securing a robust majority in the June 1960 election (Bernault 1996: 294-97, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 60). For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

08/17/1960 Continuation Electoral Autocracy [as independent country]: On this date Gabon gained independence, with M'ba, who had previously served as Prime Minister, as president (Fleischhacker 1999b: 387). In 11/1960, he detained eight internal party opponents (Bernault 1996: 294-97, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 60). The dissolution of the National Assembly followed on 11/17/1960. Furthermore, he declared a state of emergency.<sup>369</sup> Besides political liberties were absent (LIED) and can be interpreted as not really present according to V-Dem's PCLI since 1958. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive's constraints fell into Intermediate Category 1, between unlimited authority and slight limitations. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. According to LIED multiparty executive and legislative elections were held.

02/12/1961 End Electoral Autocracy/Start One-Party Autocracy: The first general elections in Gabon following independence took place on this date, marking the election of both a president and members of the parliament. This election was notable for being the inaugural presidential election, where Prime Minister Léon M'ba, representing the Gabonese Democratic Bloc, stood as the sole candidate and was elected without opposition. In the National Assembly elections, the Gabonese Democratic Bloc and the Gabonese Democratic and Social Union jointly presented a single, unopposed list of candidates under the banner of the National Union.<sup>370</sup> The newly drafted constitution by the president, provided him with widespread power (Fleischhacker 1999b: 387-388). According to LIED executive and legislative elections, which weren't multiparty, were held. LIED categorizes the elections as not competitive. V-Dem's

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<sup>369</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/L%C3%A9on\\_M%27ba#Rise\\_to\\_power](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/L%C3%A9on_M%27ba#Rise_to_power)

<sup>370</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1961\\_Gabonese\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1961_Gabonese_general_election)

EF&FI scores them as somewhat free and fair while their CEI scores them as not really clean. In addition to that, LIED considers political liberties as absent and V-Dem's PCLI as not really present. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive's constraints fell into Intermediate Category 1, between unlimited authority and slight limitations. For 1962-1963, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. For 1964, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are limited. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

02/17/1964 End One-Party Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: After M'ba dissolved the legislature, an opposition leader and military officers deposed him and established an interim government. This interim government was led by Jean-Hilaire Aubame, who served previously as foreign minister under M'ba.

02/19/1964 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start One-Party-Autocracy: The provisional government was toppled by French paratroopers on 02/19/1964. M'ba was reinstalled as the president and promised "total punishment" against the people involved in the coup. Aubame was sentenced to ten years of hard labor and ten years of exile.<sup>371</sup>

04/12/1964 End One-Party Autocracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: M'ba's party Gabon Democratic Bloc (BDG) gained a majority in the legislative elections on this date, during which M'ba is believed to have bribed voters with banknotes, and which showed serious electoral irregularities. The Gabonese Democratic and Social Union (UDSG) practically disappeared from the political scene, as many of its leaders had been jailed because of the coup and the UDSG was formally outlawed (Lansford 2021: 582).<sup>372</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes the elections as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI and CEI score them as neither free, fair nor clean. Furthermore, LIED's and V-Dem's scores concerning the political liberties stayed the same. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive's constraints fell into Intermediate Category 1, between unlimited authority and slight limitations. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

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<sup>371</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean-Hilaire\\_Aubame#1964\\_Gabon\\_coup\\_d%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean-Hilaire_Aubame#1964_Gabon_coup_d%C3%A9tat)

<sup>372</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1964\\_Gabonese\\_parliamentary\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1964_Gabonese_parliamentary_election)

03/19/1967 End Electoral Autocracy/Start One-Party Autocracy: In the 1967 general elections, the BDG was the sole party in contention, resulting in M'ba's reelection as President. Following M'ba's death later that year, Omar Bongo assumed the presidency. On 03/12/1968, the Gabonese Democratic Party succeeded the BDG, becoming the exclusive legal party. The PDG and Bongo secured re-election in one-party elections in 1973, 1980, and 1985. Constitutional amendments in May 1990 reinstated the multi-party system.<sup>373</sup> According to LIED executive and legislative elections, which weren't multiparty, were held. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Moreover, political liberties remained constantly absent (LIED). Following V-Dem's PCLI scores them as absent from 1968 to 1969 and as not really present from 1970 onwards. In 1967, based on Polity5's evaluation, the executive faced weak constraints, classified as Intermediate Category 1 between unlimited authority and slight limitations. Since 1968, as per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

09/16/1990 End One-Party Autocracy/Start Electoral (Personalist) Autocracy: On this date, after antigovernment demonstrations, violent disorders, and a national conference including opposition groups, parliamentary elections were held, the first multiparty elections since 1967.<sup>374</sup> Results from 32 of the 120 constituencies were annulled after public protests claiming fraud by the ruling Gabonese Democratic Party and the second round was postponed. Re-runs were held on 10/21/1990, with a second round on 10/28/1990. Thirteen parties and 553 candidates contested the election, with the Gabonese Democratic party retaining control of the National Assembly by winning 63 of the 120 seats.<sup>375</sup> Although Gabon holds multiparty elections, the PDG dominates the multiparty system and President Ali Bongo maintains political dominance through patronage and repression.<sup>376</sup> Presidential term limits were abolished in 2003.<sup>377</sup> After the death of Ali Bongo in 2009, Ali Bongo Ondimba, his son, won the 2009 Gabonese presidential election and was reelected in 2016, in elections marred by

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<sup>373</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gabonese\\_Democratic\\_Party](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gabonese_Democratic_Party)

<sup>374</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Gabon/Gabon-since-independence>

<sup>375</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1990\\_Gabonese\\_legislative\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1990_Gabonese_legislative_election);  
[https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Gabon\\_2011?lang=en](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Gabon_2011?lang=en)

<sup>376</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/gabon>

<sup>377</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/gabon/freedom-world/2022>

numerous irregularities, arrests, human rights violations and post-election protests and violence.<sup>378</sup> In February 2021, President Bongo's Gabonese Democratic Party (PDG) won 45 of the Senate's 52 elected seats. The PDG maintains dominance in the ostensibly multiparty system. Opposition parties remain divided, and the government has impeded their activities by withholding permits for public gatherings, apprehending participants in their mostly peaceful protests, and imprisoning their leaders<sup>379</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes the elections as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI indicates that the elections were not really free and fair from 1991 to 1995, from 2011 to 2015. For the remaining years EF&FI signals that the overall election conditions were ambiguous. V-Dem's CEI indicates that elections were either not really clean or not clean in this period. Per FH's scoring for 1990, the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. In 1991 a score of 6 to 7 designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. In 1982 the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. Between 1993 and 2008 Gabon scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. From 2009 onward it is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Besides, according to LIED political liberties were not given. Despite the classification as an electoral autocracy, V-Dem's PCLI indicates the political liberties as somewhat present between 1991 and 2011 and since 2019. For the other six years full political liberties are stated. Until 2008, according to Polity5, during this period, the executive's constraints fell into Intermediate Category 1, between unlimited authority and slight limitations. Between 2009 and 2018, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive's power was noticeably limited but not substantial, fitting Intermediate Category 2. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while our classification of V-Dem's LCE alternates between legislative constraints being limited (1992-2009, 2012-2018) and absent (1991, 2010, 2011, 2020-2023).

08/30/2023 End Electoral (Personalist) Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: After the government imposed sweeping restrictions during the August general elections, including blocking internet access, imposing a curfew, and suspending media outlets, a coup d'état was declared by senior military officers shortly after the incumbent was announced as the victor. Brice Oligui Nguema was declared transitional president with virtually no constraints on his power. In September 2023, he appointed a new prime minister, and in October, a new

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<sup>378</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali\\_Bongo\\_Ondimba](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Bongo_Ondimba)

<sup>379</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/gabon/freedom-world/2022>

transitional parliament. The military retains firm control over government activities.<sup>380</sup> On 11/16/2024 a constitutional referendum was held and passed with over 91%, on a turnout of over 54%. The referendum introduced a new constitution as part of the military junta's promise to reinstate civilian rule after the 2023 coup d'état. Key provisions include establishing a presidential system with a seven-year term, renewable once consecutively, and abolishing the office of Prime Minister. These constitutional changes have laid the groundwork for the next presidential election on 04/12/2025, after which the new constitution officially took effect.<sup>381</sup> Although he had promised a longer military transition period, Transitional President Brice Oligui Nguema ran as an independent candidate. He won the election by a wide margin, receiving 94.85% of the vote. Several high-ranking opposition candidates were excluded from the election due to new age restrictions.<sup>382</sup> Besides, political liberties are absent according to LIED but can be interpreted as somewhat present by V-Dem's PCLI. FH classifies the country as not free with a score of 12, which we also place in the not free category in our framework. Military Autocracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

## **[The] Gambia**

[officially known as Republic of the Gambia]

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: 04/xx/1816]: In April 1816, after the British had already established and abandoned a colony in Gambia from 1661 to 1779, Alexander Grant recolonized the region (Strych 2017). From 1821 to 1965, The Gambia Colony and Protectorate constituted the British colonial administration of the Gambia, within the context of the British Empire during the New Imperialism era. The colony encompassed the immediate vicinity of Bathurst (now Banjul), while the protectorate comprised the inland territory along the Gambia River, officially designated in 1894.<sup>383</sup> Influenced by the British since 1588, Gambia wasn't formally recognized as a distinct colony until 1888. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held until 1946, from 1947 onward only multiparty legislative elections were held. Universal suffrage was absent until 1959 per LIED. Political liberties were absent according to LIED. V-Dem's PCLI classifies political liberties as not really present until 1945 and as ambiguous from 1946 onward. From 1900 to 1960, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as

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<sup>380</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/gabon/freedom-world/2024>

<sup>381</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024\\_Gabonese\\_constitutional\\_referendum](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Gabonese_constitutional_referendum)

<sup>382</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025\\_Gabonese\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_Gabonese_presidential_election)

<sup>383</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gambia\\_Colony\\_and\\_Protectorate](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gambia_Colony_and_Protectorate)



indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. From 1961 to 1963, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

05/28/1963 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: Gambia adopted the characteristic traits of British colonial governance, Initially operating under a parliamentary system (with the British monarch as the head of state), Gambia transitioned to a republican form of government following a referendum in 1970 (Lansford 2021: 592). According to LIED multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. In 1960 universal suffrage was introduced. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and V-Dem's PCLI indicates an ambiguous state regarding political liberties. The People's Progressive Party (PPP) won the pre-independence parliamentary elections in 1962 with 18 out of 32 elected seats.<sup>384</sup> Gambia attained internal self-government in 1963. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

02/18/1965 End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start (Monarchical) Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date, Gambia gained full independence within the Commonwealth. The PPP, led by Dawda Jawara, led the country to independence on this date.<sup>385</sup> Dawda became prime minister. The prime minister office existed between 1961 and 1970.<sup>386</sup> According to the Polity5 indicator, during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. From 1966 to 1969, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For 1970, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

04/24/1970 Continuation Electoral Hybrid Regime (as a republic): In a referendum on this date the office of the president of the republic of The Gambia was created and The Gambia became

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<sup>384</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1962\\_Gambian\\_parliamentary\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1962_Gambian_parliamentary_election)

<sup>385</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People%27s\\_Progressive\\_Party\\_\(The\\_Gambia\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People%27s_Progressive_Party_(The_Gambia))

<sup>386</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prime\\_Minister\\_of\\_the\\_Gambia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prime_Minister_of_the_Gambia)

a republic.<sup>387</sup> Dawda held the presidency between 1970 and 1994.<sup>388</sup> Until 1994 the PPP was the predominant political party. Nonetheless, competitive, multiparty elections were held regularly (1966, 1972, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992). The elections have by many observers been considered free and relatively fair (Bendel 1999: 411, Wiseman 1996: 917).<sup>389</sup> The government led by Jawara refrained from employing repressive tactics against its opposition. Instead, it adeptly utilized state resources to preserve its predominant status. While the existence of opposition parties was permitted, with their participation in elections unimpeded, the People's Progressive Party (PPP) managed to sustain an inequitable competitive environment. This was achieved through the exclusive control over patronage and the strategic allocation of state resources, a practice that continued for approximately three decades. (Hughes/Perfect 2008: 1-lvii, Lansford 2012c: 509, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 60-61). Furthermore, the limitations on the exercise of executive power were sometimes blurred and supported by the majority in parliament held by the PPP. Therefore, allegations of judicial inefficiency and control have been raised (Edie 2000: 168-173). After an unsuccessful coup attempt on 07/30/1981, the Gambia and Senegal founded the Senegambia Confederation on 02/01/1982 to promote cooperation but the confederation was dissolved on 09/30/1989.<sup>390</sup> The classification of this period is contested. GWF, MCM, REIGN and AF (only until 1971) classify it as party-based autocracy, MCM as multiparty autocracy and AF until 1971 as single party autocracy. BR classifies it as civilian dictatorship, but HTW, LIED and AF (starting in 1972) as a(n) (electoral) democracy. We classify this period as an electoral hybrid regime, because, although there were flaws in the electoral competition, the opposition parties were not prevented from participating. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes elections during this period as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI the overall election conditions as somewhat free and fair. V-Dem's CEI indicates somewhat clean elections until 1971. Since 1972 elections scored an ambiguous cleanliness. As per FH's classification for the period until 1979, the country is considered free with a score ranging from 2 to 4, which we also interpret as free in our framework. In 1980 and 1981 the country is rated as free with a score of 5, which we interpret as rather free in our framework. For the period between 1982 and 1988 a score of 6 to 7 designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. From

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<sup>387</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President\\_of\\_the\\_Gambia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President_of_the_Gambia),  
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1970\\_Gambian\\_republic\\_referendum](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1970_Gambian_republic_referendum)

<sup>388</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dawda\\_Jawara](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dawda_Jawara)

<sup>389</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Dawda-Kairaba-Jawara>

<sup>390</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Senegambia\\_Confederation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Senegambia_Confederation)

1989 onward the country is classified as free, scoring between 2 and 4, which we also place in the free category. Furthermore, political liberties were not achieved according to LIED. V-Dem's PCLI categorizes them as somewhat present for the entire time. According to the Polity5 indicator, during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. From 1971 to 1976, For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. Between 1977 and 1993, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For 1994, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

07/22/1994 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, the government of President Dawada Kairaba Jawara and his PPP was overthrown in a bloodless coup by junior military officers led by then-lieutenant Yahya Jammeh and his Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC). Two years later, Jammeh staged controlled elections in which he and his newly-formed party, the Alliance for Patriotic Re-orientation and Construction, won (Saine 1996: 97). Jammeh and the Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council junta justified their coup stating the disturbing level of corruption and lack of democracy was harming the country.<sup>391</sup> According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held in 1994 and 1995, in 1996 only executive elections were held. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Moreover, political liberties were absent (LIED). V-Dem's PCLI scores varied between absent and not really present for this period. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

01/02/1997 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: Legislative elections, planned for 12/11/1996, were postponed until January. The decision came after weeks of UDP-orchestrated anti-government demonstrations. Subsequently, in balloting on 01/02/1997,

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<sup>391</sup> [https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Gambia\\_2018?lang=en](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Gambia_2018?lang=en)

President Jammeh's APRC captured 33 of the 45 contested seats (the president is empowered to name 4 additional legislators), giving the party the two-thirds majority necessary to pass legislation and make constitutional changes unimpeded (Lansford 2021: 593). The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) reported that the electorate had been "cowed by repression," making free and fair elections impossible (Lansford 2021: 593). The ban of political parties from the Jawara era (PPP, NCP and GPP) was enforced during the military rule and only lifted in 2001 (Edie 2000: 168).<sup>392</sup> Presidential elections under Jammeh took place in 2001, 2006, 2011 and 2016. Following the 2001 election, the immediate post-election period witnessed a surge in authoritarianism and violence against political adversaries (Saine 2008: 63). And also, the presidential elections in 2006 fell short of international standards. These included vote rigging, voter intimidation and biased media reports (Saine 2008: 68-69). Jammeh was defeated by Barrow from the opposition in presidential elections on 12/01/2016, and acknowledged the result at first, then refused to accept the defeat a few days later and ordered new balloting, prompting wide-spread criticism (Lansford 2021: 593). From 12/2015 to 01/28/2017 Gambia was named Islamic Republic of The Gambia. Jammeh refused to step down and on 01/18/2017, the Gambian assembly voted in favor of an extension of his term in office for 90 days to prepare new elections. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Until 2017, LIED categorizes Gambian elections as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores elections as being of ambiguous freedom and fairness from 1997 to 2005 and in 2016. Between 2006 and 2015 not real freedom and fairness was achieved. Their CEI outcomes varied between not really clean and no electoral cleanliness. ECOWAS launched a military intervention into the country under the name "Operation Restore Democracy" with 7,000 troops. Forces entered the country on 01/19/2017 at the request of Barrow, who was sworn in that day as the new President at the Gambian embassy in Dakar, Senegal (Lansford 2021: 593).<sup>393</sup> Jammeh subsequently stepped down and left the country. According to FH's classification for 1998 to 2000, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. In 2001 the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. Between 2002 and 2004, Gambia is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. For the period from 2005 to 2010 a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. From 2011 onward it is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to

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<sup>392</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics\\_of\\_the\\_Gambia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_the_Gambia)

<sup>393</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ECOWAS\\_military\\_intervention\\_in\\_the\\_Gambia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ECOWAS_military_intervention_in_the_Gambia)

our interpretation of not free. For this period political liberties were absent according to LIED and not really present following V-Dem's PCLI. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive's constraints fell into Intermediate Category 1, between unlimited authority and slight limitations. For almost the entire regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For 2017, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

04/06/2017 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date legislative elections were held which the UDP won a majority with 31 seats, followed by the APRC, the GDC, and the National Reconciliation Party (NRP), with 5 seats each; the People's Democratic Organization for Independence and Socialism (PDOIS), 4; the PPP, 2; and 1 independent" (Lansford 2021: 594). Since the end of Jammeh's 22-year rule in 2017, Gambians have experienced increased freedom from undue influences on their political decisions. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. After 2017, LIED categorizes elections as competitive and both the V-Dem EF&FI and CEI score elections in this period as somewhat free and fair and of ambiguous cleanliness until 2021 and of somewhat cleanliness since 2022. However, reports of abuses such as the politicized distribution of money and goods to favor the ruling party persisted leading up to the 2021 election.<sup>394</sup> On 12/04/2021, presidential elections took place in the Gambia. Incumbent President Adama Barrow of the National People's Party emerged victorious with 53% of the vote, prevailing over five other candidates.<sup>395</sup> As of August 2022, ECOWAS forces remain in the country on the request of incumbent president Barrow, assisting and training domestic security forces. Per FH's evaluation for 2017 and 2018, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. From 2019 onward the country receives a score of 8, which we interpret as falling into the rather not free category. LIED still indicates that political liberties were absent. Whereas V-Dem's PCLI indicates them as fully present since 2017. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was significantly constrained by institutional checks during this time. For 2018, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints

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<sup>394</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/gambia/freedom-world/2022>

<sup>395</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ECOWAS\\_military\\_intervention\\_in\\_the\\_Gambia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ECOWAS_military_intervention_in_the_Gambia)

on the executive were moderate. Since 2019, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

Electoral Hybrid Regime as of 07/01/2025 continued.

## Georgia

01/01/1900 Part of Other Country [Russia, Autocratic Monarchy] [Start: 09/12/1801]: In 1008, the Kingdom of Georgia was established. When Russian rule began in the early nineteenth century, Georgia was still ruled by royal families of various Georgian states. However, these were deposed by Russia and the country was under the rule of the Russian Empire, after the decree of incorporation of the Kingdom into the Russian Empire, was confirmed by Tsar Alexander I on 09/12/1801.<sup>396</sup>

11/07/1917 Continuation as Part of Other Country [Russia, Communist Ideocracy]: On this date the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) was proclaimed.

04/22/1918 End Part of Other Country [Russia, Communist Ideocracy]/Start Part of Other Country [TDFR]: The Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic (TDFR) existed briefly in the Caucasus, from 04/22/1918 to 05/28/1918. It encompassed the majority of the modern territories of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, along with portions of Russia and the Ottoman Empire. However, the republic's existence was short-lived, as Georgia declared independence after just a month, followed closely by Armenia and Azerbaijan.<sup>397</sup>

05/26/1918 End Part of Other Country [TDFR]/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: On this date, Georgia declared itself the Democratic Republic of Georgia (DRG) and became independent.<sup>398</sup> As a result of the February Revolution in Russia, the tsarist regime was also overthrown in Georgia. To protect the country from invasion by the Ottoman Empire, the Georgian National Assembly entered into negotiations with Germany. Germany was granted privileges for the exploitation of important raw materials and, in return, stationed soldiers to protect the country from the Ottoman Empire.<sup>399</sup> Universal suffrage was introduced in 1919.

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<sup>396</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgia\\_within\\_the\\_Russian\\_Empire](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgia_within_the_Russian_Empire)

<sup>397</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transcaucasian\\_Democratic\\_Federative\\_Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transcaucasian_Democratic_Federative_Republic)

<sup>398</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic\\_Republic\\_of\\_Georgia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic_Republic_of_Georgia)

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[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Georgia\\_\(country\)#Democratic\\_Republic\\_of\\_Georgia\\_\(1918%E2%80%931921\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Georgia_(country)#Democratic_Republic_of_Georgia_(1918%E2%80%931921))

02/14[-16]/1919 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Defective Democracy: On this date, the first democratic elections for parliament were held. The suffrage was universal.<sup>400</sup> The Social-Democratic Party won an overwhelming majority in the parliament (with 83% of the vote) and formed a one-party government. Georgia enacted a constitution, established state institutions, and implemented antidiscrimination laws safeguarding the rights of ethnic and religious minorities. Furthermore, it actively promoted women's rights, adopted a multi-party governmental system, and fostered political discourse, thereby contributing to the advancement of political thought and the cultivation of a culture of debate.<sup>401</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. LIED and V-Dem do not provide data for Georgia during this period. The DRG was originally under the "protection" of the German Empire, but following Germany's defeat in World War I, British troops were deployed to the country to prevent a potential Bolshevik invasion. However, the British had to withdraw in 1920 due to the Treaty of Moscow, which stipulated that Russia would recognize Georgia's independence on the condition that the DRG refrained from allowing any forces that were hostile to Russia's interests to operate within its borders.<sup>402</sup>

02/25/1921 End Defective Democracy/Start Part of Other Country [Russia, Communist Ideocracy]: Following a one-week offensive by the Red Army, Tbilisi was captured by the Bolsheviks on 02/25/1921. Georgian Bolsheviks assumed control of the country and declared the establishment of the Georgian SSR. On 03/12/1922, the Georgian SSR became part of the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (TSFSR), along with the Armenian SSR and the Azerbaijan SSR. Although there were some minor skirmishes between Bolshevik troops and the Georgian Army in Western Georgia, the government of the Georgian Democratic Republic was eventually forced into exile by March 1921. One year later, on 03/02/1922, the first constitution of Soviet Georgia was ratified.<sup>403</sup>

12/30/1922 Continuation as Part of Other Country [USSR, Communist Ideocracy]: On this date, the TSFSR was incorporated into the USSR. On 12/05/1936, the TSFSR was dissolved, and the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic was established. Under Soviet rule, Land was collectivized, private property eliminated, and nationalization extended to industry, education, and the media. While nominally sovereign, Georgia's Communist Party was directly managed from Moscow. The First Secretary held real authority, but was always subject to Moscow's intervention. Soviet authorities treated Georgia's powerful church, old nobility, and traditional clans as threats to

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<sup>400</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal\\_suffrage#cite\\_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37)

<sup>401</sup> <https://archive.gov.ge/en/sakartelos-pirveli-demokratiuli-respublika>

<sup>402</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic\\_Republic\\_of\\_Georgia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic_Republic_of_Georgia)

<sup>403</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgian\\_Soviet\\_Socialist\\_Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgian_Soviet_Socialist_Republic)

Communist ideology, suppressing religion and “bourgeois nationalism”.<sup>404</sup> Repression in Georgia was particularly brutal during the Stalinist era. The August Uprising from 08/28/1924 to 09/05/1924, a major anti-Soviet revolt by nationalists and Social Democrats, was crushed with mass executions and the deportation of tens of thousands to Siberia.<sup>405</sup> Between 08/19/1936 and 11/17/1938, Georgia was affected by the Great Purge, with many Georgian intellectuals and party officials executed or sent to the Gulag. In 1951 and 1952, a series of criminal cases was fabricated, on the personal order of Joseph Stalin, to defame Mingrelian members of the Georgian SSR Communist Party as collaborators with the Western powers.<sup>406</sup> Resistance against communist rule persisted throughout the Soviet period. Despite severe repression, Georgian intellectuals, writers, and underground organizations kept nationalist sentiment alive, with periodic waves of student unrest and secret networks of dissidents. Starting on 03/09/1956, the Georgian Communist Party profited off Khrushchev’s decentralization program and expanded their regional power. On 04/09/1989, Soviet troops broke up a peaceful demonstration in Tbilisi, prompting a radicalization of Georgian politics toward preferring independence over Soviet unity. On 11/18/1989 all union laws were declared legally invalid by the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet, followed by the nullification of all previous treaties conducted by the RSFSR and the declaration of the protection of Georgian state sovereignty on 03/09/1989. Democratic parliamentary elections were held on 10/28/1990. Georgia participated in the boycott of the union-wide preservation referendum in 03/1991. On 03/31/1991, Georgia held a referendum on the restoration of its independence, which gained a majority in favor of the act.<sup>407</sup>

04/09/1991 End Part of Other Country [USSR, Communist Ideocracy]/Start Electoral Autocracy [as independent country]: On 05/26/1991 presidential elections were held. Zviad Gamsakhurdia and the Round Table-Free Georgia party emerged as victors.<sup>408</sup> On 9/16/1991, the arrest of key opposition leaders and the suppression of demonstrators in 9/1991 mark the pivotal moment when the government of Zvia Gamsakhurdia transitioned from a relatively democratic state to an autocratic regime (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 61).<sup>409</sup> In a Human Rights Watch report it was noted, that Gamsakhurdia has accumulated nearly dictatorial powers (Denber 1992). Between 12/21/1991 and 01/06/1992, there was a violent overthrow of the

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<sup>404</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgian\\_Soviet\\_Socialist\\_Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgian_Soviet_Socialist_Republic)

<sup>405</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/August\\_Uprising](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/August_Uprising)

<sup>406</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mingrelian\\_affair](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mingrelian_affair)

<sup>407</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgian\\_Soviet\\_Socialist\\_Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgian_Soviet_Socialist_Republic)

<sup>408</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991\\_Georgian\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991_Georgian_presidential_election)

<sup>409</sup> <https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-09-18-mn-2258-story.html>;  
<https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/georgia/politics-gamsakhurdia.htm>



civilian government by oppositional militia forces that stormed the capital and forced Gamsakhurdia to flee. (Zurcher 2007: 126-27, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 61).<sup>410</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. The 1991 election is categorized as not competitive by LIED. V-Dem's EF&FI scores elections freedom and fairness as ambiguous while their CEI scores them as not really clean. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. In addition, political liberties were absent (LIED). V-Dem's PCLI declares their presence as ambiguous. As per Polity5's classification, the executive experienced moderate limitations on authority, placing it in the second intermediate category. For 1991, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For 1992, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are limited. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

01/02/1992 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, Georgia underwent a violent regime breakdown that occupies a borderline position between rebellion and military coup. The overthrow of President Zviad Gamsakhurdia began with armed uprisings in Tbilisi, led not only by irregular paramilitary formations such as Jaba Ioseliani's Mkhedrioni but also by state forces under Tengiz Kitovani, commander of the National Guard, in alliance with former Prime Minister Tengiz Sigua. The fighting, which included heavy shelling of government buildings, bore many features of an armed rebellion. However, the decisive role of the National Guard, the forcible removal of the incumbent president, and the immediate creation of a Military Council that assumed executive authority point more strongly toward a military coup. The Council dissolved parliament, abolished the constitution, and exercised effective control over the state. Because the seizure of power was consolidated by military leaders and resulted in junta rule, this episode is best coded in Va-PoReg as a military coup leading to the establishment of a military autocracy.<sup>411</sup>

03/10/1992 End Military Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: On this date the Military Council replaced itself by the State Council under the leadership of Eduard Shevardnadze, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. He was appointed

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<sup>410</sup> <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/georgia/politics-gamsakhurdia.htm>;

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991%E2%80%931992\\_Georgian\\_coup\\_d%27%C3%A9tat#](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991%E2%80%931992_Georgian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#)

<sup>411</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991%E2%80%931992\\_Georgian\\_coup\\_d%27%C3%A9tat#](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991%E2%80%931992_Georgian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#)

as the Speaker of the Georgian Parliament, which made him de facto president.<sup>412</sup> There was no electoral legitimacy, therefore, we classify this period as transitional. Per FH's evaluation for this regime period, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. In 1992 political liberties are coded as absent by LIED and as ambiguous by V-Dem's PCLI.

10/11/1992 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date general elections were held. The parliament and the chairman of parliament, as de facto head of state, were elected. Shevardnadze was the only candidate for that office.<sup>413</sup> Presidential elections were not held again until 1995.<sup>414</sup> In the aftermath, the OSCE concluded that the parliamentary and presidential elections generally transpired without violence or significant mishaps.<sup>415</sup> Some opposition members were arrested, but nonetheless the opposition was able to compete. Although media coverage was not evenly distributed, a broad public discussion took place.<sup>416</sup> Shevardnadze was able to secure a second term in the presidential elections 2000. Election observer Mission reported irregularities like ballot stuffing and non-transparent vote counting. Furthermore, the media coverage was not balanced and favored Shevardnadze and his Party Union Citizens of Georgia.<sup>417</sup> Shevardnadze was confident that he could secure electoral victories or manipulate the results if deemed necessary to ensure his triumph (Kandelaki 2006). As for Shevardnadze's political powers as president, they are often referred to as superpresidentialism (Devdariani 2011). At the same time, civil liberties were generally permitted and respected. Per FH's evaluation for the period until 1995, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. In 1996 the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. Between 1997 and 1999 a score of 6 to 7 for the assessed regime period designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. For the remaining period Georgia is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. Regarding the political liberties they were classified as absent (LIED). V-Dem's PCLI declares them as somewhat present. Overall, especially after 2001 Shevardnadze "entertained the idea of 'managed democracy'"

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<sup>412</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991%E2%80%931992\\_Georgian\\_coup\\_d%27%C3%A9tat#After\\_the\\_Coup](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991%E2%80%931992_Georgian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#After_the_Coup); [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military\\_Council\\_\(Georgia\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_Council_(Georgia)); [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eduard\\_Shevardnadze#](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eduard_Shevardnadze#)

<sup>413</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1992\\_Georgian\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1992_Georgian_general_election)

<sup>414</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eduard\\_Shevardnadze#President\\_of\\_Georgia\\_\(1995%E2%80%932003\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eduard_Shevardnadze#President_of_Georgia_(1995%E2%80%932003)); [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1995\\_Georgian\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1995_Georgian_presidential_election)

<sup>415</sup> <https://www.oscepa.org/en/documents/election-observation/election-observation-statements/georgia/statements-11/2073-1995-parliamentary-and-presidential/file>

<sup>416</sup> <https://www.oscepa.org/en/documents/election-observation/election-observation-statements/georgia/statements-11/2073-1995-parliamentary-and-presidential/file>

<sup>417</sup> <https://www.csce.gov/publications/report-presidential-election-georgia/>

(Kandelaki 2006, Chin/Wright/Carter 2021a). Overall, this period is a borderline case between an electoral hybrid regime and an electoral autocracy. The quality of elections was very volatile, and Shevardnadze was even missing an official electoral mandate the first three years. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. During this period elections are categorized as not competitive by LIED. V-Dem's EF&FI scores their freedom and fairness as ambiguous while their CEI scores them as not really clean. Since 1995, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was significantly constrained by institutional checks during this time. For the years 1993 and 1994, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. From 1995 to 1997, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. From 1998 to 2002, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. The period from 1992 to 2003 is best characterized as a borderline case leaning toward electoral autocracy. The decisive reasons are the volatility and manipulation of elections, the lack of a direct presidential mandate in the first years, and Shevardnadze's reliance on what Kandelaki described as "managed democracy." At the same time, the persistence of pluralist elements and partial respect for civil liberties place Georgia closer to the boundary than many straightforward electoral autocracies.

11/23/2003 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date, the Rose Revolution culminated on this date after weeks of massive, peaceful protests against the results of the parliamentary elections held on 11/02/2003. These elections were widely condemned by domestic and international observers due to credible allegations of systemic fraud, including ballot stuffing and the manipulation of voter lists, which favored President Eduard Shevardnadze's party. The protests were led by a trio of opposition leaders: Mikheil Saakashvili, Zurab Zhvania, and the speaker of the outgoing parliament, Nino Burjanadze. The movement reached its climax on 11/22, when demonstrators, led by Saakashvili holding a rose, peacefully stormed the parliament building during its opening session, forcing Shevardnadze to flee. Despite declaring a state of emergency, Shevardnadze lost the support of the military and police, who refused orders to use force against the protesters. On 11/23/2003, mostly peaceful opposition protesters took to the presidential palace and forced Shevardnadze to step down after sham elections. The speaker of the house Burjanadze was appointed acting president in the

wake of the revolt. Protests ultimately led to Shevardnadze's resignation and the transfer of power to an opposition interim president. The transfer of power to an opposition-led interim government paved the way for new, fairer presidential elections on 03/28/2004, which were won by Saakashvili from the National Movement-Democrats (Jones 2009: 314-37, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 61).<sup>418</sup> Although the Rose Revolution in 2003 marked a major liberalizing moment, the post-revolutionary regime under Mikheil Saakashvili remained closer to an electoral hybrid regime than a defective democracy. Elections were competitive, but systemic deficiencies in the separation of powers, media pluralism, and executive constraints prevented classification as a democracy. For 2003 and 2004, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. A preliminary report by an election observation mission from the Organization for Security and Development in Europe praised the democratic character of the elections. Nevertheless, it was highlighted that events in the post-election period, such as irregularities during result tabulation, questionable voter turnout, mishandling of certain complaints, and the selective annulment of election results, presented a challenge to the electoral cleanliness in specific districts.<sup>419</sup> On 01/05/2008, Mikheil Saakashvili was re-elected president with 53.47% of the vote. According to the OSCE election observation mission, this was "the first genuinely competitive post-independence presidential election" and was "in essence consistent with most OSCE and Council of Europe commitments and standards for democratic elections." At the same time, the mission emphasized that the process "revealed significant challenges that need to be addressed urgently,"<sup>420</sup> underscoring persistent concerns about media access, the use of administrative resources, and the blurred line between state and ruling party. The 2008 parliamentary and presidential elections still fell short of our standards required for classification as a defective democracy. Until 2012, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was significantly constrained by institutional checks during this time. Per FH, from 2004 to 2006, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. Between 2007 and 2009 the country is partly free with a score of 8 according to FH, which we interpret as rather not free. Overall, Georgia under Mikheil Saakashvili represents a borderline case between a defective democracy and an electoral hybrid regime. While elections were competitive and certain institutional and societal checks remained operative, persistent executive dominance and unequal conditions for opposition parties positioned the regime at the upper edge of the hybrid spectrum.

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<sup>418</sup> <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/4/9/17822.pdf>; [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rose\\_Revolution](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rose_Revolution); <https://www.rferl.org/a/1105091.html>

<sup>419</sup> <https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/georgia/57860>

<sup>420</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008\\_Georgian\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008_Georgian_presidential_election)

10/01/2012 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Defective Democracy: The parliamentary elections on this date marked a decisive turning point in Georgia's regime trajectory. For the first time since independence, an opposition coalition, the Georgian Dream alliance led by Bidzina Ivanishvili, defeated the incumbent United National Movement of President Mikheil Saakashvili. The election was assessed by international observers as genuinely competitive and overall free and fair, despite some irregularities. Crucially, the peaceful transfer of power from the ruling party to the opposition demonstrated that electoral competition could credibly produce alternation in government. Political rights and civil liberties, while imperfect, were sufficiently safeguarded to warrant reclassification from an electoral hybrid regime to a defective democracy. The key difference from earlier elections lay in the combination of broad suffrage, meaningful pluralism, and the actual realization of alternation in executive power, which together consolidated the regime's status as a democracy, albeit one with notable deficiencies. According to Tonino Picula, an electoral observer from the OSCE, their monitors observed an escalating political polarization within the country. They expressed specific apprehension regarding the State Audit Office's utilization of extensive discretionary powers to scrutinize the legality of individual or party expenditures. The office was noted for making dubious decisions and imposing severe penalties without clear or transparent guidelines. The fines imposed were deemed disproportionate and seemed to be applied selectively, primarily targeting one political entity.<sup>421</sup> On 10/08/2016 parliamentary elections were held. International observers from the OSCE, NATO, Council of Europe and European Parliament said the elections "were competitive, well-administered and fundamental freedoms were generally respected".<sup>422</sup> However, there were also more critical voices.<sup>423</sup> The country's political landscape, policy decisions, and media environment are influenced by oligarchs, leading to a compromise in the rule of law due to politicization. The protection of civil liberties is inconsistently maintained.<sup>424</sup> Georgia submitted its application for EU membership on 03/03/2022, shortly after the commencement of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. On 12/14/2023, the European Council awarded Georgia the status of EU Candidate.<sup>425</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. For this period, LIED has categorized elections as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores them as somewhat free and fair while their CEI fluctuates

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<sup>421</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2012\\_Georgian\\_parliamentary\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2012_Georgian_parliamentary_election)

<sup>422</sup> <https://sg.news.yahoo.com/ruling-party-set-win-georgia-vote-early-results-024041570.html>

<sup>423</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020\\_Georgian\\_parliamentary\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020_Georgian_parliamentary_election)

<sup>424</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/georgia/freedom-world/2022>

<sup>425</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgia\\_\(country\)#History](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgia_(country)#History)

between scoring their electoral cleanliness as ambiguous and somewhat clean. From 2010 onward a FH score of 6 to 7 designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. Besides, according to LIED political liberties remain absent. Whereas V-Dem's PCLI underlines a somewhat presence until 2012 and a full presence from 2013 onwards. Since 2013, based on Polity5's evaluation, the executive's power was limited to a degree between substantial constraints and parity with other institutions, fitting Intermediate Category 3. From 2005 to 2012, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. For the year 2018, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive. For the rest of the regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive.

10/26/2024    End    Defective    Democracy/Start    Electoral    Hybrid    Regime:  
On this date, parliamentary elections were held in which the ruling Georgian Dream party secured a majority amid widespread accusations of irregularities (vote-buying, intimidation).<sup>426</sup> These elections were followed by massive public protests rejecting both the parliamentary and subsequent presidential election results. On 12/14/2024, Mikheil Kavelashvili was elected president by an Electoral College, a vote that many domestic and international actors deemed illegitimate. Although elections continue, competition among multiple parties persists; opposition remains active though under pressure. The cumulative evidence warrants coding Georgia as an electoral hybrid regime. According to FH, for the assessed regime period, the country is categorized as partly free with a score of 8, which corresponds to our interpretation of rather not free. V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are limited. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE indicates that legislative constraints on the executive are moderate. Based on V-Dem's PCLI, political civil liberties are ambiguous. Furthermore, according to V-Dem's CEI, the election were not really clean.  
Electoral Hybrid Regime as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Slider 1995, Hale 2005, Kuchinka-Lančava/Grotz 2001)

## Germany

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<sup>426</sup> <https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/georgia/584029>;  
<https://www.idea.int/democracytracker/report/georgia/october-2024>; <https://epde.org/reports/legitimacy-crisis-how-georgias-elections-were-rigged/>

01/01/1900 Constitutional Monarchy [Start: 01/18/1871]: The German Empire (also referred to as Imperial Germany) was founded on 01/18/1871. On this date, the southern German states, except for Austria, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein, joined the North German Confederation, and the new constitution took effect on 04/16. This constitution established the title of German Emperor for Wilhelm I, who was the King of Prussia from the House of Hohenzollern. Otto von Bismarck, serving as the Minister President of Prussia, assumed the role of Chancellor, becoming the first head of government. The regime initially adopted universal male suffrage, which was considered one of the more progressive electoral systems of that era. According to LIED, only multiparty legislative elections were held during this period. LIED classifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI already codes them as somewhat present. From 1900 to 1908, as per Polity5's classification, the executive experienced moderate limitations on authority, placing it in the second intermediate category. Since 1909, based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive encountered substantial institutional limitations on power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. The political structure of the German Empire combined elements of authoritarianism with nascent democratic practices, reflecting a constitutional monarchy with pronounced power imbalances (Anderson 2009, Wehler 1983). The Kaiser (Emperor) wielded significant executive authority, particularly in foreign and military affairs. The Chancellor, appointed by the Kaiser, was responsible only to him, not to the Reichstag, the parliament. The Bundesrat, representing the federal states, held considerable legislative power and acted as a conservative counterweight to the Reichstag. The Reichstag itself, elected through universal male suffrage, had limited influence over the executive, though it retained control over the budget and legislation. This system allowed for some elements of representative government while maintaining a strong autocratic core. Political parties operated within the constraints of this system, but the lack of real parliamentary accountability and the dominance of the Prussian elite limited the extent of democratization. The balance of power reflected a hybrid regime that combined modern electoral processes with traditional authoritarian structures, creating a hybrid regime under the overarching dominance of monarchical and aristocratic authority.

08/04/1914 End Constitutional Monarchy/Start Autocratic Monarchy: During World War I, the German Empire shifted sharply from a constitutional system toward autocratic rule. A key turning point was 08/04/1914 – the day of the so-called Burgfrieden – when all partisan disputes

in the Reichstag were set aside in the name of national unity. This suspension of political debate marked the beginning of the parliament's de facto self-marginalization, as its role was increasingly reduced to merely endorsing war-related expenditures and decrees. With constitutional checks gradually eroded, rapid and centralized decision-making became paramount. By around 1916, military leaders such as Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff assumed decisive roles, directing the state's course with minimal parliamentary oversight. This evolution from a system of shared power to an autocratic, military-dominated regime profoundly transformed German political culture and left enduring marks on the nation's postwar legacy.

11/09/1918 End Autocratic Monarchy/Start Democratizing Regime: On this date, Germany experienced a pivotal transformation as Emperor Wilhelm II abdicated his throne, ending over seven decades of Hohenzollern rule and transitioning the nation from a constitutional monarchy to a republic. We code this regime change event to be a popular uprising, as the demonstrations and strikes by soldiers and workers significantly drove the abdication of Kaiser Wilhelm II and the proclamation of the Republic. This event initiated a non-electoral, multiparty transitional regime primarily led by the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Independent Social Democratic Party (USPD). In the wake of World War I, widespread dissatisfaction with the imperial government fueled the emergence of workers' and soldiers' councils, known as Räte, during the Rätephase or Council Phase. These grassroots councils advocated for democratic reforms and greater representation, organizing approximately 3,500 strikes and protests across Germany. This surge of social unrest highlighted the population's demand for significant political and social changes. The Rat der Volksbeauftragten (Council of People's Representatives) was established on 11/09/1918 as an interim government composed mainly of the SPD and USPD. This coalition aimed to stabilize the nation, address urgent post-war challenges, and steer Germany toward a democratic governmental structure. Unlike the previous imperial system based on hereditary succession, this multiparty approach sought to create a more inclusive and representative governance framework, laying the groundwork for the eventual formation of the Weimar Republic. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive.

01/19/1919 End Democratizing Regime/Start Defective Democracy: On this date, federal elections, the first in the newly established Weimar Republic, were held. The elections to the national assembly were free and fair. This was the first nationwide election after the November



Revolution of 1918 and aimed to establish a constituent assembly responsible for drafting a new constitution. Notably, this election marked the first time women in Germany were granted the right to vote and stand as candidates. The German National Constitutional Assembly convened for the first time on 02/06/1919, in Weimar, leading to the period known as the Weimar Republic. On 02/11/1919 the National Assembly elected Ebert as the provisional president (Reichspräsident) with votes from the so-called Weimar Coalition, which included the SPD, the Center Party (Zentrum), and the German Democratic Party (DDP) (Büttner 2008: 107). Philipp Scheidemann became prime minister (Kanzler) of this coalition. Scheidemann's government did not last long. In June, he and his cabinet opted to resign rather than sign the Treaty of Versailles (Büttner 2008, Henig 2002, Kolb 2005). Despite the new Constitution, Germany's political situation remained unstable. Bauer remained in office until 03/27/1920, when he resigned following the attempted coup in Berlin – known as the Kapp Putsch – that unfolded between 03/13/1920 and 03/17/1920 (Erger 1967). In 1923, the “unity government”, led by Gustav Stresemann, also collapsed due to the failed Munich coup, also known as Hitlerputsch.<sup>427</sup> Generally, the Weimar Republic was characterized by unstable coalitions and frequent changes in governmental power. The political system lacked legitimacy, which is often attributed to a deficiency of democratic political culture. Also, in the later years of the Weimar Republic, President von Hindenburg accumulated more and more powers, which the constitution reserved for times of crises. As a result, Prime Minister Heinrich Brüning, appointed by von Hindenburg in 1930, became increasingly dependent on the president's favor and the former's cabinet cynically came to be called the “Presidential Cabinet”.<sup>428</sup> The attempted coups and unstable governments during times of economic decline and a rise of political extremism posed existential threats to the democracy. The Weimar Constitution established universal suffrage in 1919 with a minimum voting age of 20.<sup>429</sup> Furthermore, the constitution established an extensive set of civil and political liberties as well as judicial independence.<sup>430</sup> However, LIED considers political liberties as absent. V-Dem's PCLI classified them as present until 1929 and somewhat present since 1930. The elections were the first to include female suffrage.<sup>431</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. During this period LIED categorizes elections as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI and CEI score

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<sup>427</sup> <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html>, see narratives for version 5.0, Germany\_R: 2.

<sup>428</sup> <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html>, see narratives for version 5.0, Germany\_R: 3.

<sup>429</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal\\_suffrage#cite\\_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37)

<sup>430</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weimar\\_Constitution#](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weimar_Constitution#)

<sup>431</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1919\\_German\\_federal\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1919_German_federal_election)

them as somewhat free, fair and clean. According to the Polity5 indicator, during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. From 1920 to 1931, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. For 1932, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. For the following year, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are limited. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. In 1932, the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP), led by Adolf Hitler, secured a plurality in competitive elections.

01/30/1933 End Defective Democracy/Start Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy: On this date, Adolf Hitler (NSDAP) was appointed chancellor by President Paul Hindenburg. This was a result of the election victory the year before. Following a fire that engulfed the Reichstag, the new regime swiftly enacted enabling laws, leading to the dismantling of civil liberties. This move declared a "permanent" state of emergency and shortly thereafter resulted in the prohibition of opposition. The regime promptly initiated the establishment and growth of significant paramilitary organizations such as the Sturmabteilung (SA) and the Schutzstaffel (SS), which carried out an extensive campaign of political repression (Shirer 1960: 267-72, Benz 2006: 16, 20-22, 26, 50-58, Berman 2019: 250, Casey et al. 2020: 7). The Nazi regime was based on the belief in the superiority of the Aryan race and the inferiority of other races, especially Jews. The Nazis believed that the Jews were a threat to Germany and that they needed to be eliminated. The Nazi regime also persecuted other groups, such as Roma, homosexuals, and political opponents. For the Nazi regime both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI state political liberties as absent. According to LIED only executive elections were held in 1933, from 1934 onward no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. However, for 1933 according to Polity5, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. End Germany [Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]

For the time between 05/08/1945 and 10/03/1990 see **Germany, West** and **Germany, East**

10/03/1990 Start Liberal Democracy [Continuation Regime Spell of Germany, West, Liberal Democracy]: On this date, Germany was reunified. The East German Länder became part of the Federal Republic of Germany. However, this is not coded as a new regime spell since it was clearly a continuation of the regime spell that started on 08/14/1949 in West Germany.<sup>432</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Elections since reunification are categorized as competitive by LIED. V-Dem's EF&FI and CEI score them as free, fair and clean. The institutional setting mirrors that of West Germany before reunification. Germany remained a parliamentary democracy with a bicameral system consisting of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat. The head of government remains the federal chancellor, elected by the Bundestag. The head of state is the largely ceremonial president. Germany's political landscape is influenced by its totalitarian past, with constitutional protections implemented to prevent authoritarianism. This stability is exemplified by the four consecutive terms served by Chancellors Kohl and Merkel from the Christian Democratic Union Party (CDU). From 1982 to 1998, Helmut Kohl of the CDU served as Chancellor of West Germany. During his 16-year tenure, he oversaw the reunification with the GDR after the fall of the Soviet Union and laid the groundwork for Germany's accession to the EU.<sup>433</sup> He was followed in office by the SPD politician Gerhard Schröder who served two terms in office as leader of a coalition with the Green Party, although he called snap elections before finishing his second term.<sup>434</sup> In those snap elections, the CDU regained the chancellorship under Angela Merkel, Germany's first female chancellor. She would then be reelected three times before retiring from politics in 2021.<sup>435</sup> Although stability has characterized the nation since the mid-20th century, recent years have witnessed growing political tensions, largely driven by a notable influx of asylum seekers and the surging popularity of right-wing populist movements and especially the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD).<sup>436</sup> On 09/26/2021 federal elections were held. The coalition government composed of the SPD, the Green Party, and the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP), led by Olaf Scholz of the SPD as chancellor, took the chancellorship from the CDU. The elections were deemed free and fair. On 11/06/2024 chancellor Olaf Scholz announced the dismissal of finance minister and FDP party leader Christian Lindner over disputes regarding economic policies. On 12/16/2024 Olaf Scholz called and subsequently lost a vote of confidence, with the

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<sup>432</sup> [https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/German\\_Federal\\_Republic\\_2014?lang=en](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/German_Federal_Republic_2014?lang=en)

<sup>433</sup> <https://www.bundeskanzler.de/bk-de/kanzleramt/bundeskanzler-seit-1949/helmut-kohl>

<sup>434</sup> <https://www.bundeskanzler.de/bk-de/kanzleramt/bundeskanzler-seit-1949/gerhard-schroeder>

<sup>435</sup> <https://www.bundeskanzler.de/bk-de/kanzleramt/bundeskanzler-seit-1949/angela-merkel>

<sup>436</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/germany/freedom-world/2023>

result that the Bundestag (parliament) was dissolved on 12/27/2024 and the 2025 federal elections being held roughly six months earlier than initially planned, on 02/23/2025.<sup>437</sup> Following the elections CDU/CSU and SPD formed a government coalition and President Frank-Walter Steinmeier officially proposed Friedrich Merz (CDU) for the election as Chancellor on 05/05/2025. The Bundestag (parliament) voted on the matter on 05/06/2025, and Merz failed to reach a majority in the first round, which was the first occurrence of a suggested chancellor not securing the vote in the first round. He reached the required majority in a second vote on the same day, and he and his cabinet were sworn into office.<sup>438</sup>

German politics has historically been dominated by the SPD and CDU-CSU, although other parties have also gained support in recent years. To be represented in parliament, a party must receive five percent of the vote or at least a minimum of three direct mandates. Political parties are in general able to operate freely, and the political landscape is characterized by various competing parties. All citizens over the age of 18 may vote or stand for election.<sup>439</sup> Civil liberties and political rights are generally guaranteed. According to FH, for the assessed regime period, the country is categorized as free with a score between 2 and 4, which corresponds to our interpretation of free. Therefore, both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI score a constant presence of political liberties since the reunification. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive. The case of the fascist NPD party illustrates the restraint that the constitutional court has exhibited when it comes to the banning of parties. In 2017 the court ruled that although the NPDs program was in violation of the constitution and banning it would therefore be justified, it did not possess the political relevance to actually pose a threat to the constitutional order. Therefore, the court decided not to ban it.<sup>440</sup> This case amongst others serves to highlight the internal complexities that democracies face in preserving themselves. On the one hand, threats to democracy are approached by revoking their democratic rights, yet any democracy needs to extend those democratic rights wherever possible.

Liberal Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

## Germany, East

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<sup>437</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024\\_German\\_government\\_crisis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_German_government_crisis)

<sup>438</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025\\_German\\_federal\\_election#Chancellor\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_German_federal_election#Chancellor_election)

<sup>439</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/germany/freedom-world/2023>

<sup>440</sup> <https://www.bmi.bund.de/DE/themen/verfassung/parteienrecht/partieverbot/partieverbot-node.html>

[officially known as the German Democratic Republic (GDR)]

05/08/1945 End Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [of USSR, Communist (One-Party) Ideocracy]: The period was a transformative era, beginning with the end of World War II. This marked the cessation of the fascist autocracy under Adolf Hitler and the commencement of an occupation regime by the Allied Powers—namely the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. In the Soviet-occupied zone, the immediate post-war period was characterized by significant reforms including land redistribution, nationalization of key industries, and the establishment of a new political order. The Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SMAD) encouraged the formation of antifascist blocs and political parties, albeit steering towards a communist agenda. A pivotal moment was the forced merger in April 1946 of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) and the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) into the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), laying the groundwork for a single-party state (Fulbrook 2008). During this period, no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held (LIED). Additionally, LIED considers the presence of political liberties as absent. V-Dem does not treat the first years of East Germany in their data. In 1949, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints. V-Dem only provides data since 1949. For this year, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

10/07/1949 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by USSR, Communist Ideocracy]/Start Communist (One-Party) Ideocracy: On this date, a separate East German state under leadership of the communist party, the SED, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was established. On 10/15/1950 non-competitive legislative elections were held, and the communist-dominated National Front of the German Democratic Republic (Nationale Front der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik – NFDDR) won 99 percent of the vote.<sup>441</sup> The period from 1945 to 1954 was heavily influenced by the Soviet Union, which had a significant impact on the political and social systems of East Germany. The country was part of the Eastern Bloc and adhered to communist ideology. The SED made the teaching of Marxism–Leninism and the Russian language compulsory in schools.<sup>442</sup> The SED maintained strict control over the

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<sup>441</sup> <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/home/research-projects/dadm-project/europerussiacentral-asia-region/east-germany-1949-1990/>

<sup>442</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socialist\\_Unity\\_Party\\_of\\_Germany](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socialist_Unity_Party_of_Germany)

government, economy, and society. The regime was characterized by a lack of political freedoms, with the Stasi (state security service) playing a crucial role in surveillance and suppression of dissent. The economy was centrally planned and state-controlled, focusing on industrialization and collectivization. Private enterprise was limited, and most of the industry and agriculture were state-owned. Cultural and educational policies were aimed at promoting socialist ideals. The regime-controlled media and restricted access to Western influences. Although declared fully sovereign in 1954, the GDR's sovereignty was limited, as the Soviet Union had significant influence over its policies and decision-making processes. East Germany was a member of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon, aligning its foreign policy with Soviet interests. Especially the USSR would not allow for a regime change (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 61, Gallagher 1987). The GDR was a de facto one-party state. Other institutional popular front parties were permitted to exist only in alliance with the SED (Kupferberg 2002). According to LIED executive and legislative elections, which weren't multiparty, were held. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. For this period, political liberties were still absent according to LIED and V-Dem PCLI. Until 1989, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. For 1990, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. From 1950 to 1959, based on Polity5's evaluation, the executive faced weak constraints, classified as Intermediate Category 1 between unlimited authority and slight limitations. Between 1960 and 1988, as per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time. The collapse of the East German regime unfolded in several distinct steps. On 10/18/1989, the resignation of Erich Honecker under pressure from mass protests and party elites marked the end of the ideocratic phase of SED rule. While the ideological legitimacy of the system collapsed, the party initially retained organizational control. After Honecker's resignation on 10/18/1989, opposition groups that had previously operated under the umbrella of church organizations or in informal dissident circles began to establish themselves as formal political parties and movements. Neues Forum, Demokratie Jetzt, and Demokratischer Aufbruch were among the first to organize openly and claim a role in shaping the political future of the GDR. Massive protests and emigration destabilized the SED regime further and eventually led to the fall of the Berlin Wall on 11/09/1989. From late November 1989 onward, traditional bloc parties such as the CDU and

LDPD, long subordinated to the SED, declared their independence and began to reposition themselves as genuine competitors. On 12/01/1989, the People's Chamber amended the constitution by abolishing the SED's leading role, formally ending the legal foundation of one-party rule and the SED-leadership initiated reforms and opened talks with opposition forces.

12/07/1989 End Communist (One-Party) Ideocracy/Start Democratizing Regime: On this date, the Zentrale Runde Tisch (Central Round Table) was established, after the regime had lost control. The Central Round Table institutionalized a form of dual power, effectively ending the SED's monopoly. This transitional phase was consolidated when free elections to the People's Chamber were scheduled for 03/18/1990.

03/18/1990 End Communist (One-Party) Ideocracy/Start Defective Democracy: The communist party (SED) lost in competitive election which were forced on the regime by mass demonstrations (Pfaff 2006: 242). V-Dem's EF&FI scores them as free and fair while their CEI scores them as somewhat clean. Furthermore, for the first time political liberties were achieved according to V-Dem's PCLI. Whereas LIED's data does treat East Germany for 1990. While the March 1990 elections in East Germany created the formal conditions of democracy, the institutionalization of checks and balances and the protection of civil liberties remained fragile. This transitional regime is therefore best seen as a borderline case between a liberal and a defective democracy.

10/03/1990 End Germany, East [Defective Democracy]: On this date, the territory became part of Germany, which is institutionally a continuation of Germany, West enlarged by the territory of Germany, East.

For the time after 10/03/1990, see **Germany**.

Additional sources (Kocka 1999, Fulbrook 2009)

## **Germany, West**

[officially known as the Federal Republic of Germany]

05/08/1945 End Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by USA, Defective Democracy, United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy, France, Liberal Democracy]: On this date, the Nazi regime ended with an unconditional surrender (Shirer 1960, Casey et al. 2020: 7). On 06/05/1945, the Allies issued a unilateral declaration that proclaimed their supreme authority over German territory.<sup>443</sup> The four powers asserted joint

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<sup>443</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allied-occupied\\_Germany](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allied-occupied_Germany)

authority and sovereignty through the Allied Control Council (ACC). Germany east of the Oder-Neisse line was assigned to Poland. The four occupying powers wielded government authority in their respective zones and carried out different policies toward the population and local governments. In practice, the Soviet Union began implementing elements of a Marxist political-economic system in its zone, which led to growing tensions with the other Allies.<sup>444</sup> Therefore, beginning on 05/08/1945 a occupation regime of United States, France, United Kingdom is coded for Germany, West and an occupation regime of USSR is coded for Germany, East. Alternative approaches would be to code all four occupation regimes separately or conversely code one occupation regime for the whole of Germany. The American and British zones merged as of 01/01/1947, forming the Bizone, which later included the French zone, becoming the Trizone. This cooperation among the Western Allies contrasted with the increasing estrangement with the Soviet Union, culminating in the Berlin Blockade from June 1948 to May 1949.<sup>445</sup> According to our observations and LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. In addition to that, political liberties were absent per LIED. V-Dem does not treat the first years of West Germany in their data.

08/14/1949 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by USA, Defective Democracy, United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy, France, Liberal Democracy]/Start Liberal Democracy: On this date, free and fair founding elections were followed by an uninterrupted series of free elections. Konrad Adenauer of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) won the elections and proceeded to be prime minister until his resignation in 1963. The CDU continued to provide the prime minister until 1969, when Kurt Georg Kiesinger, leading the grand coalition with the Social Democratic Party Germany (SPD), had to resign and Willy Brandt of the SPD was elected to be next prime minister. Until 1982, the SPD continued to provide the prime minister and in 1982, the CDU took over again and remained in governmental power until Germany's reunification in 1990. Both CDU and SPD occasionally formed a coalition with the Free Democratic Party (FDP). The changes in governmental power underscore the competitive character of the national elections in West Germany.<sup>446</sup> On 10/03/1990, the Länder constituting East Germany became part of the Federal Republic of Germany. From this date on, Germany West is referred to as Germany in the dataset. However, the democratic regime spell started on 08/14/1949 continued. Although the German constitution grants the constitutional court the ability to prohibit parties, this measure has only been used twice in the history of post-

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<sup>444</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allied-occupied\\_Germany](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allied-occupied_Germany)

<sup>445</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allied-occupied\\_Germany](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allied-occupied_Germany)

<sup>446</sup> <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html> , see narratives for version 5.0, German Federal Republic\_R, German Federal Republic\_V.



war democratic Germany. In 1952 the decision was made to ban the SRP on the grounds of it being the successor party to the Nazis NSDAP. In 1956 the only other instance of a party being banned applied to the communist KPD.<sup>447</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Elections after 1949 are categorized as competitive by LIED. V-Dem's EF&FI and CEI score them as free, fair and clean. According to FH, for the assessed regime period, the country is categorized as free with a score between 2 and 4, which corresponds to our interpretation of free. Moreover, political liberties are achieved ever since 1949 (LIED, V-Dem PCLI). Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive.

10/03/1990 End Germany, West [Liberal Democracy]: Unification of Germany, West and Germany East.

For the time after 10/03/1990, see **Germany**.

Additional sources (Bessel 2003, Beyme 2004, Lepsius 1978, Lindner/Schultze 2010, Todd 2002, Wendt 2000)

## Ghana

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: 1821]: In 1821, the British government formed the British Gold Coast colony on the territory of Ghana, after having taken over the remaining interests of other European countries. They purchased and incorporated the Danish Gold Coast in 1850 and the Dutch Gold Coast, including Fort Elmina, in 1872.<sup>448</sup> Ghana officially became a British Crown Colony in 1843. The territory of what constitutes today's Ghana consisted of four separate British colonial territories: Gold Coast, Ashanti, the Northern Territories, and British Togoland.<sup>449</sup> Elections were regularly held for the Legislative Council since 1925, however the Council did not have complete control over the legislation, and the voting franchise was limited to residents of urban areas meeting property

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<sup>447</sup> [https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/EN/Verfahren/Wichtige-Verfahrensarten/Parteiverbotsverfahren/parteiverbotsverfahren\\_node.html](https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/EN/Verfahren/Wichtige-Verfahrensarten/Parteiverbotsverfahren/parteiverbotsverfahren_node.html)

<sup>448</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gold\\_Coast\\_\(British\\_colony\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gold_Coast_(British_colony))

<sup>449</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ghana>

requirements and the councils of chiefs. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and V-Dem's PCLI indicates an ambiguous state regarding political liberties. For the relevant regime period<sup>450</sup>, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

02/08/1951 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: On 02/08/1951 universal suffrage was granted for the 1951 legislative election. It was the first election to be held in Africa under universal suffrage.<sup>451</sup> On 04/29/1954, a new constitution was approved. It established an African cabinet as well as an African legislature which was chosen by direct election (as opposed to election by tribal leaders).<sup>452</sup> In May 1956, Prime Minister Nkrumah and his government delivered a proposal for independence to which the British Government agreed, with the condition that a majority in favor of independence won the upcoming elections. On 07/17/1956, pre-independence general elections in the Gold Coast followed. Nkrumah's Convention People's Party (CPP) emerged with a majority of 71 of 104 seats. Consequently, the British Government agreed to grant independence.<sup>453</sup> According to LIED only multiparty legislative elections were held during this period. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and somewhat present according to V-Dem's PCLI. From 1952 to 1956, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For 1957, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

03/06/1957 End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start (Monarchical) Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date, Ghana became the first sub-Saharan African country to gain independence from colonial rule, forming a dominion within the British Commonwealth with Queen Elizabeth II as the head of state. Nkrumah became the Prime Minister in a parliamentary system.<sup>454</sup> Ghana adopted democratic institutions with a multiparty system, a constitution guaranteeing fundamental rights, and regular elections.

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<sup>450</sup> V-Dem's JCE and LCE do not provide data for Ghana prior to 1902.

<sup>451</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal\\_suffrage#cite\\_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37)

<sup>452</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1956\\_Gold\\_Coast\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1956_Gold_Coast_general_election)

<sup>453</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1956\\_Gold\\_Coast\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1956_Gold_Coast_general_election)

<sup>454</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1956\\_Gold\\_Coast\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1956_Gold_Coast_general_election)

While democratic institutions existed, there were early signs of authoritarian tendencies, such as the Preventive Detention Act of 1958, which allowed the government to detain individuals without trial. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED indicates that political liberties are coded as absent and V-Dem's PCLI can be interpreted as ambiguous. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

07/01/1960 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Electoral (Personalist) Autocracy (as a republic): Ghana was declared a republic on this date (Lansford 2021: 626). On 04/27/1960, a referendum, which concentrated power in the presidency, as well as the first presidential elections took place. The elections were won by Nkrumah but do not fulfil the criteria of being free and fair (Pinkney 1972: 15-16, Finer 1975: 501, McLaughlin/Owusu-Ansah 1995, Brooker 1995: 103-10, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b).<sup>455</sup> Subsequently, Nkrumah consolidated his power. The CPP increasingly suppressed opposition parties through legal and extralegal means (Pinkney 1972). From 1960 to 1964, the Convention People's Party (CPP) rose to power, establishing a de facto one-party dictatorship that neighboring states began to view with growing apprehension (Lansford 2021: 626). The first in a series of attempted assassinations on Nkrumah occurred at Kulugungu in August 1962. This incident led to his increased seclusion from public life and contributed to the development of a burgeoning personality cult.<sup>456</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes elections during this period as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores them as somewhat free and fair while their CEI scores them as ambiguously or somewhat clean. Besides, political liberties are absent following LIED. V-Dem's PCLI categorizes them with an ambiguous presence. According to our own observations and classifications Ghana is a clear case of an electoral autocracy. In 1960 and 1961, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints during this time. In 1962 and 1963, according to Polity5, during this period, the executive's constraints fell into Intermediate Category 1, between unlimited authority and slight limitations. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust,

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<sup>455</sup> <https://africanelections.tripod.com/gh.html>

<sup>456</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Kwame-Nkrumah>

while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

01/31/1964 End Electoral (Personalist) Autocracy/Start Personalist Autocracy: During this event, a constitutional referendum was conducted. The proposed amendments formally converted the country into a one-party state and expanded the authority of President Kwame Nkrumah, appointing him as president for life. The reported outcome, with an unlikely 99.91% of voters supporting the amendments, raised allegations of an "clearly rigged" referendum.<sup>457</sup> It is somehow problematic to code a regime change in 1964 since obviously the regime led by Nkrumah did not change but transform. Nevertheless, coding as Personalist Autocracy begins on 01/31/1964 with the official referendum transforming the state legally into a one-party system, de facto into a personalist autocracy. According to our classification rule, the appointment of a president for life is a sufficient characteristic to classify a regime as personalist autocracy. In addition, there are complementary characteristics of a personalist autocracy. Such as the fact that the CPP was co-founded by Nkrumah or the cult of personality which was expressed mainly through his own ideology called Nkrumaism.<sup>458</sup> On 06/09/1965, the first parliamentary elections since 1956 took place.<sup>459</sup> In accordance with the 1964 referendum, the CPP was the only legal party and therefore the only party able to take part in the elections.<sup>460</sup> According to LIED multiparty executive and legislative elections were held in 1964, in 1965 executive and legislative elections, which weren't multiparty, were held. Furthermore, while LIED's scores political liberties still as absent, V-Dem's PCLI outcomes changed to a range which we interpret in the way that political liberties were not really present per this indicator. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For the year 1965, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For 1966, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

02/24/1966 End Personalist Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, a military coup led by Colonel Kotoka and Major Afrifa overthrew Nkrumah. It handed power to dismissed Major General Ankrah and established the National Liberation Council, a group of four military

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<sup>457</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1964\\_Ghanaian\\_constitutional\\_referendum](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1964_Ghanaian_constitutional_referendum)

<sup>458</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convention\\_People%27s\\_Party](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convention_People%27s_Party); <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nkrumaism>

<sup>459</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_general\\_elections\\_in\\_Ghana#cite\\_note-independence-15](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_general_elections_in_Ghana#cite_note-independence-15)

<sup>460</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1965\\_Ghanaian\\_parliamentary\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1965_Ghanaian_parliamentary_election)

and four police officers as the ruling group (Pinkney 1972: 2, 70, 121, Bebler 1973: 36-40, Brooker 1995: 111-12, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 61-62). Political parties were banned until 05/01/1969 (Krennerich 1999: 423). According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. LIED classifies political liberties as absent. Following V-Dem's PCLI they were not really present until 1967 and ambiguous from 1968 onwards. Based on Polity5's evaluation, during this period, the executive faced weak constraints, classified as Intermediate Category 1 between unlimited authority and slight limitations. For the years 1967 and 1968, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For 1969, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

08/29/1969 End Military Autocracy/Start Defective Democracy: On this date, there was a "competitive election after the military agreed to return to the barracks" (Bebler 1973: 54-55, Dowse 1975: 24, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 62).<sup>461</sup> The Progress Party won the majority of the seats. Their leader Kofi Abrefa Busia became Prime Minister.<sup>462</sup> Since the constitution of 1969 established a unicameral parliamentary system, there were no presidential elections. The president was supposed to be elected by an electoral college, until 08/31/1970 a provisional presidential commission exercised the presidential functions. Afterwards Edward Akufo Addo took over the presidency (Krennerich 1999: 424).<sup>463</sup> These years are generally considered as a move towards democracy. The aim of Busia and his government was the restoration of democratic rule and economic prosperity. The failure in the latter led to the fall of Busia in particular. Attempts to silence and manage criticism were ineffective and in no means of autocratic nature. But privileges of office were nonetheless abused by parliamentarians and ministers, resulting in patronage and nepotism (LeVine 1987, Owusu 1972, Austin 1970). Between 1970 and 1971 AF, BR, GWF, LIED and MCM classify Ghana as a democracy. We classify this period as a defective democracy (borderline case to an electoral hybrid regime), acknowledging the steps to reverse the autocratic system of Nkrumah. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. During this brief period, LIED categorizes elections as

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<sup>461</sup> <https://africanelections.tripod.com/gh.html>

<sup>462</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1969\\_Ghanaian\\_parliamentary\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1969_Ghanaian_parliamentary_election)

<sup>463</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1969\\_Ghanaian\\_parliamentary\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1969_Ghanaian_parliamentary_election);  
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edward\\_Akufo-Addo](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edward_Akufo-Addo)

competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores them as somewhat free and fair but their CEI scores electoral cleanliness as ambiguous. According to LIED political liberties were still absent. However, V-Dem's PCLI classifies them as somewhat present. According to the Polity5 indicator, during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. For 1970-1971, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. For the year 1972, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive.

01/13/1972 End Defective Democracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, a military coup, orchestrated by Lieutenant Colonel Ignatius Kutu Acheampong, ousted the democratically elected President, Edward Akufo-Addo, and subsequently, assumed the role of chairman of the National Redemption Council. By 1975, this council transitioned into the Supreme Military Council, a seven-member body that included the leaders of the military services, police, border guards, and the defense chief (Bebler 1973: 56-60, Bennett 2014: 308, Lansford 2012c: 539, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 62).<sup>464</sup> In November 1978, during a strike by junior civil servants, the regime declared a state of emergency and terminated the employment of over 1.000 public workers. Under the mounting pressure, Frederick W. K. Akuffo eventually conceded by declaring the lifting of the ban on political parties on 01/01/1979 and the organization of free elections.<sup>465</sup> According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. As classified by FH for the period until 1977, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. In 1978 a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. In addition to that, political liberties were coded as absent by LIED and can be interpreted as not really present following V-Dem's PCLI. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. From 1973 to 1978, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For 1979, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

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<sup>464</sup> <https://www.modernghana.com/news/844453/13-january-1972-remembering-the-1972-coup-in-ghana.html>

<sup>465</sup> [https://photius.com/countries/ghana/national\\_security/ghana\\_national\\_security\\_the\\_akuffo\\_coup\\_197~150.html](https://photius.com/countries/ghana/national_security/ghana_national_security_the_akuffo_coup_197~150.html)

05/15/1979 End Military Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: After Jerry Rawlings, a flight lieutenant who led a group of junior officers attempting a coup, was sentenced to be executed, members of the armed forces sympathetic to him freed him and completed the coup.<sup>466</sup> He established and became chairman of a 15-member Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), primarily composed of junior officers. During his 112-day rule with the AFRC, he orchestrated the execution by firing squad of eight military officers, among them Generals Kotei, Joy Amedume, Roger Felli, and Utuka. Notably, three former Ghanaian heads of state – Acheampong, Akuffo, and Akwasi Afrifa – also faced the same fate. These executions were pivotal events in Ghana’s history, a nation that had previously experienced limited instances of political violence.<sup>467</sup> Due to the short period of its survival this regime does not appear in the country-year dataset even if it is rather important in the context of the history of Ghana.

06/18/1979 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date parliamentary elections and the first round of the presidential election took place. On 07/09/1979 a second round of competitive presidential elections took place (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 62).<sup>468</sup> Both the parliamentary and presidential elections are considered by most datasets and most researchers as free and fair and the following – short – regime period as democratic. The presidential election in 1979 was won by Hilla Limann. On 10/24/1979 the inauguration of the Third Republic took place. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. The election is categorized as competitive by LIED and as free and fair by V-Dem’s EF&FI. Their CEI, however, scores it as of ambiguous electoral cleanliness. As per FH, for 1979, the country receives a score of 8, which we interpret as falling into the rather not free category. For the remaining regime period the country receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. Additionally, political liberties continued to be coded as absent (LIED). V-Dem’s PLCI outcomes score an ambiguous presence. According to the Polity5 indicator, during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. For 1980, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For the following year, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

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<sup>466</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Ghana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Ghana)

<sup>467</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jerry\\_Rawlings](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jerry_Rawlings)

<sup>468</sup> <https://africanelections.tripod.com/gh.html>

12/31/1981 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Military (Personalist) Autocracy: On this date, a military coup orchestrated by Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings unfolded, toppling Limann from power. Subsequent to the coup, the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC), led by Rawlings and comprising a coalition of military and civilian supporters, assumed control of the country (McLaughlin/Owusu-Ansah 1995, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 62, Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 79).<sup>469</sup> The authoritarian PNDC government established a Constitutional Advisory Committee in 1991 to formulate proposals for a new constitution. After additional amendments in a Consultative Assembly, the constitution received approval through a popular referendum in April 1992. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. From 1982 to 1990, as per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time. In 1991, the executive experienced minimal limitations on decision-making, placing it in the first intermediate category. In 1992, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Besides, LIED still scores an absence of political liberties for the entire period. V-Dem's PCLI states them as not really present in 1982, as absent from 1983 to 1989 and as not really present again from 1990 onwards.

12/29/1992 End Military (Personalist) Autocracy/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: Presidential and parliamentary elections were held in November and December. These elections resulted in the victory of Rawlings and his National Democratic Congress (NDC), with the party assuming office in January 1993 (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 29).<sup>470</sup> While due to the victory of Rawlings the regime elite was more or less the same, the legitimization of the regime was different, hence, a regime change is coded. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Electoral competitiveness is categorized as not present by LIED until 1995. V-Dem's EF&FI and CEI scores vary between ambiguous and somewhat electoral freedom, fairness and cleanliness. Per FH's evaluation for the period until 1994, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. In 1995 the country receives a score of 8, which we interpret as falling into the rather not free category. For the remaining period the country

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<sup>469</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Jerry-J-Rawlings>

<sup>470</sup> [https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Ghana\\_1996?lang=en](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Ghana_1996?lang=en)



scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. Besides, political liberties were still not present until 1999 and present from 2000 onwards (LIED). V-Dem's PCLI scores them as somewhat present until 1994. Ever since 1995 they are fully present. From 1993 to 1995, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints during this time. Afterwards, based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive's power was noticeably limited but not substantial, fitting Intermediate Category 2. From 1993 to 1995, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. For 1996, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For the rest of the regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also comprehensive.

12/28/2000 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Liberal Democracy: The ruling NDC was defeated in the second round of a closely contested presidential election (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 62).<sup>471</sup> After the 2000 general election, John Kufuor of the New Patriotic Party served as Ghana's president from 01/07/2001. He was re-elected in 2004, marking the first peaceful transfer of power under the fourth republic. In 2008, Nana Akufo-Addo of the ruling party lost a close election to John Atta Mills of the National Democratic Congress. Mills passed away, and Vice President John Mahama succeeded him on 07/24/2012. Mahama became president after the 2012 general election, solidifying Ghana's status as a stable democracy. In 2016, Nana Akufo-Addo won the presidency and was re-elected in 2020 after a tightly contested election.<sup>472</sup> On 12/07/2024 general elections were held and John Mahama, former president from 2012 to 2017, of the National Democratic Congress won the presidency outright and his running-mate Jane Naana Opoku-Agyemang became the first female Vice-President of Ghana. In the parliamentary elections the NDC achieved a landslide victory with 185 seats, while the ruling New Patriotic Party won 87 seats.<sup>473</sup> While the nation has a fairly commendable history of protecting civil liberties, issues such as discrimination against women and LGBT+ individuals endure. Per FH's scoring for the period until 2002, the country is classified as free with a score of 5, which falls into our interpretation of the rather free category. From 2003 onward the country is classified as free, scoring between 2 and 4, which we also place in the free category.

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<sup>471</sup> <https://africanelections.tripod.com/gh.html>

<sup>472</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ghana#History>

<sup>473</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024\\_Ghanaian\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Ghanaian_general_election)

Besides, both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI indicate that political liberties were constantly present since 2000. Judicial independence and the rule of law exhibit certain vulnerabilities, corruption poses challenges to governmental effectiveness, and the rise of political violence is becoming a growing concern.<sup>474</sup> Increasing threats and violence against journalists may lead to self-censorship and inhibit liberties of speech and expression. LGBT+ rights are repressed by the government and discrimination against women remains an issue.<sup>475</sup> However, Ghana holds fair and free, multi-party, regular elections. Ghana is a presidential democracy, where both the parliament and the president are directly elected.<sup>476</sup> From this time onwards, the regime is consistently coded as a democracy in all data sets (BMR, GWF, HTW, LIED, MCM, RoW). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Since 2000, LIED categorizes elections in the country as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores them as free and fair while their CEI scores them as somewhat clean. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive's constraints fell into Intermediate Category 3, between substantial limitations and executive parity or subordination. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive.

Liberal Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Berry 1994, Jeffries 1989b, Pinkney 1997, Zigel 2010)

## Gibraltar

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: 04/14/1713]: During the War of the Spanish Succession, Gibraltar was captured by Anglo-Dutch from Spain in 1704. The territory was then ceded to Great Britain in perpetuity under the Treaty of Utrecht, signed on 04/14/1713.<sup>477</sup> It became an important base for the Royal Navy, particularly during the Napoleonic Wars and World War II. In the 1950s, Franco renewed Spain's claim to sovereignty over Gibraltar.

09/10/1967 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start (Monarchical) Defective Democracy [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: On this date Gibraltarians voted overwhelmingly to remain

<sup>474</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/ghana/freedom-world/2022>

<sup>475</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/ghana/freedom-world/2023>

<sup>476</sup> <https://democracyinafrica.org/democracy-monitor/ghana/>

<sup>477</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peace\\_of\\_Utrecht](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peace_of_Utrecht)

under British sovereignty, with democratic local institutions and with the United Kingdom retaining its present responsibilities.<sup>478</sup> The referendum led to the passing of the Gibraltar Constitution Order in 1969.<sup>479</sup> As a result of the British Nationality Act 1981, Gibraltarians were made British Overseas Territories citizens. Under its current constitution from 2006, Gibraltar has almost complete internal self-governance through a parliament. The head of state is the British monarch King Charles III, who is represented by the Governor of Gibraltar. The governor enacts day-to-day matters on the advice of the parliament but is responsible to the British government in respect of defense, foreign policy, internal security and general good governance. Gibraltar is not a member of the Commonwealth of Nations in its own right and is represented by the United Kingdom.<sup>480</sup> Gibraltar conducts regular free and fair elections under universal suffrage with peaceful transitions in government.<sup>481</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. FH, LIED and V-Dem do not take Gibraltar in consideration.

(Monarchial) Defective Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

**Great Britain** see **United Kingdom**

**Greece**

01/01/1900 Constitutional Monarchy [Start: 09/12/1829]: Greece only became independent after a war from 02/21/1821 to 09/12/1829 after more than four hundred years of belonging to the Ottoman Empire.<sup>482</sup> The country was at this point far more strongly and directly influenced by Byzantine Ottoman traditions than by the democratic ideas of antiquity. On 02/03/1830 the independence of Greece was recognized by the London Protocol as Kingdom of Greece. After the revolution of 09/03/1843, the Greek Constitution of 1844 with the electoral law of 03/18/1844 introduced universal male suffrage with secret ballot.<sup>483</sup> On 03/30/1863 (greg.) Prince Wilhelm was elected king of Greece and was coronated as George I<sup>484</sup>. He ruled until his murder on 03/18/1913. In the time from 07/19 to 08/28/1909 Dimitrios Rallis<sup>485</sup> was

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<sup>478</sup> <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/11/gibraltar-votes-to-remain-with-britain-archive-1967>

<sup>479</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gibraltar>

<sup>480</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gibraltar>

<sup>481</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections\\_in\\_Gibraltar](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_Gibraltar)

<sup>482</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek\\_War\\_of\\_Independence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_War_of_Independence)

<sup>483</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal\\_suffrage#cite\\_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37)

<sup>484</sup> [https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georg\\_I.\\_\(Griechenland\)](https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georg_I._(Griechenland))

<sup>485</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dimitrios\\_Rallis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dimitrios_Rallis)

deposed as prime minister as a result of a military coup. During the coup Eleftherios Venizelos arrived in Greece and became prime minister from 10/19/1910 until 03/10/1915. The regime type is coded as a ruling monarchy throughout the period even though the military coup led to the change of prime ministers.<sup>486</sup> From 12/19/1920 Constantine I was king of Greece<sup>487</sup> until he was forced to abdicate in a coup d'état on 09/27/1922. He was replaced by King George II of Greece.<sup>488</sup> According to LIED multiparty executive and legislative elections were held until 1908, no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held in 1909 and multiparty executive and legislative elections were held again from 1910 onward. Furthermore, political liberties were absent according to LIED. Following V-Dem's PCLI they were somewhat present until 1919 and ambiguous from 1920 onwards. From 1900 to 1914, based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. In 1915, 1920 and 1921, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

12/16/1923 End Constitutional Monarchy/Start (Monarchical) Electoral Autocracy: The elections on this date were boycotted by the entire monarchist camp. They cannot be classified as democratic, since the monarchists could not in fact expect fair electoral conditions (Polyzoides 1924), because the revolutionary government had enacted an electoral law that significantly favored the Venizelist Liberal Party and other parties opposed to the monarchy.<sup>489</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. The election is categorized as not competitive by LIED. V-Dem's EF&FI scores it as somewhat free and fair while their CEI scores it as not clean. Moreover, political liberties were absent according to LIED. They were classified with an ambiguous presence by V-Dem's PCLI. Venizelos returned to Greece on 01/04/1924 and took over the government a week later. In the referendum on 04/13/1924, 70 per cent of those who voted were in favor of Greece being a republic and no longer a monarchy. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is

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<sup>486</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_prime\\_ministers\\_of\\_Greece](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_prime_ministers_of_Greece); [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eleftherios\\_Venizelos](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eleftherios_Venizelos); [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_prime\\_ministers\\_of\\_Greece](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_prime_ministers_of_Greece)

<sup>487</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constantine\\_I\\_of\\_Greece](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constantine_I_of_Greece)

<sup>488</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George\\_II\\_of\\_Greece](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_II_of_Greece)

<sup>489</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leonardopoulos%E2%80%93Gargalidis\\_coup\\_attempt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leonardopoulos%E2%80%93Gargalidis_coup_attempt)

classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. These findings by V-Dem are inconsistent with the historical reality of unrestrained executive dominance. On the basis of our observations, we consider Polity's assessment more accurate, as no meaningful institutional checks limited the executive during this period.

04/13/1924 Continuation Electoral Autocracy (as republic): From this point on Greece was no longer a monarchy. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

06/25/1925 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: General Theodoros Pangalos became prime minister and president after organizing a coup.<sup>490</sup> According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. As per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. In this year, political liberties were categorized as absent per LIED and can be interpreted as ambiguous per V-Dem's PCLI.

08/24/1926 End Military Autocracy/Start Democratizing Regime: Georgios Kondylis overthrew Pangalos' government ending the ephemeral dictatorship. General Kondylis prepared a new republican constitution and parliamentary elections, for which he did not run himself.<sup>491</sup>

11/07/1926 End Democratizing Regime/Start (Male) Defective Democracy: On this date parliamentary elections were held.<sup>492</sup> In 1927 a constitution was adopted which introduced a senate that together with the parliament elected the president with a 5-year tenure (Pantelis/Koutsoubinas/Gerapetritis 2010).<sup>493</sup> The first government to be formed in this regime period was an all-party government, but until 1928 three parties dropped out of the coalition. In 1928 a new government was formed, this time a large rightwing party block. Due to personalist decision making by Prime Minister Venizelos, the coalition fell apart and Venizelos resigned. When a rightwing anti-Venizelist camp won elections in 1933, Venizelist General Plastiras took power in a short-lived coup, but he lacked support and thus could not maintain

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<sup>490</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1925\\_Greek\\_coup\\_d%27%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1925_Greek_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat);

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theodoros\\_Pangalos\\_\(general\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theodoros_Pangalos_(general)).

<sup>491</sup> <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html> , see narratives for version 5.0, Greece\_V: 2.

<sup>492</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1926\\_Greek\\_legislative\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1926_Greek_legislative_election)

<sup>493</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgios\\_Kondylis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgios_Kondylis)

power.<sup>494</sup> The anti-Venizelos camp formed a government consisting of a coalition of the People's Party (LK), the Free Opinion Party (FOP), the National Radical Party (NRP) and the Agrarians (Ag). In March 1935 the Venizelist camp attempted to stage a coup, but failed and the minister of war, Georgios Kondylis, answered with massive purges, concomitantly increasing his own power.<sup>495</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. According to LIED the elections in this period were competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores them as somewhat free and fair while their CEI scores their electoral cleanliness as ambiguous. In addition to that, female suffrage was not given. LIED viewed political liberties still as absent and V-Dem's PCLI also maintained its ambiguous scores. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive.

10/10/1935 End (Male) Defective Democracy/Start Constitutional Monarchy: In a coup d'état Georgios Kondylis restored the monarchic rule by carrying out a rigged plebiscite. King George II returned to power.<sup>496</sup> On 04/13/1936 General Ioannis Metaxas was appointed by King George II as prime minister.<sup>497</sup> According to LIED only multiparty legislative elections were held. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

08/04/1936 End Constitutional Monarchy/Start (Monarchical) Right-Wing [Semi-Fascist] Autocracy: In a self-coup General Ioannis Metaxas dismantled the parliament and promoted a more fascist and nationalist rule. Due to lack of popular approval the rule was dependent on King George II.<sup>498</sup> Metaxas suspended the constitution and repressed opposition" (Clogg 2013: 106-7, 115, 117-18, Casey et al. 2020: 7). On 01/21/1941 Metaxas died.<sup>499</sup> Lacking a popular

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<sup>494</sup> <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html> , see narratives for version 5.0, Greece\_V: 3.

<sup>495</sup> <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html> , see narratives for version 5.0, Greece\_V: 3-4.

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[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom\\_of\\_Greece#Restoration\\_of\\_Monarchy\\_and\\_the\\_4th\\_of\\_August\\_Regime](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Greece#Restoration_of_Monarchy_and_the_4th_of_August_Regime)

<sup>497</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Ioannis-Metaxas>

<sup>498</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/4th\\_of\\_August\\_Regime](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/4th_of_August_Regime)

<sup>499</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Ioannis-Metaxas>

base, after Metaxas' death in January 1941 the regime hinged entirely on the King.<sup>500</sup> Approximately one-third of historians categorize the regime as "fascist", while the remaining two-thirds describe it as "authoritarian", "quasi-fascist", "radical conservative", and other similar terms.<sup>501</sup> While the Metaxas government and its official doctrines are frequently labeled as fascist, from an academic perspective, it is generally regarded as a conventional totalitarian-conservative dictatorship, comparable to Francisco Franco's Spain or António de Oliveira Salazar's Portugal.<sup>502</sup> However, the regime did not have the strong corporatist and expansionist elements that were central to fascist regimes like those in Nazi Germany or Fascist Italy. It also lacked the mass mobilization and paramilitary organizations typically associated with fascism. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. Additionally, both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI indicate that political liberties were absent. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. From 1937 to 1939, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 1940 and 1941, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. We reject V-Dem's score on legislative constraints, as Metaxas has indefinitely suspended parliament in his self-coup<sup>503</sup> and there was no restoration even after his death.<sup>504</sup>

04/27/1941 End Right-Wing [Semi-Fascist] Autocracy/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Italy, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy, Germany, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy, and Bulgaria, Constitutional Monarchy]: On this day, German troops captured Athens, after having invaded Greece on 04/06/1941 to help Italy, who had declared war on Greece in 10/1940. On 06/01/1941 of all Greece was under occupation of Italy, Germany, and Bulgaria (Clogg 2013: 118-21, Casey et al. 2020: 7).<sup>505</sup> Since 1944, based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held until 1943, from 1944 onward only executive elections were

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<sup>500</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/4th\\_of\\_August\\_Regime](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/4th_of_August_Regime)

<sup>501</sup> <https://metaxas-project.com/was-the-4th-of-august-regime-really-fascist/>

<sup>502</sup> <https://www.populismstudies.org/Vocabulary/metaxism/>

<sup>503</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/4th\\_of\\_August\\_Regime](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/4th_of_August_Regime)

<sup>504</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/4th\\_of\\_August\\_Regime#Differences\\_from\\_other\\_far-right\\_regimes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/4th_of_August_Regime#Differences_from_other_far-right_regimes)

<sup>505</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axis\\_occupation\\_of\\_Greece](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axis_occupation_of_Greece)

held. Both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI indicate that political liberties were absent. In the timeframe 1942-1944, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For the following two years, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. We cast serious doubt on the quality of the V-Dem data in this context. Robust legislative constraints on the executive under Axis occupation—or even during a civil war—appear entirely implausible according to our observations.

10/12/1944 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Italy, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy, Germany, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy, and Bulgaria]/Start No Central Authority: On this date, German troops left Athens, following the advance of the Red Army in Romania.<sup>506</sup> Soon after that the British troops and members of the exile government landed in Athens. They tried to disarm the resistance groups, who had waged a guerrilla war against the occupation regime and controlled large parts of the countryside. However, the already politically divided and deeply antagonistic resistance groups and guerrilla armies refused to lay down their weapons and cede power. This conflict between the largest resistance group EAM (mainly-driven by the Greek communist party) and its armed forces (ELAS), and anti-communist groups supported by British troops resulted in the breakup of the first provisional government and culminated into a month-long battle over the control of Athens (“Dekremviana”).<sup>507</sup> We code this period as “No Central Authority”, because neither EAM/ELAS, nor the British troops had control over the capital and sufficient parts of Greeks territory. The underlying conflict broke the “Government of National Unity”, which was agreed before the liberation and comprised of monarchist, republican and communist forces. This period has also been described as the “first phase” of the Greek civil war.<sup>508</sup> After the ELAS lost the battle over Athens on 01/11/1945, a peace deal was signed. This regime change event is coded as a voluntary exit. The trigger for the regime change was the withdrawal of the German occupation forces. The direction is unclear because the transition was from one extreme form of autocracy, a direct rule occupation by Nazi Germany, to another, (a complete collapse of state order into civil war), representing a horizontal shift between two catastrophic states rather than a clear institutional deterioration. For that period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified

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<sup>506</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axis\\_occupation\\_of\\_Greece#Liberation\\_and\\_aftermath](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axis_occupation_of_Greece#Liberation_and_aftermath)

<sup>507</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dekemvriana>

<sup>508</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White\\_Terror\\_\(Greece\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White_Terror_(Greece))



by us as indicating that political liberties are not really present. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. As indicated in the previous regime period, we again cast serious doubt on the quality of the V-Dem data in this context. Robust legislative and moderate judicial constraints on the executive under this phase of civil war appear entirely implausible according to our observations.

02/12/1945 End No Central Authority/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: On this date, representatives of the Greek communist party and the Greek government signed the Treaty of Varkiza.<sup>509</sup> This treaty regulated the disarmament of EAM/ELAS and promised a referendum in 1945 on constitutional matters as well as the oversight of British forces over the 1946 parliamentary elections. The treaty also announced the creation of a non-political national army. In announcing a referendum as well as planning elections, this regime is clearly of transitional character. During the regime, many left-wing resistance members were persecuted for their actions, as courts classified them as criminal and not political. Anti-communist militias killed and tortured civilians as well as attacking entire villages out of retaliation while some communist fighters hid their weapons for the disarmament.<sup>510</sup> The political and military persecution of left-wing groups is known as "White Terror".<sup>511</sup> In this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as showing that political liberties are not truly present. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. As mentioned in the regime periods above, we strongly doubt the quality of the V-Dem data in this context. Parliament was suspended since the coup of Metaxas in 1936 and we found no evidence of parliamentary activities.

03/31/1946 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start (Monarchical) (Male) Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date parliamentary elections took place. The outcome led to a triumph for the United Alignment of Nationalists, a coalition comprising the People's Party, the National Liberal Party, and the Reform Party. A main aim of the new government was the proclamation of a plebiscite for the restoration of the Greek monarchy, which took place on 09/01/1946.<sup>512</sup> Right before the election a communist band attacked a police station in

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<sup>509</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty\\_of\\_Varkiza](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Varkiza)

<sup>510</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek\\_Civil\\_War#Interlude:\\_1945%E2%80%931946](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_Civil_War#Interlude:_1945%E2%80%931946)

<sup>511</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White\\_Terror\\_\(Greece\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White_Terror_(Greece))

<sup>512</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1946\\_Greek\\_legislative\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1946_Greek_legislative_election)

Litochoro, which started three years of civil war in Greece. According to MCM the “two kings that ruled during this time assembled governments and seemed to have meaningful executive power that actually affected politics in the country (Magaloni/Chu/Min 2013a: 21). Therefore, the country in the view of MCM is a ruling monarchy not a democracy. However, GWF, CGV and BMR classify the regime as democratic. PRC classifies the regime as a semidemocracy. While we agree that the kings still held political power, the gravitation center of the political regime was the elected government, the monarchs still interfered in politics. Until 1949, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem’s PCLI is classified by us as showing that political liberties are not truly present. For the rest of the assessed regime period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem’s PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. During this regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

11/16/1952 Continuation (Monarchical) Electoral Hybrid Regime: King Paul decided to dissolve Parliament in 10/1952 and appointed a caretaker government to set up new elections. This was an endeavor to secure a majority government to alleviate the nation’s severe economic situation (NELDA). Following the elections, Alexander Papagos of the Hellenic Union Party (GRAL) became prime minister and served until his death in 1955. The office, along with the leadership of GRAL, was passed on to Konstantinos Karamanlis, who changed the party affiliation into National Radical Union (ERE). The ERE won the majority in the following elections of 1958 and 1961, but when Karamanlis had a disagreement with the royal family in 1963, he fled the country. This marks the beginning of a period of social unrest with several governments forming and falling apart.<sup>513</sup> In 1965 King Constantine II dismissed Prime Minister Papandreou, causing a constitutional crisis known as the “Apostasia of 1965”.<sup>514</sup> Until 11/16/1952 the electoral regime had the additional severe restriction that only men could vote. From then on women could also vote in national elections.<sup>515</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes elections during this time as competitive. V-Dem’s EF&FI scores them as somewhat free and fair while their CEI scores their electoral cleanliness

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<sup>513</sup> <http://www.chisol.org/narratives.html> , see narratives for version 5.0, Greece\_R: 5-6.

<sup>514</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek\\_junta](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_junta)

<sup>515</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal\\_suffrage#cite\\_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37)

as ambiguous. Moreover, regarding the political liberties, they were still absent according to LIED. V-Dem's PCLI scores them as not really present until 1949 and as ambiguous from 1950 onwards. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. For the years 1952 and 1953, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 1954, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. From 1955 to 1966, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. For 1967, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

04/21/1967 End (Monarchical) Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start (Monarchical) Military Autocracy: A group of colonels, the Holy Bond of Greek Officers (IDEA), led by Colonel Papadopoulos overthrew the caretaker government a month before scheduled elections which Georgios Papandreou's Centre Union was favoured to win. The coup plotters perceived them as leftist opponents. The right-wing junta installed Kollias as acting prime minister and junta (Feit 1973: 118-122, Brown 1974: 217, Veremis 1985: 30-32, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 62).<sup>516</sup> According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. This seems to us as a clear case of miscoding by V-Dem.<sup>517</sup>

06/01/1973 Continuation Military Autocracy (as republic): On this date, the military regime proclaimed a republic and abolished the Greek monarchy. On 11/23/1973 frightened by the social unrest in the country and Papadopoulos' liberalization campaign, General Ioannides overthrew him and his appointed prime minister. Ioannides appointed General Gizikis as junta head. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. According to FH's classification for the assessed regime period since 1972, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which

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<sup>516</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek\\_junta](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_junta); [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Centre\\_Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Centre_Union)

<sup>517</sup> E.g.

[https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Griechische\\_Milit%C3%A4rdiktatur#Die\\_Entmachtung\\_der\\_unabh%C3%A4ngigen\\_Justiz](https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Griechische_Milit%C3%A4rdiktatur#Die_Entmachtung_der_unabh%C3%A4ngigen_Justiz)

we also place in the not free category. Both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI indicate that political liberties were absent in this period. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. Still this seems to us as a clear case of miscoding by V-Dem. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections took place.

07/23/1974 End Military Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: On this date, the military transferred power to Constantine Karamanlis in preparation for competitive elections (Veremis 1985: 41, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 62).

11/17/1974 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Liberal Democracy: Free and fair parliamentary elections were held on this date.<sup>518</sup> Since then Greece is a parliamentary democracy with a unicameral parliament. The political landscape is characterized by competitive and freely operating parties. Governmental power frequently changed, underscoring competitiveness in the electoral processes, but coalitions also tended to break apart prematurely or prime ministers resigned due to lacks in performance legitimacy. Economy and fiscal politics have posed ongoing problems since the early 1990s. However, governmental transitions remained constitutional.<sup>519</sup> There are persistent problems concerning migrants, discrimination against minorities and corruption. Judiciary is generally independent. However, there are still occasional problems with corruption. Although there is gender equality by law, women still face discrimination, especially in the workplace. Universal suffrage applies to Greek citizens from the age of 17 and older.<sup>520</sup> The presidential election, which took place from January 25 to February 12, 2025, was an indirect vote by the Hellenic Parliament to elect the head of state. Due to high supermajority thresholds, the election required multiple rounds. The government-backed candidate, Konstantinos Tasoulas of the New Democracy party, failed to secure the necessary majority in the first three rounds, requiring a fourth. Tasoulas was finally elected president in the fourth round with 160 votes after the required threshold was lowered to a simple majority of 151.<sup>521</sup> On 06/25/2023 snap parliamentary elections were held. The elections were necessary because no coalition government was formed after the elections on 05/21/2023. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Since then, LIED categorizes

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<sup>518</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1974\\_Greek\\_legislative\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1974_Greek_legislative_election);

[https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Greece\\_2008?lang=en](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Greece_2008?lang=en)

<sup>519</sup> <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html>, see narratives for version 5.0, Greece\_R: 7-8, Greece\_V: 8-9

<sup>520</sup> <https://www.ypes.gr/en/information-for-the-voters/>

<sup>521</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025\\_Greek\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_Greek_presidential_election)

all elections as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI and CEI score them as free, fair and clean. Per FH, for this regime period, the country is classified as free, scoring between 2 and 4, which we also place in the free category. In addition, ever since 1975 both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI acknowledge the full presence of political liberties. From 1975 to 1985, according to the Polity5 indicator, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. Since 1986, based on this assessment, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. For 1975, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. From 1976 to 2019, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also comprehensive. For 2020-2021, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For the year 2022, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. For 2023, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

Liberal Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Campbell/Sherrard 1968, Clogg 1986, Grothusen 1980, Kallis 2007, Kofas 1983, Koumoulides 1977, Mavrokordatos 1983, Richter 1990, Serafetinidis 1978, Woodhouse 1998, Zervakis/Auernheimer 2009, Zink 2000a)

## **Greenland**

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Denmark, Constitutional Monarchy] [Start: 05/16/1774]: In the 18<sup>th</sup> century Denmark slowly began to recolonize Greenland in hopes of relocating the lost Norse settlement on the Greenlandic West Coast. From 1734 to 1774, several settlements were created by the General Trade Company (GTC) along the West Coast of Greenland. On 05/16/1774, the GTC was replaced with the Royal Greenland Trade Department (KGH), a Danish State enterprise which had been given authority by the crown to administer

Greenlandic trade and settlements.<sup>522</sup> Due to Denmark's intervention in the Napoleonic Wars on France's behalf, Denmark-Norway was split up in accordance with the Treaty of Kiel of 1814.<sup>523</sup> Greenland remained under Danish control. In 1857, the KGH set up local councils (parsissaet). They were democratically elected but could only decide on minor local issues. All other matters remained under the jurisdiction of the KGH.<sup>524</sup> These local councils were dissolved in 1911 when the Danish Ministry of the Interior took over colonial administration of Greenland from the KGH.<sup>525</sup> Norway regained independence in 1905 and claimed Greenland as Erik the Red's territory as it had been in its possession prior to 1815. A Norwegian meteorologist occupied Eastern Greenland in 1931 which was then supported by the Norwegian Government. In 1933, the International Court of Justice ruled in favor of Denmark.<sup>526</sup>

04/09/1940 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Denmark, Liberal Democracy]/Start Democratizing Regime: On this date, Nazi-Germany invaded Denmark. Denmark was subjected to German control and Greenland was left to fend for itself. According to a 1920 declaration, the United States was not willing to accept third party sovereignty in Greenland. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom and Canada were seeking control over the territory. On 05/03/1940, the Danish Ambassador to the United States of America, Henrik Kauffmann, consulted with the Greenlandic local advisory parliament (landsraed). He declared that there was no other option than to act as a sovereign nation. On 04/13/1940, he had taken counsel with the Greenlandic Sheriffs who had declared a self-governing State. They agreed to keep him as their representative in the United States. While the Danish Government continued to send orders to Greenland, these were largely ignored.<sup>527</sup>

05/20/1940 Continuation as Democratizing Regime [as Protectorate of United States, Defective Democracy]: On this date, the USCGC Comanche coast guard vessel arrived in Ivigtut after the new government had asked for protection from the United States under threat from Canada and Norwegian forces present in Canada. The vessel had been sent alongside the USCGC Campbell with supplies and a consular team to establish diplomatic relations. All parties concerned were mainly interested in the cryolite which was being mined in Ivigtut and was a major component of aluminum production. The United States established a provisional consulate in Godthaab. As the United States could not officially send US soldiers to protect the mines, they supplied

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<sup>522</sup> <https://pilersuisoq.gl/da/voreshistorie/>; <https://www.worldstatesmen.org/Greenland.html>

<sup>523</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Greenland#Danish\\_recolonization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Greenland#Danish_recolonization)

<sup>524</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parsissaet>

<sup>525</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parsissaet#Parsissaet\\_dissolved](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parsissaet#Parsissaet_dissolved)

<sup>526</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Greenland#Strategic\\_importance](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Greenland#Strategic_importance)

<sup>527</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greenland\\_in\\_World\\_War\\_II#Neutrality](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greenland_in_World_War_II#Neutrality)

weapons and training to Greenlanders instead. The United Kingdom and Canada still pressed for the establishment of an airfield at Cape Farewell. Therefore, the US and the Greenland Government agreed to formalize the United States protectorate of Greenland. Two air- and one naval base were set up. On 04/09/1941, Kauffmann signed an agreement with the US secretary of State Cordell Hull, formally allowing the United States to station armed forces in Greenland and declaring a formal protectorate status.<sup>528</sup> He did this against the will of the Danish government. 1942 marked the beginning of the North Atlantic Weather War. Germany and the Allies were in a constant struggle for the monopoly on weather data as this was important for military strategizing.<sup>529</sup> Formally Greenland was directed by governors of North and South Greenland. These administrations were elected indirectly from local councils, which had little to say.<sup>530</sup> Women suffrage was only introduced in 1948.<sup>531</sup>

05/05/1945 End Democratizing Regime [as Protectorate of the United States, Defective Democracy]/Start Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Denmark, Liberal Democracy]: On this date, Denmark was liberated from German occupation. Eske Brun and the Greenland administration surrendered their powers back to the Danish Crown.<sup>532</sup> Nevertheless, American military presence remained. In the 1951 agreement, the Thule-Airbase was made permanent.<sup>533</sup>

05/25/1953 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Denmark, Liberal Democracy]/Start Part of Other Country [Denmark, Liberal Democracy]: On this date, the new Danish constitution was ratified, which incorporated Greenland into Denmark as a Danish province with the name of County of Greenland.<sup>534</sup>

05/01/1979 End Part of Other Country [Denmark, Liberal Democracy]/Start Liberal Democracy [as Protectorate of Denmark, Liberal Democracy]: On this date, Greenlandic home-rule came into effect<sup>535</sup>, after a referendum on the autonomy of Greenland from Denmark was held in January of the same year.<sup>536</sup> Consequently, the Greenlandic Parliament was established. Multiparty elections were held on 04/04/1979. Due to the first-past-the-post system in many constituencies, the seat turnout was especially high for the leftwing separatist Siumut.

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<sup>528</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greenland\\_in\\_World\\_War\\_II#Neutrality](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greenland_in_World_War_II#Neutrality)

<sup>529</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North\\_Atlantic\\_weather\\_war](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Atlantic_weather_war)

<sup>530</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South\\_Greenland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Greenland); [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North\\_Greenland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Greenland);  
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Administrative\\_divisions\\_of\\_Greenland#History](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Administrative_divisions_of_Greenland#History)

<sup>531</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s\\_suffrage](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage)

<sup>532</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greenland\\_in\\_World\\_War\\_II#Aftermath](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greenland_in_World_War_II#Aftermath)

<sup>533</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Greenland#Cold\\_War](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Greenland#Cold_War)

<sup>534</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution\\_of\\_Denmark](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_Denmark);

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greenlandic\\_independence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greenlandic_independence)

<sup>535</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greenlandic\\_independence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greenlandic_independence)

<sup>536</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1979\\_Greenlandic\\_home\\_rule\\_referendum](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1979_Greenlandic_home_rule_referendum)

Consequently, Jonathan Motzfeldt of the Siumut became the first head of the autonomous government.<sup>537</sup> Greenland was granted sovereignty in matters such as education, health, fisheries and environment. However, as Greenland was considered an autonomous constituent country of the Kingdom of Denmark, Denmark still held control over several policy areas such as foreign relations.<sup>538</sup> On 02/23/1982, a majority of Greenlanders voted to leave the EEC which it had entered as a county of Denmark in 1973. The Greenland Treaty was signed in 1985 which gave Greenland the status of Overseas Country and Territory of the European Union.<sup>539</sup> The main reason for Greenlanders wanting to remain outside of the European Union was disagreement over the Common Fisheries Policy. Nevertheless, due to the special relationship with Denmark and the European Union, Greenlandic nationals are EU citizens and can thus move freely within the European Union.<sup>540</sup> The political system functions as a parliamentary representative multi-party democracy with a certain degree of dependency of the Kingdom of Denmark. While the powers of the Danish monarch have, for the most part, become purely ceremonial and representative,<sup>541</sup> it does hold power over policies and decisions affecting the region.<sup>542</sup> The prime minister is the head of government which exercises both executive and legislative power. The parliament (Inatsisartut) also yields legislative power. Greenlandic judiciary is independent of the other branches.<sup>543</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. FH, LIED and V-Dem do not provide data for Greenland in their data.

Liberal Democracy [as Protectorate of Denmark, Liberal Democracy] as of 07/01/2025 continued.

## Grenada

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Electoral Oligarchy] [Start 11/25/1783]: Discovered by Columbus during his third expedition in 1498, Grenada experienced a succession of French and British rule until 11/25/ 1783, when the Treaty of Versailles, commonly referred to as the “Peace of Paris,” formally acknowledged British

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<sup>537</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1979\\_Greenlandic\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1979_Greenlandic_general_election)

<sup>538</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1979\\_Greenlandic\\_home\\_rule\\_referendum](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1979_Greenlandic_home_rule_referendum)

<sup>539</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Greenland#Home\\_rule](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Greenland#Home_rule)

<sup>540</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greenland\\_and\\_the\\_European\\_Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greenland_and_the_European_Union)

<sup>541</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greenland#Politics>

<sup>542</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics\\_of\\_Greenland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Greenland)

<sup>543</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics\\_of\\_Greenland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Greenland)



authority.<sup>544</sup> It continued as a British colony until 1958 when it became part of the abortive Federation of the West Indies. From 1833 to 01/01/1960, Grenada was part of the Windward Islands (Barbados [to 1885], Dominica [from 1940], Grenada, St. Lucia [from 1838], St. Vincent, Tobago [to 1889]). LIED only treats Grenada since 1951.

10/10/1951 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: On this date, general elections were held in Grenada. They were the first held with universal suffrage.<sup>545</sup> According to LIED only multiparty legislative elections were held. In this period political liberties were absent according to LIED.

03/03/1967 End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy [as associated state of the United Kingdom]: On this date, the West Indies Act was adopted, granting Grenada full autonomy over its internal affairs. On 02/07/1974, Grenada gained full independence from the United Kingdom but remained a realm of the commonwealth, with the British crown as its head of state.<sup>546</sup> According to FH, the judiciary was independent, elections were ostensibly competitive and civil liberties were mostly upheld (Gastil 1978). As classified by FH for the period until 1976, the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. For the remaining period the country receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. However, according to LIED political liberties were absent for this period. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes elections during this time as competitive. V-Dem does not list the country.

03/13/1979 End (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy/Start (Monarchical) Communist Ideocracy: The Marxist-Leninist New Jewel Movement (NJM), under the leadership of Maurice Bishop, disputed the results of the recent election, which were said to grant Eric Gairy the prime minister's office and as a result, he launched a violent revolt to oust the regime (Lansford 2021: 647). The NJM suspended the constitution and proclaimed the formation of the People's Revolutionary Government (PRG) on 03/13/1979 with Maurice Bishop as prime minister.<sup>547</sup> The PRG implemented a number of socialist policies, including nationalizing businesses, expanding social welfare programs, and promoting education and healthcare. The PRG also

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<sup>544</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peace\\_of\\_Paris\\_\(1783\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peace_of_Paris_(1783))

<sup>545</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1951\\_Grenadian\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1951_Grenadian_general_election)

<sup>546</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Grenada#Last\\_colonial\\_years:\\_1900%E2%80%931974](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Grenada#Last_colonial_years:_1900%E2%80%931974);  
[https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Grenada\\_1992?lang=en](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Grenada_1992?lang=en)

<sup>547</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New\\_Jewel\\_Movement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Jewel_Movement)

established close ties with Cuba and the Soviet Union. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. As classified by FH for 1979, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. For the remaining period a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. Moreover, political liberties were still absent per LIED.

10/19/1983 End (Monarchical) Communist Ideocracy/Start (Monarchical) Military Autocracy: Hudson Austin and the military wing of the party launched a coup against Bishop because of the recent infighting. Austin had him executed and then became chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council.<sup>548</sup>

10/25/1983 End (Monarchical) Military Autocracy/Start (Monarchical) Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: On 10/25/1983, United States forces, along with a coalition of six Caribbean nations, invaded Grenada, ousted the leaders of the ruling party, and installed an interim government led by Nicholas Braithwaite. The interim government reinstated the pre-1979 revolution constitution, and on 03/12/1984, it conducted democratic elections, marking the first such elections since 1976 (Baukhage/Hillebrands 2005, Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 29). As per FH, for this regime period, the country receives a score of 8, which we interpret as falling into the rather not free category. In this short period political liberties were still absent according to LIED. Further no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held.

12/03/1984 End (Monarchical) Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy: On this date, a general election took place (Baukhage/Hillebrands 2005).<sup>549</sup> The result was a victory for the New National Party (NNP), which won 14 of the 15 seats.<sup>550</sup> Since democracy was restored, power has rotated several times, but the NNP won most of the elections. Grenada is a bicameral parliamentary democracy with competitive elections. Civil liberties such as freedom of speech, expression, religion etc. are safeguarded by the constitution.<sup>551</sup> As per FH's classification for 1985, the country receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. From 1986 onward the country is categorized as free with a score between 2 and 4, which corresponds to our interpretation of free. In addition to that political liberties were constantly present ever since 1986 per LIED. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Since 1984, LIED again categorizes all elections as competitive. Democratic institutions such as the judiciary are independent and generally strong. However,

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<sup>548</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New\\_Jewel\\_Movement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Jewel_Movement)

<sup>549</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1984\\_Grenadian\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1984_Grenadian_general_election)

<sup>550</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1984\\_Grenadian\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1984_Grenadian_general_election)

<sup>551</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics\\_of\\_Grenada](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Grenada)

challenges to the democratic quality of Grenada are posed by corruption and unequal treatment of and frequent violence against LGBT+ people and women. In 2022 the New National Party was accused of misusing funds for diplomatic passports while in government. While the media is generally free, seditious libel remains criminalized and several lawsuits against media by politicians contribute to self-censorship.

(Monarchical) Liberal Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

## **Guadeloupe**

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Defective Democracy] [Start: 06/28/1635]: Caribs successfully resisted Spanish forces and settlers in 1515, 1520, and 1523. In 1626, a Frenchman named Pierre Bélain, sieur d'Esnameuc, ousted the Spanish who had settled on the coast and established a trading company. On 06/28/1635, Frenchmen Léonard de L'Olive and Jean Duplessis d'Ossoville founded a colony. The introduction of the slave trade in 1644 provided labor for sugar, coffee, and other plantations, leading to the establishment of slavery. In 1674, Guadeloupe shifted from chartered companies to French crown rule, becoming a dependency of Martinique until 1775. The British occupied Guadeloupe in 1759 but returned it to France in 1763. In 1794, the British briefly reoccupied Guadeloupe, later reclaimed by French revolutionary official Victor Hugues, who abolished slavery and executed numerous white planters. The British occupied Guadeloupe again in 1810, and after some changes in its status, it was returned to France in 1816. The most significant 19th-century development in the region was the complete abolition of slavery in 1848.<sup>552</sup>

03/19/1946 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Liberal Democracy]/Start Part of Other Country [France, Liberal Democracy]: On this date, Guadeloupe was designated as a French département.<sup>553</sup> An independence movement gained momentum during the 1970s, leading to France's decision to designate Guadeloupe as a French region in 1974. In 2000, Guadeloupe was given increased autonomy. In 2003, through a referendum, Saint-Martin and Saint Barthélemy voted to break away from Guadeloupe's administrative jurisdiction, and this separation was fully implemented by 2007.<sup>554</sup> Due to the legal equality of the overseas territory with the regions of mainland France, as well as its representation in the French Parliament and in the European Union, Guadeloupe can be regarded as a part of France. Alongside Martinique,

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<sup>552</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Guadeloupe/History>

<sup>553</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Guadeloupe/History>; <https://www.culture.gouv.fr/Regions/Dac-Guadeloupe/La-Direction-des-Affaires-Culturelles-DAC-de-Guadeloupe/La-Guadeloupe-en-bref>

<sup>554</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guadeloupe#History>

La Réunion, Mayotte, and French Guiana, Guadeloupe is part of the overseas departments, constituting a unique entity that serves as both a region and a department. The residents of Guadeloupe are French citizens enjoying complete political and legal rights.<sup>555</sup> FH, LIED and V-Dem do not register Guadeloupe in their database.

Part of Other Country [France, Liberal Democracy] as of 07/01/2025 continued.

## **Guam**

01/01/1900 (de facto) Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of USA, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: 12/23/1898]: Portuguese explorer Ferdinand Magellan, serving the King of Spain, became the initial European to reach Guam on 03/06/1521, as part of his global circumnavigation expedition. Despite Magellan's exploration, it wasn't until 01/26/1565, that Guam was officially claimed by Spain. The onset of Spanish colonization occurred on 06/15/1668 marking the establishment of the inaugural Catholic church.<sup>556</sup> Following nearly four centuries under the rule of the Kingdom of Spain, Guam came under United States occupation in the aftermath of Spain's defeat in the 1898 Spanish American War, as stipulated in the Treaty of Paris of 1898. On 12/23/1898, Executive Order 108-A issued by the 25th President, William McKinley, transferred control of Guam to the United States Navy.<sup>557</sup>

12/08/1941 End (de facto) Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of USA, Defective Democracy]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Japan, Constitutional Monarchy]: On this date, Japan initiated an attack and invasion of Guam concurrently with the assault on Pearl Harbor.<sup>558</sup> Guam was renamed Ōmiya-jima (Great Shrine Island) by the Japanese during their occupation, which endured for approximately 31 months. Throughout this time, the native people of Guam experienced forced labor, separation of families, imprisonment, executions, concentration camps, and forced prostitution.<sup>559</sup>

08/10/1944 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Japan, Constitutional Monarchy]/Start (de facto) Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of USA, Defective Democracy]: From 06/21 to 08/10, the United States reclaimed and engaged in the Battle of Guam in 1944, aiming to regain control of the island. Following World War II, the Guam Organic Act of 1950 officially designated Guam as an unincorporated organized territory of the United States. This act outlined the

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<sup>555</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guadeloupe#Governance>

<sup>556</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guam#Spanish\\_era](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guam#Spanish_era)

<sup>557</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guam#American\\_era](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guam#American_era)

<sup>558</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Guam#World\\_War\\_II](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Guam#World_War_II)

<sup>559</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guam#World\\_War\\_II](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guam#World_War_II)

framework for the island's civilian government and conferred U.S. citizenship upon its residents.

09/01/1968 End (de facto) Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of USA, Liberal Democracy]/Start (de facto) Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of USA, Defective Democracy]: Initially, the Governor of Guam was federally appointed, a practice that continued until 1968 when the Guam Elective Governor Act introduced the popular election of the governorship.<sup>560</sup> It is important to note that, since Guam is not a U.S. state, residents there who are U.S. citizens do not have the right to vote for the president, and their congressional representative holds a non-voting status.<sup>561</sup> We therefore classify Guam as a de facto colony of the USA. FH, LIED and V-Dem do not provide data for Guam.

(De facto) Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of USA, Liberal Democracy] as of 07/01/2025 continued.

## Guatemala

01/01/1900 Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy [Start: 09/15/1821]: On 09/15/1821, Guatemala, a former colony of Spain, became part of the Federal Republic of Central America, which declared independence from Spain. On 04/17/1839, Guatemala declared its independence from the Federal Republic of Central America. From 02/08/1898 to 04/15/1920 Manuel José Estrada Cabrera was the President of Guatemala, using brutal methods and effectively controlling general elections to assert his authority. On 04/15/1920, Dictator Manuel Estrada Cabrera (1898-1920) was declared mentally unfit to rule by the National Assembly. The background was the formation of a new political party, the so-called Unionist Party, which had organized large scale demonstrations. Between 04/08 and 04/14/1920 the 'Tragic Week' took place. Cabrera refused to leave office and triggered civil uprisings under the leadership of the Unionist Party. Important for the downfall of Cabrera was also the missing support of the United States and the United Fruit Company, which saw their interests better protected in a new president. On 04/15/1920 he surrendered, and Carlos Herrera y Luna assumed the role of interim president until 09/15/1920 and was elected on 08/27/1920 (Cardoso 1986: 220-21, Dunkerley 1990: 212, Casey et al. 2020: 7).<sup>562</sup> Despite the popular uprising the change in the presidency does

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<sup>560</sup> <http://uscode.house.gov/statutes/pl/90/497.pdf>

<sup>561</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guam#History>

<sup>562</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manuel\\_Estrada\\_Cabrera](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manuel_Estrada_Cabrera); [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carlos\\_Herrera](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carlos_Herrera); [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tragic\\_Week\\_\(Guatemala\)#](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tragic_Week_(Guatemala)#)

not display a regime change. The coalition which had been responsible for the ousting of Cabrera was very heterogeneous and pursued different goals. Therefore, Herrera was not only tasked with safeguarding the interests of the economically and politically influential coffee elite in the nation, but he also faced intense pressure to meet exaggerated social, economic, and political expectations from university students and urban workers (Kit 1993: 34). Nearly the whole Guatemalan elite was at that point dependent on the coffee industry, therefore, the decline in coffee prices led to a serious economic and political crisis. Despite Herreras good intention to pursue a politic style which would adhere individual liberties, press freedom and liberal principles in general, he was not able to overcome the economic and the incrementing political crisis (Kit 1993). Universal male suffrage was only granted in 1945. Before then illiterates were excluded and therefore a huge part of the indigenous population (Kellam 2013: 28-29). During the rule of Cabrera (1904, 1910, 1916) voters made only 5.0 % of the whole population up. In 1920 the percentage rose to 20,6 percentage (Vanhanen 2019). We classify this period as an electoral oligarchical autocracy because of the restricted suffrage and the clearly identifiable oligarchic class made up of the coffee elite. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes elections during this time as not competitive. In addition the elections were not free and fair and executive constraints extremely weak. V-Dem's EF&FI and CEI score the elections as neither free, fair nor clean. Besides, both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI confirm that political liberties were absent for the whole period. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. From 1900 to 1918, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. From 1919 to 1921, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

12/05/1921 End Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date the military under the leadership of General Jose Maria Orellana took over in a coup and forced the resignation of Herrera. Orellana and the two military officers José María Lima and Miguel Larrave formed a military junta. On 12/06/1921 the National Assembly accepted the resignation of the former president. The National Assembly was dismissed, because the Junta claimed that Cabrera had been removed unconstitutional and therefore, the Assembly and all legislation passed in this period had to be unconstitutional too. The old Assembly of the Cabrera period

was reinstated. This Assembly then named Orellana the First Designate and on 12/11/1921 he assumed executive responsibilities (Kit 1993: 59-61). On 02/22/1922 presidential elections were held. Orellana won against Jorge Ubico. The military controlled the elections and silenced any opposition.<sup>563</sup> During General José María Orellana's presidency in Guatemala, political parties were banned. This move was part of his broader efforts to consolidate power and control the political landscape of the country. In 1926 Orellana was succeeded by General Lazaro Chacon. On 12/05/1926, general elections were held in Guatemala. The presidential election resulted in a victory for General Lázaro Chacón, who received 88.6% of the vote. Whilst the elections were rigged, the Progressive Liberal Party did manage to win some seats in the Congress.<sup>564</sup> After Lazaro Chacon suffered a stroke in 1930, he was succeeded by cabinet member Baudilio Palma. LIED still indicated that political liberties were absent. V-Dem's PCLI scores them as not really present until 1923 and as absent from 1924 onwards. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held in 1921, in 1922 executive and legislative elections, which weren't multiparty, were held, from 1923 onward multiparty executive and legislative elections were held.

12/16[&17]/1930 End Military Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, a military coup led by General Orellana Contreras and Luis Leonardo forced Palma to resign after a short battle inside the Presidential Palace. During the fight, that lasted no more than an hour, Mauro de León died. The Liberal Progresista party placed General Roderico Anzueto in the key position of Chief of Police. Once in power, Orellana Contreras reformed the Cabinet and worked on restructuring the Guatemalan military bases. However, given the large investments that American companies had in Guatemala -especially the United Fruit Company, the United States Secretary of State Henry Stimson publicly denounced Orellana as an unconstitutional leader and demanded his removal. Realizing that the Americans would not recognize his government, Orellana resigned on 12/29. Stimson sent Ambassador Shelton Whitehouse to tell Orellana Contreras that his country would not be dealing with the new Guatemalan president whatsoever. Whitehouse pressed the National Assembly to force Orellana Contreras to resign, taking advantage of Orellana's lack of political experience, and the American government

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<sup>563</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1922\\_Guatemalan\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1922_Guatemalan_presidential_election)

<sup>564</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1926\\_Guatemalan\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1926_Guatemalan_general_election)

needed a stable regime in Guatemala (Dunkerley 1990: 213, Casey et al. 2020: 8).<sup>565</sup> LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is also classified by us as indicating that political liberties were absent. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

02/09/1931 End Military Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On 02/14/1931, yielding to pressure from the USA, coup leader Orellana relinquished power, paving the way for General Jorge Ubico to successfully coerce opposition candidates into refraining from participating in the 02/1931 elections, where he secured victory unopposed. Throughout his term, Ubico systematically obstructed opposition involvement, seldom convened cabinet meetings, reduced Congress to a symbolic role, and maintained a substantial secret police force to quell dissent (Dunkerley 1990: 213-15, Yashar 1997: 42-49, Streeter 2000: 10-12, Casey et al. 2020: 8). The Liberal Party and Progressives nominated Ubico as the only candidate, leading to his election with 305,841 votes. Upon taking office, Ubico promised a "march toward civilization" and adopted dictatorial powers, establishing an autocratic regime. John Gunther in 1941 highlighted Ubico's complete control over Guatemala. Ubico militarized key institutions and placed military officers in significant government roles, frequently conducting national tours with military and official entourage to underscore his authority.<sup>566</sup> Since 1930 both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI confirm the absence of political liberties. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. According to LIED executive and legislative elections, which weren't multiparty, were held.

07/01/1944 End Military Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: In June 1944, student protests sparked a political shift, leading to Ubico's resignation once junior officers and the middle class showed their support (Dunkerley 1990: 218, Streeter 2000: 12, Casey et al. 2020: 8). A junta composed of military officers Francisco Javier Arana, Jacobo Árbenz and Jorge Toriello took power and quickly announced presidential elections.

12/17[-19]/1944 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Defective Democracy: On these dates largely free and fair presidential elections were held.<sup>567</sup> The following ten years until 1954

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<sup>565</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baudilio\\_Palma#Coup\\_d'%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baudilio_Palma#Coup_d'%C3%A9tat)

<sup>566</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jorge\\_Ubico](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jorge_Ubico)

<sup>567</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1944\\_Guatemalan\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1944_Guatemalan_presidential_election)



are known as the Guatemalan Revolution.<sup>568</sup> Women could vote from 1945 on, but only if literate.<sup>569</sup> Universal female suffrage was only granted in 1965 (Rodriguez-Saenz 2008: 314). The regime is despite severe democratic defects usually classified as democratic (GWF, MCM, PRC, BMR). There was no universal adult suffrage, regardless of literacy. Hence, we face an exclusive electoral regime. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes these elections as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores them as somewhat free and fair while their CEI scores electoral cleanliness as ambiguous. Additionally, political liberties were absent according to LIED and classified as what we interpret as somewhat present by V-Dem's PCLI. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. From 1945 to 1952, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For 1953 and 1954, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

06/27/1954 End Defective Democracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, fearful of communism in the Western hemisphere the CIA in league with anti-Arbenz rebel leader Armas overthrew the democracy (Dunkerley 1992: 300, Gibson 1989: 172, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 62).

06/29/1954 End Military Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: The CIA aided other opposition military leaders to oust the Diaz junta and helped to install the Monzon junta. In 1956 universal male suffrage was introduced (LIED). Carlos Castillo Armas was assassinated in 1957, and elections were held immediately afterwards by a military junta. However, these elections were so fraudulent that popular outcry forced a fresh ballot.<sup>570</sup> LIED codes political liberties as absent. V-Dem's PCLI indicates an ambiguous state in 1954 and a decrease to an absent level afterwards. As per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were

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<sup>568</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guatemalan\\_Revolution#October\\_Revolution](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guatemalan_Revolution#October_Revolution)

<sup>569</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s\\_suffrage](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage)

<sup>570</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Miguel\\_Yd%C3%ADgoras\\_Fuentes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Miguel_Yd%C3%ADgoras_Fuentes)

absent. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held in 1954 and 1955, in 1956 only legislative elections, which weren't multiparty, were held.

10/24/1957 End Military Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: Rioting following a contested election resulted in a military coup. On this date a group of 80 military officers marched into the presidential palace and replaced provisional president Luis Arturo González López with a three-person junta led by army Colonel Óscar Mendoza.<sup>571</sup> Both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI indicate political liberties were absent. As per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. According to LIED only multiparty legislative elections, which weren't multiparty, were held.

02/02/1958 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: Congress selected the candidate who secured the most votes in the January 1958 election as president, a contest from which left-leaning candidates were barred. Despite the exclusion of several parties with significant public backing, rendering the election neither free nor fair, a candidate opposed by the military emerged victorious (Dunkerley 1988: 439, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 62-63). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes the elections as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI and CEI score them as neither free, fair nor clean. Furthermore, according to LIED and V-Dem's PCLI political liberties were not achieved. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

03/30/1963 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: Colonel Enrique Peralta orchestrated a military coup that installed a ruling military junta under his leadership (Dunkerley 1988: 443, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 63). After coming to power, Peralta suspended the Constitution, dissolved the Congress, and banned the Communist Party (PGT) (Weaver 1969).<sup>572</sup> Voting restrictions were lifted in 1965. Illiterates could vote from then on.<sup>573</sup> Besides, political liberties were still indicated as absent per LIED and V-Dem's PCLI. As per

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<sup>571</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luis\\_Arturo\\_Gonz%C3%A1lez\\_L%C3%B3pez](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luis_Arturo_Gonz%C3%A1lez_L%C3%B3pez)

<sup>572</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enrique\\_Peralta\\_Azurdia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enrique_Peralta_Azurdia)

<sup>573</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s\\_suffrage](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage)

Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held.

05/10/1966 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral (Military) Autocracy: Following the March 1966 presidential election, Mendez Montenegro was appointed president by Congress in accordance with the constitution, due to the absence of a majority victor in the election. The left and various other parties were barred from participation. Montenegro, a civilian centrist, secured the highest number of votes against a candidate backed by the military. To be sworn in, he was compelled to concede control over military "own" affairs and key policy domains to the military. (Calvert 1985: 83, Dunkerley 1988: 459, Johnson 1971: 35, Weaver 1970: 68, 78). Beginning in November 1966, a state of siege further curtailed constitutional rights (Dunkerley 1988: 457, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 63). On 03/01/1970 Colonel Arana, candidate of the military, MLN and PID, won in a presidential election in which the left and some other parties were prohibited from running (Berger 1986: 563, Dunkerley 1988: 459, Johnson 1971: 41, Montenegro Rios 2002: 122-23, 133). From this election until 1985, only military officers were permitted to win elections, so this regime is coded as a different from the previous one in which civilians shared top policy making positions with the military" (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 63). Different from GWF, which coded the presidential election of 1970 as a regime change, we view it as a continuation of the military subtype of an electoral autocracy, with more or less the same ruling elite. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes the elections as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI and CEI score them as neither free, fair nor clean. As per FH's classification for 1972, the country receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. In 1973 the country is classified as free, scoring between 2 and 4, which we also place in the free category. Between 1974 and 1978 a score of 6 to 7 for the assessed regime period designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. Per FH's evaluation for 1979, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. For the remaining period a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. Moreover, political liberties were still absent (LIED, V-Dem PCLI). According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is

interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

03/23/1982 End Electoral (Military) Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: General Romeo Lucas towards the end of his term was seen as threatening to the popular will and the military establishment. In March 1982, a CIA-backed coup led by General Efraín Ríos Montt Ríos deposed incumbent Lucas, effectively negating the victory of Ángel Aníbal Guevara, the hand-picked successor of García and candidate of the Popular Democratic Front, in fraudulent presidential elections held on 03/07/1982. Montt established a short lived junta before ruling on his own (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 80).<sup>574</sup> As per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is likewise classified by us as showing that political liberties were absent. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held.

08/08/1983 End Military Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: Viteres and his group of dissident armed forces believed that religious extremism had taken over the government. He removed Montt and took the military presidency for himself. In 1984, the military government declared elections for an 88-member Constituent Assembly, tasked with formulating a new constitution and electoral law. The constitution was officially unveiled in 06/1985 (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 30).<sup>575</sup> As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Since 1982 LIED and V-Dem's PCLI indicate that state of political liberties is classified as absent per LIED and per V-Dem's PCLI. were absent. As per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held.

11/03/1985 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral (Military) Hybrid Regime: On this date the first round of presidential elections was held. The second round of a fair, semi-competitive

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<sup>574</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1982\\_Guatemalan\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1982_Guatemalan_general_election)

<sup>575</sup> [https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Guatemala\\_1993?lang=en](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Guatemala_1993?lang=en)

presidential election in which non-leftist parties were allowed to run was won by the Christian Democrats (Anderson 1988: 61). The military-maintained authority over its own matters and possessed veto power over significant policy domains. It persisted in excluding left-leaning parties from participating in elections and retained veto authority in certain policy arenas (Dunkerley 1988: 498-99, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 63-64). The government's exclusion was often justified under the pretext of national security and anti-communism during the Cold War era. The critical question is whether all these excluded parties were extremist, or if some were non-violent political groups advocating for leftist ideologies within a legal framework. One of the central issues was the absence of judicial oversight over the executive's power to ban political parties. This lack of judicial review enabled the arbitrary exclusion of political parties, particularly leftist groups, from the electoral process, hindering true democratic representation. Hence, the regime is classified as a military subtype of an electoral autocracy. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes elections during this time as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores electoral freedom and fairness as ambiguous between 1985 and 1989. After that, it scores elections as somewhat free and fair. V-Dem's CEI scores electoral cleanliness as ambiguous. Per FH's scoring for 1985, the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. Between 1986 and 1990 a score of 6 to 7 for the assessed regime period designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. In 1991 the country receives a score of 8, which we interpret as falling into the rather not free category. For the remaining period the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. Moreover, political liberties were still absent according to LIED. V-Dem's PCLI considers them as ambiguous. FH classifies Guatemala in this period as partly free. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. Given all observations Guatemala is according to our classification an electoral hybrid regime in this period. For the year 1986, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. From 1987 to 1993, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For 1994 and 1995, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive.

11/12/1995 End Electoral (Military) Hybrid Regime/Start Defective Democracy: On this date, rather free and fair general elections in which the left was for the first time allowed to participate marked the end of military rule (Jonas 2000: 21-22, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 64).<sup>576</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes all elections after 1995 as competitive and V-Dem's EF&FI scores them as somewhat free and fair. V-Dem's CEI continues to rank their electoral cleanliness as ambiguous until 2008, when it upgraded its score to somewhat clean elections. General elections were held on 09/11/2011 in order to elect the president, vice president, members of congress, members of parliament and mayors and counselors for all municipalities.<sup>577</sup> Observers from the non-profit electoral watchdog, Mirador Electoral, reported 65 incidents of voting irregularities, including illegal campaigning in Guatemala's capital, as well as attempted vote buying in several sites across the country.<sup>578</sup> The elections commenced on 06/16 in 2019, and during the August 2019 runoff, Alejandro Giammattei from the Vamos party secured 58 percent of the vote, triumphing over former first lady Sandra Torres of the center-left National Unity for Hope party (UNE). Although the results were deemed credible, electoral observers from the Organization of American States (OAS) highlighted irregularities, including disruptions, ballot burning, voter intimidation, and instances of violence. Giammattei assumed office in January 2020.<sup>579</sup> General elections were held on 06/25/2023, covering various positions including the president, vice president, all seats in Congress, members of the Central American Parliament, and mayors and councils for all municipalities. Incumbent president Alejandro Giammattei could not run for reelection due to constitutional limits. As no presidential candidate secured over 50 percent of the vote in the first round, a runoff was held on 08/20/2023, between Congressman Bernardo Arévalo and former first lady Sandra Torres. Arévalo won nearly 61 percent of the vote. The ruling Vamos party gained the most seats in Congress. On 12/08/2023, the Attorney General's office reported "irregularities" in the election and requested an annulment of the results. However, the Constitutional Court upheld the election results on 12/14, ordering Arévalo's inauguration. Challenges in Congress caused delays, but Arévalo was eventually inaugurated on 01/15.<sup>580</sup> Government functioning is significantly hampered by organized crime and corruption. Serious

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<sup>576</sup> <http://tinyurl.com/8chamu2>

<sup>577</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011\\_Guatemalan\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Guatemalan_general_election)

<sup>578</sup> <https://insightcrime.org/news/brief/guatemala-elections-hit-by-fraud-ballot-burning/>

<sup>579</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/guatemala>

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[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023\\_Guatemalan\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023_Guatemalan_general_election)

issues such as violence and criminal extortion schemes prevail, with victims having limited avenues for seeking justice.<sup>581</sup> As classified by FH for the period until 2001, the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. Between 2002 and 2005 the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. From 2006 to 2008 a score of 6 to 7 designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. In 2009 and 2010 the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. Between 2011 and 2014 Guatemala is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. From 2015 onward it receives scores of 8 to 9, which we interpret as falling into the rather not free category. Regarding the political liberties they were coded as absent for the entire time per LIED. V-Dem's PCLI scores them as somewhat present from 1996 to 1999, in 2018 and since 2020. For the other years full political liberties were given. From 1996 to 2014, based on Polity5's evaluation, the executive's power was limited to a degree between substantial constraints and parity with other institutions, fitting Intermediate Category 3. Since 2015, according to Polity5, the executive was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. In all regime datasets – BMR, GWF, LIED, MCM, RoW – Guatemala is classified as a democracy. RoW classifies it as an electoral democracy. According to our data it is a defective democracy. However, in the present and other parts of this regime period Guatemala is/was a borderline case between a defective democracy and an electoral hybrid regime. From 1996 to 1999, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. From 2000 to 2020, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. For 2021 and 2022, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For 2023, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive.

Defective Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Bendel/Krennerich 2005, Cameron 1994, Villagrán de León 1993)

## Guinea

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<sup>581</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/guatemala/freedom-world/2022>

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Defective Democracy] [Start: 12/17/1891]: Guinea became on 12/17/1891 a colony of France and was since 06/16/1895 part of French West Africa.<sup>582</sup> Universal suffrage was absent during this period (LIED). According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held until 1945, from 1946 to 1952 only multiparty legislative elections were held, from 1953 to 1956 no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held, in 1957 only multiparty legislative elections were held. According to LIED and political liberties were absent. V-Dem's PCLI classifies political liberties as absent until 1944 and as not really present from 1945 onward. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

10/02/1958 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Liberal Democracy]/Start One-Party (Personalist) Autocracy: Post–World War II colonial policy led to increasing political activity by indigenous groups, and in 1947 the Democratic Party of Guinea (PDG) was founded. Under the leadership of Ahmed Sékou Toure, the PDG pushed for independence, and, following rejection of membership in the French Community in a referendum held on 09/28/1958, Guinea became the first of France's African colonies to achieve complete independence. Since the PDG already held 58 of the 60 seats in the Territorial Assembly, Sékou Touré automatically became president upon establishment of the republic on 10/02/1958 (Lansford 2021: 660). Soon after independence the opposition merged with the PDG and there was no more legal opposition. As leader of the PDG, Touré was the only candidate for president of the republic. He was elected unopposed to four seven-year terms. Independence was achieved under the single-party rule of the PDG. While the PDG initially won a fair election before independence, the opposition later merged with the PDG. The regime is deemed authoritarian due to the government's swift suppression of opposition activities following independence (Finer 1975: 495-96, Brooker 1995: 117-18, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 64).<sup>583</sup> In 1958 universal suffrage was introduced.<sup>584</sup> On 01/01/1979 Guinea was named People's Revolutionary Republic of Guinea and on 05/25/1984 Republic of Guinea. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI classify political liberties as absent. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional

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<sup>582</sup> <https://www.webguinee.net/bibliotheque/economie/vdubois/independence-movement-in-guinea/chapter01-guinea-introduction.html>

<sup>583</sup> <http://tinyurl.com/446xmvk>

<sup>584</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s\\_suffrage](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage)



checks on power. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. According to LIED multiparty executive and legislative elections were held until 1960, from 1961 onward executive and legislative elections, which weren't multiparty, were held.

04/03/1984 End One-Party (Personalist) Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, after Toure's death a military coup led by Lieutenant Colonel Lansana Conté and other middle ranking officers toppled the PDG regime. A 25-member Military Committee of National Restoration (CMRN) under the leadership of Conté was set up. He became president of the Republic (Lansford 2012c: 569).<sup>585</sup> A national referendum regarding a new constitution was held on 12/23/1990 (Brüne 1999: 448). Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. LIED's political liberties outcomes continued to be coded as absent. According to V-Dem's PCLI they were absent until 1986 and can be interpreted as not really present since 1987. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held.

01/16/1991 End Military Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: The Junta (CMRN) was replaced by the Transitional Committee for National Recovery (CTRN) to prepare elections. The new constitution was promulgated on 12/23/1991, it was a further step in the direction of civilian rule. Furthermore, it provided for a unicameral legislative and a civilian president. We classify this regime change event as a strategic liberalizing restructuring because the regime's stated goal was to establish democratic institutions. At this stage, however, the change cannot yet be considered full liberalization, as those institutions were not functioning in practice. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. In 1992 political parties were legalized, but legislative elections were indefinitely postponed (Brüne 1999: 448).<sup>586</sup> For this transition period, political liberties were coded as absent (LIED). V-Dem's PCLI indicates them as not really present in 1991 and as ambiguous afterwards. Based on Polity5's evaluation, during this period, the executive faced weak constraints, classified as Intermediate Category 1 between unlimited authority and slight limitations. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's

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<sup>585</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lansana\\_Cont%C3%A9](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lansana_Cont%C3%A9); <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-guinea/#history>

<sup>586</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military\\_Committee\\_of\\_National\\_Restoration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_Committee_of_National_Restoration); <https://www.britannica.com/place/Guinea/Government-and-society#ref517229>

JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held.

12/19/1993 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date, the first multi-party presidential election since independence took place. Beforehand, Conté had resigned from the army to run as a civilian in line with the constitution in the presidential elections. Conté, who ran for the newly formed the Unity and Progress Party (Parti de l'Unité et du Progrès, PUP), won 51.7 per cent of the vote. The elections are not considered to be fair and the rule of Conté remained authoritarian. Especially the neutrality of the electoral commission was questioned. National Assembly election took place on 06/11/1995 and municipal elections in late June. The PUP won the majority of seats in both elections. In total 21 parties competed. The inaugural session was held on 08/30/1995 and attended by members of all elected parties, despite raised allegations of electoral fraud (Brüne 1999: 448).<sup>587</sup> Conté's government narrowly survived a coup attempt on 02/02/1996 that stemmed from an army mutiny over payment of salaries. On 12/14/1998 a presidential election was held. Conté was re-elected.<sup>588</sup> The presidential elections in 12/1998, once again clouded by serious fraud allegations, occurred amid heightened political tension and were marked by incidents of repression (Brüne 1999: 449). The next presidential election was held on 12/21/2003 and Conté was re-elected again and began his third and last term in office.<sup>589</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes elections during this period as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores them as not really free or fair while their CEI scores them as not clean. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Besides, political liberties are considered as absent by LIED. V-Dem's PCLI indicates them with an ambiguous presence. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. From 1994 to 2002, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. From 2003 to 2008, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the

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<sup>587</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unity\\_and\\_Progress\\_Party](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unity_and_Progress_Party);

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lansana\\_Cont%C3%A9](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lansana_Cont%C3%A9)

<sup>588</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lansana\\_Cont%C3%A9](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lansana_Cont%C3%A9)

<sup>589</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lansana\\_Cont%C3%A9](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lansana_Cont%C3%A9)

executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

12/22[&23]/2008 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: President Conté died on 12/22/2008. After his death a military coup by junior officers led by Captain Camara established a military junta, the Comité National pour le Développement et la Démocratie (National Council for Democracy and Development) to rule (Lansford 2012c: 570, Lansford 2021: 662, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 64-65).<sup>590</sup> In December 2009 President Camara was shot and General Konaté took over as president while Camara was in Morocco for medical treatment. According to FH's classification for the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. Furthermore, political liberties are coded as absent (LIED) and can be interpreted as ambiguous (V-Dem PCLI). Based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held.

01/16/2010 End Military Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: On this date, based on an agreement between Sékouba Konaté<sup>591</sup>, Camara, and the opposition power was turned over to a transitional government led by the opposition until elections (Burgis 2010: 1, Lansford 2012c: 570, Lansford 2021: 662, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 64-65). Based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. Per FH's evaluation for this regime period, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free.

11/07/2010 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date, the second round of competitive presidential election completed the transition to an electoral regime. Condé was declared the winner with 52.5 percent of the vote (Brüne 1999, Lansford 2021: 663).<sup>592</sup> Although the constitution enshrined respect for freedom of assembly, it was often suppressed in practice. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes elections during this period as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores freedom and fairness as ambiguous while their CEI scores them as not really clean. Given the high

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<sup>590</sup> <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-guinea/#history>

<sup>591</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S%C3%A9kouba\\_Konaté](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S%C3%A9kouba_Konaté)

<sup>592</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alpha\\_Condé](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alpha_Condé)

illiteracy rate, the majority of the population relied on radio for information, with limited access to the internet, primarily in urban areas. However, certain radio stations faced repression by the state. The judicial system exhibited a modest level of independence starting from 2010. Legislative elections, initially slated for 12/29/ 2011, were repeatedly postponed (Puddington 2013). On 09/28/2013, legislative elections were held, several irregularities have been cited by observers. Presidential balloting was held on 10/11/2015. Condé was re-elected with 57.9 percent of the vote (Lansford 2021: 663). The seven opposition parties called for a postponement citing alleged irregularities in the electoral roll, but their pleas were rejected.<sup>593</sup> Constitutional changes in 2020 allowed Condé to seek two additional terms. He was re-elected in the 2020 Guinean presidential elections (Lansford 2021: 663). During the last year of the second term and his third term, Condé cracked down on protests and on opposition candidates, some of whom died in prison.<sup>594</sup> LIED categorizes elections during this period as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores freedom and fairness as ambiguous while their CEI scores them as not really clean. As classified by FH for the time of 2013 to 2020, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. From 2021 onwards, Guinea will be classified as not free with a score of 11, which corresponds to our not free category. Furthermore, LIED's outcome concerning the political liberties maintained to be coded as absent. V-Dem's PCLI classifies them as ambiguous until 2012 and as somewhat present from 2013 to 2016. The scores decreased to ambiguous since 2017. In 2011 and 2012, according to Polity5, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. From 2013 to 2018, as per Polity5's classification, the executive experienced moderate limitations on authority, placing it in the second intermediate category. For 2011 and 2012, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For the rest of the regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

09/05/2021 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: Condé was captured by the country's armed forces in a coup d'état after gunfire in the capital, Conakry. Special forces commander Mamady Doumbouya released a broadcast on state television announcing the dissolution of the constitution and government.<sup>595</sup> On 05/11/2023, a minimum of 7 individuals

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<sup>593</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2015\\_Guinean\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2015_Guinean_presidential_election)

<sup>594</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alpha\\_Cond%C3%A9](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alpha_Cond%C3%A9)

<sup>595</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revoluci%C3%B3n\\_Libertadora](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revoluci%C3%B3n_Libertadora)

were fatally shot during anti-government protests in various cities across Guinea. The demonstrators, part of the anti-government movement, engaged in peaceful protests, urging authorities to terminate military governance and facilitate a transition to democracy in the country.<sup>596</sup> According to FH's classification for the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. Furthermore, LIED continues to code political liberties as absent. V-Dem's PCLI indicates an ambiguous presence since 2021. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. Military Autocracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

## **Guinea-Bissau**

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Portugal, Constitutional Monarchy] [Start: xx/xx/1879]: In 1446, Portuguese mariner Nuno Tristão first discovered the territory later known as Portuguese Guinea. In 1879 Guinea Bissau was separated from Cape Verde as the colony Portuguese Guinea. However, it was not until 1905 that the borders of the territory were officially determined. Initially, the region suffered from slave trade exploitation, which led to hostility among the indigenous people and uprisings in the early 20th century. The military eventually pacified the area, and in 1952, it was formally established as an Overseas Province of Portugal. In 1956, a dissatisfied group of Cape Verdeans, led by Amílcar Cabral, Luís de Almeida Cabral, Aristides Pereira, and Rafael Barbosa, formed the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC). Their attempts to negotiate with the Portuguese government failed, prompting the PAIGC to initiate an armed struggle in 1963, with support from Warsaw Pact nations. By the early 1970s, the PAIGC claimed control over two-thirds of the mainland territory. On 01/20/1973, Amílcar Cabral was assassinated in Conakry, Guinea, allegedly by dissidents within the PAIGC but with suspected involvement from the Portuguese military. Six months later, Pereira and Cabral's brother, Luís, were confirmed as the new leaders of the party during a PAIGC congress (Lansford 2021: 670-671). On 09/24/1973 Guinea-Bissau declared its independence from Portugal. LIED confirms that multiparty legislative elections as well as universal elections were absent during this period. Both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI indicate that political liberties were absent. Until 1971, V-Dem's

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<sup>596</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guinea#History>

JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For the years 1972-1974, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

09/10/1974 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Portugal, Military (Transitional) Autocracy]/Start One-Party Autocracy: On this date, the country became independent from Portugal under the PAIGC, led by Luis Cabral, which had led the fight for independence (Piette 2005: 526, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 65). The PAIGC was the constitutionally exclusive political force in society and the state, the PAIGC maintained control through a single-party system. We interpret the direction of this regime change event as liberalization, as the country's independence, the maintenance of executive and legislative elections with universal suffrage, and at least some enhancements in executive limitations, even when there were no political liberties and the country was classified as not free, were all factors. The Regional Councils' elections in December 1976, which lacked competitiveness, secured the PAIGC's ongoing dominance by obtaining approval for the proposed candidate list. (Clemente-Kersten 1999: 461) In 1977 universal suffrage was introduced.<sup>597</sup> Vieira took on the role of the commander in chief of the armed forces in Guinea-Bissau. After the accidental death of his predecessor, Francisco Mendes, in July, Vieira assumed the position of prime minister in Guinea-Bissau in August 1978.<sup>598</sup> The newly approved constitution in November 1980, enhanced the authority of the President by abolishing the position of Prime Minister (Clemente-Kersten 1999: 662), therefore, eliminating Vieira's office. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held from 1974 to 1976, from 1977 to 1980, executive and legislative elections, which weren't multiparty were held. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Moreover, political liberties are indicated as absent per LIED and per V-Dem's PCLI for this time. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. From 1975 to 1979, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For 1980, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that

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<sup>597</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s\\_suffrage](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage)

<sup>598</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Guinea-Bissau/Independence>

legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. While V-Dem's indicators suggest the presence of moderate judicial and even robust legislative constraints, this clearly contradicts the historical record of closed Congress and executive dominance; in our assessment, Polity5's classification of unrestricted executive authority provides the more accurate reflection of political reality during this period.

11/14/1980 End One-Party Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date a military coup led by Prime Minister and General João Bernardo Vieira took place. Allegations of ethnic domination and repression in the highest level of government was cited as the reason for Vieira's coup. Vieira maintained the single party but replaced the National Assembly and State Council. He announced the creation of a predominantly military nine-man Revolutionary Council, which exercised after the coup all executive and legislative powers in the country.<sup>599</sup> Following the coup, Cape Verde abandoned its plans for unification, leading to a significant departure of Cape Verdeans from the party (Forrest 1987: 103-5, Piette 2005: 526, Lansford 2012c: 579, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 65). According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. In addition to that, LIED and V-Dem's PCLI still indicate the absence of political liberties. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

05/06/1984 End Military Autocracy/Start One-Party Autocracy: On this date, On 05/06/1984, military rule in Guinea-Bissau formally ended with the adoption of a new constitution. The Revolutionary Council, which had governed since the 1980 coup under João Bernardo Vieira, was dissolved and replaced by a civilian State Council. A civilian government was reinstated, but the constitution simultaneously enshrined the PAIGC as the sole legal party. This transition was deliberately initiated and carefully managed by the ruling elite to stabilize its power on a new institutional foundation. The 1984 constitution thus marked a classic case of strategic restructuring: it replaced direct military rule with the façade of civilian institutions while consolidating the one-party monopoly of the PAIGC. National elections were introduced, but these were strictly one-party elections. All candidates were members of the PAIGC, the selection process was controlled within the party, and voters could only ratify the party's pre-approved lists. Vieira

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<sup>599</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1980\\_Guinea-Bissau\\_coup\\_d%27%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1980_Guinea-Bissau_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat)

himself remained in power as head of state under this arrangement, ensuring that military leaders retained decisive influence. The outcome was the formal establishment of a one-party autocracy. The institutional redesign gave the regime a constitutional and electoral veneer, but it excluded any real political competition and entrenched authoritarian rule under the PAIGC. In short, the 1984 transition in Guinea-Bissau was a strategic restructuring that transformed military autocracy into one-party autocracy through controlled, noncompetitive elections. Military leaders, above all Vieira, continued to dominate key positions, and political opposition remained entirely excluded. The elections for the Regional Council held in 1984 affirmed the PAIGC party lists (Clemente-Kersten 1999: 462). The opposition against the regime grew after the execution of two regime critics and the arrest of 52 supporters. Influenced by various organizations, such as the Democratic Front (FD) led by Aristide Menezes, the country lifted the ban on political parties and further institutional barriers in 1991. Furthermore, freedom of press and union choice were admitted. International pressure and the breakdown of the Eastern Europe communist regimes led to economic liberalization. In December 1991 the post of Prime Minister was reinstalled. Parliamentary elections were supposed to be conducted in 1992, but Vieira postponed them twice until 1994 (Clemente-Kersten 1999: 462).<sup>600</sup> According to LIED executive and legislative elections, which weren't multiparty were held. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. While LIED's scores still code political liberties absent, V-Dem's PCLI categorizes the political liberties as absent until 1991 and decrease into a range which we interpret as not really present afterwards. From 1984 to 1990, as per Polity5's categorization, the executive experienced minimal limitations on decision-making, placing it in the first intermediate category. Between 1991 and 1993, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power. From 1985 to 1992, For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. For 1993, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. The following year, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

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<sup>600</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jo%C3%A3o\\_Bernardo\\_Vieira](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jo%C3%A3o_Bernardo_Vieira);  
[https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Guinea\\_Bissau\\_1996?lang=en](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Guinea_Bissau_1996?lang=en)



07/03/1994 End One-Party Autocracy/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date, the first multi-party elections since independence took place. In the presidential election, the result was a victory for incumbent João Bernardo Vieira of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC). Vieira, despite being an army major, did not rely on the military to retain his power. Surprisingly, his actions, such as dismissing the chief of staff and confronting smaller dissident groups, indicated that the military was not consistently supportive of his authority. In 1991, Vieira voluntarily resigned from his military position and ran for presidential elections. Furthermore, during this period, the legislature saw the representation of multiple political parties (Magaloni/Chu/Min 2013b: 22). His opponent in the first multiparty presidential election Kumba Ialá did not accept the results immediately. He raised concerns regarding organizational shortcomings, which raised doubt about the rightfulness of Vieira's victory. The UN Election Observer Commission declared the elections as free and fair. Thereafter Ialá resigned as opposition leader. Although improvements towards democracy had been made, there were still shortcomings, such as the conservation of power by former leaders. The opposition had just started to organize and was therefore still immature and missing political tradition but was represented in parliament and was therefore able to increase political activity. The allocation and concentration of power stayed essentially the same (Clemente-Kersten 1999: 462-663, Ferreira 2004: 46). The transition from a one-party autocracy to an electoral regime should be understood as a process rather than a singular decision made by regime elites. The ruling elite maintained its authoritarian character (Jaló 2023: 5). We classify the regime as semidemocracy, because the electoral process did not show severe deficits, which would justify a classification as electoral autocracy. At the same time, Guinea-Bissau had not completed the transition to democracy. The classification is disputed. AF and LIED classify the regime between 1994 and 1997 as electoral democracy. GWF classifies it as personal, BR as military dictatorship and HTW as well as MCM as multiparty autocracy. In 1997, Guinea-Bissau became a member of the West African Economic Monetary Union and the Franc Zone. However, the resulting fiscal instability, partly influenced by these decisions, contributed to political unrest. The situation reached a critical point in 1998 when President Vieira dismissed military chief of staff Brigadier (later General) Ansumane Mané. In response, Mané led a rebellion fueled by widespread frustration and opposition to Vieira's rule. Numerous cease-fires were attempted but repeatedly broken, leading to the intervention of troops from Guinea, Nigeria, Senegal, and France. With each round of fighting, Vieira found himself increasingly isolated in Bissau. In May 1999, he was compelled to surrender and subsequently went into

exile in Portugal.<sup>601</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes elections during this time as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores the electoral freedom and fairness of these elections as ambiguous and as somewhat free and fair from 1999 onwards. . Their CEI scores them as not really clean until 1999 and as ambiguous afterwards. Per FH, for the period until 1997, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. In 1998, the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. According to FH, from 1999 to 2002 a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. Additionally, political liberties were coded as absent by LIED and as what we interpret as ambiguous by V-Dem's PCLI. In this regime period Guinea-Bissau according to our observations was a borderline case between an electoral autocracy and an electoral hybrid regime. Between 11/28/1999 and 01/16/2000, general elections took place, followed by a second round for the presidential election on 01/16/2000. The opposition leader, Kumba Ialá of the Party for Social Renewal (PRS), won the presidential election, defeating Malam Bacai Sanhá of the ruling African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde. The PRS also achieved success in the National People's Assembly election, securing 38 out of 102 seats. Notably, this marked the first time since the country's independence in the 1970s that an opposition party had won an election.<sup>602</sup> The elections were deemed free and fair by international observers.<sup>603</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED.. As per Polity5's classification, the executive experienced moderate limitations on authority, placing it in the second intermediate category. From 2000 to 2002, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was significantly constrained by institutional checks during this time. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also moderate.

11/16/2002 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Electoral (Personalist) Autocracy: On this date the elected President, Kumba Ialá, leader of the Social Renewal Party (PRS), dissolved parliament. Initially, new elections were scheduled for February 2003, but they were postponed several times - first to April, then to July, and later to October 2003.<sup>604</sup> Ialá ruled in this period

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<sup>601</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Guinea-Bissau/Independence>

<sup>602</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1999%E2%80%932000\\_Guinea-Bissau\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1999%E2%80%932000_Guinea-Bissau_general_election)

<sup>603</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Guinea-Bissau/Independence>

<sup>604</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kumba\\_Ial%C3%A1](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kumba_Ial%C3%A1)

by decree, engaged in the harassment of the opposition, and ordered the arrest of opposition leaders (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 65, Piette 2005: 532-33, Lansford 2012c: 579).<sup>605</sup> Since there was almost no control of the executive in this period, it is understandable that GWF and AF classified the case as a personalist regime. However, while elections were several times postponed in this period, we would still classify this rather brief regime period as an electoral autocracy. According to LIED multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. Per FH's evaluation for this regime period, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. Moreover, political liberties were coded as absent by LIED and by V-Dem's PCLI indicate an ambiguous state regarding political liberties. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive's constraints fell into Intermediate Category 1, between unlimited authority and slight limitations. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive.

09/14/2003 End Electoral (Personalist) Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regimes: When Ialá moved to stall elections and failed to pay certain army factions, Chief of Staff and Defense Minister General Veríssimo Correia Seabra overthrew him and installed himself at the head of a junta that oversaw a transition to democracy (Lansford 2012c: 579).<sup>606</sup> Henrique Rosa was appointed to lead the interim government and assumed the presidency on 10/28/2003. Meanwhile, Seabra maintained his position as the chairman of the National Transition Council.<sup>607</sup> According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. As per Polity5's categorization, the executive experienced minimal limitations on decision-making, placing it in the first intermediate category. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also moderate. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. While LIED's political liberties continue to be coded as absent, V-Dem's PCLI increased to a range which we interpret as somewhat present.

03/28/2004 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regim/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date fair legislative elections were held, and fair presidential elections in June-July 2005 completed

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<sup>605</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2010/guinea-bissau>

<sup>606</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ver%C3%ADssimo\\_Correia\\_Seabra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ver%C3%ADssimo_Correia_Seabra); <http://tinyurl.com/3naxznw>

<sup>607</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ver%C3%ADssimo\\_Correia\\_Seabra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ver%C3%ADssimo_Correia_Seabra)

the transition the following year (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 65). In March 2005, Kumba Ialá expressed his intention to participate in the upcoming elections scheduled for June, despite being barred from politics in 2003, along with Vieira who had recently returned from exile in April. However, both candidates were granted permission to run in April. In the following month, Ialá declared himself as the current president and briefly occupied the presidential building. Despite his defeat in the initial round of voting, Ialá eventually supported Vieira, who won in the second round of elections held in July. While allegations of fraud were raised by opposition supporters, international observers declared the elections to be free and fair.<sup>608</sup> Generally human rights were respected, but some deficits remained. These concerned, for example, freedom of speech or women's rights. Another deficit concerned the independence of the judiciary.<sup>609</sup> Growing conflict between the military elite and President Vieira's administration, driven in part by ethnic tensions, led to increased domestic instability. In November 2008, Vieira survived an attack by mutinous soldiers, described as an attempted coup. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes the elections as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores them as somewhat free and fair. Their CEI scores their electoral cleanliness as ambiguous. As per FH, for 2004, the country receives a score of 8, which we interpret as falling into the rather not free category. In 2005 a score of 6 to 7 for the assessed regime period designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. For the remaining period the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. Besides, LIED scores for the entire time that political liberties were absent. However, V-Dem's PCLI declares them as somewhat present. Based on Polity5's evaluation, during this period, the executive's power was limited to a degree between substantial constraints and parity with other institutions, fitting Intermediate Category 3. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive.

03/02/2009 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: On this date, Vieira was assassinated by soldiers who believed he was responsible for the death of the chief of the armed forces, General Batista Tagme Na Waie, who had been killed in an explosion just hours earlier. The military denied any intention to seize power. According to the

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<sup>608</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Guinea-Bissau/Independence>

<sup>609</sup> <https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78739.htm>

constitutional provisions, Raimundo Perreira, the parliamentary leader, was sworn in as interim president until elections could be held. Eventually, elections were scheduled for 06/28/2009.<sup>610</sup> 06/28/2009 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date, Malam Bacai Sanhá of the PAIGC won the presidential elections, defeating Kumba Ialá, the presidential candidate of the PRS. The elections were characterized as free and fair by international observers.<sup>611</sup> The judiciary remained not fully independent, journalists were not able to work completely freely, and women still do not enjoy the same rights.<sup>612</sup> Therefore, deficits in the institutional constraints on the executive and deficits in the guarantee of political and civil liberties remained. Per FH's scoring for the assessed regime period, the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. According to LIED no political liberties were coded. V-Dem's PCLI scores them as somewhat present for this time. On 01/09/2012, President Sanhá passed away due to complications from diabetes. Consequently, Pereira was once again appointed as the interim president. On 03/18/2012 presidential elections were held.<sup>613</sup> According to LIED multiparty executive and legislative elections were present. LIED categorizes the elections as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores them as somewhat free and fair. Their CEI scores the electoral cleanliness as ambiguous. Based on Polity5's evaluation, during this period, the executive's power was limited to a degree between substantial constraints and parity with other institutions, fitting Intermediate Category 3. For the years 2010-2011, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. For 2012, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

04/12/2012 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Military Autocracy: On this date a military coup led by Army Vice Chief of Staff General Mamadu Ture Kuruma was staged before the second round of a presidential election between Carlos Gomes Júnior and Kumba Ialá.<sup>614</sup> After the coup, the leading candidates were arrested and the election was cancelled.<sup>615</sup> After facing international condemnation and sanctions against the junta's leaders, an agreement was signed on 04/15/2012. This agreement resulted in the selection of Manuel Serifo Nhamadjo, the third-

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<sup>610</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Guinea-Bissau/Independence>

<sup>611</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2009\\_Guinea-Bissau\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2009_Guinea-Bissau_presidential_election)

<sup>612</sup> <https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/af/154351.htm>

<sup>613</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Guinea-Bissau](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Guinea-Bissau)

<sup>614</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2012\\_Guinea-Bissau\\_coup\\_d%27%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2012_Guinea-Bissau_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat);

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plak\\_Phibunsongkhram#1957\\_coup\\_and\\_exile](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plak_Phibunsongkhram#1957_coup_and_exile);

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mamadu\\_Ture\\_Kuruma](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mamadu_Ture_Kuruma)

<sup>615</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2012\\_Guinea-Bissau\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2012_Guinea-Bissau_presidential_election)

place candidate in the election, as the interim president.<sup>616</sup> While the regime de jure was led by Nhamadjo it is classified to the coding rules as a military transitional regime. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Furthermore, LIED codes political liberties as absent while V-Dem's PCLI indicates them as somewhat present. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive's power was noticeably limited but not substantial, fitting Intermediate Category 2. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also moderate.

04/13/2014 End Military Transitional) Autocracy/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: The general elections in Guinea-Bissau took place on 04/13/2014, and a second round was conducted for the presidential elections on 05/18 due to no candidate securing a majority in the initial round.<sup>617</sup> Presidential elections took place in Guinea-Bissau on 11/24/2019. Since no candidate secured a majority of the vote, a second round was conducted on 12/29. The incumbent president, José Mário Vaz, concluded in fourth place during the initial voting round, consequently not advancing to the runoff. Umaro Sissoco Embaló emerged as the winner in the second round with 54% of the vote.<sup>618</sup> The 2019 parliamentary elections received commendation from the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU) for being peaceful and well-organized. An observation mission from the African Union (AU) considered the elections to be free and fair, although it acknowledged some shortcomings in the process.<sup>619</sup> Despite initially promising to accept the results, President Jose Mario Vaz's campaign manager accused his rivals of fraud.<sup>620</sup> Furthermore, deficits in the guarantee of political and civil liberties persist. These include violence and discrimination against women as well as a lack of judicial freedom and due process.<sup>621</sup> On 06/04/2023, snap parliamentary elections took place. President Umaro Sissoco Embaló dissolved the parliament on 05/16/2022, citing allegations of corruption and "unresolvable" conflicts between the National People's Assembly and other branches of government. The outcome saw the opposition coalition, Inclusive Alliance Platform – Terra Ranka, led by the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde, securing

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<sup>616</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2012\\_Guinea-Bissau\\_coup\\_d%27%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2012_Guinea-Bissau_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat)

<sup>617</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014\\_Guinea-Bissau\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_Guinea-Bissau_general_election)

<sup>618</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019\\_Guinea-Bissau\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019_Guinea-Bissau_presidential_election)

<sup>619</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/guinea-bissau/freedom-world/2022>

<sup>620</sup> <https://www.dw.com/en/guinea-bissau-election-polls-close-amid-fraud-claims/a-51396435>

<sup>621</sup> <https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2015/af/252691.htm>

victory with 54 out of the 102 seats.<sup>622</sup> LIED categorizes the elections as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores them as somewhat free and fair. Their CEI score on electoral cleanliness varies considerably, between not really and somewhat clean elections. Per FH's evaluation for this regime period, the country scores from 9 to 10 as partly free, which we categorize as rather not free. Furthermore, LIED still scores an absence of political liberties, but V-Dem's PCLI views them as what we interpret as somewhat present. Based on Polity5's evaluation, during this period, the executive's power was limited to a degree between substantial constraints and parity with other institutions, fitting Intermediate Category 3. From 2015 to 2017, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. From 2018 to 2021, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. For 2022, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are moderate. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 2023, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

12/04/2023 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Electoral Autocracy: Following failed coup attempts in 2022 and 2023, President Umaro Sissoco Embaló dissolved the parliament again on 12/04/2023, leaving the legislature largely non-functional. The dissolution took place less than 12 months after the last parliamentary elections, which is unconstitutional.<sup>623</sup> Furthermore, the elected government was deposed and replaced by a government chosen by the president. Legislative elections were initially scheduled for 11/24/2024, and presidential elections for December 2024, but both were postponed due to logistical and financial constraints, leaving Embaló in power without a functioning legislature or Supreme Court at the end of the year.▯ President Embaló's presidential term officially ended on 02/27/2025, yet he remained in power, an action widely described as an "institutional coup", which effectively consolidated authority in the executive branch. Parliament continued to operate in a limited capacity. ▯ The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the United Nations (UN) attempted to mediate between the opposition and governing parties between 02/23/2025 and 02/28/2025, but they were unable to reach a consensus.<sup>624</sup> As classified by FH for this regime period, the country

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<sup>622</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023\\_Guinea-Bissau\\_parliamentary\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023_Guinea-Bissau_parliamentary_election)

<sup>623</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023\\_Guinea-Bissau\\_coup\\_attempt#Aftermath](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023_Guinea-Bissau_coup_attempt#Aftermath)

<sup>624</sup> <https://www.idea.int/democracytracker/country/guinea-bissau>

is classified as partly free with a score of 9, which corresponds to our interpretation of rather not free. V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. Based on V-Dem's PCLI, political civil liberties were ambiguous.

Electoral Autocracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

## **Guyana**

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: 07/21/1831]: The Dutch were the first Europeans to settle on the territory starting in the early 17th century, when they founded the colonies of Essequibo and Berbice, adding Demerara in the mid-18th century. In 1796, Great Britain took over these three colonies during hostilities with the French, who had occupied the Netherlands. Britain returned control to the Batavian Republic in 1802 but captured the colonies a year later during the Napoleonic Wars. The colonies were officially ceded to the United Kingdom in 1815 and consolidated into a single colony on 07/21/1831.<sup>625</sup> Even though multiparty legislative elections were present according to LIED, universal suffrage was absent until 1953.<sup>626</sup> In 1957, when the UK introduced elected members, the legislature advocated for a more representative government. This led to a constitutional conference convened by the UK in 1960, resulting in a new constitution that granted full internal self-government.<sup>627</sup> According to LIED only multiparty legislative election were held until 1953, from 1954 to 1956 no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held and from 1957 onward only multiparty legislative elections were held. According to LIED political liberties were absent. V-Dem's PCLI classifies political liberties as ambiguous until 1957 and as somewhat present from 1958. Until 1957, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. From 1958 to 1961, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

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<sup>625</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British\\_Guiana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Guiana)

<sup>626</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s\\_suffrage](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage)

<sup>627</sup> [http://www.caribbeanelections.com/education/independence/gy\\_independence.asp](http://www.caribbeanelections.com/education/independence/gy_independence.asp)



08/21/1961 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start (Monarchical) Electoral Hybrid Regime [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: On this date, the new constitution which installed internal self-government came into force. The UK still had power over defense and external affairs. A bicameral legislative system was established by the constitution. While the British governor remained the official head of State, the prime minister held the most executive power.<sup>628</sup> In the elections held on 08/21/1961 the PPP again gained the majority. Even though the People's Progressive Party (PPP) had secured only 1.6% more of the vote than the new People's National Congress, it managed to win nearly double the number of seats. This discrepancy led to widespread protests led by the PNC, a general strike, and intense inter-racial violence.<sup>629</sup> The governor declared a state of emergency and the UK sent troops. The UK held further constitutional conferences in 1962 and 1963, to settle terms for independence, but ethnic divisions prevented the leaders of Guyana's three political parties from being able to reach consensus among themselves on the terms of a constitution; they then asked the UK to settle the matter.<sup>630</sup> The proposal of the British colonial secretary to create a unicameral assembly with proportional representation was adopted in 1964. Cheddi Jagan, the then Premier of British Guiana had expressed support and encouragement for the Cuban Revolution. Therefore, he was believed to be a communist, especially by the USA. Amongst other measures, the CIA helped fund an 80-day strike which was later held against Jagan's ability to govern British Guiana.<sup>631</sup> On 12/07/1964, the first elections under the new constitution took place. A new coalition government headed by the People's National Congress (PNC) won the election. Cheddi Jagan was removed from office by the governor after refusing to step down.<sup>632</sup> Forbes Burnham became Prime Minister on 12/14/1964. He severed diplomatic ties with Cuba. During the first year of his rule, the situation in British Guiana stabilized.<sup>633</sup> However, after assuming power, he consolidated the PNC's control by taking charge of the electoral system. The PNC-dominated national assembly shifted the elections commission's authority to a government department headed by a deputy loyal to the PNC, ultimately placing it under Burnham's power (Trefs 2005: 355). At a constitutional conference in London, the date for independence was set for 05/26/1966. According to LIED only multiparty legislative elections were held during this

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<sup>628</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution\\_of\\_Guyana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_Guyana)

<sup>629</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1961\\_British\\_Guiana\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1961_British_Guiana_general_election)

<sup>630</sup> [http://www.caribbeanelections.com/education/independence/gy\\_independence.asp](http://www.caribbeanelections.com/education/independence/gy_independence.asp)

<sup>631</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cheddi\\_Jagan](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cheddi_Jagan)

<sup>632</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1964\\_British\\_Guiana\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1964_British_Guiana_general_election)

<sup>633</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Guyana#Independence\\_and\\_the\\_Burnham\\_era](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Guyana#Independence_and_the_Burnham_era)

period. LIED categorizes elections during this period as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI and CEI score electoral freedom, fairness and cleanliness as ambiguous. Moreover, political liberties were coded as absent (LIED). Whereas V-Dem's PCLI scores them as somewhat present. For most of the regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For 1966, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

05/26/1966 Continuation (Monarchical) Electoral Hybrid Regime [as independent country]: On 05/26/1966, Guyana became fully independent (Marshall 2018g). After its success in the elections on 12/16/1968, the PNC was able to rule without a coalition.<sup>634</sup> However, Burnham is said to have committed large scale election fraud.<sup>635</sup> According to LIED multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

02/23/1970 Continuation Electoral Hybrid Regime (as a republic): Guyana became a republic; however, it remained a cooperative republic within the Commonwealth.<sup>636</sup> In the 1970s, authoritarianism of Burnham's government increased. Election fraud became more obvious. In 1974, Burnham declared that all "organs of the State would be considered agencies of the ruling PNC and subject to its control". Nevertheless, oppositional groups were tolerated within certain limits.<sup>637</sup> On 07/10/1978, a constitutional referendum was held which suspended the elections and kept the current parliament in power.<sup>638</sup> The Jonestown Massacre on 11/19/1978 brought the government of Guyana to international attention which began to weaken it.<sup>639</sup> After a year filled with political violence in 1979, a new constitution was established in 1980.<sup>640</sup> The elections held on 12/15/1980, which yielded a victorious PNC, were once again claimed to have been fraudulent. Burnham died unexpectedly on 08/06/1985. Power transition to the vice-president Desmond Hoyte went smoothly.<sup>641</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive

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<sup>634</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1968\\_Guyanese\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1968_Guyanese_general_election)

<sup>635</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1968\\_Guyanese\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1968_Guyanese_general_election)

<sup>636</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Guyana/Independence>

<sup>637</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Guyana#Independence\\_and\\_the\\_Burnham\\_era](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Guyana#Independence_and_the_Burnham_era)

<sup>638</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1978\\_Guyanese\\_constitutional\\_referendum](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1978_Guyanese_constitutional_referendum)

<sup>639</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Guyana#The\\_Jonestown\\_massacre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Guyana#The_Jonestown_massacre)

<sup>640</sup> [https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Guyana\\_2016?lang=en](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Guyana_2016?lang=en)

<sup>641</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Guyana#Burnham's\\_last\\_years](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Guyana#Burnham's_last_years)

and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. During this period, LIED categorizes elections as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores them as not really free or fair while their CEI scores them as not clean. As per FH's classification for 1972, the country is considered free with a score ranging from 2 to 4, which we also interpret as free in our framework. In 1973 a score of 6 to 7 designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. In 1974, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. Between 1975 and 1977 Guyana is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. From 1978 to 1979 the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. For the remaining period a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. In addition to that political liberties remain absent according to LIED. V-Dem's PCLI scores the political liberties as somewhat present from 1966 to 1976 and since 1987. For the remaining years ambiguous outcomes were stated. In 1966 and 1967, based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. From 1968 to 1977, based on Polity5's evaluation, during this period, the executive's power was limited to a degree between substantial constraints and parity with other institutions, fitting Intermediate Category 3. In 1978 and 1979, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was significantly constrained by institutional checks. Since 1980, according to Polity5, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For almost the entire regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For 1992, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

10/05/1992 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Defective Democracy: On this date, after a period of political and economic liberalization, the ruling party's leaders conducted competitive elections. These elections saw the end of the twenty-eight-year reign of the People's National Congress (PNC) and marked a victory for the Progressive People's Party (PPP), predominantly supported by the East Indian (Indo-Guyanese) majority (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 31). Since the transfer of power was constitutional and non-violent we code this regime change event as a voluntary exit. These elections were the first since 1964 to be internationally

recognized as free and fair.<sup>642</sup> Guyana operates as a parliamentary democracy with a vibrant press and a resilient civil society. Nevertheless, the elections conducted in 2020 were tainted by attempted fraud perpetrated by the then-incumbent government.<sup>643</sup> In November 2022, the National Assembly passed a Bill for a constitutional reform commission, with the purpose of boosting minority rights and improving the electoral framework.<sup>644</sup> Elections are competitive and multi-party. The judiciary is independent from executive and legislative branches of government.<sup>645</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Since 1992 LIED categorizes elections as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI and CEI score them as somewhat free, fair and clean. As classified by FH for 1992, the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. Between 1993 and 2004 the country is classified as free, scoring between 2 and 4, which we also place in the free category. In 2005 a score of 6 to 7 designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. From 2006 onward Guyana receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. In 2024 the score improved to 4, which we categorize as free. Furthermore, according to LIED, political liberties have been present since 2013. V-Dem's PCLI classified them as somewhat present until 2002 and fully present from 2003 onwards. Until 2014, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was significantly constrained by institutional checks. Since then, based on Polity5's evaluation, the executive's power was limited to a degree between substantial constraints and parity with other institutions, fitting Intermediate Category 3. For the years 2016 and 2017, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For the rest of the regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

Defective Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

## Hawaii

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<sup>642</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Guyana#Hoyte\\_to\\_present](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Guyana#Hoyte_to_present)

<sup>643</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/guyana/freedom-world/2022>

<sup>644</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/guyana/freedom-world/2023>

<sup>645</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics\\_of\\_Guyana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Guyana)

01/01/1900 Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [United States of America, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: 08/12/1898]: Through the annexation of Hawaii by the United States on 08/12/1898 and its institutionalization under the Hawaiian Organic Act on 04/30/1900, Hawaii was transformed from the Kingdom of Hawaii into the Territory of Hawaii.<sup>646</sup> In contrast to other regions, such as Alaska, Hawaii had a parliament from the very beginning that was elected through popular vote.<sup>647</sup> Due to the participatory elements of its parliament, the Territory of Hawaii can be classified as an Indirect Rule Colonial Regime.

08/21/1959 End Hawaii [Indirect Rule Colonial Regime]: Due to the Hawaii Admission Act, Hawaii was admitted to the United States as the 50th state.<sup>648</sup> The repeated participation in elections and representation in legislative and executive bodies can be seen as indicators of the legitimacy of Alaska's government through the consent of its population.

For time after 08/21/1959, see United States of America.

## **Haiti**

01/01/1900 Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy [Start: 01/01/1804]: On 01/01/1804 Haiti, once France's richest colony, gained independence from France as the first Caribbean State and became an elective monarchy after that.<sup>649</sup> On 09/22/1804, the Generals of the Haitian Revolution Army proclaimed Jean-Jacques Dessalines as emperor, and on October 6th, he conducted his coronation ceremony, adopting the name Jacques I.<sup>650</sup> The constitution outlined the succession process for the throne, stipulating that the crown would be elective and granting the reigning emperor the authority to designate his successor.<sup>651</sup> Since, the monarchy was not rooted in an aristocracy it resembled more a personalist autocracy. In 1806 Jacques I. was assassinated and a split between northern and southern Haiti took place. In 1844 the Dominican Republic seceded from Haiti. The crisis of the 1865 to 1868 civil war led to the formation of two political parties, the National and the Liberal Parties, and marked a transition toward a modern party-based regime. On 10/26/1879, Lysius Salomon was elected president, and the National Party controlled the government for nearly a decade (Stieber 2020). Florvil Hyppolite

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<sup>646</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hawaiian\\_Organic\\_Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hawaiian_Organic_Act)

<sup>647</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Territory\\_of\\_Hawaii#cite\\_note-6](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Territory_of_Hawaii#cite_note-6)

<sup>648</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hawaii\\_Territorial\\_Legislature](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hawaii_Territorial_Legislature)

<sup>649</sup> <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-19548810>

<sup>650</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First\\_Empire\\_of\\_Haiti](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Empire_of_Haiti)

<sup>651</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First\\_Empire\\_of\\_Haiti](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Empire_of_Haiti)

was president from 1889 until 1896. Following Hyppolite, the political landscape in Haiti grew even more precarious, with governments notably brief in their tenure (Greene 2001). During the 20th century the mulattos, despite constituting less than 10% of the population, managed to establish themselves as the dominant elite by leveraging both their education and skin color. The black military elite after the revolution harbored resentment toward being excluded from the circles of the mulattos. Black rural farmers voiced their demands for land reforms and resorted to taking up arms. They voiced their dissatisfaction with the dominance of mulatto individuals and called for the election of a black president, hoping for greater consideration of their concerns. One method employed to address these grievances during the 19th century was the “politique de doublure,” wherein the mulatto elite installed a black figurehead president, at times even an individual lacking literacy. From 1847 to 1915, a majority of presidents were of dark complexion (Ulloa 2005: 374). From 1896 to 1902 Tirésias Simon Sam was president.<sup>652</sup> He was a member of the National Party and was instituted by parliament.<sup>653</sup> Nonetheless, starting in 1879, the presidencies concluded through coercion or the imminent prospect thereof (Greene 2001). During this period, the military exerted significant influence. According to Sheller, Haiti struggled to achieve the “subordination of the military to civil control” (Sheller 2000). The military was the ultimate arbiter of Haitian politics ( 1993). Between 1867 and 1950, the president was elected indirectly through an absolute majority vote by a joint session of both parliamentary chambers. From 1816 to 1918 the chamber of deputies also elected the senate indirectly. Before 1950, voting rights were exclusively granted to men and were subject to specific property and income requirements (Ulloa 2005: 378-379). While the president was elected by a parliament there are no traces of popular elections of the parliament itself. Vanhanen records values of 0 and 0.2 for the years 1896 and 1902 respectively, whereby the latter is his own estimate (Vanhanen 2019). Therefore, we classify this period as an electoral oligarchical autocracy. Simon Sam abdicated on 05/12/1902 and Pierre Boisrond-Canal became provisional president.<sup>654</sup> According to LIED executive and legislative elections, which weren’t multiparty, were held. According to LIED no political competitiveness was achieved. V-Dem’s EF&FI indicates that no elections were held during this time. Therefore, V-Dem’s CEI scores no cleanliness. Moreover, political liberties are classified as absent by LIED and as not really present by V-Dem’s PCLI. In 1902, a civil war erupted between the government of Boisrond-Canal and General Pierre Nord Alexis against rebel groups led by Anténor Firmin. According

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<sup>652</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haiti#History>

<sup>653</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tir%C3%A9sias\\_Simon\\_Sam](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tir%C3%A9sias_Simon_Sam)

<sup>654</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tir%C3%A9sias\\_Simon\\_Sam](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tir%C3%A9sias_Simon_Sam)

to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

12/17/1902 End Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy/Start Military (Personalist) Autocracy: General Nord Alexis prevailed and became president on 12/17/1902 by leading troops into the country's Chamber of Deputies and forcing legislators to declare him president.<sup>655</sup> This method of assuming power, relying on military force and the suppression of legislative authority, is indicative of a military autocracy. Once in power, Alexis' regime was characterized by centralized control, with decisions and authority largely emanating from the military leadership rather than civilian political structures. According to LIED only legislative elections, which weren't multiparty, were held during this period. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For this period political liberties were coded as absent per LIED and can be interpreted as not really present per V-Dem's PCLI. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

12/02/1908 End Military (Personalist) Autocracy/Start Military (Personalist) Autocracy: On this date, Pierre Nord Alexis was ousted by a rebellion led by General F. Antoine Simon (Nicholls 1986: 312). Antoine Simon was unanimously elected president of the republic by the Haitian Congress on 12/17/1908 (The New York Times 1908). According to LIED only legislative elections, which weren't multiparty, were held in 1908. From 1909 onward no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. Political liberties were coded as absent per LIED and can be interpreted as not really present per V-Dem's PCLI. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

08/07/1911 End Military (Personalist) Autocracy/Start Military (Personalist) Autocracy: On this day, Cinciannatus Leconte orchestrated a military coup against General Antoine Simon, seizing control (Lentz 1999: 218, Casey et al. 2020: 8). Leconte assumed the presidency of

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<sup>655</sup> <https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/massacres-perpetrated-20th-century-haiti.html>; [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pierre\\_Nord\\_Alexis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pierre_Nord_Alexis)

Haiti with a unanimous vote from Congress on August 14, serving a seven-year term. During his tenure, he implemented discriminatory measures against the local Syrian population, who were Christian migrants from Ottoman Syria, compounding the persecution faced by this already marginalized minority group. Despite being elected to a seven-year term, Leconte's time in office was short lived. On 08/08/1912, an explosion destroyed the National Palace, killing the president and several hundred soldiers.<sup>656</sup> Following the death of Leconte, Haiti went through a series of transitional governments. Tancredi Auguste was chosen by the National Assembly to succeed Leconte and continued the policies of his predecessor, but his presidency was short-lived due to his death in May 1913. After Auguste's death Michel Oreste was elected by the National Assembly. His term was also brief as he faced several rebellions and ultimately resigned in January 1914 due to political unrest. General Oreste Zamor led one of the rebellions against Oreste and assumed power after Oreste's resignation. His term was plagued by political instability. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held in 1911. From 1912 onward only executive elections were held. Moreover, LIED's score for the political liberties continued to be coded as absent and V-Dem's PCLI outcome is still at a not really present level. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

10/29/1914 End Military (Personalist) Autocracy/Start Military (Personalist) Autocracy: On this date, the junta was ousted by another group of officers (Lentz 1999: 218, Casey et al. 2020: 8).

11/07/1914 End Military (Personalist) Autocracy/Start Personalist Autocracy: On this date, Joseph Davilmar Theodore took control through a coup and subsequently secured the presidency for a seven-year term. Théodore did not hold a formal military rank before or during his presidency. His rise to power was facilitated by his leadership within the political realm, leveraging the influence of the Cacos, a peasant militia group (Lentz 1999: 219). According to LIED executive and legislative elections, which weren't multiparty, were held. In 1914 political liberties were absent per LIED and can be interpreted as not really present per V-Dem's PCLI. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial

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<sup>656</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cincinnatus\\_Leconte](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cincinnatus_Leconte)



constraints on the executive were absent, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

07/28/1915 End Personalist Autocracy/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by United States of America, Defective Democracy]: On this date, the USA invaded and occupied Haiti, motivated by American business interests. During the occupation, the United States of America installed wealthy and pro-American Haitians in positions of power and ruled as a military regime through martial law led by Marines and the Gendarmerie. A new constitution was approved on 06/12/1918 and allowed foreigners to control Haitian land. Due to efforts to oppose the rewriting of the constitution, Haiti remained without a legislative branch until 1929.<sup>657</sup> Stenio Joseph Vincent, who served as mayor of Port-au-Prince, was elected president in 1930 amid the U.S. occupation (Nicholls 1986: 311, 317, Nicholls 1998: 157, Casey et al. 2020: 8). Those elections were one of the few fair presidential elections in the country's history (Ulloa 2005: 375). However, LIED lists male suffrage during this period as absent. According to LIED executive and legislative elections, which weren't multiparty were held in 1915 and 1916, from 1917 to 1929 no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held and from 1930 onward multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. For this time LIED and V-Dem's PCLI indicate that political liberties were absent and not really present. From 1916 to 1920, and then again from 1930 to 1934, During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. In the timeframe between, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

08/15/1934 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by United States of America, Defective Democracy]/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date the last contingent of U.S. troops departed but it maintained direct fiscal control until 1941.<sup>658</sup> Under President Vincent's leadership, the government suppressed opposition, and he implemented a new constitution that granted extensive powers to the president (Lentz 1999: 219-20, Nicholls 1990: 550, Casey et al. 2020: 9). For example, the new constitution granted the right to dissolve the legislature and reshuffle the judiciary (Greene 2001: 284). On 05/15/1941 Vincent resigned following the elections held in May 1941 (Nicholls 1990: 550, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 65-66, Casey et al. 2020: 9) and transferred power to Èlie Lescot. On 06/05/1941 He was confirmed by the elected assembly

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<sup>657</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United\\_States\\_occupation\\_of\\_Haiti](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_occupation_of_Haiti)

<sup>658</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United\\_States\\_occupation\\_of\\_Haiti](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_occupation_of_Haiti)

and began to suppress the opposition immediately (Smith 2009: 43, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 65-66). Overall, he grew more authoritarian. He asserted the role of military commander in chief, oppressed the populace, imposed press censorship, and coerced Congress into bestowing upon him considerable powers to manage the budget and appoint legislators without the need for elections (Greene 2001: 284). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED classifies elections during this period as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores them as not really free or fair while their CEI scores them as not clean. In addition to that, LIED scores an absence of political liberties. V-Dem's PCLI indicates them as not really present. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions.

01/11/1945 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: Populist and ethnic-inspired popular uprising led to President Élie Lescot's resignation. Lescot and his cabinet fled into exile.<sup>659</sup> Colonel Lavaud, his lieutenant Antoine Levelt, and American Ambassador Orme Wilson Jr administered executive power through a junta, the Conseil Exécutif Militaire (CEM).<sup>660</sup> According to LIED multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. Political liberties were coded as absent by LIED and can be interpreted as not really present per V-Dem's PCLI. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

05/12/1946 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date, the interim military government oversaw elections (Nohlen 1993: 389, Smith 2009: 80-81, 89, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 65-66). The electoral process of 1946, often heralded as "the Revolution of 1946", was in essence a consequence of governance that was marked by incompetence, dishonesty, and repression. Dumarsais Estimé emerged victorious in these elections, securing his win with the support of the military (Greene 2001: 285). In 01/1950, elections resulted in the formation of a lower house in the National Assembly entirely obedient to the president (Smith 2009: 144). On 04/03/1950, President Estimé pushed through a constitutional revision that barred reelection, which was unanimously approved in the Chamber of Deputies but rejected in the Senate. On 05/08/1950, Estimé dissolved the cabinet and the Senate in violation of the constitution and declared a new cabinet the next day, causing tensions within the army high command (Smith 2009: 146). The strength of his political opponents,

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<sup>659</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%89lie\\_Lescot](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%89lie_Lescot)

<sup>660</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Franck\\_Lavaud](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Franck_Lavaud)

open ethnic conflict, and an attempt to extend his term in office floundered the Estimé regime. In 1950, the principle of universal suffrage was established; however, the electoral cleanliness of the following elections was still compromised by widespread ballot manipulation.<sup>661</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED classifies elections during this period as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores them as not really free or fair while their CEI scores them as not clean. Furthermore, political liberties remained absent (LIED) and not really present (V-Dem PCLI). According to the Polity5 indicator, during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

05/10/1950 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: On this date, Estimé signed a resignation letter, and the military junta, which had overseen Lescot's removal, once again assumed its role as the transition government (Nohlen 1993, Smith 2009: 147, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 66). As per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time.

10/08/1950 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Electoral (Military) Autocracy: On this date, Paul Magloire was elected president, becoming the first military president since 1915. However, Magloire was the only candidate and elected unopposed with 99 per cent of the vote running under the Peasant Worker Movement banner (Smith 2009, Ulloa 2005).<sup>662</sup> The election was army-monitored and Magloire enjoyed official backing from the army, church, elite, and the American embassy. It was the first election with universal male suffrage.<sup>663</sup> During his presidency, Magloire used state-sanctioned violence, such as the threat of force against opponents, to consolidate his power. He reinstated the secret police, targeted dissidents regardless of political beliefs and effectively controlled the army (Smith 2009: 153-154). In January 1955, Magloire manipulated the Deputies' election to ensure the defeat of Daniel Fignolé, a well-liked political figure, former leader of the MOP, and labor organizer in Port-au-Prince, by a significant margin. Subsequently, Magloire incarcerated Fignolé and shut down Haiti Democratique, a newspaper established by Fignolé. Furthermore, schools nationwide were shuttered as potential hubs of dissent, and the Faculty of Medicine was disbanded.<sup>664</sup>

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<sup>661</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Haiti/Government-and-society>

<sup>662</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1950\\_Haitian\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1950_Haitian_general_election)

<sup>663</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul\\_Magloire](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Magloire)

<sup>664</sup> <https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/haitians-strike-and-overthrow-dictator-1956>

According to LIED executive and legislative elections, which weren't multiparty, were held in 1950; from 1951 onward multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. LIED classifies elections during this period as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores them as not really free or fair while their CEI scores them as not clean. Regarding the political liberties, LIED and V-Dem's PCLI maintained their scorings. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. Until 1955, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For 1956, V-Dem's JCE is classified as absent, indicating no judicial oversight of the executive. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

12/12/1956 End Electoral (Military) Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: On this date, popular unrests forced President Magloire to resign and flee. The Colpus Dataset codes here a protest rather than a coup because the popular strike, not the military, hindered Magloire's continued rule. Instead, the army enabled the constitutional succession to Justice Pierre-Louis (Chin/Wright/Carter 2021b: 31). In accordance with the constitution, the head of the Supreme Court, Pierre-Louis, who agreed on competitive elections, was inaugurated on a provisional basis (Hall 2012: 272, 2009: 171-72). On 02/07/1957 a general strike forced Pierre-Louis out of the provisional presidency and Franck Sylvain was appointed interim president by the parliament.<sup>665</sup> According to LIED political liberties were absent, while V-Dem's PCLI indicates that they were not really present in this period. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

04/02/1957 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, rioting and violence following an election Sylvain allegedly forced the chief of the army, Léon Cantave, to demand Sylvain's resignation "on the grounds that he was an accessory to civil unrest" (Smith 2009: 176). The army installed a civilian government, the Conseil Exécutif Gouvernement (CEG) comprised of thirteen representatives of the six principal candidates, entrusted with electoral preparation (Smith 2009). Consequently, Haiti was without a

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<sup>665</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Franck\\_Sylvain](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Franck_Sylvain)

government or a unified military (Smith 2009). On 05/18/1957 a bloody battle forced Cantave to oust the CEG and declare martial law.

05/25/1957 End Military Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: On this date, violence forced Cantave to resign and Daniel Fignolé became provisional president. Due to his political popularity, he was seen as the sole candidate possessing sufficient influence to stabilize the deteriorating situation (Smith 2009: 179).

06/12/1957 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, Fignolé, who had previously attempted to weaken the military, was kidnapped by army officers, and forced to resign and flee. Haiti was from then on ruled again by a military junta, the Conseil Militaire de Gouvernement (CMG), headed by Kébreau (Smith 2009). New elections were announced for September 1957. According to the Polity5 indicator, during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. In 1957, both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI indicate that political liberties were fully absent.

09/22/1957 End Military Autocracy/Start Personalist Autocracy: On this date, the junta supervised an unfair election in which their favored candidate, François Duvalier, was elected. (Nohlen 1993: 389, Smith 2009: 177-83, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 66). These were the last presidential elections until Duvalier's son Jean-Claude Duvalier fled Haiti. We code this regime change event as a voluntary exit, since the military withdrew from the government. Duvalier did have support from the military but acted as a civilian president. He cultivated support among segments of the rural poor and used noiriste rhetoric to mobilize followers, yet his rule relied primarily on repression, manipulation, and clientelist networks rather than on genuine widespread popular support. Both Duvalier governments banned or severely restricted opposition political parties. In 1964 François Duvalier declared himself President for Life and remained in power until he died in April 1971. Jean-Claude Duvalier was chosen by his father as successor and inherited the title President for Life in 1971. He ruled until 1986. While the political regime was clearly a personalist autocracy from 1964 to 1986 the classification for the years 1957 to 1964 is much harder. However, Haiti is also coded from 1957 to 1964 as a personalist autocracy. The National Unity Party which became the sole party in Haiti was just a vehicle to support the presidency of the Duvaliers (Ferguson 1987, Ferguson 1993). In a presidential referendum on 04/30/1961 François Duvalier was the only candidate. The official count was all votes in favor of Duvalier and none against. According to LIED multiparty executive and legislative elections were held until 1960, from 1961 to 1970 executive and legislative elections, which weren't multiparty, were held, from 1971 onward only legislative elections, which weren't multiparty, were held. From 1957 to 1960, according to the Polity5

indicator, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. Since 1961, as per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. In addition to that political liberties were indicated as absent per LIED and per V-Dem's PCLI.

02/07/1986 End Personalist Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, Jean-Claude Duvalier fled because of popular uprising and was replaced by an interim government (Nicholls 1998: 165-66).<sup>666</sup> The formation was supposed to be an interim transitional government, the Conseil National de Gouvernement, made up of two civilians and three officers, led by Lieutenant General Namphy. This government is not treated as a continuation of the previous regime because it authorized legal proceedings against Duvalier allies and banned them from holding office for ten years (Payne/Sutton 1993: 80-84), thus changing the rules for choosing leaders. The first attempted election in November 1987 was cancelled because of violence. According to LIED only legislative elections, which weren't multiparty, were held during this period. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE is classified as absent, indicating no judicial oversight of the executive. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

01/17/1988 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral (Military) Autocracy: On this date, Leslie Manigat was elected. The military dominated the elections, manipulating them to ensure the emergence of a winner deemed acceptable to the military (Payne/Sutton 1993: 89, Nicholls 1998: 169, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 66). However, since the interim government, which was made up of military officers and civilians and did not include Manigat, withdrew from governmental positions, we code this regime change event as a voluntary exit. LIED classifies the election as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores it as not really free or fair while their CEI scores it as not clean. According to FH, for 1986, a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. For the remaining period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. Besides, political liberties were still absent (LIED). V-Dem's PCLI scores changed to ambiguous for this short regime period.

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<sup>666</sup> <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-haiti/>

06/20/1988 End Electoral (Military) Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, General Henri Namphy overthrew Leslie Manigat, who was elected in a presidential election controlled by the military, and declared himself president.<sup>667</sup> The reason was that Manigat had tried to dismiss Namphy (Payne/Sutton 1993: 89, Nicholls 1998: 169, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 66-67).<sup>668</sup>

09/18/1988 End Military Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, a military coup by junior officers and non-commissioned officers ousted the government led by General Namphy and high ranking officers (Nohlen 1993: 390, Payne/Sutton 1993: 90).<sup>669</sup> The coup brought General Matthieu Prosper Avril to power. During the Duvalier regime, Avril held the role of a trusted member of François Duvalier's Presidential Guard and served as an adviser to Jean-Claude Duvalier.<sup>670</sup> According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. As classified by FH for 1989, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Political liberties were still classified as absent by LIED and can be interpreted as ambiguous by V-Dem's PCLI. For 1989, V-Dem's JCE is classified as absent, indicating no judicial oversight of the executive. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 1990, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

03/10/1990 End Military Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: A popular uprising forced General Prosper Avril to flee after mass public protests. The military transferred power to the army chief of staff, General Hérard Abraham, on 03/10/1990, to oversee a democratic transition (Nohlen 1993: 390, Payne/Sutton 1993: 92-94, Hall 2012: 272).

12/16/1990 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date, elections were conducted by a provisional civilian government, resulting in a victory for populist leader Jean-Claude Aristide, who secured 67 percent of the vote in the first round and assumed office in 02/1991. (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 33). The elections were monitored by the United Nations Observer Group for the Verification of the Elections in Haiti (ONUVEH) and the Organization of American States (OAS), and are regarded as free and fair (Ulloa 2005). Due to the continued high influence of the military and a weak judiciary, FH classifies Haiti as

<sup>667</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henri\\_Namphy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henri_Namphy)

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<http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/haiti88eng/chap.2e.htm#E.%20%20%20%20%20%20%20THE%20COUP%20D'ETAT%20OF%20JUNE%2020,%201988>

<sup>669</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/September\\_1988\\_Haitian\\_coup\\_d%27%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/September_1988_Haitian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat)

<sup>670</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prosper\\_Avril](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prosper_Avril)

partly free in 1991 (McColm 1991). Only GWF categorizes the regime period as democratic, LIED and HTW classify it as a multiparty autocracy, RoW as an electoral autocracy and BR as a civilian autocracy. According to our classification, the regime is an electoral hybrid regime. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED classifies the elections as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores them as free and fair but their CEI as not clean. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. Besides, political liberties were absent (LIED). V-Dem's PCLI scores them with an ambiguous presence. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

09/30/1991 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: A military coup led by Brigadier General Raoul Cedras overthrew Aristide. Cedras ruled as executive through the military junta but had puppet presidents (Nohlen 1993: 390, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 67, Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 80).<sup>671</sup> According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. Furthermore, according to LIED political liberties were coded as absent. V-Dem's PCLI indicates with an ambiguous level.

10/19/1994 End Military Autocracy/Start Defective Democracy: The military regime led by Cedras was ousted by a foreign intervention (Operation Uphold Democracy, 09/19/1994-03/31/1995) which oversaw the return of the previously elected president (Ulloa 2005: 377).<sup>672</sup> The operation was effectively authorized by the 07/31/1994 United Nations Security Council Resolution 940.<sup>673</sup> Jean-Bertrand Aristide was restored to power (Malone 2008: 133, Hall 2012: 272, Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 67).<sup>674</sup> As classified

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<sup>671</sup> <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-haiti/>

<sup>672</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation\\_Uphold\\_Democracy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Uphold_Democracy)

<sup>673</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation\\_Uphold\\_Democracy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Uphold_Democracy)

<sup>674</sup> [https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/uphold\\_democracy.htm](https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/uphold_democracy.htm)



by FH for the period until 1999, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. For the remaining period a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. Political liberties remained absent according to LIED and can be interpreted as ambiguous according to V-Dem's PCLI until 1994 and somewhat present afterwards. On 12/17/1995 a presidential election was held, that was won by René Préval. Parliamentary elections were held on 04/06/1997.<sup>675</sup> The parliamentary elections faced controversy after the initial round and were ultimately canceled. This initiated a new political crisis (Ulloa 2005: 377). On 01/12/1999 the legislature refused to confirm his third nominee for prime minister, amid accusations of vote rigging in legislative elections when elected President Rene Preval dismissed the Chamber of Deputies and all but nine members of the Senate. He began to rule by decree (Erikson 2004, Wucker 2004: 45, Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 34, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 67). Parliamentary elections were held on 05/21/2000 and 07/09/2000. They were overall deeply flawed. International observation missions characterized them as not free and fair and questioned tabulation method (Ulloa 2005: 377).<sup>676</sup> Presidential elections were held on 11/26/2000. They were boycotted by the opposition due to the experience of the spring parliamentary elections. Jean Bertrand Aristide won with over 90%.<sup>677</sup> The opposition proclaimed its own president. The Organization of American States mediated the negotiations between both sides (Ulloa 2005: 377-378). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes elections as competitive from 1994 to 1998 and later as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores them as somewhat free and fair during this period. Their CEI scores them as not really clean from 1999 onwards, having scored their electoral cleanliness as ambiguous before. In 1995, according to Polity5, the executive's constraints fell into Intermediate Category 3, between substantial limitations and executive parity or subordination. From 1996 to 1998, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. Since 2000, according to Polity5, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. From 1995 to 1998, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 1999, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as

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<sup>675</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1995\\_Haitian\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1995_Haitian_general_election);

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1997\\_Haitian\\_parliamentary\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1997_Haitian_parliamentary_election)

<sup>676</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2000\\_Haitian\\_parliamentary\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2000_Haitian_parliamentary_election)

<sup>677</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2000\\_Haitian\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2000_Haitian_presidential_election)

indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. From 2000 to 2003, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

02/29/2004 End Defective Democracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: Aristide fled in response to an armed rebellion led by the National Revolutionary Front for the Liberation and Reconstruction of Haiti, a rebel group formed of a former police chief and criminal gang leaders (Erikson 2005: 86, Hall 2012: 272). By 02/25/2004, the rebel group controlled nearly the entire north of Haiti and forced Aristide to resign on 02/29/2004. After Aristide's departure, Prime Minister Gérard Latortue and President Boniface Alexandre, Chief of Justice of the Supreme Court in Haiti, formed an interim government.<sup>678</sup> According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. Political liberties continued to be coded as absent per LIED and can be interpreted as somewhat present (V-Dem PCLI). For 2005, V-Dem's JCE is classified as absent, indicating no judicial oversight of the executive. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 2006, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

02/07/2006 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date, general elections were held to elect the replacements for the interim government of Gérard Latortue, which had been put in place after the 2004 Haiti rebellion. Following four delays, presidential and legislative elections took place on 02/07/2006. Former president Préval secured victory in the presidential race, narrowly evading a runoff with 51.2 percent of the vote in the initial round. However, the legitimacy of the outcome was questioned due to the Electoral Council (CEP) excluding approximately 85,000 blank ballots from the tally, a decision met with strong opposition criticism based on dubious legal grounds. Préval's inauguration was postponed until 05/14 due to inconclusive legislative results, which necessitated a runoff poll on 04/21, with only 15–20 percent of eligible voters reportedly participating (Lansford 2021: 690). Jovenel Moïse of the Haitian Tet Kale Party (PHTK), the handpicked successor of then President Michel Martelly, won the 2015 presidential election, but the results were nullified

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<sup>678</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2004\\_Haitian\\_coup\\_d'état](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2004_Haitian_coup_d'état)

due to extensive fraud. Moïse went on to win a repeat election in 2016, taking 55.6 percent of the vote. Elections for a portion of the Senate and the runoff elections for the remaining seats in the Chamber of Deputies were held in 2016 along with the repeat presidential election, and the contests were marred by low voter turnout and fraud.<sup>679</sup> According to LIED multiparty executive and legislative elections were held until 2010, from 2011 to 2014 only executive elections were held, in 2015 no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held, from 2016 to 2018 multiparty executive and legislative elections were held and in 2019 and 2020 only executive elections were held. During this period LIED categorizes elections as not competitive except between 2006 and 2009. V-Dem's EF&FI scores their freedom and fairness as ambiguous while their CEI scores them as not really clean. Per FH's evaluation for this regime period, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. Furthermore, LIED still indicates no political liberties and V-Dem's PCLI outcomes stayed at a somewhat present level. Between 2006 and 2009, according to Polity5, the executive's constraints fell into Intermediate Category 3, between substantial limitations and executive parity or subordination. In 2017 and 2018, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive encountered substantial institutional limitations on power. From 2007 to 2009, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. For 2010, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. For 2011 and 2012, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. From 2013 to 2016, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 2017-2018, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. From 2019 to 2021, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

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<sup>679</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/haiti/freedom-world/2022>

07/07/2021 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: The first half of the year was dominated by protests and political disputes over the expiration of President Jovenel Moïse's term, his plans to hold a referendum on constitutional reforms, and the continued postponement of overdue elections. On 07/07/2021, President Moïse was assassinated by a group of heavily armed men who entered his residence, and the resulting succession crisis was exacerbated by the lack of a sitting Parliament, as the terms of most lawmakers had expired in 2020.<sup>680</sup> Joseph assumed political control of the government. At that time, Joseph stated that he was in control of the country. The legal succession to the presidency was unclear. Meanwhile, eight out of ten sitting members of Haiti's Senate chose the Senate speaker Joseph Lambert as the interim President on 07/09. On 07/19, Joseph announced that he will stand down as prime minister in Favor of Henry.<sup>681</sup> General elections were scheduled to be held in Haiti on 11/07/2021 to elect the president and Parliament, alongside a constitutional referendum. However, in September 2021 they were postponed following the dismissal of the members of the Provisional Electoral Council by acting Prime Minister Ariel Henry.<sup>682</sup> On 12/12/2022, Henry signed an agreement with representatives of the civil society, political parties, and the business sector to hold elections in 2023 and install an elected government in 2024.<sup>683</sup> However, no general elections were held in 2023 either, which means that no elections have been held in the country since 2016. On 03/11/2024 Henry announced that he will resign and that his government will hand over power after a transitional council (The High Transition Council) has been appointed.<sup>684</sup> Without a functioning government, lawlessness, crime, and violence are widespread, and, paired with increasing food shortages present an acute humanitarian crisis.<sup>685</sup> According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held in 2021. According to FH's classification for the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. Political liberties were still coded as absent in 2021 (LIED). Whereas V-Dem's PCLI still indicates a somewhat present level for them. For 2022, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 2023, V-Dem's JCE is classified as absent, indicating no judicial oversight of the executive.

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<sup>680</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/haiti/freedom-world/2022>

<sup>681</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ariel\\_Henry](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ariel_Henry)

<sup>682</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Next\\_Haitian\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Next_Haitian_general_election)

<sup>683</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/haiti/freedom-world/2023>

<sup>684</sup> <https://edition.cnn.com/2024/03/11/americas/haiti-pm-ariel-henry-resigns-gang-violence-intl-hnk/index.html>

<sup>685</sup> <https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/03/1147871>

Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

Non-Electoral Transitional Regime as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional Sources (Ferguson 1988, Mattarollo 2002, Shamsie 2004, Rotberg/Clague 1971)

## Hejaz

01/01/1900 Part of Other Country [Ottoman Empire, Autocratic Monarchy] [Start: 02/22/1517]: Because the Hejaz was home to two holy cities, it was governed by various empires throughout its history. During the Rashidun Caliphate, with Medina as its capital from 632 to 656 CE, the Hejaz was at the heart of the empire. In later times, the region came under the control of local powers such as Egypt in 1258 and the Ottoman Empire in 1517.<sup>686</sup> As a result of the Ottoman-Mamluk war between 1526 and 02/22/1517, the Hejaz as a province was incorporated into the Ottoman Empire.<sup>687</sup>

06/27/1916 End Part of Other Country [Ottoman Empire, Constitutional Monarchy]/Start Autocratic Monarchy (Kingdom of Hejaz): On 06/27/1916, during World War I, Sharif Husayn ibn Ali of Mecca declared the independence of the Kingdom of Hejaz from the Ottoman Empire, backed by British support. This declaration was not merely political but was carried out through an armed rebellion. Sharif Husayn commanded several thousand tribal fighters who launched attacks against Ottoman garrisons. The uprising began with the capture of Mecca after heavy fighting and extended to other cities such as Jeddah and Ta'if. British assistance was decisive, as the Royal Navy helped secure coastal towns and British officers, including T. E. Lawrence, provided weapons, funds, and logistical support. Through these military operations, Ottoman authority in the region was effectively dismantled. The establishment of the Hashemite Kingdom of Hejaz thus represents a secessionist rebellion, supported by an external power, which led to the creation of a new autocratic monarchy.

01/08/1926 End Autocratic Monarchy/Start Part of Other Country [Kingdom of Hejaz and Nejd]: After the Kingdom of Hejaz fell to Abdulaziz's forces on 12/19/1925, he declared himself king of Hejaz on 01/08/1926 and combined the territories of the Kingdom of Hejaz and the Sultanate of Nejd, which he elevated to the status of a kingdom on 01/29/1927.<sup>688</sup> On

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<sup>686</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hejaz#Subsequent\\_history](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hejaz#Subsequent_history)

<sup>687</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ottoman%E2%80%93Mamluk\\_War\\_\(1516%E2%80%931517\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ottoman%E2%80%93Mamluk_War_(1516%E2%80%931517))

<sup>688</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sultanate\\_of\\_Nejd](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sultanate_of_Nejd)

05/20/1927, the Treaty of Jeddah was signed, in which Great Britain recognized the independence of the Kingdoms of Hijaz and Najd, both ruled by the monarchy established through conquest by Abdulaziz al Saud over the previous 25 years (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 91). LIED, FH and V-Dem do not provide data for Hejaz. For further information on the Kingdom of Hejaz and Nejd, see **Saudi Arabia**.

09/23/1932 End Hejaz [Part of Other Country, Kingdom of Hejaz and Nejd]: On this day, Abdulaziz proclaimed the union of the main Saudi dominions of al-Hasa, Qatif, Nejd and the Hejaz as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.<sup>689</sup>

For the time after 09/23/1932 see **Saudi Arabia**.

## **Honduras**

01/01/1900 Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy [Start 09/15/1821]: On 09/15/1821, Honduras gained independence from Spain and became part of the First Mexican Empire before joining the Federal Republic of Central America. On 11/15/1838, Honduras declared independence from the Federal Republic of Central America, adopting a new constitution in January 1839. Since then, Honduras replaced the constitution on several occasions (1839, 1848, 1865, 1873, 1880, 1894, 1906, 1924, 1936, 1957, 1965, and 1982) with corresponding electoral laws (Somoza 2005). The 1894 constitution introduced secret, direct, and male suffrage.<sup>690</sup> As one of the first countries in Central and South America, Honduras extended suffrage to illiterates in 1894 (Kellam 2013: 29). Voting for men has always been compulsory, and the military personnel has been disenfranchised since 1895. Between 1876 and 1878, liberal reforms were introduced with the goal of reducing the traditional oligarchic dominance held by landholders, the clergy, and the military. These reforms included the implementation of the separation of church and state, as outlined in the 1879 constitution (Somoza 2005: 400). Elections have been held since independence in 1839, although somewhat irregular and presidential terms varied with the different constitutions. On 02/27/1902, the National Party (Partido Nacional -PN) was established by General Manuel Bonilla.<sup>691</sup> In October 1902, general elections were held. The presidential elections were won by Bonilla. However, President Terencio Sierra declined to surrender governance to General Bonilla, leading Congress to elect Juan Angel Arias as president.<sup>692</sup> According to Vanhanen in 1898 10.4 and in 1903 12.2 percentage of the total

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<sup>689</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom\\_of\\_Hejaz\\_and\\_Nejd](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Hejaz_and_Nejd)

<sup>690</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal\\_suffrage#Dates\\_by\\_country](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#Dates_by_country)

<sup>691</sup> <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/western-hemisphere-region/honduras-1902-present/>

<sup>692</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1902\\_Honduran\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1902_Honduran_general_election)

population voted (Vanhanen 2019). Although suffrage was extended to illiterates, military personnel were excluded, elections were held only irregularly, a traditional oligarchy was evident, and the proportion of voters was less than 15 percent of the population. Therefore, we classify this period as an electoral oligarchy. In the initial decades of the 20th century, American corporations like the United Fruit Company, the Standard Fruit Company, and the Cuyamel Fruit Company held sway over Honduras' economy. They set up vast banana plantations along the northern coast, swiftly turning bananas into the nation's chief export. In exchange for sizable land concessions from conservative politicians, these companies gained significant influence.<sup>693</sup> The interests of these American companies were of great importance for the behavior of the USA in relation to Honduras. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED classifies elections during this period as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores them as not really free or fair while their CEI scores them as not clean. Moreover, both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI confirm the absence of political liberties. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive encountered substantial institutional limitations on power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

04/13/1903 End Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy/Start Military (Personalist) Autocracy: On this date, following a coup, General Manuel Bonilla took control and suppressed any political opposition (Stokes 1950: 47, Haggerty/Millet 1995: 19, Euraque 1996: chap. 3, Lentz 1999: 2020-21, Casey et al. 2020: 9). The regime is classified according to our coding rules as a military autocracy because Manuel Bonilla gained power through a military operation. Despite winning a plurality vote in the presidential elections on 03/01/1902, Bonilla failed to meet the absolute majority requirement specified by the constitution. Consequently, the congress appointed Juan Ángel Arias Boquí as president and General Máximo Betancourt Rosales as vice president. After seizing power, Bonilla summoned congress and coerced them to overturn the election results, declaring him president and Miguel R. Dávila vice president. They assumed office on 05/17/1903. Subsequently, Bonilla called for a constituent assembly, which annulled the 1894 constitution and reinstated parts of the 1880 constitution, leading to a six-year presidential term. This new constitution took effect on 01/01/1906.<sup>694</sup> During his presidency,

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<sup>693</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Honduras\\_\(1838%E2%80%931932\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Honduras_(1838%E2%80%931932))

<sup>694</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Honduras\\_\(1838%E2%80%931932\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Honduras_(1838%E2%80%931932))

Bonilla imprisoned the former president, Policarpo Bonilla, and suppressed the political opposition of the liberals while organizing conservatives into a single political party (Merrill 1995). Moreover, both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI indicate that political liberties were absent in this period. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. According to LIED only legislative elections, which weren't multiparty, were held in 1903 and executive and legislative elections, which weren't multiparty were held from 1904 to 1906.

03/25/1907 End Military (Personalist) Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: On this date, Bonilla was ousted by a Liberal rebellion led by General Dionisio Gutierrez and supported by Nicaragua. On the same day, a cabinet (Consejo de Ministros) assumed office composed of Miguel Oquelí Bustillo, Máximo B. Rosales, and J. Ignacio Castro (Somoza 2005). The government junta appointed vice-President Miguel Dávila as provisional president on 04/18/1907.<sup>695</sup> (Stokes 1950: 47-48, Haggerty/Millet 1995: 20, Lentz 1999: 221, Casey et al. 2020: 9). Dávila summoned a constituent assembly to reiterate the constitution of 1894 and called for elections. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is also classified by us as indicating that political liberties were absent. According to LIED only executive elections were held in 1907. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

03/01/1908 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy: Dávila was elected president in March by an unclear election process.<sup>696</sup> Apparently, Dávila was elected by the constituent assembly.<sup>697</sup> Somoza does not record an election for 1908, but only in 1902 and 1911 (Somoza 2005: 407). Vanhanen does record an election in 1908, in which 0 percentage of the population participated (Vanhanen 2019). Since we cannot assume that Dávila was legitimized by the population but rather within the ruling elite, we code the

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<sup>695</sup> <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/western-hemisphere-region/honduras-1902-present/> The chronology of events by Casey et al. is somehow different and not completely in line with our observations.

<sup>696</sup> The actual date is also unknown: <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/western-hemisphere-region/honduras-1902-present/>; [https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elecciones\\_generales\\_de\\_Honduras\\_de\\_1908](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elecciones_generales_de_Honduras_de_1908)

<sup>697</sup> <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/home/research-projects/dadm-project/western-hemisphere-region/honduras-1902-present/>



regime change event as a strategic status quo restructuring. On an unknown date in 1908, opponents of Dávila, most likely backed by Guatemala and El Salvador, entered Honduras, which in turn was supported by Nicaragua. There was a real threat of war. Due to the threat of US intervention, however, the case was submitted to the newly established Central American Court. The case still pending, the revolt collapsed and order and peace was restored to Honduras for a short while (Haggerty/Millet 1993). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED classifies elections during this period as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI does not provide a score for electoral freedom and fairness while their CEI scores them as not clean. Besides both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI score concerning the political liberties remained unchanged. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive encountered substantial institutional limitations on power. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

03/28/1911 End Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: On this date, a revolt spearheaded by General Manuel Bonilla prompted the United States to pressure Dávila into resigning (Stokes 1950: 48-49, Haggerty/Millet 1995: 22, Euraque 1996: chap. 1, Casey et al. 2020: 9). The US led mediations between Bonilla and Dávila between 02/21/1911 and 03/15/1911. It was agreed that Francisco Bertrand would be appointed as provisional president and that general elections were to be held.<sup>698</sup> Even though the revolt was led by General Bonilla, the regime change would not have been possible without the United States intervention. This fits our characterization of an externally sponsored coup or regime replacement, which we classify as a foreign-imposed regime change. Bertrand acted as provisional president between 03/28/1911 and 01/21/1912 (Somoza 2005). According to the Polity5 indicator, during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power.

10/29[-31]/1911 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy: General elections took place on this date. The presidential elections were won by Bonilla, who was the only candidate (Somoza 2005). Bertrand, although stepping down as president, continued as vice president. Therefore, we consider this a strategic restructuring instead of a voluntary exit through elections. The elections are categorized as "non-

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<sup>698</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1911\\_Honduran\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1911_Honduran_general_election)

competitive." Bonilla passed away barely a year into his presidency. Following his demise, Vice President Francisco Bertrand assumed the presidency and emerged victorious in the 1916 elections (Stokes 1950: 49-50, Haggerty/Millet 1995: 22, Euraque 1996: chap. 1, Casey et al. 2020: 9).<sup>699</sup> Bertrand was the only candidate in the elections and took office on 01/02/1916 (Somoza 2005). It soon became clear that Bertrand would not allow free and fair elections in 1920. On 09/09/1919, after Bertrand started planning to manipulate the forthcoming elections, General Rafael Lopez Gutierrez initiated arrangements for his ousting (Stokes 1950: 50-51, Haggerty/Millet 1995: 24, Euraque 1996: chap. 3, Casey et al. 2020: 9). On 09/09/1919, Bertrand resigned and left the country, after the United States of America threatened an invasion if he would not accept their offer to mediate the dispute with General López Gutiérrez (Merrill 1995). With the help of the US, Francisco Bográn was installed as the head of an interim government with the promise to hold free elections.<sup>700</sup> On 02/01/1920, Following Bertrand's removal from power, General Rafael Lopez Gutierrez orchestrated the subsequent elections and assumed office in October 1920 (Stokes 1950: 51, Haggerty/Millet 1995: 24, Euraque 1996: chap. 3, Casey et al. 2020: 9). From 1920 to 1921, Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador made an unsuccessful attempt to reintroduce the CAF. The corresponding constitution from 09/21/1921 introduced women's suffrage but was never implemented (Smith 2008). During this time, the United States defended its interests and those of its companies in Honduras to a great extent and interfered in Honduran politics (Somoza 2005: 400).<sup>701</sup> The fruit companies wielded significant influence over the political decision-making process, a sway that was amplified by the absence or fragility of the national oligarchy and the populace's exclusion from political and economic engagement (Somoza 2005: 400). During this turbulent period there were no fair elections (Somoza 2005: 400). The available sources on electoral restrictions are inadequate. It is not entirely clear whether the electoral restrictions for military personnel of the 1894 constitution were lifted with the constitution of 1904. In general, it can be stated for the beginning of the 20th century and the Central and South American states that universal male suffrage was often only guaranteed *de jure* (Negretto/Visconti 2018: 30-32). According to Vanhanen, between 10.0 and 12.9 % of the population participated in the elections. Therefore, we classify the regime in this period as an electoral oligarchy. Based on our

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<sup>699</sup> The elections were wrongly dated to 1912 by Casey et al.

<sup>700</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Honduras#Honduras\\_in\\_the\\_twentieth\\_century](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Honduras#Honduras_in_the_twentieth_century)

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[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Honduras\\_\(1838%E2%80%931932\)#Expanded\\_role\\_of\\_the\\_United\\_States\\_\(1907%E2%80%931919\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Honduras_(1838%E2%80%931932)#Expanded_role_of_the_United_States_(1907%E2%80%931919)); <https://countrystudies.us/honduras/16.htm>

observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED classifies elections during this period as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores them as ambiguously free and fair while their CEI scores them as not clean. Furthermore, LIED and V-Dem's PCLI maintained their scoring, referring to an absence of political liberties. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive encountered substantial institutional limitations on power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

10/03/1924 End Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: Under pressure from the United States, the regime conducted moderately competitive elections from 10/27-10/29/1923. With inconclusive outcomes and the legislature unable to achieve a quorum to declare a victor, Lopez Gutierrez declared in January 1924 his intention to retain office. This decision prompted the defeated candidate, General Tiburcio Carias, to initiate an armed uprising, leading to U.S. intervention. Amid the conflict, Lopez Gutierrez passed away. A cease-fire brokered by the United States installed General Vicente Tosta as interim president (Stokes 1950: 53, Haggerty/Millet 1995: 25-26, Morris 2018: 8, Casey et al. 2020: 9-10). Interim president Tosta adhered to the stipulation of not seeking the presidency, and following the withdrawal of opposition candidates from the race, Miguel Paz Barahona emerged victorious in the presidential election on 12/28/1924 (Stokes 1950: 53-54, Haggerty/Millet 1995: 25-26, Morris 2018: 8, Casey et al. 2020: 10). On 02/01/1929, In an unexpected turn of events, opposition contender Vicente Mejia Colindres secured victory in the 1928 elections, prompting Paz Barahona to consent to stepping down from office (Stokes 1950: 54-55, Haggerty/Millet 1995: 27-28, Casey et al. 2020: 10). According to LIED only legislative elections, which weren't multiparty were held in 1924, from 1925 to 1927 executive and legislative elections, which weren't multiparty were held and from 1928 onward multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. LIED categorizes the elections as not competitive between 1924 and 1928, after which they are categorized as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores them as somewhat free and fair from 1924 to 1927, after which it scores them as fair. V-Dem's CEI scores them as not really clean for the entire period. However, according to LIED no political liberties were achieved. V-Dem's PCLI classified them as not present except from 1929 to 1931 they were not really present. General Carias emerged victorious in a legitimate election held in October 1932. The election was classified as competitive by LIED, but V-Dem's CEI indicates no real cleanliness. Nevertheless, the overall conditions were somewhat

free and fair (V-Dem EF&FI). Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive encountered substantial institutional limitations on power. On 11/26/1933 Carías upheld the state of siege initiated by his predecessor and expanded his political dominance across the nation by appointing local political and military figures. Initially, Carías employed patronage and control over state resources to sway opposition politicians. From 1935 onwards, there was a noticeable escalation in arrests and suppression of dissenting voices (Dodd 2005: 62-71, Haggerty/Millet 1993, Leonard 1998: 96, MacCameron 1983: 17, Stokes 1950: 219-26, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 67). In 1935 the Communist Party of Honduras was outlawed. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive encountered substantial institutional limitations on power. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

04/15/1936 End Electoral Autocracy/Start One-Party Autocracy: The constitution prohibited an immediate reelection of President Carías so he called a constituent assembly to propose a new constitution. The constitution was amended on 04/15/1936.<sup>702</sup> The major constitutional changes included the elimination of the prohibition of immediate reelection as well as a prolonged term in office of six rather than four years. The constitution also established that the incumbent president would remain in office until 1943.<sup>703</sup> Other constitutional changes included restoring the death penalty, reducing legislative powers, and denying women citizenship and voting rights (Merrill 1995). On 12/12/1939, a proposal presented to the congress which would prolong Carías' presidency until 1949 was adopted.<sup>704</sup> By the conclusion of the 1930s, the National Party of Honduras (PNH) stood as the sole organized and operational political party in the country.<sup>705</sup> Leaders of other political parties had been imprisoned or had fled to exile. In the 1940s, antigovernment protests and uprisings emerged. In July 1944, antigovernment protestors were killed by the military. Following pressure from the United States of America, Carías announced free elections for October 1948 when his current term in office expired (Merrill 1995). Opposition parties were allowed to return.<sup>706</sup> Following a boycott of the elections by the PLH due to restricted campaigning and their accusation of election fraud to be committed by the PNH, Carías' choice for president, Gálvez won the elections on

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<sup>702</sup> <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/home/research-projects/dadm-project/western-hemisphere-region/honduras-1902-present/>

<sup>703</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Honduras#Honduras\\_in\\_the\\_twentieth\\_century](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Honduras#Honduras_in_the_twentieth_century)

<sup>704</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1939\\_Honduran\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1939_Honduran_presidential_election)

<sup>705</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Honduras#Honduras\\_in\\_the\\_twentieth\\_century](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Honduras#Honduras_in_the_twentieth_century)

<sup>706</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Honduras#End\\_of\\_Carías's\\_regime](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Honduras#End_of_Carías's_regime)

10/10/1948 unopposed.<sup>707</sup> According to LIED executive and legislative, which weren't multiparty, were held. Besides, LIED continued to code political liberties as absent. V-Dem's PCLI indicates them as absent until 1949 and as what we interpret as ambiguous afterwards. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. Until 1953, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For 1954, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

10/10/1954 End One-Party Autocracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date, relatively free elections were held and Villeda Morales of the PLH won a plurality of the votes, but an absolute majority was required. During this time, president Gálvez went to the United States due to health issues, and, in line with the constitution, Vice President Julio Lozano Díaz assumed office on 11/16/1954 as provisional president. The congress vote was boycotted by the PNH and MNR, the two major conservative parties. Thus, it fell to the supreme court to select a president, but because the court was primarily composed of appointees by Carías, the PLH declined to comply with this course of action (Leonard 2011: 143). The constitution allowed the incumbent president to assume dictatorial powers as chief of state if a new president was not elected by congress within eight weeks. This deadline passed on 12/04/1954, and on 12/05/1954, Julio Lozano Díaz proclaimed himself president, dissolving the congress and claiming dictatorial powers. Subsequently, Lozano appointed a council of state, led by a PLH member but comprising representatives from all three major parties, to temporarily replace the congress until a constituent assembly could be chosen to draft a new constitution (Merrill 1995). Chin/Wright/Carter (2021b: 125) categorize this event as an autogolpe due to Lozano's actions falling partially within constitutional bounds, whereas in standard procedures, the president should have been one of the presidential candidates. Universal suffrage was decreed in November 1955 and ratified in the 1957 constitution (Smith 2008). On 10/07/1956, constituent assembly elections were held. Before the elections, President Lozano Díaz formed his party, the National Union Party (PUN). The elections were allegedly rigged, as the PUN won all 56 congressional seats (Leonard 2011). While for a period between 12/05/1954 and 10/07/1956 there was no legislative assembly, formally the conditions for an electoral autocracy

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<sup>707</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1948\\_Honduran\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1948_Honduran_general_election)

are not fulfilled in this period. However, because the procedure was more or less in line with the constitution, we classify this period still as an electoral autocracy. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. Furthermore, political liberties were still coded as absent by LIED and can be interpreted as ambiguous following V-Dem's PCLI.

10/21/1956 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, the armed forces, under the leadership of the commanders from the army and air force academies, along with Major Roberto Gálvez, the son of the former president, removed Lozano Díaz from power and established a military junta to govern the nation.<sup>708</sup> The subsequent military junta consisted of a military triumvirate comprising General Roque Jacinto Rodríguez Herrera (Director of the "Francisco Morazán" Military Academy), Roberto Gálvez Barnes (an engineer who served as Minister during Lozano's government), and Héctor Caraccioli Moncada (chief of the Honduran Armed Forces).<sup>709</sup> After the junta took power, they annulled the fraudulent constituent elections held on 10/07/1956, established a new cabinet and declared martial law against armed partisans of Lozano (Chin/Wright/Carter 2021b). The coup represented a pivotal moment in Honduran history. It marked the first instance where the armed forces operated as an institution rather than merely serving as a tool for a political party or a single leader (Merrill 1995: 36). On 07/07/1957, the ruling junta ousted Rodríguez. López Arellano became chairman. The classification of this event depends on the regime leader at the time. In agreement with Chin/Wright/Carter (2021b), we consider Rodríguez to be the nominal executive, not the regime leader. Therefore, this constitutes a coup by a faction of the junta, rather than a regime change. This period was falsely described as a military coup that installed an interim government to oversee a democratic transition in the GWF dataset. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the state of political liberties. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were

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<sup>708</sup> <https://onwar.com/data/honduras1956b.html>

<sup>709</sup> [https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Honduran\\_military\\_junta\\_of\\_1956-1957](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Honduran_military_junta_of_1956-1957)

limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

12/21/1957 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: The military allowed relatively free popular elections on 10/07/1957 for a constituent assembly, resulting in a majority victory for the PLH under a system of proportional representation. On 11/14/1957, the military junta and the liberal party decided against the initially planned direct presidential elections, opting for Ramón Villeda Morales to assume the presidency. During this period, Villeda was the only candidate widely supported by the military and civil society. Thus, Villeda was appointed by a democratically elected body, despite the unfulfilled promise of direct elections. His six-year term as president commenced on 12/21/1957 (Leonard 2011, Chin/Wright/Carter 2021b). He exerted significant influence over politics in the ensuing era. Nevertheless, the nation struggled to solidify democratic institutions (MCM codebook, S. 22). For instance, the low Polity score of -1 corroborates our coding of these years as an electoral hybrid regime.<sup>710</sup> MCM coded the country as a multiparty autocracy, PRC as semidemocracy, GWF, LIED, BR, BMR as a democracy. The classification by RoW as a closed autocracy seems to be a sheer misclassification since elections took place in this period. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes elections during this time as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI does not provide data for this time while their CEI scores the elections as not clean. Additionally, political liberties were absent (LIED), but V-Dem's PCLI scores them with an ambiguous presence. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

10/03/1963 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Military Autocracy: Military coup led by Air Force Colonel and commander of the armed forces López Arellano ousted the elected government of Villeda Morales days before the presidential election and established a military junta because they feared Villeda would enact leftist reforms after re-election. On the same day, General Oswaldo López Arellano declared himself president, dissolved the congress, suspended the constitution, and cancelled the planned elections (Haggerty/Millet 1993, Morris 1984: 39, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 67). As a result, the military emerged as the

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<sup>710</sup> <https://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/hon2.htm>

predominant political force in Honduras, yet it relied on civilian allies for support. From 1963 to 1971, General of the Air Force Oswaldo López governed the country in partnership with Ricardo Zúniga Agustinus, the leader of the National Party (Ruhl 1996: 36). According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held in 1963 and 1964, from 1965 onward multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. Besides, political liberties continued to be coded as absent (LIED). V-Dem's PCLI decreased into a range which we interpret as not real presence of political liberties. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For 1964, V-Dem's JCE is classified as limited, indicating weak judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For the rest of the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

03/28/1971 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date, elections under the auspices of a pact for power sharing between the PN and PL took place. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED classifies them as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores them as somewhat free and fair while their CEI scores them as not really clean. Under the agreement, the seats were divided equally between both parties, disregarding the electoral results (Morris 1984: 43, Anderson 1988: 134, Somoza 2005, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 67). Ramón Ernesto Cruz Uclés, a non-military, was elected as president. It is true that the regime period was "sandwiched by military regimes on either side" and not free of military influence (MCM, S. 23). However, precisely the fact that there was a military coup against Ucles shows that he was not just a puppet president of the military. According to LIED multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. Furthermore, political liberties were not given (LIED). V-Dem' PCLI scores them as not really present. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

12/04/1972 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, a military coup, led by General López Arellano, ousted elected president Cruz Ucles and López Arellano ruled



as a military dictator (Morris 1984: 44, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 67-68). The ensuing government adopted a populist stance and implemented various socio-economic reforms aimed at modernizing the nation through proactive state involvement. One of the most contentious initiatives introduced was an agrarian reform program.<sup>711</sup> On 04/22/1975, López Arellano was deposed for his corruption scandal involving an American fruit company. This internal military coup was led by Melgar Castro, who announced his cabinet on 04/23/1975, but ruled *de facto* alone as a military dictator. Under this regime, military hard-liners gradually regained control, bringing an end to the era of military reformism (Ruhl 1996: 37). On 08/07/1978, right-wing elements in the military charged that his corruption and repression cost him control over the country, ousted Melgar Castro, and replaced his government with a three-member junta led by General Policarpo Paz García. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. Moreover, the state of political liberties is coded as absent per LIED and can be interpreted as not really present per V-Dem's PCLI. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE is classified as limited, indicating weak judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

04/20/1980 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral (Military) Autocracy: On this date, the military regime permitted the election of a constituent assembly. On 07/25/1980, the constituent assembly held presidential elections. As no candidate received an absolute majority, Paz García remained in office (Somoza 2005). Since the military still played a major role in politics and held veto power the regime is classified as an electoral autocracy. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. LIED classifies them as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores them as somewhat free and fair while their CEI scores them as not really clean. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. V-Dem' PCLI still scores political liberties as not really present and LIED views them as absent. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were

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<https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100114713;jsessionid=FC581B2B49BA8746EC9BA6E72CBB1966>

moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

11/29/1981 End Electoral (Military) Autocracy/Start Defective Democracy: On this date, multiparty elections ended military rule. The election was won by the party not endorsed by the military, and the newly elected president assumed office in January 1982, finalizing the transition to democracy (Pearson 1982: 439, Anderson 1988: 155, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 67-68). A new constitution was approved in 1982 and the PLH government of Roberto Suazo assumed power. In a regularly scheduled election, opposition candidate Rafael Leonardo Callejas of the National Party captured 42 percent of the vote to 27 percent for of the ruling Liberal Party candidate Jose Azcona Hoyo. However, the PLH interpreted election law in such a way that it allowed for multiple candidates from one party. Taken conjointly, the results of all the candidates from the PLH outweighed Callejas' score. Therefore, Azcona, the PLH candidate with the most votes, assumed presidency.<sup>712</sup> The transfer of power was peaceful and strongly supported by the military. Elections in 1990, 1993 and 1998 went smoothly. Civilian control over the military was established. In the 2001 elections the PNH triumphed over the PLH. On 11/27/2005, Zelaya (PLH) won the presidential elections with a margin of only 4%.<sup>713</sup> 2009 marked the beginning of the Honduran constitutional crisis surrounding Zelaya's plans to execute a referendum concerning the establishment of a constituent assembly tasked with the drafting of a new constitution. This move was deemed unconstitutional by many and led to the 2009 coup.<sup>714</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes elections during this time as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores them as somewhat free and fair. Their CEI scores them as of ambiguous cleanliness from 1982 to 1989 and from 2001 to 2009. In between these periods, the CEI scores elections as somewhat clean. As per FH's classification for 1982, the country receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. In 1983 a score of 6 to 7 designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. Between 1984 and 1992 Honduras is classified as free with a score of 5, which falls into our interpretation of the rather free category. For the period from 1993 to 1996 it scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. In 1997 and 1998 the country is once again classified as free with a score of 5, which falls within our interpretation of the rather free category. For the remaining period Honduras scores between 6 and 7,

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<sup>712</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Honduras#1980s](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Honduras#1980s)

<sup>713</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Honduras#2000s](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Honduras#2000s)

<sup>714</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Honduran\\_fourth\\_ballot\\_box\\_referendum](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Honduran_fourth_ballot_box_referendum)

categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. Moreover, political liberties were absent until 1998 (LIED). V-Dem's PCLI scores the political liberties as ambiguous until 1990. From 1991 to 1997 they were somewhat present and fully present from 1998 onwards. From 1982 to 1984, based on Polity5's evaluation, the executive's power was limited to a degree between substantial constraints and parity with other institutions, fitting Intermediate Category 3. Since 1995, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was significantly constrained by institutional checks during this time. For the year 1982, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. From 1983 to 1989, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. From 1990 to 1992, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. From 1993 to 1998, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For the years 1999-2008, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For 2009, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. The regime is a borderline case between a defective democracy and an electoral hybrid regime.

06/28/2009 End Defective Democracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: On this date, following orders from the Honduran Supreme Court, the army ousted President Manuel Zelaya and sent him into exile.<sup>715</sup> Zelaya had attempted to schedule a non-binding poll on holding a referendum on convening a constituent assembly to rewrite the constitution. He refused to comply with court orders to cease, and the Honduran Supreme Court issued a secret warrant for his arrest dated 06/26/2009. Two days later, Honduran soldiers stormed the president's house in the middle of the night and detained him, forestalling the poll. Instead of bringing him to trial, the army put him on a military airplane and flew him to Costa Rica. Later that day, after the reading of a resignation letter of disputed authenticity, the Honduran Congress voted to

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<sup>715</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2009\\_Honduran\\_coup\\_d%27%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2009_Honduran_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat)

remove Zelaya from office, and appointed Speaker of Congress Roberto Micheletti, his constitutional successor, to replace him. On 11/05/2009 the Micheletti administration formed a so-called unity government without the participation of Zelaya and his supporters, prompting Zelaya to threaten to pull out of the reconciliation agreement and boycott the upcoming presidential election. On 11/25/2009 the Supreme Court ruled that Zelaya could not legally return to office (Lansford 2021: 701-702). As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was significantly constrained by institutional checks during this time.

11/26/2009 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date, parliamentary and presidential polling took place amid greatly heightened security, as some 30,000 police and military personnel were ordered to patrol the streets and oversee the electoral process. In the presidential election, the PN's Lobo won 56.6 percent of the vote, easily defeating the PL's Elvin Santos, who had served as vice president under Zelaya. Santos garnered 38.1 percent on turnout of slightly less than 50 percent of the electorate. In concurrent parliamentary elections, the PN won 71 seats of the total 128 contested seats in congress. The PL secured the second highest number of seats with 45. On 12/02/2009, the outgoing congress voted against reinstating Zelaya as president (Lansford 2021: 701). The election results were rejected by many national and internationally actors.<sup>716</sup> General elections were held in Honduras on 11/24/2013. The elections took place at a time of rapidly declining human rights.<sup>717</sup> Voters went to the polls to elect a new President, the 128 members of the National Congress, 298 Mayors and vice-mayors and their respective councilors and 20 representatives to the Central American Parliament. Honduran elections have historically been marred by fraud, and polls leading up to the elections found that 59% of Hondurans believe the elections would be fraudulent. However, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) has stated that these would be the most clean and fair elections in Honduras's history, and both the traditionally dominant parties – the National and Liberal parties – agree. The newly formed Libre Party and Anti-Corruption Party feared that there would be fraud, a position backed by the Carter Center. Anti-Corruption Party candidate Salvador Nasralla publicly denounced attempts at vote-buying by the National Party across the country.<sup>718</sup> In 2014, the Hernández government abolished five ministries at the cabinet level and established seven overarching ministries as a cost-cutting measure. Critics contend that this restructuring centralized power excessively.<sup>719</sup> On 11/26/2017, following that, President Juan Orlando Hernández was re-elected with the Supreme

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<sup>716</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2009\\_Honduran\\_general\\_election#Reactions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2009_Honduran_general_election#Reactions)

<sup>717</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2013\\_Honduran\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2013_Honduran_general_election)

<sup>718</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2013\\_Honduran\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2013_Honduran_general_election)

<sup>719</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/honduras/freedom-world/2021>

Electoral Council (TSE) declaring in December, three weeks post the election, that he had garnered 42.95 percent of the vote, compared to opposition candidate Salvador Nasralla's 41.42 percent. The Organization of American States (OAS) highlighted several concerns regarding the electoral procedure, describing it as "marked by irregularities and deficiencies, with notably low technical standards and electoral cleanliness," and called for fresh elections to be conducted.<sup>720</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes some elections as competitive and others as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI fluctuates between speaking of not really and ambiguous free or fair elections. Their CEI scores elections as not really clean. Overall, the quality of the elections fluctuated, but never reached the stage of (semi-)democratic elections. In addition, there were also measures that substantially increased the power of the executive. Per FH's scoring for the regime period until 2019, the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. In 2020 a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. For this time political liberties decreased back to absent (LIED). Whereas V-Dem's PCLI scores were still at a somewhat present level until 2019 and full present ever since 2020. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was significantly constrained by institutional checks during this time. For 2010 and 2011, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For 2012, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For 2013 and 2014, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. From 2015 to 2020, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For the year 2021, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

11/28/2021 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Defective Democracy: In November 2021, Xiomara Castro of the Libre Party secured the presidency with 51.1 percent of the vote, marking the end

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<sup>720</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/honduras/freedom-world/2018>

of 12 years of National Party control of the office. As the transition of power happened peacefully and constitutionally, we code this regime change event as a voluntary exit. Castro, the country's inaugural female president, was elected amidst a historically high voter turnout. The EU election mission to Honduras noted that, despite several lingering challenges, the electoral system reforms implemented in May 2021 had enhanced transparency and bolstered confidence in the election outcomes.<sup>721</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes the elections as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores them as somewhat free and fair. Their CEI scores them as not clean. As per FH, for this regime period, the country receives a score of 8, which we interpret as falling into the rather not free category. However, political liberties were absent in 2021 according to LIED. V-Dem's PCLI still underlines full political liberties. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. Defective Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional Sources (Bendel 1995, Benítez 2009, Oettler/Peetz 2010, Peetz 2009)

## **Hong Kong**

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: 08/29/1842]: The Qin dynasty brought the Hong Kong area under Chinese rule in 214 BCE, following their conquest of the indigenous Baiyue people. After the Qin dynasty collapsed, the region became part of the Nanyue kingdom, a precursor to Vietnam, until it was recaptured by China during the Han conquest. During the Mongol conquest in the 13th century, the Southern Song court briefly resided in modern-day Kowloon City before its ultimate defeat in the 1279 Battle of Yamen by the Yuan Dynasty. By the end of the Yuan dynasty, seven prominent families had settled in the area, with migration continuing during the Ming dynasty. In 1839, the Daoguang Emperor refused to legalize and tax opium, leading to the First Opium War after imperial commissioner Lin Zexu destroyed opium stockpiles and halted foreign trade. The Qing surrendered Hong Kong Island to Britain in the Convention of Chuenpi, but dissatisfaction led to further hostilities until the formal cession of Hong Kong Island to the United Kingdom in the

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<sup>721</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/honduras/freedom-world/2022>

1842 Treaty of Nanking.<sup>722</sup> V-Dem's PCLI classifies political liberties as ambiguous until 1931 and as somewhat present from 1932 onward. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

12/25/1941 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Liberal Democracy]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Japan, Constitutional Monarchy]: On this date, the Imperial Japanese occupation of Hong Kong commenced, when Sir Mark Young, the Governor of Hong Kong, capitulated the British Crown colony to the Empire of Japan. This surrender followed 18 days of intense combat against Japanese invading forces. Lasting for three years and eight months, the occupation persisted until Japan's surrender at the conclusion of World War II.<sup>723</sup> Moreover, political liberties are indicated with an ambiguous level for this period according to V-Dem's PCLI. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

08/14/1945 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Japan, Constitutional Monarchy]/Start Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Democracy]: On this date, following Japan's announcement of unconditional surrender, the British assembled a naval task force destined for Hong Kong. Rear-Admiral Cecil Harcourt declared a military administration, appointing himself as its leader, on 09/01. Upon his reinstatement as governor in May 1946, Young initiated political reform, referred to as the Young Plan, aiming to counter the Chinese government's efforts to reclaim Hong Kong by granting local residents a greater role in the territory through expanded political representation.<sup>724</sup> The terms outlined in the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration established the conditions for the transfer of Hong Kong, with China consenting to uphold the existing governmental and economic frameworks under the "one country, two systems" principle for a span of 50 years. According to FH, for the years 1972 to 1978, the country is rated as free with a score of 5, which we interpret as rather free in our framework. As classified by FH for the rest of the analysed regime period, the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. Besides, V-Dem's PCLI increased into a range which we interpret as political liberties were somewhat present until 1979 and as present from 1980 onward. Until 1985, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted

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<sup>722</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hong\\_Kong#History](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hong_Kong#History)

<sup>723</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese\\_occupation\\_of\\_Hong\\_Kong](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_occupation_of_Hong_Kong)

<sup>724</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British\\_Hong\\_Kong#Restoration\\_of\\_British\\_rule](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Hong_Kong#Restoration_of_British_rule)

by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. From 1986 to 1991, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. From 1992 onwards, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

07/01/1997 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime [as Protectorate of China, Communist Ideocracy]: On this date, the transfer of Hong Kong from the United Kingdom to the People's Republic of China occurred at midnight. This marked the conclusion of 156 years of British governance in the territory. The transfer marks the entry into force of the Sino-British Joint Declaration. Therefore, we code the regime change event as a negotiated transition. Hong Kong was designated as a special administrative region (SAR) of China for a duration of 50 years, allowing it to maintain distinct economic and governmental structures separate from those of mainland China during this period.<sup>725</sup> The Legislative Council established by Patten, with plans for partial universal suffrage, was replaced by an entirely unelected provisional legislature by the People's Republic of China (PRC).<sup>726</sup> The Provisional Legislative Council (PLC) served as Hong Kong's interim legislature from 1997 to 1998. Initially founded in Guangzhou and later relocated to Shenzhen in 1996 (with offices in Hong Kong), it moved to Hong Kong upon the handover to temporarily replace the Legislative Council.<sup>727</sup> As classified by FH for 1997, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. Per FH's scoring for 1998, the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. V-Dem's PCLI indicates that political liberties were present. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

05/24/1998 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime [as Protectorate of China, Communist Ideocracy]/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime [as Protectorate of China, Communist Ideocracy]: On this date, the 1998 Hong Kong Legislative Council election took place, which was the first

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<sup>725</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Handover\\_of\\_Hong\\_Kong](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Handover_of_Hong_Kong)

<sup>726</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy\\_in\\_Hong\\_Kong#Post-1997](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy_in_Hong_Kong#Post-1997)

<sup>727</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Provisional\\_Legislative\\_Council](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Provisional_Legislative_Council)



since the establishment of the HKSAR in 1997. It replaced the Beijing-controlled Provisional Legislative Council (PLC), which was boycotted by the pro-democracy camp. The election returned 20 members from directly elected geographical constituencies, 10 from the Election Committee constituency, and 30 from functional constituencies, with 10 uncontested. The pro-Beijing Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB) capitalized on Beijing's proportional representation system, gaining more seats than the Democratic Party. The Democratic Party secured 13 seats, becoming the largest party, while the Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood also won seats. The Beijing-controlled PLC lost all its seats.<sup>728</sup> Hong Kong operates under a hybrid regime that does not fully represent its population. Members of the Legislative Council elected by functional constituencies, comprising professional and special interest groups, are answerable to these limited corporate electorates rather than the broader public. This electoral system has ensured a pro-establishment majority in the legislature since sovereignty was transferred. Similarly, the chief executive is chosen by establishment politicians and corporate members of the Election Committee, rather than through direct election. While universal suffrage for the chief executive and all Legislative Council elections are stipulated goals of Basic Law Articles 45 and 68, the legislature is only partially directly elected, and the executive continues to be nominated by an unrepresentative body. Calls for direct elections for these positions have been repeatedly made to the government.<sup>729</sup> The pan-democratic camp proposed a referendum in 2004 to gauge support for universal suffrage, but the idea faced resistance from the government and Beijing officials, citing concerns about breaching the Basic Law. In 2005 the government proposed a "district council model" for electing the chief executive and legislature, facing criticism from pan-democrats for not fully embracing universal suffrage. Pan-democrats proposed their own blueprint for political reform in 2007, advocating for equal and universal suffrage, but faced challenges in gaining support. Despite efforts for electoral reform, progress has been slow, with mainland officials emphasizing other priorities over democracy in Hong Kong. Various protests and controversies, including the 2014 Umbrella Movement and the 2019 extradition bill protests, highlighted ongoing tensions and concerns about Hong Kong's political future. V-Dem's CEI scores the elections as clean from 1998 to 2015. For the following six years the scores decreased to somewhat clean. The overall election conditions are classified as free and fair until 2015 and switched then to a somewhat level (V-Dem EF&FI). Per FH's scoring for 1998-2003, the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as

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<sup>728</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1998\\_Hong\\_Kong\\_legislative\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1998_Hong_Kong_legislative_election)

<sup>729</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hong\\_Kong#Political\\_reforms\\_and\\_sociopolitical\\_issues](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hong_Kong#Political_reforms_and_sociopolitical_issues)

rather not free. As classified by FH for 2004-2018, the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. According to FH, for the years 2019 and 2020, the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. According to FH, for the rest of the regime period under consideration, a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. Besides, according to V-Dem's PCLI political liberties were fully present until 2013, then decreased to somewhat present until 2018. From 2019 to 2020 political liberties were acknowledged to be ambiguous. V-Dem's PCLI classifies the political liberties as not really present since 2021. Until 2017, For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For the year 2018, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For 2019, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For 2020, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For 2021, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

03/11/2021 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date, the National People's Congress passed a decision to overhaul Hong Kong's electoral system, seen as further limiting democratic freedoms and increasing Beijing's control over the region. We code this regime change event as a strategic autocratic restructuring, recognizing Beijing's de facto governmental power over Hong Kong. Debate continues about Hong Kong's political future post-2047.<sup>730</sup> While the quantitative indicators point clearly into the direction of an electoral hybrid regime in the regime period until 03/11/2021 it is according to our qualitative observations afterwards an electoral autocracy. We classify it as an electoral autocracy since the competition was severely restricted. Even before the 2021 reforms, Hong Kong experienced significant crackdowns on pro-democracy activists and movements. Notable incidents include the 2014 Umbrella Movement and the 2019 extradition bill protests, which were met with

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<sup>730</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy\\_in\\_Hong\\_Kong#Post-1997](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy_in_Hong_Kong#Post-1997;);  
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021\\_Hong\\_Kong\\_electoral\\_changes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021_Hong_Kong_electoral_changes)

heavy-handed responses from authorities, curbing political dissent and activism. From the outset, Beijing maintained substantial influence over Hong Kong's political affairs. The establishment of the Provisional Legislative Council (PLC) in 1997, bypassing fully democratic procedures, set a precedent for external control over Hong Kong's legislative processes. Media outlets critical of the government or pro-democracy movements often faced pressure, censorship, or shutdowns. This environment limited free expression and hampered the ability of opposition voices to gain traction and influence public opinion. Since 2022, not real electoral cleanliness is achieved according to V-Dem's CEI. V-Dem's EF&FI indicates the overall election conditions as not free and fair since 2022. LIED does not treat Hong Kong in its dataset. From 03/11/2021 onwards Hong Kong is a clear case of an electoral autocracy. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country receives a score of 10 and is interpreted as partly free, which corresponds to our interpretation of rather not free.

Electoral Autocracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

## **Hungary**

[Until 10/30/1918 Hungary refers to the Hungarian half of the Habsburg Empire.]

01/01/1900 Constitutional Monarchy [Start: 12/25/1000]: The Principality of Hungary was formed in 895. The Kingdom of Hungary was founded by Stephen I of Hungary in 1000, who received his crown from the Pope on Christmas day in 1000 (12/25/1000).<sup>731</sup> The Kingdom of Hungary was a diverse, multiethnic state from its establishment, encompassing present-day Hungary, Slovakia, Transylvania, and other regions of Romania, Carpathian Ruthenia (currently part of Ukraine), Vojvodina (present-day Serbia), the territory of Burgenland (now part of Austria), Međimurje (currently part of Croatia), Prekmurje (now part of Slovenia), and a handful of villages that are now situated in Poland.<sup>732</sup> According to LIED only multiparty legislative elections were held until 1913, from 1914 to 1916 no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held, in 1917 only multiparty legislative elections were held. For this time LIED codes political liberties as absent. V-Dem's PCLI indicates an ambiguous state of political liberties. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight

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<sup>731</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom\\_of\\_Hungary\\_\(1000%E2%80%931301\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Hungary_(1000%E2%80%931301))

<sup>732</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom\\_of\\_Hungary](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Hungary)

limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

10/30/1918 End Constitutional Monarchy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: On this date, Count Mihaly Karolyi and his Independence Party, in conjunction with the Radical Party and Social Democrats, formed a National Council that assumed control. Following King Karl's abdication on 11/16, Hungary was proclaimed a republic (Molnár 2001: 250-51, Casey et al. 2020: 10). On 11/03/1918 independence was finally gained.<sup>733</sup> According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

03/21/1919 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Communist Ideocracy: Following public outcry over Karolyi's decision to cede substantial territory to the Entente powers, Karolyi stepped down and transferred authority to the Social Democrats, who had clandestinely aligned with the Communist Party. On this day, they proclaimed the establishment of the Socialist Federative Republic of Councils in Hungary (commonly known as the Hungarian Soviet Republic) (Molnár 2001: 252-53, Casey et al. 2020: 10).<sup>734</sup> Sándor Garbai and Béla Kun were leading the country until Romania and Czechia invaded Hungary. On 02/08, Kun escaped Hungary and headed towards the Austrian border, eventually arriving in the Russian SFSR (Balogh 1976, Grotz/Hubai 2010). As per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time.

08/08/1919 End Communist Ideocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: A Romanian intervention ousted the Hungarian Soviet Republic in August 1919 and departed in November (Molnár 2001: 261, 264-68, Berman 2019: 310-311). In Budapest, a socialist government led by Gyula Peidl was established with support from the Allied council, but its time in power was brief.<sup>735</sup> The cabinet, comprising four of Kun's previous government commissioners, swiftly shifted allegiance to the Social Democrats, who retained key ministerial positions, such as Defense and Foreign Affairs. During its inaugural session on 02/08/1919, it formally dissolved

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<sup>733</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First\\_Hungarian\\_Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Hungarian_Republic)

<sup>734</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hungarian\\_Soviet\\_Republic#Coup\\_d'%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hungarian_Soviet_Republic#Coup_d'%C3%A9tat)

<sup>735</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hungarian%E2%80%93Romanian\\_War#Romanian\\_occupation\\_of\\_Budapest](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hungarian%E2%80%93Romanian_War#Romanian_occupation_of_Budapest)

the Hungarian Soviet Republic and reinstated the Hungarian People's Republic. Additionally, the people's courts were dissolved, and former political detainees were freed from incarceration. The release of these opponents bolstered the ranks of the counterrevolutionaries. Consequently, the country operated without a head of state or head of government.<sup>736</sup> As per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time. LIED identifies political liberties as absent and V-Dem's PCLI is also classified by us as indicating that political liberties are absent.

11/16/1919 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Right-wing (Semi-Fascist) (Military) Autocracy: After the Romanian departure, Admiral Miklos Horthy and his army entered Budapest on 11/16/1919 (Molnár 2001: 261, 264-68, Berman 2019: 310-311, Casey et al. 2020: 10). Men could vote from the age of 24 while women only gained the right to vote from the age of 30. There were also educational and economic criteria set for both genders, but all criteria were higher for women.<sup>737</sup> Horthy was crowned regent on 03/01/1920. The regime swiftly launched an extensive campaign of political repression known as the "white terror," resulting in the execution of thousands of suspected leftists, along with members of political opposition groups and Jewish individuals (Molnár 2001: 261, 264-68, Berman 2019: 310-311, Casey et al. 2020: 10). During Horthy's tenure, Hungary was defined by its conservative, nationalist, and staunchly anti-communist disposition. The administration relied on a fragile coalition of conservatives and right-wing factions.<sup>738</sup> As per Istvan Deak, from 1919 to 1944, Hungary existed as a right-leaning nation molded from a legacy of counter-revolution. Despite its formal designation as a kingdom, Hungary functioned as a kingdom devoid of royalty. Amid extensive civil unrest that hindered the selection of a new monarch, the decision was made to officially appoint Horthy as the Regent of Hungary. The lack of elections for the executive was a key feature of the Horthy regime. It meant that Horthy was not accountable to the people, and that he could rule without any checks or balances. Formally, Horthy was elected by the National Assembly in 1920. However, this election was held under duress, and it is widely considered to be illegitimate. Since the regime came into being by a military coup and was led by a military officer backed by a network of high-ranking military officers who shared a common goal of maintaining the Horthy regime and promoting Hungarian nationalism the regime is classified as a military [semi-fascist] autocracy. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held in 1919, from 1920 onward multiparty executive and legislative

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<sup>736</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gyula\\_Peidl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gyula_Peidl)

<sup>737</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s\\_suffrage](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage)

<sup>738</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom\\_of\\_Hungary\\_\(1920%E2%80%931946\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Hungary_(1920%E2%80%931946))

elections were held. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. From 1920 to 1943, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For 1944, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For this time LIED continued to code political liberties as absent. V-Dem's PCLI indicates them as ambiguous until 1919 and from 1920 to 1940 and as not really present afterwards.

03/19/1944 End Right-wing (Semi-Fascist) (Military) Autocracy/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Germany, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]: On this date, as an ally of Nazi Germany and a combatant on the eastern front against the Soviet Union, Hungary sought an armistice from Moscow after Soviet troops entered the country on 10/15/1944. Subsequently, German forces occupying Hungary removed Horthy from power. During this period, LIED lists universal suffrage as absent. Ultimately, Hungarian and German forces were defeated by the Soviet Red Army by 04/04/1945 (Molnár 2001: 281, 290-91, 294, Casey et al. 2020: 10). According to LIED only executive elections were held. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is likewise classified by us as showing that political liberties are absent. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are moderate. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

04/04/1945 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Germany, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: On this date, Soviet operations in Hungary ended and the last German troops were expelled from the Hungarian territory. The regime was heavily dominated by Soviet influence. Although there was initial cooperation between the Communist Party (MKP) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP), political life was tightly controlled by the Soviets. In this phase, formal elections were delayed, and while multiple parties were allowed to operate, the Communists began consolidating power by cooperating with and, eventually, absorbing other leftist forces. The Communist Party played a moderate role initially to avoid alienating the population, distancing itself from the radicalism of the short-lived 1919 regime of Béla Kun. Despite outward cooperation, tensions remained between the Communists and other political forces, particularly as the MKP sought to dominate political institutions, eventually leading to a one-party system. In this period universal suffrage

for both men and women from the age of 20 was introduced.<sup>739</sup> In these two years political liberties are coded as absent per LIED and can be interpreted as not really present in 1945 and 1947 and as ambiguous in 1946. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are not really present in 1945 and are ambiguous in 1946. According to LIED multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

05/14/1947 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Communist Ideocracy: On 02/25/1947 the arrest of the secretary general of the Smallholders' Party and a number of other opposition activists marked an important step in the gradual takeover of the Communists. The Communists forced the arrest and recall of over 50 of MPs of the Smallholders' Party, robbing the party of its democratically won majority.<sup>740</sup> On 05/14/1947 a communist de facto coup against Ferenc Nagy (Smallholders Party) while he travelled to Switzerland finalized the takeover. Despite intimidation and fraud, the communists won only a plurality (22%) of the vote in 1947 but were able to control the succeeding government through a coalition with allies in other parties (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 68). The disorganization and repression of the Smallholders' Party, which had been the largest, was completed in 1947, and the Social Democrats, the other authentic large party, were forced to merge with the communists in June 1948 (Rakosi 1952, Nyssönen 2001: 892, Wittenberg 2006: 56-57, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 68).<sup>741</sup> On 07/15/1956 the Soviets forced the communist party to remove Rakosi to put Hungary back on the Soviet line. Gero was promoted to replace him. In October/November 1956 a popular uprising against the Gero and Soviet-backed regime began with the aim of overthrowing the government. The revolt regime was crushed. On 04/11/1956 Nagy was deposed as premier and later as party secretary. Kadar replaced him. During roundtable negotiations in 1989, the government and moderate opposition figures reached an agreement to conduct elections (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 35). Despite legalizing other parties, relinquishing its constitutional role in governing the country, and implementing several significant reforms throughout 1989, the communist party did not truly lose its grip on power until the elections of 1990 (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 68). According to LIED multiparty executive and legislative elections were held in 1947 and executive and legislative elections,

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<sup>739</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s\\_suffrage](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage)

<sup>740</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ferenc\\_Nagy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ferenc_Nagy)

<sup>741</sup> <http://tinyurl.com/8kochvl>

which weren't multiparty were held from 1948 onward. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For 1948, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. From 1949 to 1988, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For 1989, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. As classified by FH for the regime period until 1984, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Between 1985 and 1988 a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. In 1989 the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. Furthermore, the state of political liberties is coded as absent by LIED. V-Dem's PCLI indicates them as not really present from 1947 to 1948, in 1988 and as ambiguous in 1990.

04/08/1990 End Communist Ideocracy/Start Liberal Democracy: On this date, free and fair parliamentary elections which were won by an opposition party, the center-right Hungarian Democratic Forum, took place (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 35, Racz 1991: 112).<sup>742</sup> This period was characterized by multiple competitive elections with changes of government, peaceful transitions of power and an independent judiciary. Furthermore, civil liberties were effectively upheld (Puddington 2010: 288-289). As per FH's classification for this regime period, the country is considered free with a score ranging from 2 to 4, which we also interpret as free in our framework. According to LIED and V-Dem's PCLI political liberties were constantly present for this time. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes elections during this period as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI and CEI score them as free, fair and clean. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. Until 2009, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive. For 2010, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that

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<sup>742</sup> <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-hungary/>



judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

04/11/2010 End Liberal Democracy/Start Defective Democracy: From 2010 to 2014, Hungary can be characterized as a defective democracy. During this period, Viktor Orbán's Fidesz-KDNP coalition, which gained a two-thirds parliamentary majority in 2010, used its power to make sweeping constitutional and legislative changes. Democratic institutions remained formally intact, but systemic flaws emerged as the government tightened control over the judiciary, altered the constitution to centralize power, and implemented media regulations that increased state influence over public and private broadcasters. Restrictions on political freedoms and electoral reforms—including gerrymandering and rules favoring the ruling party—further eroded the fairness of political competition. While the democratic process was still functional, these deficiencies increasingly compromised Hungary's democratic standards, gradually shifting it towards a less competitive and more controlled political environment. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes all elections during this period as competitive. However, V-Dem's EF&FI and CEI score elections between 2010 and 2013 as free, fair and clean. Per FH, for this regime period, the country is classified as free, scoring between 2 and 4, which we also place in the free category. Moreover, both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI indicates that political liberties were present in this period. For the year 2011, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For the rest of the regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive.

01/01/2014 End Defective Democracy/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: The specific event marking Hungary's transition from a defective democracy to an electoral hybrid regime is the electoral law reform, which came into effect on this date. This reform introduced significant structural changes to the electoral system, which disproportionately disadvantaged the opposition. One major aspect was the unequal redrawing of electoral boundaries, leading to gerrymandering that favored the Fidesz-KDNP coalition, allowing them to secure more seats with relatively fewer votes. Another significant change was the introduction of a bonus system for the leading party, awarding extra seats to the strongest party, which benefited Fidesz and disadvantaged smaller opposition parties. This made the electoral system less proportional and distorted democratic competition. Additionally, new restrictions on election advertising severely disadvantaged the opposition, as pro-government media and institutions received more

favorable access to public attention, while the opposition's reach was curtailed. In balloting for the assembly on 04/08/2018, the FiDeSz-MPSz- KDNP coalition came first with 133 seats (Lansford 2021: 711). The OSCE recognized that the elections were largely well managed but pointed out an "overlap between state and ruling party resources." They also highlighted issues such as opaque campaign financing, media bias, and the presence of "intimidating and xenophobic rhetoric," which impeded voters' ability to make informed decisions. Although there was no evidence of electoral fraud capable of influencing the election results, some irregularities were reported. The OSCE also noted that the strict adherence to formal regulations by the National Election Commission effectively restricted access to legal recourse.<sup>743</sup> As per FH, the state of "national governance" in Hungary exhibits autocratic inclinations, accompanied by a growing disregard for the rights of marginalized communities. While elections are technically free, fairness is compromised, exacerbated by alterations to the electoral laws that disproportionately disadvantage opposition parties (Bogaards 2018).<sup>744</sup> FH characterizes Hungary as a "hybrid regime," situated in the ambiguous territory between democracies and autocracies, often referred to as the "gray zone."<sup>745</sup> However, this is only partially reflected in the FH scores. Per FH, for the period until 2015, the country is classified as free, scoring between 2 and 4, which we also place in the free category. In 2016 and 2017 the country is rated as free with a score of 5, which we interpret as rather free in our framework. From 2018 onward the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. V-Dem CEI and EF&FI view elections as somewhat free, fair and clean. In addition to that the political liberties changed to absent scores (LIED). However, V-Dem's PCLI considers them as present until 2014 and as somewhat present ever since 2015. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. According to our observations Polity5 misjudges executive constraints in Hungary in this period. Until 2017, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. From 2018 onwards, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. However, in a comparative perspective Hungary is a borderline case between a defective democracy and an electoral hybrid regime.

Electoral Hybrid Regime as of 07/01/2025 continued.

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<sup>743</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/hungary/freedom-world/2022>

<sup>744</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/hungary/nations-transit/2022>

## Iceland

01/01/1900 Part of Other Country [Denmark, Constitutional Monarchy] [Start: 06/06/1523]: All of the Nordic states, including Iceland, were united in one alliance between 1397 and 1523 under the Kalmar Union, but on its dissolution on 06/06/1523<sup>746</sup>, Iceland fell under Danish rule. In 1661 Frederick III introduced an absolute monarchy in Denmark and Norway, and in the following year his absolutism was acknowledged in Iceland.<sup>747</sup> In 1874, Iceland was granted a constitution and a form of limited self-governance by Denmark. This development marked a significant step in Iceland's journey towards greater autonomy.<sup>748</sup> A small share of men was given the right to vote in the 1844 Althing elections. A small share of women was granted the right to vote in local elections in 1882. Women's suffrage was proposed in the Althing in 1911, ratified by the Althing in 1913, and enacted on 06/19/1915 by the Danish king but only granted the vote to women over 40, and did not grant the right to vote to servants. According to LIED only multiparty legislative elections were held. Both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI indicate that political liberties were present in this time. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

12/01/1918 End Part of Other Country [Denmark, Constitutional Monarchy]/Start (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy: On this date, through the Danish-Icelandic Act of Union Iceland became sovereign and independent from Denmark as the Kingdom of Iceland but retained a personal union with the King of Denmark. However, the monarch only had a ceremonial role. All voting restrictions were lifted in 1920 after Iceland became an independent state.<sup>749</sup> During this time Iceland conducted multiple competitive elections under universal suffrage.<sup>750</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes elections during this period as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI and CEI score them as free, fair and clean.

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<sup>746</sup> <https://blogs.loc.gov/law/2023/06/on-this-day-in-1523-gustav-vasa-elected-king-happy-500-sweden/>

<sup>747</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Iceland/Iceland-under-foreign-rule>

<sup>748</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Icelandic\\_independence\\_movement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Icelandic_independence_movement)

<sup>749</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom\\_of\\_Iceland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Iceland)

<sup>750</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_elections\\_in\\_Iceland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_elections_in_Iceland)

Furthermore, LIED and V-Dem's PCLI score that political liberties were present. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

05/10/1940 End Liberal Democracy/Start Indirect Rule Occupation Regime [by Allied Powers]: Following unsuccessful attempts to convince the Icelandic government to align with the Allies, the British launched an invasion on the morning of 05/10/1940.<sup>751</sup> The Allied powers occupied Denmark, whose monarch remained the Icelandic head of state. According to LIED, multiparty legislative elections were held during this period. LIED identifies political liberties as absent whereas V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are present. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

07/07/1941 End Indirect Rule Occupation Regime [by Allied Powers]/Start (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy: Iceland extended an invitation for the US Military to come ashore because US troops were reluctant to invade a neutral country. The transition from British to US troops is regarded as crossing the line from an occupied country to, at the very least, a semi-sovereign country. On this date the defense of Iceland was transferred from Britain to the United States, which was still a neutral country until five months later.<sup>752</sup> According to LIED multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. According to FH, for the assessed regime period, the country is categorized as free with a score between 2 and 4, which corresponds to our interpretation of free. The state of political liberties is indicated as present by both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

06/17/1944 Continuation Liberal Democracy (as a republic): The Kingdom of Iceland became a Republic.<sup>753</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes these elections as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI and CEI score them as free, fair and clean. Iceland has a parliamentary system of government with a unicameral parliament. The political landscape is characterized by a freely operating multi-party system. Adult Icelandic citizens

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<sup>751</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allied\\_occupation\\_of\\_Iceland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allied_occupation_of_Iceland);

<https://www.icelandicroots.com/post/2014/11/11/the-occupation-of-iceland-during-world-war-ii>

<sup>752</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iceland\\_in\\_World\\_War\\_II](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iceland_in_World_War_II)

<sup>753</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom\\_of\\_Iceland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Iceland)

have the right to vote. Elections are generally free and fair. The quality of liberal democratic freedoms is also substantial, as evidenced by the LDI. Both indexes score Iceland in the high very high range since its independence. Per FH, for this regime period, the country is classified as free, scoring between 2 and 4, which we also place in the free category. Additionally, according to LIED and V-Dem's PCLI constant political liberties were achieved ever since the end of Iceland's occupation. The judiciary operates generally independent.<sup>754</sup> On 09/25/2021 parliamentary elections were held.<sup>755</sup> Although the elections were generally considered free and fair, procedural irregularities occurred.<sup>756</sup> On 01/06/2024, Halla Tomasdottir was elected as Iceland's new president with 34.3% of the vote, after incumbent Gudni Johannesson did not seek re-election; the OSCE found no irregularities (OSCE 2024).<sup>757</sup> The parliamentary snap elections, on 11/30/2024, resulted in a clear shift to the left, with the Social Democratic Alliance winning the most seats. The highly fragmented outcome saw several established parties suffer their worst historical results, leading to complex negotiations to form a new government under the Alliance leader, Kristrún Frostadóttir.<sup>758</sup> From 1945 to 1986, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 1987-1988, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive. From 1989 to 2008, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. From 2009 to 2020, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also comprehensive. Since 2021, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

Liberal Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Qualitative Sources: (Jahn/Eythórsson 2009, Kristinsson 1999)

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<sup>754</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/iceland/freedom-world/2023>

<sup>755</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021\\_Icelandic\\_parliamentary\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021_Icelandic_parliamentary_election)

<sup>756</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/iceland/freedom-world/2023>

<sup>757</sup> <https://apnews.com/article/iceland-election-women-tomasdottir-d21ac1e08025de61c74ce16413b1224f>

<sup>758</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024\\_Icelandic\\_parliamentary\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Icelandic_parliamentary_election)

## India

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: 11/01/1858]: The British East India Company, established in 1600 as a trading company attained wide-ranging control over large areas of the Indian subcontinent. The Company was charged with governing and administering India and its rule in India lasted effectively from the 1757 (Battle of Plassey) until 1858 (Lowe 2015). Following the 1857 Indian Rebellion, the British Crown assumed direct colonial rule of India (called British Raj) by annexing the whole subcontinent. The transfer of administrative authority was effectively entrenched in the Act for the Good Government of India of 1858, which was introduced and passed by the British Parliament (Singh/Murari 2022). The act transferred the Government of India from the Company to the Crown by establishing the positions of British Viceroy and Governor General. Both were responsible of administering the government and were regarded as representatives of the British sovereign (Singh/Murari 2022). According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held until 1918, from 1919 onward only multiparty legislative elections were held. Elections in colonial India were based on a restricted franchise, heavily limited by qualifications such as property ownership, education, income, and landholding. These elections were part of a gradual process of introducing representative government under British rule, but universal suffrage was not implemented during this period. The introduction of elections began with the Indian Councils Act of 1861, which established legislative councils, though no elections took place, and members were appointed by the British government. The Indian Councils Act of 1892 brought a limited and indirect form of elections, where Indians could nominate representatives to legislative councils, but the franchise remained extremely narrow, limited to elite groups such as landlords and merchants. The Indian Councils Act of 1909, also known as the Morley-Minto Reforms, introduced direct elections to legislative councils for the first time, albeit with a very restricted electorate. The act also established separate electorates for Muslims, deepening the communalization of Indian politics. Only a small segment of the population was eligible to vote, based on property and educational qualifications. The Government of India Act of 1919, known as the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, expanded the electorate to about 10% of the adult male population. It also introduced the system of dyarchy in provincial governments, giving some measure of power to elected Indian ministers, although real power remained in the hands of British officials. The franchise was still limited by property and education. The most significant pre-independence electoral reform came with the Government of India Act of 1935, which extended the franchise further,

allowing around 30 million people to vote, including some women. It also introduced provincial autonomy, with elected provincial legislatures having greater authority. Nevertheless, the franchise was still based on property and education, far from being universal, and British control over key sectors remained intact. Colonial-era elections in India were thus largely designed to provide representation to a narrow segment of the Indian population, primarily the elites, while maintaining British dominance. On 04/01/1937, Burma province (today: Myanmar), which had been a part of British India in its entirety since 1885, was separated from British India and made into a distinct colony of the United Kingdom.<sup>759</sup> For more information, see Myanmar. Pre-independence elections were held in British India in December 1945 until January 1946 to elect members of the Central Legislative Assembly and the Council of State. The Indian National Congress emerged as the largest party, winning 59 of the 102 elected seats.<sup>760</sup> The Interim Government of India, also known as the Provisional Government of India, formed on 09/02/1946 from the newly elected Constituent Assembly of India. It had the task of assisting the transition of British India to independence. The Viceroy's Executive Council became the executive branch of the interim government. Originally headed by the Viceroy of India, it was transformed into a council of ministers, with the powers of a prime minister bestowed on the vice-president of the Council, a position held by the Congress leader Jawaharlal Nehru.<sup>761</sup> According to LIED political liberties were coded as absent. V-Dem's PCLI classifies political liberties as not really present until 1944 and in an ambiguous state from 1945 onward. India is after 1919 a borderline case between a direct rule and an indirect rule colonial regime. From 1900-1934 and in 1947, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. Between 1935 and 1946, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. On 08/14/1947 the Partition of India granted independence to Pakistan, comprised of West and East Pakistan. The regions of Bengal and Punjab were split between India and Pakistan.<sup>762</sup> For further information, see Pakistan.

08/15/1947 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start (Monarchical) Defective Democracy: India attained independence as a Dominion within the Commonwealth on this date (Lansford 2021: 727). The British sovereign

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<sup>759</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British\\_rule\\_in\\_Burma#Separation\\_from\\_India](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_rule_in_Burma#Separation_from_India)

<sup>760</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1945\\_Indian\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1945_Indian_general_election)

<sup>761</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interim\\_Government\\_of\\_India](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interim_Government_of_India)

<sup>762</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partition\\_of\\_India](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partition_of_India)

remained to be the head of state (Crawford 2006, Kumarasingham 2013). The latter was represented in each capital by a governor general appointed on the advice of the local prime minister (Kumarasingham 2013). However, the role of governor general became almost entirely ceremonial. Power was exercised on a day-to-day basis by the Indian cabinet and two native governors-general.<sup>763</sup> Jawahar Lal Nehru, leader of the politically dominant Indian National Congress (INC), served as India's first prime minister (Lansford 2021: 727). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED describes these elections as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores it free and fair while their CEI scores it not really clean. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are robust. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

11/26/1949 Continuation Defective Democracy (as a Republic): India adopted its first constitution and became a democratic republic on 01/26/1950.<sup>764</sup> The functions of the governor general were transferred to and performed by the president of India.<sup>765</sup> Universal suffrage was introduced in 1950 irrespective of race or gender or religion.<sup>766</sup> As per FH's classification for this regime period since 1972, the country receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. In addition to that, political liberties were absent according to LIED. V-Dem's PCLI scores them as somewhat present since 1948. In the period from 10/25/1951 to 02/21/1952 the first parliamentary elections after independence were held. The Indian National Congress (INC) won a landslide victory, winning 364 of the 489 seats and 45% of the total votes polled and Jawaharlal Nehru became the first democratically elected Prime Minister of the country.<sup>767</sup> . Despite universal suffrage and constitutional assurances of "justice, liberty, and equality in opportunity,"<sup>768</sup> the persistence of the caste system renders the Indian democracy a defective democracy. The democratic regime is accompanied by numerous abuses of civil and personal freedoms, particularly affecting the lower castes and, most of all, the Dalit community.<sup>769</sup> Thus, despite nominally having access to the political process and despite state efforts to ameliorate the living conditions of the Dalit, they continue to encounter a variety of political disadvantages

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<sup>763</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Governor-General\\_of\\_India](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Governor-General_of_India)

<sup>764</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1951%E2%80%9352\\_Indian\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1951%E2%80%9352_Indian_general_election)

<sup>765</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Governor-General\\_of\\_India](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Governor-General_of_India)

<sup>766</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal\\_suffrage#cite\\_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37)

<sup>767</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1951%E2%80%9352\\_Indian\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1951%E2%80%9352_Indian_general_election)

<sup>768</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution\\_of\\_India](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_India)

<sup>769</sup> <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/campaigns/caste/presskit.htm>



that impede their access to political power and participation (Saeed 2007).<sup>770</sup> However, the caste system predominantly persists in rural areas, gradually diminishing in significance in urban environments.<sup>771</sup> When Jawaharlal Nehru of the Congress Party, the first prime minister, died in 1964 he was replaced by newly elected party leader Lal Bahadur Shastri, who died shortly after, in 1966. A small group of influential men within the Congress Party, known as the “Syndicate”, decided for Indira Ghandi, the late Nehru’s daughter, to become the new party leader and thus, the new prime minister.<sup>772</sup> While her being the first female prime minister of India at this early point in history is interesting, and later she is reelected, this practice of succession is not exactly democratic. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. For the entire period LIED categorizes elections as competitive. V-Dem’s EF&FI classifies elections as free and fair until 1970, after which it only scores them as somewhat free and fair. V-Dem’s CEI changes its scoring earlier, as it scores elections as clean before 1967. From this point on, it scores them as somewhat clean. According to our criteria, India is a borderline case between a democracy and a semidemocracy in this period. From 1952 to 1966, based on Polity5’s evaluation, the executive’s power was limited to a degree between substantial constraints and parity with other institutions, fitting Intermediate Category 3. Since 1967, as per Polity5’s classification, the executive’s authority was on par with or below that of other branches, reflecting executive parity or subordination. For the year 1950, V-Dem’s JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive. For 1951, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. From 1952 to 1964, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also comprehensive. From 1965 onwards, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive.

06/25/1975 End Defective Democracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date, a state of emergency was declared which limited democratic rights: political opponents were imprisoned, the press was censored, and the practice of forced sterilization was enforced upon the

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<sup>770</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dalit#Prevention\\_of\\_Atrocities\\_Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dalit#Prevention_of_Atrocities_Act)

<sup>771</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caste\\_system\\_in\\_India#Apartheid\\_and\\_discrimination](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caste_system_in_India#Apartheid_and_discrimination)

<sup>772</sup> <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html> , see narratives for version 5.0, India\_R: 1.

impoverished as a form of birth control. This period was also known as the Reign of Terror. Within the Congress, Indira Gandhi outmaneuvered her rivals and the party split in 1969 - into the Congress (O) (comprising the old-guard known as the "Syndicate") and her Congress (R). On 06/12/1975, Justice Jagmohanlal Sinha of the Allahabad High Court found the prime minister guilty on the charge of misuse of government machinery for her election campaign. The court declared her election null and void and unseated her from her seat in the Lok Sabha. The court also banned her from contesting any election for an additional six years. Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer, on 06/24/1975, upheld the High Court judgement and ordered all privileges Gandhi received as an MP be stopped, and that she be debarred from voting (Paul 1996: 51-55).<sup>773</sup> The Emergency was a direct reaction to this verdict and comes extremely close to an autogolpe. During this time LIED categorizes elections as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI and CEI score them as somewhat free, fair and clean. As classified by FH for 1975, the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. In 1976 the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. Besides, political liberties were still coded as absent (LIED). V-Dem's PCLI scores changed to ambiguous in 1975 and to not really present in 1976. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was significantly constrained by institutional checks during this time. We would argue that Polity5 overlooked the missing constraints on the executive during this period.

03/21/1977 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Defective Democracy: On this date, the Emergency that had curtailed democratic rights in India formally ended.<sup>774</sup> We code this regime change event as a voluntary exit because Prime Minister Indira Gandhi not only called elections in January 1977, confident of her reelection, but also accepted the outcome when the Indian National Congress was decisively defeated. In the elections held from 03/16 to 03/20, the opposition Janata Party secured a majority in parliament, while Gandhi's party suffered its first major loss since independence. On 03/24/1977 Morarji Desai was sworn in as Prime Minister.<sup>775</sup> The crucial point is that the restoration of democratic competition was initiated by Gandhi herself and, most importantly, that her regime stepped down after losing power at the ballot box, marking this as a voluntary exit rather than a forced collapse. Indira Gandhi was democratically voted out of office, but was reelected in 1980, now running for the Congress-Indira Party which she created after her ousting from office. She remained in office until she was assassinated in 1984 by her own bodyguards, who were Sikhs.<sup>776</sup> Her assassination entailed

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<sup>773</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The\\_Emergency\\_\(India\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Emergency_(India))

<sup>774</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/event/the-Emergency-India#ref405284>

<sup>775</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1977\\_Indian\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1977_Indian_general_election)

<sup>776</sup> <https://www.zeit.de/2004/15/ustinov>

a series of Anti-Sikh-pogroms with thousands of Sikhs killed.<sup>777</sup> Indira Gandhi was succeeded by her son Rajiv Gandhi as prime minister, who was in the same party. While her succession took place within the constitutional framework, the whole incident of her assassination and the disastrous violence following can be interpreted as an expression of the injustices and social tensions.<sup>778</sup> Corruption scandals and ethnic unrest marked the tenure of Rajiv Gandhi, culminating in the Congress party's loss in the 1989 general elections.<sup>779</sup> VP Singh of the Janata Dal party became Prime Minister, supported by the BJP and other smaller parties. The coalition broke when the BJP withdrew their support and Singh's government subsequently lost a parliamentary vote of confidence on 11/07/1990. A new government was formed under Chandra Shekhar, which also collapsed only months later. On 05/21/1991, Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated while campaigning for the Congress party, which went on to win the elections. Continued inter-communal conflict as well as corruption scandals diminished the election results of the Congress party. The BJP subsequently emerged as the largest party in the elections of 05/1996, but remained without a definitive majority. A BJP-led coalition lasted only 13 days, followed by a 14-party coalition led by the Janata Dal. This "United Front" government lasted a year, in 03/1997 the Congress party withdrew their support. A new United Front coalition was formed, with Kumar Gujral becoming Prime Minister. Elections were held again in 02/1998, after the Congress party had once again withdrawn their support for the United Front in 11/1997. On 03/20/1998, a BJP-led government emerged, with Atal Bihari Vajpayee as Prime Minister.<sup>780</sup> On 02/21/1999 Vajpayee signed the Lahore Declaration with Nawaz Sharif, then-Prime Minister of Pakistan, aimed at easing relations between the two nations.<sup>781</sup> Elections were held again in 09/1999 after the coalition failed in 04/1999. With the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), a new coalition led by the BJP emerged, gaining the majority and forming a new government around Vajpayee in 10/1999. In 05/2004 the new United Progressive Alliance (UPA), led by the Congress party, won the elections and Manmohan Singh became the first Sikh Prime Minister. On 07/25/2007 Pratibha Patil was sworn into office and became the first female president of India. The UPA won again in the 2009 parliamentary elections.<sup>782</sup> The NDA won legislative balloting from 04/07 to 05/12/2014, with 336 seats, with the BJP securing an absolute majority of 282 seats. BJP leader Narendra Modi was named prime minister on

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<sup>777</sup> [https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indira\\_Gandhi#Attentat](https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indira_Gandhi#Attentat)

<sup>778</sup> <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html>, see narratives for version 5.0, India\_R: 1.

<sup>779</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_India\\_\(1947%E2%80%93present\)#1980s](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_India_(1947%E2%80%93present)#1980s)

<sup>780</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_India\\_\(1947%E2%80%93present\)#1980s](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_India_(1947%E2%80%93present)#1980s)

<sup>781</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lahore\\_Declaration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lahore_Declaration)

<sup>782</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_India\\_\(1947%E2%80%93present\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_India_(1947%E2%80%93present))

05/20/2014 and formed a coalition government with other parties in the NDA (Lansford 2021: 729). The elections were considered generally free and fair, though some violations of campaign rules were reported. However, the government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has since 2014, increasingly adopted discriminatory policies against the Muslim minority (Ding/Slater 2021).<sup>783</sup> During this era, the caste system remained a significant societal and political concern, contributing to the characterization of this period as a defective democracy.<sup>784</sup> India's democracy is an interesting case in terms of compromise building, because many regional and local parties are elected into the national parliament. Consequently, large coalitions have to be constructed, which culminated in the 1998 National Democratic Alliance, a coalition consisting of 41 parties.<sup>785</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED continues its classification of elections as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI and CEI initially stay at their scoring of somewhat free, fair and clean elections. The EF&FI goes up to scoring elections as free and fair in 1984. The CEI increases its score to clean elections between 1991 and 2008. Per FH, for the period until 1979, the country is classified as free, scoring between 2 and 4, which we also place in the free category. Between 1980 and 1990 the country receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. In 1991 and 1992 a score of 6 to 7 designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. For the period from 1993 to 1995 India is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. In 1996 and 1997 it is categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. For the remaining period the country receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. Moreover, political liberties were present until 2017 according to LIED. V-Dem's PCLI also classifies the political liberties as present until 2011 and as somewhat present from 2012 onwards. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. For the year 1976, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 1977, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. From 1978 to 1995, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE

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<sup>783</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/india/freedom-world/2021>

<sup>784</sup> For further information see information about the Indian caste system between 10/25/1951 – 06/25/1975.

<sup>785</sup> <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html> , see narratives for version 5.0, India\_V: 1-2

is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. From 1996 to 2014, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive. For the year 2015, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. Since 2016, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive.

05/19/2019 End Defective Democracy/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: Parliamentary elections were held between April and May 2019. The ruling BJP won 303 seats, giving its National Democratic Alliance coalition a stable majority of 353 seats. The decline of democratic quality continued and according to our classification the regime crossed the threshold from defective democracy to electoral hybrid regime. This includes deficits in the institutional restrictions on the executive regarding the judiciary and the general centralization of power. Furthermore, civil rights are being increasingly restricted.<sup>786</sup> According to FH, a score of 6 to 7 for the assessed regime period designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. Political liberties decreased back to absent in 2018 according to LIED. V-Dem's PCLI scores them as ambiguous since 2019. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also robust. In 2021, FH downgraded India from free to partially free and stated: "Modi and his party are tragically driving India itself toward authoritarianism."<sup>787</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED continues to classify elections as competitive. The V-Dem EF&FI reduces its scoring back to somewhat free and fair elections in 2019. Their CEI drops back down to ambiguous clean elections from 2019 onwards. Most recently, the 2024 parliamentary elections were held between April and June.<sup>788</sup> Although Modi's BJP was predicted to win an absolute majority, they did not achieve this feat. Instead, they lost significantly, compared to the last election, and only secured 240 seats. The Indian Congress Party came second with 99 seats and the Samajwadi Party third with 37 seats.<sup>789</sup> This still makes the BJP the largest party in parliament by far but is a sign, that the opposition is not as defeated

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<sup>786</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Narendra\\_Modi#](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Narendra_Modi#)

<sup>787</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege>

<sup>788</sup> <https://elections24.eci.gov.in/>

<sup>789</sup> <https://results.eci.gov.in/PcResultGenJune2024/index.htm>

as it was feared to be by outside observers. Modi will, however, retain his position of power and have the ability to continue his shift towards authoritarianism.

Electoral Hybrid Regime as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional Sources (Heller 2000, Kohli 1992, Kohli/Bardhan 1988, Lijphart 1996, Rudolph/Rudolph 1967, Varshney 1998)

## Indonesia

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Netherlands, Constitutional Monarchy] [Start: 08/19/1816]: On 08/19/1816 the French and British interregnum in the Dutch East Indies ended and the Netherlands regained full control over the area.<sup>790</sup> Starting in 1816 the Dutch East Indies was a Dutch colony consisting of what is now Indonesia (Ricklefs 2001). Since 1918, there was a People's Council, an advisory body whose membership was partly nominated and partly elected based on a small racially delineated franchise. However, the Governor-General retained the power to defy the decisions by the Council (Feith 1962). In 1937, restricted suffrage for Europeans was introduced.<sup>791</sup> LIED confirms that multiparty legislative elections as well as universal suffrage were absent. Both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI indicate political liberties as absent. From 1900 to 1917, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. From 1918 to 1935, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. From 1936 to 1942, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

03/08/1942 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Netherlands, Direct Rule Occupation Regime]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Japan, Constitutional Monarchy]: After Germany invaded the Netherlands, they ceded their European territory to Germany on 05/14/1940, and on 09/27/1940, Germany, Hungary, Italy and Japan signed a treaty outlining 'spheres of influence' whereas the Dutch East Indies fell into Japan's sphere (Ricklefs 2001).<sup>792</sup>

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<sup>790</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French\\_and\\_British\\_interregnum\\_in\\_the\\_Dutch\\_East\\_Indies#cite\\_note-7](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_and_British_interregnum_in_the_Dutch_East_Indies#cite_note-7)

<sup>791</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s\\_suffrage](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage)

<sup>792</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese\\_occupation\\_of\\_the\\_Dutch\\_East\\_Indies](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_occupation_of_the_Dutch_East_Indies)

According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. LIED and V-Dem's PCLI indicate the absence of political liberties for this time. For 1943 and 1944, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. For the year 1945, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

08/17/1945 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Japan, Constitutional Monarchy]/Start Democratizing Regime: On this date, the Japanese occupation ended with Japanese surrender in the Pacific and two days later Sukarno, born Koesno Sosrodihardjo, and Mohammad Hatta declared Indonesian independence on the morning of this day (Ricklefs 2001). The following day, the Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence (PPKI) elected Sukarno as President, and Hatta as Vice-president.<sup>793</sup> Universal suffrage was granted for all citizens.<sup>794</sup> The initial elections were slated for January 1946; however, due to the ongoing Indonesian National Revolution, they could not proceed as scheduled.<sup>795</sup> By late August 1946, a central Republican administration had been formed in Jakarta, which adopted a constitution prepared by the Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence during the Japanese occupation.<sup>796</sup> The Dutch accused Sukarno and Hatta of collaborating with the Japanese, and denounced the Republic as a creation of Japanese fascism.<sup>797</sup> The nationalist government was captured by the Dutch but had to be freed due to pressure from the United Nations.<sup>798</sup> De facto Dutch forces re-occupied most of Indonesia's territory and committed a variety of war crimes which led to four years of guerrilla struggle. On 12/20/1948 Dutch invasion forces overthrew the elected government. Sukarno took over as a dictator to combat the invasion.<sup>799</sup> On 12/27/1949, Indonesia attained de facto independence as the Republic of the United States of Indonesia, comprising the Republic of Indonesia (covering parts of Java and Sumatra) and various states and autonomous territories that had been established since 1946.<sup>800</sup> However, the Dutch part of New Guinea was excluded.<sup>801</sup> On 12/20/1949 the cabinet was sworn in, and seven days later, it

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<sup>793</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indonesian\\_National\\_Revolution](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indonesian_National_Revolution)

<sup>794</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s\\_suffrage](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage)

<sup>795</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1955\\_Indonesian\\_legislative\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1955_Indonesian_legislative_election)

<sup>796</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indonesian\\_National\\_Revolution](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indonesian_National_Revolution)

<sup>797</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indonesian\\_National\\_Revolution](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indonesian_National_Revolution)

<sup>798</sup> <https://ehne.fr/en/encyclopedia/themes/europe-europeans-and-world/europeans-and-decolonisations/decolonization-dutch-east-indiesindonesia>

<sup>799</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dutch\\_East\\_Indies#World\\_War\\_II\\_and\\_independence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dutch_East_Indies#World_War_II_and_independence)

<sup>800</sup> <https://www.rulers.org/ruli.html#indonesia>

<sup>801</sup> <https://ehne.fr/en/encyclopedia/themes/europe-europeans-and-world/europeans-and-decolonisations/decolonization-dutch-east-indiesindonesia>

officially received sovereignty transferred by both the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia (Feith 1962). On 08/17/1950, the Republic of the United States of Indonesia was dissolved, and the unitary state inaugurated as the Republic of Indonesia (Feith 1962). The cabinet and president were not elected by Indonesian people and no legislative elections took place before 1955. Therefore, this period is coded as transitional. At independence, Sukarno was unelected president. The unelected first parliament included representatives of the Dutch-created states, members of the revolutionary committee, and members appointed by Sukarno based on estimates of the various parties' strength. The first parliamentary election was not held until September 1955 (Liddle 1978: 173-74, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 68-69). According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. From 1946 to 1949, based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. Between 1950 and 1955, the executive's authority was significantly constrained by institutional checks during this time. For the years 1946-1948, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. For 1949, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For the rest of the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. Moreover, LIED continued to code political liberties as absent. V-Dem's PCLI indicates them as somewhat present from 1946 to 1948 and as present afterwards

09/29/1955 End Democratizing Regime/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date legislative elections took place. This was the first national election since the conclusion of the Indonesian National Revolution. The outcome was inconclusive as none of the parties received a clear mandate to govern.<sup>802</sup> The parliament (People's Representative Council) convened on 03/04/1956. During his opening speech, President Sukarno advocated for an Indonesian-style democracy, and in the subsequent years, he further elaborated on his vision of a novel governmental system known as "konsepsi".<sup>803</sup> Sukarno's preference for a "guided democracy" was inspired by his observations in the Chinese People's Republic. This model diverged from the Western liberal democratic model, leaning more towards a system where democratic and autocratic elements were mixed. The period in question is marked by divergent assessments

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<sup>802</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1955\\_Indonesian\\_legislative\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1955_Indonesian_legislative_election)

<sup>803</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1955\\_Indonesian\\_legislative\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1955_Indonesian_legislative_election)



concerning its classification. It is acknowledged that between 1950 and either 1957 or 1959, this phase exhibited characteristics of a democracy (Liddle 1992).<sup>804</sup> BR classifies it as civilian dictatorship starting in 1950, GWF as a personal autocracy between 1950 and 1966, AF as a democracy between 1955 and 1956 and as a personalist rule before and after, LIED codes a multiparty autocracy between 1955 and 1959 and a closed autocracy before and after. We argue that this specific regime period starts in 1955 because there were no elections prior to that. President Sukarno survived an attempted assassination on 11/30/1956. Afterwards he declared a state-of-siege in North Sumatra on 12/25/1956 and South Sumatra on 12/28/1956. A military council headed by Lieutenant Colonel Sumual took control of East Indonesia 03/02/1957.<sup>805</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes elections during this time as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores them as free and fair while their CEI scores them as somewhat clean. Furthermore, LIED classified the political liberties as absent. V-Dem's PCLI scores them as present in 1955 and 1956 and as somewhat present the year after. In 1956, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was significantly constrained by institutional checks during this time. For the year 1956, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 1957, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

03/14/1957 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date, President Sukarno declared a national state-of-emergency. In May 1957 he established by martial law a National Council, which he chaired. It was a non-political body on the basis of functional groups. It was supposed to give advice to the cabinet, as a counterweight to the political sphere.<sup>806</sup> The fragmentation in the parliament, combined with Sukarno's growing influence and his vision for a "guided democracy", set the stage for a political regime where democratic elections coexisted with strong executive control and diminishing parliamentary power.<sup>807</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this

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<sup>804</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberal\\_democracy\\_period\\_in\\_Indonesia#Government\\_and\\_politics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberal_democracy_period_in_Indonesia#Government_and_politics);  
<https://www.britannica.com/biography/Sukarno#ref6967>

<sup>805</sup> <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/home/research-projects/dadm-project/asiapacific-region/indonesia-1949-present/>

<sup>806</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guided\\_Democracy\\_in\\_Indonesia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guided_Democracy_in_Indonesia)

<sup>807</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/House\\_of\\_Representatives\\_\(Indonesia,\\_1956%E2%80%931959\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/House_of_Representatives_(Indonesia,_1956%E2%80%931959))

period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. According to LIED no electoral competitiveness was present. V-Dem's CEI scored a somewhat cleanliness. V-Dem's EF&FI categorizes the elections as free and fair. Regarding the political liberties, they are absent according to LIED and score an ambiguous outcome by V-Dem's PCLI. As per Polity5's classification, the executive experienced moderate limitations on authority, placing it in the second intermediate category. For the year 1958, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. For the following year, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

07/05/1959 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Personalist Autocracy: On this date Sukarno launched a self-coup which granted him dictatorial powers. He established a political regime called "guided democracy". Following the declaration of martial law and its implementation, Indonesia reverted to presidentialism, resulting in Sukarno reassuming the position of president.<sup>808</sup> What makes the regime in this period hard to classify is that it was a party regime but without elections. Since the regime started with a self-coup, no elections and parties played a neglectable role the regime period it is classified as a personalist autocracy (by Sukarno).<sup>809</sup> Political power was concentrated in the hands of Sukarto. The parliament provided no check on his power because he appointed all members of the parliament. Although representatives from various political parties, including the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), were included in the parliament, they lacked real power or influence. Their appointment was mainly symbolic and intended to give the appearance of broad political support. Our categorization as a personalist autocracy is especially underpinned by the fact that Sukarno was made president for life by the parliament in 1963. Sukarno's ideological writings on Manipol-USDEK and NASAKOM were made compulsory subjects in Indonesian schools and universities.<sup>810</sup> However, there were also semi-ideocratic elements of Sukarnos rule. The Encyclopaedia Britannica characterized the ideology of Guided Democracy as a "neo-Marxist, crypto-communist ideology".<sup>811</sup> Similarly J. M. Van Der Kroef argued that "Sukarno's own ideological exhortations steadily seemed to merge with Marxist-Leninist doctrine" (Van Der Kroef 1972: 277). However, Sukarno's "guided democracy" rested on precarious foundations, as it faced an

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<sup>808</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guided\\_Democracy\\_in\\_Indonesia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guided_Democracy_in_Indonesia)

<sup>809</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Sukarno>

<sup>810</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sukarno#President\\_for\\_life\\_and\\_Cult\\_of\\_personality](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sukarno#President_for_life_and_Cult_of_personality)

<sup>811</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Sukarno>

inherent conflict between its two main support pillars, namely, the military and the communists.<sup>812</sup> On 10/01/1965 in a coup attempt, in which the communist party was involved, six Indonesian army generals were killed (Van Der Kroef 1972). On 11/01/1965, Major General Suharto, commander of the military's strategic reserve command, took control of the army. The army subsequently led a nationwide violent anti-communist purge.<sup>813</sup> In this period there was a power struggle between Sukarno and the military. Sukarno refused to outlaw the PKI despite military pressure, and he was able to appoint ministers and top military officers opposed by the army high command before (Crouch 1988: 158-78). Commencing in January 1966, university students-initiated protests Sukarno, calling for the dissolution of the PKI and urging the government to address escalating inflation.<sup>814</sup> According to LIED, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held in 1959, from 1960 onward no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. Moreover, political liberties are coded as absent per LIED and can be interpreted as ambiguous per V-Dem's PCLI. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. Until 1965, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For 1966, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

03/12/1966 End Personalist Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: General Suharto forced Sukarno to step down from his executive post. Sukarno retained a ceremonial position, but Suharto led the country from then on as a dictator. The March 1966 coup resulted in the transfer of day-to-day executive power to Suharto, the arrest of more than fifteen ministers, the purge of left-leaning bureaucrats, officers, and PNI party leaders, and the symbolically important outlawing of the PKI. Thus, we code it as the point at which Sukarno lost control, though he retained the formal title president until March 1967 (Crouch 1988: 188-202, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 69). On 01/10/1967 Sukarno was stripped of his president-for-life title by parliament and arrested at home. On the same day, the parliament named Suharto acting president. A policy of "De-Sukarnoization" followed.<sup>815</sup> According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held from 1966 to 1970, in 1971 and 1972 only multiparty legislative elections were held; from 1973 onward multiparty executive and

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<sup>812</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sukarno#President\\_for\\_life\\_and\\_Cult\\_of\\_personality](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sukarno#President_for_life_and_Cult_of_personality)

<sup>813</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suharto>

<sup>814</sup> <http://soekarnotheclaimer99.blogspot.com/2011/02/>

<sup>815</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De-Sukarnoization>

legislative elections were held. Per FH's evaluation for 1972-1983, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. According to FH's classification for 1984-1987, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. As classified by FH for 1988 and 1989, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. Per FH, for the years 1990 to 1997, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. According to FH, for the year 1998, a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. The state of political liberties is coded as absent by LIED. V-Dem's PCLI indicates them as not really present until 1973 and as absent afterwards. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive's constraints fell into Intermediate Category 1, between unlimited authority and slight limitations. From 1967 to 1997, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. For 1998, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

05/21/1998 End Military Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: A financial crisis and mass protests brought Suharto military regime to the brink. When he moved to repress the movement his security agencies refused his orders. Suharto resigned and fled, leaving his vice president Habibie in charge. Habibie initiated liberalization but did not initially signal his intention to step down. A consultative assembly dominated by authoritarian incumbents made further liberalizing moves and electoral laws were finalized in early 1999.<sup>816</sup> As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints during this time. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. Per FH's evaluation 1998, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free.

06/07/1999 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Defective Democracy: On 06/07/1999, a parliamentary election took place. On 10/19/1999, President Habibie's "accountability speech" was rejected by the legislature, ending his tenure. Subsequently, on 10/20/1999, Abdurrahman Wahid was elected president by the legislature, finalizing the transition (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 36). A parliamentary election characterized by fairness and competitiveness resulted in a victory for the opposition. Subsequently, in October

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<sup>816</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fall\\_of\\_Suharto](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fall_of_Suharto)

1999, the predominantly elected legislature elected a new president from the opposition (Thompson 1999: 1). Suharto's resignation following mass protests is not considered the regime's end, as he passed power to his longstanding ally, Habibie, with no significant alterations in either the cabinet or military command under Habibie's leadership (Kingsbury 2003: 162, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 69). On 07/23/2001, ethnic cleavages and threats to dissolve the legislature fueled the opposition and armed forces to act and depose Wahid. Sukanoputri was voted as acting president. Until 2004 38 seats in the People's Consultative Assembly were reserved for the military appointment. Challenges such as systemic corruption, discrimination, and violence against minority communities, conflicts in the Papua region, and the politicized application of defamation and blasphemy laws persisted.<sup>817</sup> Although voters and candidates typically operate without undue interference, the military continues to exert influence, with former commanders assuming prominent and expanding roles in politics. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes elections during this period as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores them as free and fair. Their CEI scores them as somewhat clean. Political liberties remained absent per LIED, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are somewhat present since 2016. Nonetheless, the period is characterized by revisions in the constitution and legislative bodies that laid the foundations for later democratic elections. This included the progressive reduction and eventual elimination in 2004 of guaranteed seats for military representation in parliament (Dagg 2007). Based on Polity5's evaluation, during this period, the executive's power was limited to a degree between substantial constraints and parity with other institutions, fitting Intermediate Category 3. On 06/05/2004, the first direct general elections were held in Indonesia, after a constitutional amendment in 2002 stripped the People's Consultative Assembly of the power to elect the president and vice-president, continuing Indonesia's path of democratization. Political bodies such as the parliament were fundamentally reformed, its size reduced, and its members largely voted directly. Elections were considered free and fair (Vaughn 2005), and the institution in charge of managing the election was found to be impartial and effective (Dagg 2007). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED continues to categorize elections as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI also continues to score elections as free and fair. Their CEI initially increased to calling elections clean but dropped back down to speaking of somewhat

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<sup>817</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/indonesia/freedom-world/2022>

clean elections in 2010. The Democratic Party, led by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who served in Megawati's Cabinet as Security Minister before becoming a presidential candidate, won in the second election round. In 2009, Yudhoyono secured a second term until the 2014 elections, where he yielded the presidency to the new election winner Joko Widodo. However, during Yudhoyono's presidency corruption and charges of nepotism continued, showcased by a list of fourteen relatives as presidential candidates in 2014. The 2014 elections were characterized by the race between front-runners Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subianto, the former son-in-law of the previous autocrat Suharto who threatened democratic backsliding by proposing returning to the 1945 constitution and framing direct election as unsuitable (Mietzner 2014: 114-115). Joko Widodo went on to be elected for two presidential terms in free, fair and competitive elections with high turn-out rates. The general elections on 02/14/2024 have tarnished Widodo's reputation. Prabowo Subianto, an ex-general and son-in-law to Suharto, who is accused of severe human rights abuses before 1999, has won the election, which his opponents claim was marred by irregularities and nepotism. ANFREL's interim report notes the unfair use of state resources during the campaign. Widodo's backing of Subianto is underscored by the fact that his running mate and now vice president is Widodo's son, Joko Widodo. Indonesia's highest court has rejected an appeal for re-elections by Subianto's opponents.<sup>818</sup> According to FH, for the year 1999, the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. As classified by FH from 2000 to 2004, the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. As per FH's classification for 2005 to 2012 the country receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. As classified by FH for the rest of this regime period, the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. Until 2013, as per Polity5's categorization, the executive's authority was significantly constrained, nearing parity with other branches, placing it in the third intermediate category. Since 2014, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. From 2000 to 2013, as well as from 2015 to 2022, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. For 2014, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. For 2023, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive.

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<sup>818</sup> <https://apnews.com/article/indonesia-election-fraud-appeal-baswedan-subianto-pranowo-cedb89b905ea598e3a025ccc2ca07d08>

Defective Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional Sources (Alatas 1997, Chua 2004, Crouch 1979, Frederick/Worden 2011, Pepinsky 2009, Rüländ 2001, Slater 2009, Slater 2010, Ufen 2002)

## Iran

[officially known as the Islamic Republic of Iran; also known as Persia]

01/01/1900 Autocratic Monarchy [Start: 03/20/1794]: Sovereignty was reached on 678 BC. The Qajar dynasty started with the reign of Agha Mohammad Khan Qajar and the death of Lotf Ali Khan, the last of the Zand Dynasty, on 03/20/1794.<sup>819</sup> Mozaffar al-Din Shah Qajar ruled as the fifth Qajar shah of Iran from 05/01/1896 until 01/03/1907.<sup>820</sup> The period from 1906 to 1911 was characterized by an era of constitutional revolution. The Constitutional Revolution of 1906 was sparked by a variety of factors, reflecting a range of intellectual movements, social backgrounds, and political demands (Mansourian 2007: 221). According to LIED no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. Moreover, both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI indicate political liberties as absent for this time. On 08/05/1906, Mozaffar al-Din Shah issued a royal proclamation establishing the first constitution. The 1906 fundamental and electoral laws set up the electoral system and outlined the internal structures of the Majlis, the Parliament, and the Senate. Further amendments to the constitution that year included the introduction of male suffrage and the bicameral legislature. On 12/30/1906, due to significant public pressure, the Shah enacted the fundamental laws (Lockhart 1959: 377). As anticipated, the Shah's powers were restricted by several articles. While he remained the head of state, he was required to govern through his ministers, who were accountable to parliament rather than to him (Lockhart 1959: 378). The constitution also stipulated the separation of powers.<sup>821</sup> On 01/03/1907 Mohammad Ali Shah Qajar took over as Shah after the death of his father Mozaffar al-Din Shah. According to LIED, only multiparty legislative elections were

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<sup>819</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_monarchs\\_of\\_Persia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_monarchs_of_Persia)

<sup>820</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mozaffar\\_ad-Din\\_Shah\\_Qajar](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mozaffar_ad-Din_Shah_Qajar)

<sup>821</sup> <https://fis-iran.org/document/iran-1906-constitution/>

held in 1906 and only legislative elections, which weren't multiparty, were held in 1907. LIED still codes political liberties as absent. V-Dem's PCLI increased into a range which we interpret as not really present. For the year 1907, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For 1908, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. On 06/23/1908 Mohammad Ali was by no means a defender of the constitutional movement from the time he took over from his father. On 06/23/1908 he did not hesitate to dissolve the Majlis by force. This drastic measure was carried out by his Cossack Brigade, commanded by an officer on loan from the Russian Army. Furthermore, the Majlis building was bombarded by artillery under the direction of other Russian officers serving the Shah. This marked the beginning of the period known as *Istibdad-i-saghir* or the Minor Tyranny, when the Shah ruled unrestrained by parliamentary control (Lockhart 1959: 383). According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are not really present. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. On 07/16/1909 nearly the entire nation rallied behind the Constitutionals due to Mohammad Ali's excesses, which eventually led to their success and forced him to abdicate in favor of his son Ahmad Shah Qajar on 07/16/1909 (Lockhart 1959: 383). The second Majlis was elected on 11/15/1909. According to LIED only multiparty legislative elections were held in 1909 and 1910. No multiparty executive and legislative elections were held from 1911 to 1913. Only multiparty legislative elections were held in 1914. From 1915 to 1920 no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. Political liberties continued to be coded as absent (LIED) and can be interpreted as not really present per V-Dem's PCLI. For the years 1910 and 1911, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For 1914 and 1915, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For the rest of the assessed period, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-



Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

02/21/1921 End Autocratic Monarchy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, Ahmad Shah was pushed aside in a military coup by Colonel Reza Khan, Minister of War and commander of the Persian Cossack Brigade, who subsequently seized the post of prime minister".<sup>822</sup> A civilian ally was appointed prime minister and in turn appointed Reza Khan commander of the armed forces. According to LIED only multiparty legislative elections were held during this period. The state of political liberties is coded as absent by LIED. V-Dem's PCLI indicates them as not really present, except in 1924 they were absent. From 1922 to 1924, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For 1925, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

12/15/1925 End Military Autocracy/Start Autocratic Monarchy: After the Majils deposed the Qajar dynasty in October 1925, the Majlis crowned on this date, Reza Khan as Reza Shah. The crowning marks the beginning of the Pahlavi dynasty (Metz 1989, Roshandel 1987, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 69). Under Reza Shah, independent parliamentary work became impossible. Elections were undemocratic, and the parliament was structured to follow the Shah's agenda (Abrahamian 1982: 138). On 08/19/1953 the CIA and UK intelligence agencies manufactured a popular uprising and coordinated a military coup against Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh.<sup>823</sup> The effective executive leadership was returned to Shah Pavlevi. In the "Constitutional", White Revolution women gained the right to vote in 1963.<sup>824</sup> Until 1962, V-Dems EF&FI score for Iran is labeled as none, indicating that any elections held before this time cannot be considered free or fair at all. According to LIED only multiparty legislative were held from 1921 to 1927. From 1928 to 1942 only legislative elections, which weren't multiparty, were held. From 1943 to 1951 only multiparty legislative elections were held. In 1952 and 1953 no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. From 1954 to 1960 only multiparty legislative elections were held. In 1961 and 1962 no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. From 1963 to 1966 only legislative elections, which weren't multiparty, were held. From 1967 to 1974 only multiparty legislative elections were held. From

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<sup>822</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ahmad\\_Shah\\_Qajar](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ahmad_Shah_Qajar)

<sup>823</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammad\\_Mosaddegh](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammad_Mosaddegh)

<sup>824</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal\\_suffrage#cite\\_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37)

1975 to 1978 only legislative elections, which weren't multiparty, were held. From 1925 to 1940, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power. Between 1941 and 1952, based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive encountered substantial institutional limitations on power. Since 1953, as per Polity5's classification, the executive experienced moderate limitations on authority, placing it in the second intermediate category. Until 1941, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. For the years 1942-1944, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. From 1945 to 1949, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For 1950-1953, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. From 1954 to 1978, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For 1979, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. From 1972 to 1977, according to FH, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. Per FH's evaluation for 1978, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. LIED still codes political liberties as absent. V-Dem's PCLI classifies them as absent until 1941 and from 1954 onwards, as not really present from 1942 to 1944, 1946 to 1947 and in 1953 and as ambiguous between 1948 and 1952.

01/16/1979 End Autocratic Monarchy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: Popular uprising forced the Shah to flee the country to Egypt once his security forces proved impotent against the demonstrations, strikes, and riots against his rule. Shapour Bakhtiar, still appointed as prime minister by the Shah, became the effective head of government as an interim ruler (Curtis/Hooglund 2008, Metz 1989, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 69).<sup>825</sup> Per FH's evaluation for 1979, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free.

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<sup>825</sup> [http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/january/16/newsid\\_2530000/2530475.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/january/16/newsid_2530000/2530475.stm);  
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranian\\_Revolution](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranian_Revolution)

05/02/1979 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Islamist Ideocracy: Upon his return to Iran, Ruhollah Khomeini rejected Bakhtiar's government. On 02/05/1979, at his headquarters in the Refah School in Tehran, Khomeini declared a provisional revolutionary government and appointed Mehdi Bazargan as his own prime minister, instructing Iranians to obey Bazargan as a religious duty.<sup>826</sup> By 02/11/1979, the Supreme Military Council declared neutrality in the political disputes, effectively yielding control of the country to Khomeini. Estimates of the number of casualties during the revolution vary. Some sources claim around 2.781 protesters and revolutionaries were killed. Khomeini's regime reported a much higher figure of 60.000, but this is believed to be an overstatement for propaganda purposes.<sup>827</sup> On 06/22/1981 Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini used troops and supporters to drive out his independently powerful president Banisadr from power.<sup>828</sup> The Ayatollah thus gained the powers reserved to the president for himself. Later he had his parliament legalize the self-coup (Marshall 2018h). Khomeini was succeeded on 06/03/1989 by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as the Supreme Leader. Khamenei, previously serving as President, was not as widely recognized as a religious authority as Khomeini. His elevation involved a change in the constitution to allow a less senior cleric to assume the position. The regime was and is marked by the suppression of opposition, including the execution and imprisonment of political dissidents. Hashemi Rafsanjani became President shortly after Khomeini's death, serving from 1989 to 1997. He was followed by Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005), Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-2013), Hassan Rouhani (2013-2021), Ebrahim Raisi (2021-2024), Mohammad Mokhber (2024) and Massud Peseschkian (2024-present). Each president brought different policies and approaches, reflecting the evolving political landscape in Iran. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held in 1979. From 1980 onward, only multiparty legislative elections were held. From 1979 to 1996, according to Polity5, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. Between 1997 and 2003, the executive's constraints were categorized as Intermediate Category 2, between slight and substantial limitations. Since 2004, the executive faced weak constraints, classified as Intermediate Category 1 between unlimited authority and slight limitations. For the year 1980, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 1981 and 1982, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that

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<sup>826</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranian\\_Revolution](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranian_Revolution)

<sup>827</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranian\\_Revolution](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranian_Revolution)

<sup>828</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abolhassan\\_Banisadr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abolhassan_Banisadr)

judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. From 1983 to 1988, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For 1989-1991, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 1992, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. Again from 1993 to 2018, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 2019 and 2020, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. Since 2021, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. Per FH's evaluation for 1979 and 1980, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. As classified by FH for the rest of this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Moreover, political liberties continued to be coded as absent per LIED and can be interpreted as not really present in 1979 and from 1997 to 2005 and as absent for the remaining years by V-Dem's PCLI.

Islamist Ideocracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional Sources (Arjomand 1988, Arjomand 2009, Brownlee 2007, Chehabi 2005, Milani 2009, Wahdat-Hagh 2003)

## **Iraq**

[Mesopotamia historically occupied modern Iraq]

01/01/1900 Part of Other Country [Ottoman Empire, Autocratic Monarchy] [Start: 12/25/1638]:

The area which now forms the state of Iraq was divided into the three provinces of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul (Sluglett 2007). Starting in 1533, most of the territory of present-day Iraq came under the control of Ottoman Empire as the pashalik of Baghdad. Baghdad was officially

captured in December 1534.<sup>829</sup> On 12/25/1638, Baghdad fell back under the rule of the Ottoman Empire, after being under Iranian rule between 1623 and 1638.<sup>830</sup> Ottoman rule over Iraq lasted until the end of World War I in 1918.<sup>831</sup>

11/06/1914 End Part of Other Country [Ottoman Empire, Autocratic Monarchy]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy]: After the Ottoman Empire entered World War I, Britain occupied the territory of later Iraq (Yaphe 2003, Wilks 2016, Sluglett 2007). Both LIED and V-Dem do not provide data for Iraq before 1920.

11/21/1920 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [United Kingdom, Defective Democracy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [United Kingdom, Defective Democracy]: In October 1920, Sir Percy Cox, High Commissioner and Commander in Chief in Iraq, ended military rule and set up a new constitution with local elites (Yaphe 2003, Wilks 2016). He set up a provisional government lead by an Arab President and council (Yaphe 2003). A referendum was held in Mandatory Iraq between 06/16 and 08/11/1921 to determine the form of government and head of state.<sup>832</sup> The result of the popular vote was 96 percent for Emir Faysal from the Hashemite family of the sharifs of Mecca (Yaphe 2003, Nissen/Heine 2009). Although Iraq established formal internal governance structures after the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, key areas of domestic policy remained under effective British control. Major decisions regarding security, finance, and institutional development required British approval or alignment with British interests. Therefore, despite the appearance of self-rule, Iraq's domestic sovereignty was fundamentally constrained, and the regime should be classified as an indirect rule colonial regime. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. Political liberties are coded as absent by LIED and can be interpreted as ambiguous by V-Dem's PCLI. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are robust. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. During this period, Iraq conducted its first Constituent Assembly elections (1922–1924), leading to the establishment of a constitutional framework. While local authorities retained influence in their regions, the central government, under British oversight, sought to consolidate power, aiming for a unified administrative structure. On 10/10/1922 the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of October 1922 was an agreement unilaterally signed by Percy Cox in 1922 and ratified by the Iraqi government only in 1924. The treaty allowed Iraqi self-government while the British retained control of

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<sup>829</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capture\\_of\\_Baghdad\\_\(1534\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capture_of_Baghdad_(1534))

<sup>830</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baghdad>; [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capture\\_of\\_Baghdad\\_\(1638\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capture_of_Baghdad_(1638))

<sup>831</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Iraq](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Iraq)

<sup>832</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1921\\_Iraqi\\_monarchy\\_referendum](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1921_Iraqi_monarchy_referendum)

Iraq's foreign policy (Wilks 2016).<sup>833</sup> Male suffrage was introduced in 1924 (LIED). According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held in 1922 and 1923, from 1924 onward only multiparty legislative elections were held. Since 1924, according to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. Until 1924, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are robust. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For the rest of the regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

10/03/1932 End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime/Start Autocratic Monarchy [as independent country]: Iraq gained formal independence in 1932 and became a full member of the League of Nations (Nissen/Heine 2009). The crown was given to King Faisal with no previous ties to Iraq by the British as a reward for his military support against Turkey. He was a Sunni (Haddad 1971: 55-57, Lewis 1990, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 69). On 10/30/1936 Bakr Sidqi and Hikmat Sulayman organized a coup d'état in which prime minister Yasin al-Hashimi was deposed.<sup>834</sup> Until 08/17/1937 Sulayman ruled as prime minister. In the Golden Square Coup on 04/01/1941 prime minister Nuri al-Said was deposed and Rashid Ali al-Gaylani became prime minister.<sup>835</sup> In 1948 female suffrage was introduced.<sup>836</sup> According to LIED only multiparty legislative elections were held until 1935, in 1936 no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held, from 1937 to 1942 only multiparty legislative elections were held, from 1943 to 1946 no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held, from 1947 onward only multiparty legislative elections were held. From 1932 to 1935, according to Polity5, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. Between 1936 and 1940, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. Since 1941, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints during this time. Until 1957, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For 1958, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. LIED still codes political

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<sup>833</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iraqi\\_Treaty\\_of\\_1922](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iraqi_Treaty_of_1922)

<sup>834</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yasin\\_al-Hashimi](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yasin_al-Hashimi)

<sup>835</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1941\\_Iraqi\\_coup\\_d%27%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1941_Iraqi_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat)

<sup>836</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s\\_suffrage](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage)

liberties as absent. V-Dem's PCLI indicates an ambiguous level until 1940 and from 1946 to 1953 and a not real presence between 1941 and 1945 and from 1954 onwards.

07/14/1958 End Autocratic Monarchy/Start Military Autocracy: A military coup led by General Abdul-Karim Qasim led to the murder of the prime minister and the royal family. The Iraqi Republic was proclaimed and the monarchy ended with a junta, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) taking over (Nissen/Heine 2009, Dann 1969: 19-33, Dawisha 2009: 172, Wolfe-Hunnicut 2015, Haddad 1971: 86, 91-92, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 69-70).<sup>837</sup> According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE is classified as limited, indicating weak judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. LIED continued to code political liberties as absent and V-Dem's PCLI states them as not really present.

02/08/1963 End Military Autocracy/Start One-Party Autocracy: Ba'athists and Arab nationalists, which included significant participation from military officers, overthrew the Qasim government because of its relationship with Iraqi communists and external forces. A National Council of the Revolutionary Command (NCRC) was set up by the Ba'th party replacing the RCC. The NRC included military leaders who held substantial power. The most powerful figure in the new government was the secretary general of the Ba'th Party, Ali Salih al-Sa'di<sup>838</sup> (Haddad 1971: 115-129, 1982: 80, Sorby 2009, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 70). The new regime introduced a different ideological focus, emphasizing Arab nationalism and socialism, contrasting with Qasim's more Iraqi-centric approach. The Ba'ath Party's rise to power represented a new political force dominating Iraqi politics. The Ba'ath Party sought to monopolize political power by controlling state institutions and eliminating political opposition. The new regime actively suppressed other political parties, especially the Communist Party and groups loyal to the previous government. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. LIED identifies political liberties as absent and V-Dem's PCLI is likewise classified by us as showing that political liberties are absent.

11/13[-18]/1963 End One-Party Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: Al-Sadi and 18 of his Ba'ath Party colleagues were seized at gunpoint. The Ba'ath Party was overthrown, and Abdul

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<sup>837</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abdul-Karim\\_Qasim](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abdul-Karim_Qasim)

<sup>838</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ramadan\\_Revolution](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ramadan_Revolution)

Salam Arif established a new regime dominated by military leadership. Arif reconstituted the RCC served as the ruling junta, composed primarily of military personnel. In addition, Arif leveraged his military position and influence to carry out this coup, indicating his active role in the military. After the coup, he consolidated power and continued to lead Iraq as both the head of state and an active military leader. Upon becoming president, Arif promoted himself to the rank of Field Marshal, the highest rank in the Iraqi military. No elections were held during his presidency. According to our classification this is a clear case of a military autocracy. Political parties were suppressed, and the regime focused on consolidating power. After Abdul Salam Arif's death in a helicopter crash on 04/13/1966, his brother Abdul Rahman Arif became president on 04/16/1966. The military autocracy continued, maintaining tight control over political activities. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. From 1964 to 1967, V-Dem's JCE is classified as limited, indicating weak judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 1968, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are moderate. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For this time political liberties are still coded as absent per LIED and can be interpreted as not really present per V-Dem's PCLI.

07/17/1968 End Military Autocracy/Start One-Party Autocracy: A military coup led by ex-Major General al-Bakr seeking to avenge the previous coup and purge by the years ago ousted Arif. Bakr became president. The regime was dominated by Ba'athist military officers and ruled through the Revolutionary Command Council of the Ba'athist party's military section (Haddad 1971: 138-40, 143-44, 157-64, Farouk-Sluglett/Sluglett 1987: 115-17, 120, Brooker 1997: 115, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 70). On 07/31/1968 Bakr purged the military branch of the Ba'athist party which brought him to power by removing an-Naif from the position of prime minister position. While it is possible to argue that the regime established from 07/17/1968 on was a one-party autocracy it is coded as military autocracy because it came to power through a military coup and was led by a non-electoral military junta. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. From 1969 to 1978, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are moderate. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution,



can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 1979, V-Dem's JCE is classified as limited, indicating weak judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. As classified by FH (since 1972), the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Besides, both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI indicate that political liberties were absent in this period.

07/16/1979 End One-Party Autocracy/Start Personalist (One-Party) Autocracy: It is disputed if the formal transfer of power from Field Marshal al-Bakr to Saddam Hussein on 07/16/1979 marked a shift from a military to a personalist regime (this is the coding of GWF). Before and after the Ba'ath party remained the ruling party.<sup>839</sup> However, since the formal rules were altered fundamentally from a non-electoral military regime reigned by a junta to a one-party regime it makes sense to identify a regime change on 07/16/1979 (Bengio 1998). The 1979 Ba'ath Party Purge, also known as the Comrades Massacre, was a significant event that marked Saddam Hussein's consolidation of power into a personalist autocracy in Iraq. Orchestrated by Saddam Hussein, on 07/22/1979, six days after becoming president, this purge occurred and involved the execution of many Ba'ath Party members who were labeled as traitors in a dramatic and public display of power. The leading party members who were spared "were given weapons and directed to execute their comrades".<sup>840</sup> The executed leading members of the party were accused of taking part in a pro-Syrian plot to overthrow Hussein. Iraq subsequently cut off relations with its fellow Ba'athist regime in Syria, accusing Hafiz al-Assad of organizing the plot.<sup>841</sup> This event was a crucial moment in solidifying Saddam's personal control over Iraq. It served to eliminate potential rivals and instill fear among party members and the population, ensuring that loyalty to Saddam was paramount and unchallenged. From this point on, Saddam's word was effectively law, and his personal authority was the primary force in Iraqi governance, characterizing his rule as a personalist autocracy. The ruling ideology since is described as Saddamist Ba'athism, a distinct form of Ba'athism.<sup>842</sup> Starting from 1980, the party came under the control of the military and security services (Farouk-Sluglett/Sluglett 1987: 208-13, Brooker 1997: 115-118, Kamrava 1998: 73, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 70-71).

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<sup>839</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Baath-Party>

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[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1979\\_Ba%27ath\\_Party\\_Purge#:~:text=The%201979%20Ba%27ath%20Party%20Purge,Republic%20on%2016%20July%201979](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1979_Ba%27ath_Party_Purge#:~:text=The%201979%20Ba%27ath%20Party%20Purge,Republic%20on%2016%20July%201979)

<sup>841</sup>

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1979\\_Ba%27ath\\_Party\\_Purge#:~:text=The%201979%20Ba%27ath%20Party%20Purge,Republic%20on%2016%20July%201979](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1979_Ba%27ath_Party_Purge#:~:text=The%201979%20Ba%27ath%20Party%20Purge,Republic%20on%2016%20July%201979)

<sup>842</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ba%27athist\\_Iraq#State\\_ideology](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ba%27athist_Iraq#State_ideology)

The events of July 1979 signify a regime change rather than a mere continuation of the existing regime. The transition involved a fundamental alteration of power structures, marked by a shift from collective leadership to personal dictatorship and the dismantling of previous checks on executive power. There was a purging of the Ba'ath Party, involving the elimination of influential party members who could challenge Saddam Hussein and transforming the party into a vehicle for his personal rule. The establishment of a personalist autocracy became evident through the creation of a cult of personality and the centralization of military and security forces under Saddam's direct control. Additionally, an ideological shift occurred, moving from traditional Ba'athist ideology to Saddamist Ba'athism, with an emphasis on loyalty to Saddam over the party or state. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held in 1979, 1980 to 1994 only legislative elections, which weren't multiparty, were held, from 1995 onward only multiparty executive elections were held. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. From 1980 to 2001, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For the year 2002, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For 2003, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. According to FH's classification for the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. Moreover, the state of political liberties is indicated as absent according to LIED and V-Dem's PCLI.

04/07/2003 End Personalist (One-Party) Autocracy/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by USA, Liberal Democracy]: A US invasion force ousted Saddam Hussein because of fears of WMD proliferation. On 04/07/2003 the U.S. forces took control of presidential palace (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 71).<sup>843</sup> A new Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) was established on 07/13/2003. The 25 members were carefully divided across religious and ethnic lines (13 Shiites, 5 Sunnis, 5 Kurds, 1 Assyrian Christian, and 1 Turkman). A system of rotating presidency was established for the IGC, overseeing preparations for transitional government elections (Lansford 2021: 779). During this period no legislative elections were held (LIED). A draft interim constitution was presented on 03/01/2004, which was approved by the United

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<sup>843</sup> <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/apr/07/iraq.politics>

States (confirming the regime was still an occupational regime) and the IGC on 03/08/2004. On 06/28/2004 the IGC was dissolved in favor of the new Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) (Lansford 2021: 780). According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative election were held. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. LIED still codes political liberties as absent. V-Dem's PCLI increased into a range which we interpret as not really present in 2003 and as somewhat since 2004. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are moderate. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

01/30/2005 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by USA, Liberal Democracy]/Start Indirect Rule Occupation Regime [by USA, Liberal Democracy]: On 01/20/2005 parliamentary elections under universal suffrage were held (LIED). According to LIED multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. According to FH's classification for the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. Moreover, political liberties are coded as absent per LIED and can be interpreted as somewhat present per V-Dem's PCLI. From 2006 to 2009, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 2010, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

03/07/2010 End Indirect Rule Occupation Regime [by USA, Liberal Democracy]/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date parliamentary elections were held. The elections are not considered free and fair because, among other things, nearly 500 candidates were prevented from running (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 71).<sup>844</sup> The inability to establish a new government also delayed the election of a new president (Lansford 2021: 780). The following elections in 2014, 2018 and 2021 were also plagued by fraud allegations and other irregularities, and Gorran and other smaller parties rejected the results.<sup>845</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes elections as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores electoral freedom and fairness as ambiguous. Their CEI scores the elections as not really clean.

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<sup>844</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2010\\_Iraqi\\_parliamentary\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2010_Iraqi_parliamentary_election)

<sup>845</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2010\\_Iraqi\\_parliamentary\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2010_Iraqi_parliamentary_election);  
<https://freedomhouse.org/country/iraq/freedom-world/2022>

Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. Additionally, political liberties are considered absent by LIED. V-Dem's PCLI scores them as ambiguous. FH classified Iraq as partly free until 2017 and as not free from 2018 onwards. Until 2013, as per Polity5's classification, the executive experienced moderate limitations on authority, placing it in the second intermediate category. Since 2014, according to Polity5, the executive's constraints fell into Intermediate Category 3, between substantial limitations and executive parity or subordination. According to our classification the regime was an electoral autocracy from the start. For 2022, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For the rest of the assessed regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

Electoral Hybrid Regime as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional Sources (Abdullah 2006, Arjomand 2008, Enterline/Greig 2008, Shields/Koestler-Grack 2005)

## **Ireland**

01/01/1900 Part of Other Country [United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: 06/18/1542]: 06/18/1542 marks the date of the annexation of Ireland by England, as it proclaimed Henry VIII as the King of Ireland. Prior to this, English influence in Ireland was through the Lordship of Ireland, but this Act brought Ireland more directly under the authority of the English crown. The Kingdom of Ireland was founded by the 'Crown of Ireland Act 1542' on 06/18/1542.<sup>846</sup> The Roman Catholic Relief Act 1791 removed the voting ban from Catholic men in the Kingdom of Ireland. On 04/16/1916, Irish Republicans launched the Easter Rising against British rule and proclaimed the Irish Republic. However, they were defeated by British forces a week later. Nonetheless, the Easter Rising had a significant political impact and contributed to the landslide victory of the Irish Republican party, Sinn Féin, in the Irish general elections on 12/04/1918 (as part of the 1918 United Kingdom general elections).<sup>847</sup> All adult men in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland were enfranchised by the

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<sup>846</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crown\\_of\\_Ireland\\_Act\\_1542](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crown_of_Ireland_Act_1542)

<sup>847</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Irish\\_War\\_of\\_Independence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Irish_War_of_Independence)

Representation of the People Act 1918. Women were enfranchised over the age of 30, subject to a property qualification. Men who had seen active service could vote from the age of 19.<sup>848</sup> On 01/21/1919, Sinn Féin formed a breakaway government, the Dáil Éirann, and declared Ireland's independence. Subsequently, the conflict between the Irish Republican Army, the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC), and the British Army patrols escalated amidst the Irish War of Independence. On 12/10/1920, the British authorities declared martial law in the southern region of Ireland.<sup>849</sup> According to LIED only multiparty legislative elections were held in 1919 and 1920. LIED and V-Dem do not provide data for Ireland before 1919. In this timeframe, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

05/03/1921 End Part of Other Country [United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Defective Democracy]/Start (Monarchical) Democratizing Regime: On this date, the British government divided Ireland into two self-governing entities: Northern Ireland and Southern Ireland. This division de facto ended the British rule in Southern Ireland and established a provisional government. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are somewhat present.

12/06/1921 End (Monarchical) Democratizing Regime/Start (Monarchical) Defective Democracy: The Anglo-Irish Treaty established the Irish Free State and offered Northern Ireland to remain in the United Kingdom, which it accepted on 12/08/1922. Subsequently, on 10/25/1922, the Constitution of the Irish Free State was ratified, establishing a parliamentary system of government.<sup>850</sup> Arthur Griffith, the first president and pro-Treatyite who had been in office since January 1922, died in August 1922. He was succeeded by Micheal Collins who was killed after only ten days in office. After Collins, William T. Cosgrave took office and began organizing the pro-Treatyites within the newly re-founded Cumann na nGaedheal party (CG). Cosgrave remained in Office until 1932, although his CG party did not always have the majority of seats, he was not challenged by oppositional parties.<sup>851</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes the elections as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores

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<sup>848</sup> <https://www.irishtimes.com/culture/heritage/how-irish-women-won-the-right-to-vote-in-1918-1.3697389>

<sup>849</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Irish\\_War\\_of\\_Independence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Irish_War_of_Independence)

<sup>850</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution\\_of\\_the\\_Irish\\_Free\\_State](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_the_Irish_Free_State)

<sup>851</sup> <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html> , see narratives for version 5.0, Ireland\_R: 1, Ireland\_V: 1

them as free and fair but their CEI scores electoral cleanliness as ambiguous. Moreover, political liberties were not achieved according to LIED. V-Dem's PCLI already declares them as somewhat present for the time. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was on par with or below that of other branches, reflecting executive parity or subordination. However, the adoption of the Anglo-Irish Treaty ignited a ten-month civil war between the Provisional Government (pro-Treaty forces) and the Irish Republican Army (anti-Treaty forces). The conflict concluded on 05/04/1923 when Frank Aiken, IRA Chief of Staff, issued a ceasefire order to IRA volunteers.<sup>852</sup> The Electoral Act in the Irish Free State changed previous British law to enfranchise women equally with men in 1923.<sup>853</sup> For the year 1922, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For the following year, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

08/27/1923 End (Monarchical) Defective Democracy/Start (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy: On this date, for the first-time universal suffrage was practiced in a parliamentary election in Ireland. Free and fair elections have been the norm since 1923. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED has ever since classified all elections as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI and CEI have scored all elections as free, fair and clean. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was on par with or below that of other branches, reflecting executive parity or subordination. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. On 02/16/1932, the losing faction of the 1922 Irish civil war, Fianna Fáil, took power by peacefully winning the election. It was the first election in the Irish Free State since the 1931 Statue of Westminster had removed the authority of the United Kingdom parliament to legislate for the Dominions.<sup>854</sup> The leader of Fianna Fáil, Eamon de Valera, was able to form a government with the support of seven members of other parties, indicating for a will to compromise in preparation for the drafting of a constitution.<sup>855</sup>

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<sup>852</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Irish\\_Civil\\_War](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Irish_Civil_War)

<sup>853</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal\\_suffrage#cite\\_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37)

<sup>854</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1932\\_Irish\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1932_Irish_general_election)

<sup>855</sup> <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html> , see narratives for version 5.0, Ireland\_R: 1

07/01/1937 Continuation Liberal Democracy: On this date, a new constitution reestablished the state as Ireland as a republic. The British monarch was no longer the head of state. During the Second World War, Ireland remained neutral.<sup>856</sup> On 04/18/1949 Ireland left the Commonwealth and became a republic under the Fine Gael Taoiseach (prime minister) John A. Costello. Several of the main political parties in Ireland – Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael, and Sinn Féin – represent successors of the conflict parties of the 1922 to 1923 civil war.<sup>857</sup> Since the 1930s the governmental power alternated between Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael as the main political parties, usually governing in coalition with minor parties. Starting in 1979, there are several instances of prime ministers resigning, but otherwise the governmental conditions are stable and competitive within constitutional boundaries.<sup>858</sup> Ireland is a parliamentary democracy with a bicameral system consisting of an indirectly elected Senate and a directly elected House of Representatives. All citizens over the age of 18 years are able to vote in elections. Additionally, British citizens residents in Ireland have the right to vote in parliamentary elections (OSCE 2020). Credible polls are held by the Irish government as well as frequent referendums. Ireland has a free and competitive political landscape. The freedom of religion and freedom of assembly are granted. Per FH, for this regime period, the country is classified as free, scoring between 2 and 4, which we also place in the free category. Furthermore, political liberties have been present ever since 1946 (LIED). Whereas V-Dem's PCLI already underlines them as fully present since 1924. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was on par with or below that of other branches, reflecting executive parity or subordination. Judiciary is generally independent in Ireland. Until 1991, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. Since 1992, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive. Discrimination based in sexual orientation and discrimination in the workplace based on gender is prohibited, but still problems persist. On 01/08/2020 a general election was held, which was deemed free and fair.<sup>859</sup>

Liberal Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

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<sup>856</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Ireland#Free\\_State\\_and\\_Republic\\_\(1922–present\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Ireland#Free_State_and_Republic_(1922–present))

<sup>857</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/ireland/freedom-world/2023>

<sup>858</sup> <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html>, see narratives for version 5.0, Ireland\_R: 1-2, Ireland\_V: 1-2

<sup>859</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/ireland/freedom-world/2021>;

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020\\_Irish\\_general\\_election#:~:text=Sinn%20Féin%20made%20significant%20gains,and%20in%20first%2Dpreference%20votes.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020_Irish_general_election#:~:text=Sinn%20Féin%20made%20significant%20gains,and%20in%20first%2Dpreference%20votes.)

## Israel

[for the time before 05/14/1948 see **Palestine**]

05/14/1948 Start Democratizing Regime: On this day, the British international mandate over Palestine expired. On the same day, David Ben Gurion, the executive head of the World Zionist Organization, issued the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel. Egypt, Transjordan, Iraq and Syria invaded former mandatory Palestine and attacked the new Israeli forces. This marked the beginning of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War.<sup>860</sup> According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held in 1948. LIED and V-Dem do not provide data for Israel before 1948. In 1948, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as suggesting that political liberties are somewhat present. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive.

01/25/1949 End Democratizing Regime/Start Defective Democracy: On this date, the first free and fair elections were held for the Constituent Assembly. Universal suffrage was granted since the founding of Israel.<sup>861</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorized all elections held since 1949 as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI and CEI score all elections as free, fair and clean. Mapai and Mapam, two Socialist-Zionist parties, won the most seats in the elections. David Ben-Gurion, Mapai's leader, was appointed Prime Minister. He formed a coalition government which excluded the Stalinist Mapam. Chaim Weizmann was elected first President of Israel by the Knesset.<sup>862</sup> From February to July 1949, Israel signed individual armistices with Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria equating to a permanent ceasefire. However, actual peace agreements were never signed. The armistices established Israel's new borders, known as the Green Line. Britain released over 2000 Jewish detainees and recognized the state of Israel.<sup>863</sup> In 1950, the Knesset passed the so-called Law of Return, allowing all persons with Jewish ancestry to settle in Israel. Between 1948 and 1951, the Jewish population in Israel doubled. On 06/05/1967, the so-called Six-Day War broke out. It lasted until 06/10/1967 and was fought between Israel and a coalition consisting of mainly Egypt, Syria

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<sup>860</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1948\\_Arab%E2%80%93Israeli\\_War#](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1948_Arab%E2%80%93Israeli_War#)

<sup>861</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal\\_suffrage#cite\\_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37)

<sup>862</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Israel\\_\(1948%E2%80%93present\)#Establishment\\_years](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Israel_(1948%E2%80%93present)#Establishment_years)

<sup>863</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Israel\\_\(1948%E2%80%93present\)#Armistice\\_agreements](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Israel_(1948%E2%80%93present)#Armistice_agreements)



and Jordan. Many Palestinians living in Gaza, the West Bank and the Golan Heights were displaced.<sup>864</sup> Israel emerged victorious from the Six-Day War, leaving it in control of the entire Sinai Peninsula. This sparked the War of Attrition between Israel and Egypt which lasted from 07/01/1967 until 08/07/1971 when an armistice agreement was signed.<sup>865</sup> From 10/06/1973 until 10/25/1973, the so-called Yom Kipur War took place. It was fought between Israel and a coalition of Arab States led by Egypt and Syria. The main object of the conflict were territories in the Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula. An armistice was signed to end the conflict.<sup>866</sup> On 06/07/1982, Israel Defense Forces (IDF) invaded southern Lebanon where the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) had been stationed. By invading and occupying Lebanon, Israel hoped to expel the PLO and Syrian influence in order to sign a peace treaty with a newly installed government led by President Bachir Gemayel. Israel's position was weakened after Gemayel's assassination in September 1982 and Israel began to gradually withdraw.<sup>867</sup> From 12/08/1987 to 09/13/1993, the First Intifada, a series of violent riots and protests against the Israeli occupation of Gaza and the West Bank carried out by Palestinians in the Palestinian Territories and Gaza.<sup>868</sup> The Second Intifada took place from 09/28/2000 to 02/08/2005. The results of these uprisings and violent clashes were the construction of the Israeli-West Bank barrier and a decrease of violence in the West Bank. Additionally, Israel disengaged from the Gaza Strip.<sup>869</sup> Following a Hezbollah cross-border raid, the 2006 Hezbollah-Israel war broke out on 07/12/2006 and lasted until 08/14/2006.<sup>870</sup> In 2014, the Gaza War occurred. It was a military operation launched by Israel against the Hamas in the Gaza Strip. It lasted for one and a half months and ended on 08/26/2014.<sup>871</sup> Despite the many military conflicts and power struggles, we code this regime as a democracy as power is passed on with respect to free and fair elections within the state of Israel. Political instability arose during the 2019-2022 political crisis. During this period, five elections to the Knesset were held. The last of these elections, which took place in 2022, allowed Netanyahu to return to power as Prime Minister. His coalition has been described as the most right-wing government the country has ever seen. The plans for judicial reform in 2023 were highly controversial with many calling out antidemocratic tendencies of the regime. Nevertheless, elections can still be considered free and

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<sup>864</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six-Day\\_War#Occupied\\_territories\\_and\\_Arab\\_displaced\\_populations](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six-Day_War#Occupied_territories_and_Arab_displaced_populations)

<sup>865</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War\\_of\\_Attrition#1967](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_of_Attrition#1967)

<sup>866</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom\\_Kippur\\_War](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_Kippur_War)

<sup>867</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1982\\_Lebanon\\_War](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1982_Lebanon_War)

<sup>868</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First\\_Intifada](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Intifada)

<sup>869</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second\\_Intifada#Background](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Intifada#Background)

<sup>870</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006\\_Lebanon\\_War](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_Lebanon_War)

<sup>871</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014\\_Gaza\\_War](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_Gaza_War)

fair.<sup>872</sup> Israel operates as a parliamentary democracy featuring a multi-party system and autonomous institutions that safeguard political freedoms and civil liberties for the majority of its populace. As per FH's classification for 1972 to 1976, the country receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. As per FH's classification for the regime period until 2018, the country is considered free with a score ranging from 2 to 4, which we also interpret as free in our framework. From 2018 onward, the country receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. However, LIED considers political liberties as absent for the entire time. Whereas V-Dem's PCLI scores them as somewhat present from 1948 to 1969 and in 2018. For the remaining years full political liberties were achieved. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was on par with or below that of other branches, reflecting executive parity or subordination. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also comprehensive. Despite the judiciary's relatively active role in safeguarding minority rights, there has been discrimination against Arab and other minority groups by political leaders and certain segments of society. As a result of this discrimination, systematic inequalities have emerged across various sectors, encompassing infrastructure, criminal justice, education, and economic opportunity.<sup>873</sup> On 10/09/2023 Israel declared war on Hamas, after Hamas attacked Israel on 07/10/2023 causing casualties and taking hostages. In addition, Israel imposed a total blockade of the Gaza Strip.<sup>874</sup>

Defective Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional Sources (Decker 2003, Peled 1992, Peled 2011, Reich 2002)

## Italy

01/01/1900 Constitutional Monarchy [Start: 03/17/1861]: Sovereignty of the Kingdom of Italy, an independent successor state of the dissolved Carolingian Empire was gained on 02/02/888. Italy was unified on 03/17/1861. The Kingdom of Italy as a state existed from 03/17/1861, when Victor Emmanuel II of Sardinia was proclaimed King of Italy.<sup>875</sup> The kingdom adopted the Statuto Albertino, the governing document of the Kingdom of Sardinia, as its constitution. On

<sup>872</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Israel\\_\(1948%E2%80%93present\)#2020s%E2%80%93present](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Israel_(1948%E2%80%93present)#2020s%E2%80%93present)

<sup>873</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/israel/freedom-world/2023>

<sup>874</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaza\\_Strip](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaza_Strip)

<sup>875</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom\\_of\\_Italy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Italy)

07/29/1900, King Umberto I was assassinated. His son Victor Emmanuel III, who favored a return to constitutional government,<sup>876</sup> acceded to the throne. Parliamentary rule had been firmly established but some considerable residual powers were granted to the monarch. The Statuto Albertino allowed him to appoint the prime minister even against a majority in the Chamber of Deputies. The first universal male suffrage, which was introduced in 1912, extended to all citizens aged 30 and older, with no restrictions. It was applied in the elections of 1913. Nevertheless, when Prime Minister Antonio Salandra resigned after Italy had signed the secret Treaty of London in April 1915, which had been rejected by most politicians, King Victor Emmanuel III rejected his resignation. He personally decided for Italy to enter the war, exercising his right under the Statuto.<sup>877</sup> According to LIED multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. According to the Polity5 indicator, during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. Until 1913, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. For the year 1914, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. From 1915 to 1918, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. For 1919, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. Political liberties are coded as absent by LIED and can be interpreted as somewhat present by V-Dem's PCLI. The King had the exclusive authority to sanction and promulgate laws. Both the King and the two Chambers had the right to propose legislation. Under the Statuto Albertino, the King of Italy held the authority to appoint the Prime Minister. While the King had the formal power to select the Prime Minister, in practice, the appointee needed to maintain the confidence of Parliament to effectively govern. Over time, it became increasingly difficult for the King to appoint a government entirely of his own choosing or to keep it in office against the will of Parliament. As a result, the Prime Minister became both politically and legally responsible to Parliament, necessitating its confidence to remain in office.<sup>878</sup>

11/16/1919 End Constitutional Monarchy/Start (Monarchical) (Male) Defective Democracy: On this date, the general elections were held. Considered the most significant elections in Italy since 1870, they were the first to occur under conditions approaching mass political democracy

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<sup>876</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Italy/The-Crispi-era-1887-1900>

<sup>877</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Victor\\_Emmanuel\\_III\\_of\\_Italy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Victor_Emmanuel_III_of_Italy)

<sup>878</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prime\\_Minister\\_of\\_Italy?utm\\_source=chatgpt.com](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prime_Minister_of_Italy?utm_source=chatgpt.com)

(Morgan 1995). The Electoral Reform Law which had been passed in August 1919 expanded suffrage to all males over the age of 21 and introduced proportional representation. The period from 1919-1920 is referred to as the Red Biennium. It was marked by intense social conflicts. Reasons for the unrest were mainly political instability, the aftermath of the First World War, high unemployment, and the economic crisis. Mass strikes and demonstrations occurred throughout the country. This paved the way for the fascist March on Rome.<sup>879</sup> While royal prerogatives were not officially diminished, they were challenged by a substantial rise in political participation as well as the turmoil of the Red Biennium. However, Italy is on one hand in this regime period a borderline case between an electoral regime and a constitutional monarchy, on the other hand it is a borderline case between a defective democracy and an electoral hybrid regime. During this regime period, the position of prime minister was held by five different politicians of four different political parties, indicating low governmental stability, though the transitions have been conducted non-violently.<sup>880</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes these elections as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores them as somewhat free and fair while their CEI scores electoral cleanliness as ambiguous. Political liberties are considered as absent by LIED and as somewhat present by V-Dem's PCLI. According to the Polity5 indicator, during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. For the years 1920 and 1921, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. For 1922, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also moderate.

10/27[-29]/1922 End (Monarchical) (Male) Defective Democracy/Start (Monarchical) Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy: The March on Rome brought Benito Mussolini in power, when he was appointed on 10/29/1922 by King Victor Emmanuel III as prime minister.<sup>881</sup> Soon after taking office, Mussolini pushed through an electoral law which made it nearly impossible for non-fascists to be elected, purged non-fascist ministers, and engaged in widespread electoral fraud and violence (Bosworth 2002: 145-70, Berman 2019: 220-37, Casey et al. 2020: 10-11). From 1925 onwards, constitutional safeguards against government autocracy were dissolved, elections were banned, free speech and free association abolished, unions and

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<sup>879</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biennio\\_Rosso](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biennio_Rosso)

<sup>880</sup> <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html>, see narratives for version 5.0, Italy\_R: 1, Italy\_V: 1

<sup>881</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/March\\_on\\_Rome](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/March_on_Rome)

opposition parties banned. Opposition leaders were imprisoned, sent into exile, or killed at the hands of Mussolini's supporters. In 1927, the *Organizzazione di Vigilanza Repressione dell'Antifascismo* (Organization for the Vigilant Repression of Anti-Fascism, OVRA) was established. The OVRA subsequently was involved in the persecution and assassination of demarked "enemies of the state".<sup>882</sup> According to LIED multiparty executive and legislative elections were held from 1922 to 1925, from 1926 to 1928 only multiparty executive elections were held, from 1929 to 1938 only legislative elections, which were not multiparty, were held, from 1939 onward no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. LIED continued to code political liberties as absent. V-Dem's PCLI indicates them as ambiguous in 1922, as not really present from 1923 to 1924 and as absent from 1925 onwards. For the years 1923 and 1924, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For the rest of the regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

07/25/1943 End Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Germany, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]: Mussolini's reign ended due to a successful vote of no confidence. Pietro Badoglio took over the government for a short period. Mussolini was placed under arrest.<sup>883</sup> German troops continued to fight in Italy until their defeat and unconditional surrender in May 1945 (Collier 2003: 58, Casey et al. 2020: 11). As the Allies progressed through the peninsula, it became evident that Victor Emmanuel III's previous support of Mussolini had compromised him too greatly to continue in any significant capacity. Consequently, in April 1944, he delegated the majority of his powers to Crown Prince Umberto.<sup>884</sup> According to LIED, no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. Since 1928, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. For the year 1944, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For 1945, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. Political liberties were still coded as absent

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<sup>882</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Fascist-Party>

<sup>883</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fall\\_of\\_the\\_Fascist\\_regime\\_in\\_Italy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fall_of_the_Fascist_regime_in_Italy)

<sup>884</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1946\\_Italian\\_institutional\\_referendum](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1946_Italian_institutional_referendum)

per LIED. V-Dem's PCLI indicates them as absent in 1943 and as not really present between 1944 and 1945.

05/02/1945 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Germany, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]/Start Democratizing Regime: On this date, the German Army Group C surrendered, marking the collapse of the German forces on the Italian front. On 04/25/1945, which is celebrated as Liberation Day, a partisan uprising with support from Allied forces managed to oust the German occupation forces, one day later Mussolini was captured by partisan forces and killed.<sup>885</sup> Disestablishment of the German-backed Italian Social Republic, whereby the unity and independence of the Italian state was restored. Following World War II, Italy was governed under provisional laws established through agreements between the National Liberation Committee (CLN) and the royal Lieutenant General of the Realm, Umberto II of Italy.<sup>886</sup> The member parties of the CLN were the Italian Communist Party, the Italian Socialist Party, the Action Party, the Christian Democracy, the Labour Democratic Party, and the Italian Liberal Party.<sup>887</sup> According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as showing that political liberties are not truly present. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive.

06/02/1946 End Democratizing Regime/Start Liberal Democracy: On this date, the first elections after World War II for a Constituent Assembly were held. The election did not take place in the Julian March and in South Tyrol, which were under military occupation by the United Nations. For the first time, Italian women were allowed to vote in a national election.<sup>888</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Since then, LIED categorizes elections as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI and CEI score them as free, fair and clean. On 01/01/1948 the Constitution of the Italian Republic came into force, having already been ratified by the Constituent Assembly on 12/22/1947.<sup>889</sup> From then on Italy's parliamentary system features competitive multiparty elections. Italy has a parliamentary system of government with a multiparty system and a bicameral parliament consisting of the Chamber of deputies and the

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<sup>885</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Italian\\_Social\\_Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Italian_Social_Republic)

<sup>886</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1946\\_Italian\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1946_Italian_general_election)

<sup>887</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National\\_Liberation\\_Committee](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Liberation_Committee)

<sup>888</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1946\\_Italian\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1946_Italian_general_election)

<sup>889</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution\\_of\\_Italy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_Italy)

Senate.<sup>890</sup> The Christian Democratic party (DC) dominated the political landscape in the post-war years, but slowly lost support. In 1960, attempts were made by the DC to incorporate the right-wing and neo-fascist Italian Social Movement (MSI) into the cabinet, leading to riots in the summer of 1960. Consequently, this incorporation did not come to pass and on 07/27/1960, Amintore Fanfani replaced Fernando Tambroni as Prime Minister.<sup>891</sup> Between 03/01/1968 and 10/23/1988, during the “Years of Lead”, right- and left-wing political terrorism disrupted the Republic.<sup>892</sup> On 03/16/1978, a unit of the militant far-left Red Brigades (BR) kidnapped Italian politician and former Prime Minister Aldo Moro, killing his five bodyguards in the process. Extensive mobilization by the police and attempts toward a release of Moro made by Pope Paul VI remained without success. After the Italian government and authorities continuously refused to negotiate, the BR assassinated Moro after 55 days of capture.<sup>893</sup> Following Moro’s death, the so-called “historic compromise”, a phase of mutual accommodation between the Christian Democracy (DC) party and the Communist Party (PCI) came to an end. Subsequently, the DC lost its dominant role in Italian politics, with Giovanni Spadolini from the Republican Party becoming Prime Minister from 06/28/1981 to 12/01/1982.<sup>894</sup> He was followed by Benedetto Craxi from 08/04/1983 to 04/18/1987. On 05/11/1994 Silvio Berlusconi took the Prime Minister office for the first time.<sup>895</sup> Similar to the first democratic period from 1919 to 1922, the governmental composition since 1946 and the office of prime minister were characterized by numerous and frequent changes as well as coalitions containing relatively many parties, for example, in the year 2000, Giuliano Amato, who did not belong to a party, acted as prime minister in a coalition of nine parties (IND, DS, PPI, UDEUR, Greens, PCDI, RI, DEM, SDI). While this can be interpreted as compromise oriented, it also underscores the instability of governmental compositions. However, constitutional successions were upheld.<sup>896</sup> On 06/11/2001, Berlusconi was once again elected Prime Minister and held the office for a full term until 05/17/2006, followed by center-left Romano Prodi who held the office until 05/08/2008.<sup>897</sup> The 2008 general election returned Berlusconi to the office of Prime Minister which he held until his resignation on 11/12/2011. The 2013 elections were once again followed by a number of quickly changing governments, and the 2018 general elections resulted in no

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<sup>890</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics\\_of\\_Italy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Italy)

<sup>891</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics\\_of\\_Italy#First\\_Republic:\\_1946%E2%80%931994](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Italy#First_Republic:_1946%E2%80%931994)

<sup>892</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Years\\_of\\_Lead\\_\(Italy\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Years_of_Lead_(Italy))

<sup>893</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aldo\\_Moro](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aldo_Moro)

<sup>894</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Giovanni\\_Spadolini](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Giovanni_Spadolini)

<sup>895</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Silvio\\_Berlusconi](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Silvio_Berlusconi)

<sup>896</sup> <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html>, see narratives for version 5.0, Italy\_R, Italy\_V.

<sup>897</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Romano\\_Prodi](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Romano_Prodi)

clear majority. Guiseppe Conte led a government coalition for 14 months, until one the League withdrew its support, and Conte allied with other parties to form a new cabinet.<sup>898</sup> Since an amendment to the constitution in 2021, all citizens aged 18 and older are entitled to vote for both chambers of the parliament. Previously, the voting age for the Senate was 25 (OSCE 2022). Between 02/13/2021 and 10/22/2022, following the resignation of Guiseppe Conte, Mario Draghi lead the Italian government at the behest of President Sergio Mattarella.<sup>899</sup> On 09/25/2022 snap elections were held. Giorgia Meloni became the first female prime minister of Italy and a right-wing coalition under her leadership formed the government. The snap elections were deemed free and fair. The political spectrum in Italy is characterized by diversity and competitiveness.<sup>900</sup> Civil liberties are generally respected, but there are endemic problems of corruption and organized crime which pose an enduring challenge to the rule of law as well as rising concerns about the rights of LGBT+ people and migrants.<sup>901</sup> Freedom of the press, freedom to assemble and religious freedom are constitutionally guaranteed. As per FH's classification for this regime period, the country is considered free with a score ranging from 2 to 4, which we also interpret as free in our framework. LIED scores the political liberties as present since 1957 and V-Dem's PCLI since 1948. Since 1948, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. Until 1969, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. Since 1970, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive. Incidents of corruption led to stricter laws in 2022, with which aspects of the judicial system should be reformed. Overall, the judiciary operates autonomously and independently.<sup>902</sup>

Liberal Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional Sources (Gosewinkel/Masing/Würschinger 2006, Bach/Breuer 2010, Dunnage 2002, Hertner 1987, Petersen 1981, Salvemini 1973, Schieder 2008, Seton-Watson 1967, Stübler 1987, Trautmann 1997, Ullrich 2009, Wellhofer 2003, Zohlnhöfer 2002)

<sup>898</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Italy#Republican\\_era\\_\(1946%E2%80%93present\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Italy#Republican_era_(1946%E2%80%93present))

<sup>899</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Draghi\\_government](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Draghi_government)

<sup>900</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/italy/freedom-world/2023>

<sup>901</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/italy>

<sup>902</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/italy/freedom-world/2023>



## **Ivory Coast**

[officially known as the Republic of Cote D'Ivoire; also known as Cote D'Ivoire]

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Defective Democracy] [Start: 03/10/1893]: On 03/10/1893 the Ivory Coast became a French colony.<sup>903</sup> On 06/16/1895 it became part of French West Africa. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. We therefore do not list the country as an indirect colony. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and not really present according to V-Dem's PCLI. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are moderate. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

06/02/1946 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Liberal Democracy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Liberal Democracy]: On this date, elections for the French National Assembly were held in the territory of Ivory Coast, which at the time included Upper Volta, as part of the broader parliamentary elections. From 1946 onward, only multiparty legislative elections were held according to LIED. In 1952 universal suffrage was introduced.<sup>904</sup> This was done for the elections to the territorial assembly, a regional parliament elected by the populace.<sup>905</sup> Winning party was the Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast (PDCI).<sup>906</sup> The territorial assembly did not have much power, as the French colonial system continued to rely on central administration from Paris through appointed governors as well as divide and conquer strategies that played ethnic groups off each other.<sup>907</sup> Because the French still held a lot of governmental power, we code this regime change event as a strategic restructuring instead of a voluntary exit. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and not really present according to V-Dem's PCLI. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

12/04/1958 End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Liberal Democracy]/Start One-Party Autocracy: On this date the Republic of Ivory Coast became an autonomous republic within the French Community and on 08/07/1960 a fully independent republic (Marshall 2018a). In October 1960 membership in the French Community was abandoned with the

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<sup>903</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Ivory\\_Coast](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Ivory_Coast)

<sup>904</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s\\_suffrage](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage)

<sup>905</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1952\\_Ivorian\\_Territorial\\_Assembly\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1952_Ivorian_Territorial_Assembly_election)

<sup>906</sup> <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/home/research-projects/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/french-ivory-coast-1946-1960/>

<sup>907</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Ivory\\_Coast#French\\_colonial\\_era](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Ivory_Coast#French_colonial_era)

adoption of the country's present constitution. The dominant political figure since the 1940s was Félix Houphouët-Boigny, who in 1944 organized the Syndicat Agricole Africain (an African farmers' union) and helped to found the African Democratic Rally (Rassemblement Démocratique Africain—RDA), an international political party with branches in numerous French African territories (Lansford 2021: 391). Ivory Coast embarked on the path to autonomy and independence from France, with Houphouët-Boigny as prime minister and a government under the control of the democratic Party of Ivory Coast – African Democratic Rally (Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire — Rassemblement Démocratique Africain, PDCI – RDA).<sup>908</sup> The PDCI won all pre-independence elections to various offices. It ran unopposed in the 4/59 Assembly elections, giving it control of the government and electoral rules at independence (Zolberg 1964: 75-271).<sup>909</sup> From 1959 the PDCI began manipulating electoral rules to limit the ability of potential opposition groups to compete (Zolberg 1964: 264- 65, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 71). In the parliamentary elections on 04/12/1959 as a prelude to independence the next year, the PDCI “was the only party to contest the election, thereby winning all”<sup>910</sup> seats. In 1960, upon independence, the PDCI officially became the sole legal party in the country. Over the next three decades, the PDCI and the government effectively merged. Every five years, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, its founder and leader, was automatically elected as president of the republic for a five-year term and confirmed through a referendum. Simultaneously, a unified list of PDCI candidates was elected to the National Assembly. All adult Ivorians were mandated to be party members, considering the PDCI as the primary intermediary between the government and the populace.<sup>911</sup> According to LIED only multiparty legislative elections were held in 1958 and 1959. From 1960 onward only multiparty executive elections were held. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For 1959, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For the rest of the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. Per FH, for 1972 to 1979, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. According to FH, for 1980-1983, a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free,

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<sup>908</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic\\_Party\\_of\\_Ivory\\_Coast\\_%E2%80%93\\_African\\_Democratic\\_Rally](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic_Party_of_Ivory_Coast_%E2%80%93_African_Democratic_Rally)

<sup>909</sup> <http://africanelections.tripod.com/ci.html>

<sup>910</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1959\\_Ivorian\\_parliamentary\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1959_Ivorian_parliamentary_election)

<sup>911</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic\\_Party\\_of\\_Ivory\\_Coast\\_%E2%80%93\\_African\\_Democratic\\_Rally](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic_Party_of_Ivory_Coast_%E2%80%93_African_Democratic_Rally)

which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. As classified by FH for the years 1984 to 1989, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Per FH's evaluation for 1990, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. Moreover, political liberties are coded as absent by LIED and can be interpreted as not really present by V-Dem's PCLI for the entire period.

10/28/1990 End One-Party Autocracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: In 1990 opposition parties were legalized. On 10/28/1990 presidential and parliamentary multi-party elections were held, which cannot be considered free and fair (Hartmann 1999: 303). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. During this period, LIED categorizes elections as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores them as not really free or fair until 1994 and as ambiguous from 1995 onwards. While their CEI scores them as not clean until 1995 and as not really clean the remaining years. After the legalization of opposition parties in 1990, the PDCI maintained its stronghold over Ivorian politics. During the 1990 elections, Houphouët-Boigny secured a seemingly improbable 81 percent of the vote, and the party claimed all but 12 seats in the legislature.<sup>912</sup> The emerging party system was still dominated by the PDCI (Hartmann 1999: 302-303). When Houphouët-Boigny died on 12/07/1993, acting President Henri Konan Bédié took over and was elected with 96% of the vote in 1995. This was strongly contested by the opposition parties.<sup>913</sup> Following the conclusion of Houphouët-Boigny's 33-year reign, the political landscape retained traits of low institutionalization and the prevalence of personalistic and informal networks. Without the charisma of his predecessor, President Bédié not only targeted the opposition and curbed press freedom but also estranged a significant portion of the population through electoral manipulation in 1995 (Hartmann 1999: 303). As classified by FH for 1990-1992, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. According to FH's classification for 1993-1996, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. Per FH's evaluation for 1997 and 1998, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. As classified by FH for 1999, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Political liberties were not achieved according to LIED. V-Dem's PCLI scores them as somewhat present until 1994 and from 1998 to 1999 and as present from 1995 to 1997. From 1991 to 1992, based on Polity5's evaluation, the executive faced weak constraints, classified as Intermediate Category 1 between unlimited authority and slight

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<sup>912</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic\\_Party\\_of\\_Ivory\\_Coast\\_%E2%80%93\\_African\\_Democratic\\_Rally](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic_Party_of_Ivory_Coast_%E2%80%93_African_Democratic_Rally)

<sup>913</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic\\_Party\\_of\\_Ivory\\_Coast\\_%E2%80%93\\_African\\_Democratic\\_Rally](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic_Party_of_Ivory_Coast_%E2%80%93_African_Democratic_Rally)

limitations. Since 1993, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints. Until 1993, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For the rest of the regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

12/24/1999 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: Army revolt by junior officers led to a coup. The army overthrew Bédié and handed over power to a junta led by ex-army chief-of-staff General Robert Guéï. He created the 9-man, all-military Comité National de Salut Publique (National Committee of Public Salvation) to rule (Cornewell 2000, Englebert 2004: 332, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 71). According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. According to FH's classification for the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as suggesting that political liberties are somewhat present. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

10/22/2000 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date a presidential election took place. Robert Guéï, who led a transitional military government after the December 1999 coup d'état, ran as a candidate in the election. All significant opposition candidates, except for Laurent Gbagbo of the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI), were disqualified from participating.<sup>914</sup> Nevertheless, Gbagbo won the presidential election, but Guéï refused to validate the results. Popular uprising followed in response to Guéï's effort to steal the election. Gbagbo declared himself president in the aftermath (Cornewell 2000, Englebert 2004: 332, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 71). Considering that Gbagbo's rise to power in October 2000 was the direct result of mass demonstrations that forced General Robert Guéï to step down, we code this regime change event as a popular uprising. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. The elections are categorized as not competitive by LIED. V-Dem's EF&FI scores electoral freedom and fairness as ambiguous. Their CEI scores them as not really

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<sup>914</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2000\\_Ivorian\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2000_Ivorian_presidential_election)

clean. The following regime led by Gbagbo was also not democratic. As per Human Rights Watch, Gbagbo's security forces perpetrated violations against civilians, specifically targeting immigrants, their descendants, and Ivorians from the north based on factors such as nationality, ethnicity, or religion (Rocco/Ballo 2008). Per FH's evaluation for 2001, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. Besides, political liberties were still absent (LIED). V-Dem's PCLI declares them as fully present for the whole time. In 2001, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was significantly constrained by institutional checks. Based on all information we classify the regime as an electoral hybrid regime. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

09/19/2002 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start No Central Authority: On this date war broke out – the so called First Ivorian Civil War. The confrontation involved the government of Ivorian President Laurent Gbagbo facing off against a domestic insurgency led by the New Forces of Ivory Coast (Forces nouvelles de Côte d'Ivoire, abbreviated as FN), under the leadership of Guillaume Soro. The rebels swiftly gained dominance over a significant portion of the northern region while engaging in combat with government forces for control of the western territories. Throughout the nation, supporters of the opposition clashed with pro-government militias. The uprising that sparked the conflict was fueled by factions aiming to demand a rerun of the 2000 election and advocate for reforms regarding exclusionary citizenship policies (Rocco/Ballo 2008: 350-354). The global community promptly dispatched peacekeepers and organized peace negotiations. While the peace agreements mediated by the international community did not fully resolve the conflict, their intervention helped contain it and improve the humanitarian crisis. This intervention also opened up opportunities for dialogue (Bah 2010: 605). Although the violence faded, the civil war resulted in a de facto division of the country in a southern part, which was ruled by the elected government of Gbagbo, and a northern part, which was under the rule of the rebel forces (Bah 2010, Riehl 2007). Although the First Ivory Coast Civil War emerged in 2002 and lasted until 2007, we classify only the initial period until the first Agreement (Linas-Marcoussis Agreement) as no central authority. The reason for this is that the Government of National Reconciliation (GNR) was founded from then on, even though the country continued to be divided into two parts. As classified by FH for 2002, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Political liberties were coded as absent by LIED. V-Dem's PCLI states them as present. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us

as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

01/26/2003 End No Central Authority/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: The Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, signed by conflicting parties, highlighted conflict issues but focused more on power sharing than addressing citizenship. Despite efforts to establish a Government of National Reconciliation (GNR), disagreements over appointments and power-sharing halted progress. The Accra II Agreement reaffirmed the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement and Gbagbo's authority, but tensions persisted. The Pretoria Agreement of April 2005 aimed at military and electoral issues but faced challenges with ongoing violence and stalled disarmament. The Ouagadougou Agreement of March 2007, influenced by UN Resolution 1721, shifted the peace process significantly, with Ivorian leadership. Resolution 1721, which not only granted more powers to the prime minister, but also gave Gbagbo legitimacy, as his term of office had expired. Though it didn't define citizenship, it aimed to resolve Ivoirité-related grievances (Bah 2010: 605-613). After the agreement, the election was scheduled to take place in the initial quarter of 2008, but were postponed until 2011, after the presidential elections of 2010. We classify not only the remaining period of the First Ivorian Civil War (2003-2007) as a non-electoral transitional regime, but also up to 2010, the first elections since 2000. Overall, the period since the First Ivorian Civil War is classified in different ways. AF and GWF classify a personalist rule, BR a civilian dictatorship, HTW a limited multiparty autocracy and LIED a multiparty autocracy between 2000 and 2007 and a closed autocracy between 2008 and 2010. Polity codes a state of interregnum or anarchy between 2002 and 2007 and a state of transition until 2010. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. According to FH's classification for the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. Furthermore, the state of political liberties is coded as absent by LIED. V-Dem's PCLI indicates them as present in this time.

10/31/2010 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start No Central Authority: After several delays, the first round of the presidential election was held on 10/31/2010. President Laurent Gbagbo received 38 percent of the vote, while former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara of the RDR won 32.1 percent. The run-off took place on 11/28. The Independent Electoral Commission announced Ouattara as the winner with 54.1 percent of the vote against Gbagbo's 45.9 percent. Gbagbo, however, rejected the results, and the Constitutional Court annulled ballots from seven northern provinces, subsequently declaring him the winner with 51.5 percent

to Ouattara's 48.5 percent on 12/04/2010. (Lansford 2021: 394). As both candidates claimed the presidency, established rival governments, and relied on competing sources of legitimacy, Côte d'Ivoire entered a situation of no central authority. Both were inaugurated and formed cabinets, while the international community recognized Ouattara as the legitimate president and called on Gbagbo to step down (Ogwang 2011: 1). Fighting between supporters of Gbagbo and Ouattara (mainly FN fighters) spread throughout the country, and by March forces loyal to Ouattara controlled most of the country, with the exception of Abidjan. On 04/11/2011 FN fighters backed by French and AU forces stormed Gbagbo's compound and captured the presidential claimant and his leading supporters. Ouattara was sworn in as president on 05/11, and he reappointed Soro as prime minister of a reshuffled cabinet on 06/01. Observers attributed much of the violence to reprisals against Gbagbo supporters, although pro-Gbagbo militias were also deemed responsible for killings and other abuses (Lansford 2021: 394). We classify this period of the Second Ivorian Civil War as no central authority, because the country was again divided into two parts and two presidents were proclaimed, so that no clear central power can be identified. Our classification is in line with Polity5, which also contests a state of interregnum between 2010 and 2011. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. For this year, political liberties are coded as absent per LIED and can be interpreted as somewhat present following V-Dem's PCLI. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

12/10/2011 End No Central Authority/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date parliamentary elections were held. The Rally of the Republicans, the party of President Ouattara, won just under half the seats in the parliament.<sup>915</sup> The Ivorian Popular Front opted to boycott the election, alleging bias on the part of the electoral commission in favor of Alassane Ouattara. They also accused the army of intimidating FPI supporters during the campaign. Additionally, the party lamented restrictions on disseminating information to the electorate, citing the government's ban on the pro-FPI newspaper *Notre Voie* and the subsequent arrest or imprisonment of many of its journalists.<sup>916</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes almost all elections as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI fluctuates in its scoring between not really, ambiguous and somewhat free and fair elections. Their CEI scores electoral

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<sup>915</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011\\_Ivorian\\_parliamentary\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Ivorian_parliamentary_election)

<sup>916</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2010\\_Ivorian\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2010_Ivorian_presidential_election)

cleanliness as ambiguous. Given the persistent challenges to democracy and based on these indicators, we consider Ivory Coast to be a clear case of an electoral hybrid regime. The most recent presidential election conducted, in which incumbent president Alassane Ouattara was re-elected with 95% of the vote amidst an opposition boycott, is considered neither free nor fair. Amongst other aspects, the Constitutional Council rejected 40 of the 44 candidates for the presidential election and validated the candidacy of only four individuals.<sup>917</sup> However, in March 2021, the members of the National Assembly were elected in transparent, credible, and peaceful elections.<sup>918</sup> In 2022 President Alassane Ouattara won a controversial third term in the presidential election held in October 2020, amid boycotts and violence from the opposition. He faced criticism from regional and international actors for violating the constitutional term limit. In 2022, he appointed former rebel leader Guillaume Soro as his prime minister, in a move seen as an attempt to appease the opposition and promote national reconciliation. However, Soro was also accused of plotting a coup against Ouattara and arrested in June 2022. The political situation remained tense and unstable throughout the year.<sup>919</sup> According to FH, for the time of this regime period, the country is partly free with a score of 8 to 10, which we interpret as rather not free. Additionally, political liberties were absent according to LIED. Following V-Dem's PCLI political liberties were mostly somewhat present for this time. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive encountered substantial institutional limitations on power. For the year 2012, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. From 2013 to 2018, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. For 2020, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For the year 2019, and again since 2021, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. According to our classification Ivory Coast in this period had an electoral hybrid regime.

Electoral Hybrid Regime as of 07/01/2025 continued.

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<sup>917</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/cote-divoire/freedom-world/2022>

<sup>918</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/cote-divoire/freedom-world/2022>

<sup>919</sup> <https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/CIV>



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